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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.  Introduction
The European Union and the world economy went 
through a deep financial and economic crisis in 2008 and 
2009. The first signs of recovery were visible in 2009 and 
were confirmed in the first half of 2010. These develop-
ments and the quickly evolving world market situation 
are a compelling call for the importance of remaining 
competitive.
This year’s edition of the annual European Competitive-
ness Report looks first at the implications of the eco-
nomic downturn for productivity — the key factor for 
competitiveness in the long run — and at some of the 
main future determinants of EU competitiveness on 
world markets: the changing pattern of trade in inter-
mediate products and EU manufacturing supply chains; 
foreign corporate R & D and innovation activities in the 
EU; European competitiveness in key enabling technolo-
gies; and innovation and competitiveness in the creative 
industries.
2.  Overall competitiveness 
performance
With the exception of the 2001 slowdown, the period 
1995–2006 has been one of remarkable stability for 
industrialised countries. In the EU in particular, it has 
been a period of sustained growth, increasing participa-
tion in employment and increasing income per capita. In 
the US and some European countries, however, this sta-
bility was hiding the accumulation of significant imbal-
ances that ultimately led to a downturn of a severity 
unseen since the early 1970s’ oil shocks. In the EU, with 
the sole exception of Poland, all Member States saw a 
drop in their production in 2009, from around 3 % in Bel-
gium or France to double-digit drops for Ireland and the 
three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Even 
if some individual countries have experienced similar 
recessions in the recent past, this recession is unusual 
for its combination of a large drop in economic activity 
and its scope — synchronised global downturn with all 
advanced economies in nose-dive.
Beyond the issue of recovery, it is legitimate to ask what 
could be the impact of the crisis on economic perform-
ance in the medium to long term. The European Com-
petitiveness Report 2009 examined the potential impact 
of the recession on competitiveness. All in all, the con-
clusion was that the recession need not have a negative 
impact on the rate of technical change in the years to 
come because a recession includes two types of mech-
anisms: those that impinge negatively on economic 
efficiency, but also those that improve our ability to 
increase productivity in the future. Furthermore, under-
standing those mechanisms makes it possible to design 
economic policies to tone down the negative effects and 
amplify the positive ones in order to speed recovery and 
boost future growth.
The first chapter of the present edition of the report 
examines the potential impact of the boom years 2000–
07 on competitiveness. The abovementioned accumula-
tion of large imbalances has the potential to distort sig-
nificantly the allocation of resources among and within 
our economies.
Seen in retrospective, the boom period 2000–07 was also 
a period of growing imbalances, notably in the housing 
sector in the US but also in Europe: some Member States 
saw investment in dwellings increase by the order of mag-
nitude of several percentage points of GDP. For a decade 
or more, in some countries, particularly the UK, Denmark, 
Ireland and Spain, the prices of dwellings increased over 
their fundamental value. The distortion did not affect all 
countries, but in those affected it was not a minor one. 
In countries like Spain, for instance, at the height of the 
boom (around 2005–06) housing prices were increas-
ing by 15 % annually. For years millions of agents in the 
private sector, notably households, made consumption-
saving decisions counting on house prices increasing in a 10
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way that ex post appeared not to be sustainable. Indeed, 
in countries affected, the fast growth of housing prices 
led households to overinvest in housing and to overstate 
their wealth, pulling down their saving rate. If houses con-
stituted an attractive investment for locals, so they did for 
foreigners as well, directly or indirectly.
The period 2000–06 also witnessed a substantial change 
in the lending/borrowing position of many European 
countries. In those with a housing bubble, the demand 
for credit fuelled capital inflows. When the boom came 
to an end, the magnitude of the adjustment was propor-
tional to the magnitude of the accumulated distortions. 
Once the value of houses dropped — or was believed to 
be going to drop in the future — a large portion of per-
ceived wealth vanished, leading to a major adjustment of 
consumption and saving patterns. Consumption dropped 
and saving increased to recompose the latter. Hence, 
countries affected by bubbles found themselves in a clas-
sical demand-side recession caused by the consumption-
saving adjustments performed by households. Other 
countries, not necessarily affected by these imbalances, 
were affected through a drop in external demand.
The European Competitiveness Report 2009 examined 
the potential impact of the recession itself on com-
petitiveness. The European Competitiveness Report 2010 
examines the potential impact of the boom years and, 
in particular, whether these growing imbalances had an 
impact on competitiveness via the distortion of prices, 
wages or the allocation of investment.
For instance, during the boom some countries experi-
enced large increases in unit labour costs, a measure of 
the nominal cost of labour. However, it does not seem 
that the evolution of unit labour costs has had a signifi-
cant effect beyond accompanying the corresponding 
increases in the general level of prices. In principle, rais-
ing the nominal cost of labour may affect the competi-
tive position of domestic firms in international markets. 
However, when the international market shares are com-
pared to the evolution of unit labour costs, there is no 
obvious relation. Part of the explanation for this appar-
ent paradox may lie in the fact that wage inflation takes 
place mostly in non-tradable sectors, notably services, 
and, in particular, in the construction sector.
In short, if the boom years have affected competitive-
ness, that is, the ability to increase productivity in the 
forthcoming years, the evidence remains elusive. Never-
theless, this is not to say that exiting the crisis may not 
be a slow adjustment process in some EU countries. For 
instance, it is possible that a part of those large capital 
inflows has not been used productively in some of the 
so-called deficit countries, therefore hampering the abil-
ity of these countries to generate income in the future 
while at the same time increasing the interest burden on 
these economies.
3.  Trade in intermediate 
products and EU 
manufacturing supply chains
A large and growing number of products, especially 
in the high-tech area, consist of many different com-
ponents that are manufactured in various parts of the 
world. Manufacturing production processes also require 
many kinds of services from different parts of the world if 
firms are to develop, produce and market their products.
However, this multi-country nature of products is no 
longer typical only for complex high-tech goods. Com-
ponents and services are purchased abroad for many 
products. This is the case for direct inputs, when firms 
purchase both domestically and foreign-produced 
intermediate inputs, but also in an indirect way: compo-
nents imported from a particular country might already 
include inputs from other countries, which are then used 
indirectly in the final product.
A prominent feature of the globalisation of today’s 
economy is the increasing adjustment and adaptation 
of production structures to more international sourcing 
structures and cross-border production networks. Firms 
distribute their production activities and develop supply 
chains in different geographical locations according to 
the comparative advantages of the locations. So these 
developments can be said to have led to increased trade 
in intermediate goods.
Important shifts in the composition of EU‑27 inter‑
mediate trade have taken place during the last decade
Trade in intermediates accounts for the largest part of 
overall trade, with an average share of about 50 % of 
both imports and exports. There are, however, big dif-
ferences across countries. This share has increased little 
over the last decade or so, and has been driven mostly 
by industry specialisation. The shift towards more know-
ledge-intensive sectors in the EU has led to an   increasing 
role for imported intermediates.
Large shifts have taken place in the geographical struc-
ture of trade in intermediates for the EU-27 countries. 
BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) have become more 
important for EU exports and imports. They increased 
their share in EU-27 imports by 5 percentage points dur-
ing the last decade. Gains of market shares can in general 
be related to relative price changes or increased product 
quality. Product quality upgrading also explains part of 
the EU-12 (1) market share increase within the EU.
(1)    The EU-12 are the 12 countries which joined the European Union in 2004 
and 2007.11
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A large part of trade in intermediates consists of two-
way trade, i.e. most countries are both exporters and 
importers of intermediates, which blurs the common 
perception of certain countries being predominantly 
outsourcing or target countries. Smaller emerging econ-
omies, including most of the EU-12, are more specialised 
in trade in intermediates as compared to larger ones, 
both in imports and exports. This raises the more gen-
eral question of whether trade in intermediates might 
help countries to integrate into the world economy and 
how this shapes patterns of specialisation in both pro-
duction and trade.
Increasing sourcing of inputs, trade of intermediates 
and inter‑industry linkages
The growing trade in intermediates means that inter-
industry linkages across borders have increased over 
time. For instance, when demand for cars increases in a 
particular country, more intermediate goods have to be 
imported than was the case a few years ago. Between 
1995 and 2005 imports of intermediate goods increased 
in all manufacturing industries and in almost all EU 
countries. During the same period of time, the share of 
imported intermediates in total intermediates has also 
grown, indicating an increasing role of imported inter-
mediates in final products. There are, however, some 
distinct industry differences in the use of imported 
intermediates. High-technology industries import more 
intermediate goods than other industries: imported 
intermediates accounted for 55 % of total inputs in high-
technology manufacturing industries in 2005. On the 
other hand, foreign trade plays a smaller role in service 
industries than in manufacturing. Among service indus-
tries, the largest share of imported intermediate goods 
in 2005 (26 %) was in transport services.
Detailed information from a leading European mobile 
phone producer on supply chains shows that Europe 
captures 55 % of a particular phone’s total value added. 
The phone was assembled both in Europe and China. 
When it was assembled and sold in Europe, the Euro-
pean share accounted for 68 %. But even when it was 
assembled in China and sold on the US market, Europe 
still captured as much as 51 % of the value. This shows 
that the final assembly, though important, represents 
only a fraction of the overall value added of a high-
tech product like a mobile phone. The value is largely 
detached from the physical flows of goods within the 
supply chain. The major parts of the value are attributed 
to design, R & D, brand, marketing and distribution and 
management of these activities.
The financial crisis hit intermediate trade relatively 
harder and disrupted supply chains
There is a risk that the economic crisis of 2008–09, char-
acterised by trade flows collapsing by more than the 
drop in GDP growth rates, might have changed sour-
cing patterns and firms’ supply chains. Trade in inter-
mediates, and especially in parts and components, 
was hit harder by the crisis than other types of goods. 
Trading volumes of parts and components slumped by 
some 38 % compared to pre-crisis levels. As a result, the 
relative importance of parts and components in EU-27 
trade declined both in EU-27 trade overall and in almost 
all sectors in which vertical supply chains play a major 
role. These vertical supply chains are particularly import-
ant for the industries producing electrical machinery, 
mechanical equipment and motor vehicles.
The automotive industry has one of the highest shares 
of the parts and components trade. During the recent 
recession its exports and imports registered the biggest 
falls, of some 45 % compared to before the crisis. Such 
disruptions to international supply chains might have 
resulted from changes in the sourcing strategies of multi      -
national corporations, such as shifting to domestic sup-
pliers. Inventory adjustments have also contributed to 
the decline. An upturn in EU-27 trade can be expected 
if the marked decline in parts and components trade is 
primarily driven by the inventory cycle, as empty stocks 
have to be replenished. However, the recovery may be 
delayed if there is a reversal of the trend towards ever 
more complex international vertical supply chains.
Globalisation and localisation of the value chain
Trade in intermediates constitutes only one of many 
business activities in the value chain. As the mobile 
phone example shows, large parts are attributed to 
more knowledge-intensive activities, like management, 
design and R & D. These are especially important for 
high-tech industries, which tend to locate them close 
to the firm’s headquarters, where it is easier to control 
and manage them. So EU firms’ R & D and innovation 
activities are still predominantly domestic, though they 
are becoming increasingly internationalised as adapting 
products to foreign markets necessitates the presence 
of product development close to those markets. Firms 
also seek to ensure access to scientific and technological 
capabilities, human capital and other resources, which 
is another motive for the foreign location of R & D activ-
ities. Localisation decisions are not based on local pref-
erences but on strategic considerations concerning the 
provision of strategic resources.12
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4.  Foreign corporate R & D and 
innovation in the European 
Union
Corporate research, development and innovation 
(R & D & I) activities were long seen as one of the few 
business areas still relatively insulated from offshoring 
and globalisation. This perception has lately been chan-
ging rapidly. Over the last 30 years, globalisation has 
changed international trade and foreign direct invest-
ment flows considerably, reshaping and transforming 
R & D & I processes and the knowledge and skills that 
enable firms to compete in domestic and international 
markets. As a result, a growing number of firms, in par-
ticular large multinational enterprises, started locating 
R & D & I activities outside their home countries.
Firms decide to (re)locate R & D & I activities abroad by 
weighing a number of important considerations against 
each other. Potential benefits include: local develop-
ment and design of new products and services to cap-
ture new markets and growth opportunities; gaining 
access to new sources of scientific and technological 
capabilities, skills and talent; and reducing R & D & I 
capacity bottlenecks. Potential costs include foregone 
benefits of R & D & I centralisation, including economies 
of scale and scope, the need for more coordination and 
complexities in the transfer of knowledge, given its often 
‘tacit’, cumulative, localised and context-related nature.
The European Union has been an important player 
in this emerging internationalisation of R & D & I, as 
documented by a number of datasets (patents, R & D 
expenditure of foreign affiliates and various surveys). 
The analysis points to some important differences across 
countries, sectors, technologies and firms, as well as to 
some of the likely effects of the increasing and uneven 
degree of internationalisation on productivity and 
employment in the European Union.
EU performance in the emerging internationalisation 
of R & D & I
In a global perspective, the EU is still in a position of 
strength, but the global competition to attract R & D & I 
flows is set to continue rising. R & D & I internationalisa-
tion is predominantly a matter for the triad of the US, EU 
and Japan, with smaller roles for countries like Canada, 
Switzerland, South Korea and Israel. The bilateral flows 
between the EU and the US clearly take prominence 
on a global scale. For instance, from 2001 to 2007, US 
multinational firms significantly increased their R & D 
expenditure in the EU, still the main location for their 
R & D (the EU single market attracted more than 60 % of 
all US overseas R & D expenditure in this period). The EU, 
however, is facing growing global competition in this 
field, from both developed and emerging economies. 
R & D expenditure of US subsidiaries in the BRICs is still 
relatively low (altogether representing about one 10th 
of the value for the EU-27 in 2007), but is growing fast.
The considerable increase in R & D & I cross-border links 
is evident at extra-EU and in particular intra-EU levels, as 
further documented by the locations of patent applicants 
and inventors. For instance, some 17 % of all European 
Patent Office patents resulting from inventions made in 
the EU were foreign-owned (9 % by non-EU and 8 % by 
EU-based organisations); in 1990, only 10 % of such pat-
ents had foreign owners (6 % non-EU and 4 % EU-based 
organisations). Moreover, the last two decades have seen 
an increase in the number of both domestic and foreign-
owned patents resulting from inventions made in the EU, 
which suggests that the internationalisation of R & D & I 
did not squeeze out domestically owned patenting.
Altogether, the various sources of evidence confirm the 
rise of R & D & I cross-border links and flows, indicating 
at the same time a possible slowdown in recent years 
and showing that domestic activities still account for the 
bulk of R & D & I, particularly in the large countries.
Uneven levels and trends across EU countries, sectors, 
technologies and firms
Cross-border R & D & I links between the EU-15 countries 
tend to be relatively strong, but are often limited to the 
large and medium-sized R & D-intensive Member States. 
In contrast, links between the EU-12 and EU-15 coun-
tries, and in particular within the EU-12, tend to be rare.
Medium-sized or small Member States tend to have a 
higher degree of internationalisation and in some cases 
relatively higher R & D & I inflows than large countries. 
Patent data suggest that strong country links in terms 
of R & D & I often appear to be explained by a common 
language, geographical proximity or a long history 
of economic integration. Key examples are the links 
between the Nordic countries, and the links between a 
large country and a smaller neighbour, such as Germany 
and Austria, the UK and Ireland, or France and Belgium. 
There are at least five countries in the EU (Czech Repub-
lic, Ireland, Hungary, Austria, Slovakia) where foreign-
owned firms currently account for more than 50 % of 
total R & D expenditure in manufacturing.
Services tend to be less internationalised than manufac-
turing, but their share of total overseas R & D expend-
iture is rising. Also, different sectors and technolo-
gies present different internationalisation levels and 
dynamics. For instance, a high and increasing level of 
internationalisation is generally found in technology-
intensive sectors, such as information technologies, tele    -
communications and pharmaceuticals (  characterised 13
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by high R & D intensity and fast rates of technological 
change). A high, but more or less stable, international-
isation level is found, for instance, in the food industry, 
possibly reflecting the presence of a number of large 
multinational enterprises and a high degree of product 
variation and innovation in response to differing con-
sumer tastes.
Internationalisation is mainly pursued by a small 
number of large R & D-intensive firms. Typically, firms 
move R & D & I to high-income countries to access 
knowledge, while relocation to low-income countries is 
driven by the quest for new markets.
EU firms are increasing their R & D & I outside the EU
EU firms are increasingly seizing opportunities to start 
or expand R & D & I abroad (extra-EU), particularly in 
the US. The outward internationalisation of EU firms 
has increased considerably over the last two decades 
and is catching up with the top levels of R & D & I 
internationalisation that US firms overall still tend to 
hold. For instance, between the periods 1991–95 and 
2001–05, the share of all EU patent applications (in 
the OECD triadic database) resulting from inventions 
made outside the EU increased from 4 % to 11 %. It 
is worth comparing the outward internationalisation 
dynamics among the triad (US, EU and Japan): the EU 
more or less caught up with the US (11 % share of pa-
tent applications from inventions made abroad in the 
period 2001–05), leaving Japan well behind (3 % in the 
same period).
Patent data and R & D expenditure surveys both indi-
cate that the US is by far the preferred location for over-
seas R & D & I of the EU-27 — as a whole and across 
countries, sectors and technologies. R & D-intensive 
European firms, sectors and technologies (such as 
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics or semiconductors) tend 
to have a somewhat higher level of outward inter-
nationalisation.
Foreign‑owned firms innovate differently in the EU 
than domestically owned companies ...
Foreign-owned firms tend to have lower innovation 
input intensities than domestically owned companies, 
but achieve similar innovation outputs. This suggests 
that the innovation efforts of foreign-owned firms are 
based to a considerable degree on knowledge and tech-
nologies received from the group or parent company. 
Many of the differences between foreign-owned and 
domestically owned firms can be explained by related 
firm characteristics, e.g. foreign-owned firms are larger, 
have higher absorptive capacities or operate more often 
in technology-intensive sectors.
Cooperation with domestic partners, in particular 
domestic research organisations (including universities), 
is common among foreign-owned firms, a sign of their 
embeddedness in the host countries’ innovation sys-
tems and of potential spillover effects. Foreign-owned 
firms can act as agents of international technology dif-
fusion and as links between organisations in the host 
country and foreign sources of knowledge.
… but both groups of firms contribute to productivity 
growth and employment creation
Foreign-owned firms have significantly higher produc-
tivity levels (measured by sales per employee) than 
domestically owned companies. They also show higher 
levels of productivity growth, though differences in 
relation to domestically owned firms are considerably 
smaller and less significant here. Productivity growth 
of foreign-owned companies is mainly related to out-
put growth of old products and the effects of prod-
uct innovation, but not process innovation. There are 
no major differences between foreign-owned firms, 
domestic group enterprises and domestic unaffiliated 
firms in the way in which innovation affects productiv-
ity levels.
Foreign-owned companies also differ from domestic-
ally owned firms in the way in which they transform 
new technologies into employment growth. General 
productivity increases as a result of job cuts are on aver-
age compensated by the employment-creating effects 
of higher sales from old products and product innov-
ation in the foreign-owned firms. Together, these effects 
result in net employment growth in foreign-owned 
companies.
5.  European competitiveness in 
key enabling technologies
Because they can generate new growth, spur innov-
ation, increase productivity, help tackle environmental 
and climate challenges and give rise to new applica-
tions, key enabling technologies are attracting growing 
interest, and the importance of staying competitive in 
these technologies cannot be overstated.
Trends in six key enabling technologies (KETs) — nan-
otechnology, micro and nanoelectronics (including 
semiconductors), industrial biotechnology, photonics, 
advanced materials and advanced manufacturing tech-
nologies — are reviewed from a variety of perspectives: 
(i) state of development; (ii) existing and future applica-
tions; (iii) current market volume and future potential; 
and (iv) European competitiveness in comparison with 
North America, east Asia and the rest of the world.14
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There is considerable uncertainty about how fast the 
markets for applications of the six technologies — nano-
technology in particular — will grow in the medium 
term. A contributing factor to the uncertainty is that 
there are no agreed definitions of key enabling tech-
nologies. A broad definition is likely to lead to a more 
optimistic assessment of potential market volume than 
a more narrowly defined technology. With this in mind 
it is hardly surprising that the potential market for key 
enabling technology applications in 2015 (as reflected 
in the literature) covers a very wide range.
Most applications of key enabling technologies are still 
at a conceptual or pre-competitive stage, and it is not 
possible to use market data to assess how competitive 
Europe is compared with the rest of the world. Instead, 
patent data analysis and a number of case studies are 
used to analyse Europe’s competitiveness in these 
areas.
Strong European position in advanced manufacturing 
technologies and industrial biotechnology
The overall conclusion is that European producers of 
KETs are well placed in all six technologies, represent-
ing between a quarter and a half of all patent applica-
tions analysed. Europe is the world leader in advanced 
manufacturing technologies and shares the lead with 
North America in industrial biotechnology. In photonics, 
nanotechnology and micro and nanoelectronics, Europe 
contributes less to total output than North America and 
east Asia.
Europe is in principle holding its position in all six tech-
nologies. In recent decades it has neither lost nor gained 
ground, despite increasing competition from east Asia, 
which in the past decade has made great strides in most 
of the technologies. At the same time the contribu-
tion of North America to global technology output has 
gradually diminished. Germany is the main producer of 
key enabling technology patents in the EU, followed by 
France and the United Kingdom.
Importance of skills and venture capital and of main‑
taining a manufacturing base
Maintaining a strong European manufacturing base in 
each key enabling technology is critical if the EU is to 
benefit fully from productivity and innovation effects. 
Direct interaction between research and development, 
manufacture and application in user industries is needed 
if new fields of application are to emerge and good facil-
ities for new technologies are to be developed.
KET research is often at the cutting edge of technology. 
Complex technologies and new technological chal-
lenges have to be addressed. In such a context progress 
depends on bringing together different scientific dis-
ciplines and fields of technology in a joint endeavour. 
More coordination is needed between research and 
industry, going beyond any coordination by market 
mechanisms. Providing incentives for networking and 
clustering can help to achieve this. In some areas global 
networks of the leading organisations from research and 
industry are ideal; elsewhere regional networks (clus-
ters) can spur technology development. Clusters can be 
particularly helpful in linking research and commercial 
applications. Best practices for facilitating the flow of 
know-how, ideas and personnel between industry and 
research institutions should be circulated between and 
within Member States.
With Europe facing a likely shortage of skilled labour, 
promoting higher education and training in KETs will be 
essential. Strengthening cross-disciplinary education is 
a main challenge in that context. Higher education insti-
tutions need to offer curricula that are better geared to 
meeting the specific demands of KETs. Students need to 
be made aware of the career opportunities offered by 
cross-disciplinary studies. Education and training may 
be complemented by immigration policies to address 
the shortage of skilled personnel.
Venture capital markets are important for commercialis-
ing research results in KETs through spin-offs and other 
types of start-ups. To work, venture capital needs a sup-
portive regulatory environment, and public programmes 
may need to step in to address any failures by European 
private venture capital markets to provide sufficient 
funds for start-up and early-stage financing.
The role of regulation
In some KETs there is a particular focus on health, envir-
onment and safety issues. Cases in point are nanotech-
nology, industrial biotechnology and advanced mater-
ials. Procedures, standards and implementation tools 
(e.g. test methods and guidance documents) are needed 
to deal with health, safety and environmental issues and 
to provide incentives for further technological advances 
and innovative dynamics. Legislation has to be flexible 
enough to adjust to technological progress within each 
KET.
Industrial standardisation, intellectual property rights 
and enabling and promoting spin-offs are of critical 
importance to the transfer of technology. All in all, an 
integrated, coherent policy approach is required if KETs 
are to increase productivity and wealth. This should 
bring in regional, national and international levels and 
the various policy domains, including research, innov-
ation, education, competition, industry, taxation, health 
and environment.15
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6.  Innovation and 
competitiveness of the 
creative industries in the EU
The creative industries have large growth potential. 
A survey in the EU Member States in early 2010 found 
that more than 97 % of respondents thought the cre-
ative industries were ‘important’ or ‘very important’ in 
supporting innovative activities, encouraging economic 
growth and creating new jobs. Creative industries are at 
the crossroads between arts, business and technology. 
They range from information services, such as publish-
ing or software, to professional services like architecture, 
advertising or design (2). Creative industries are among 
the fastest-growing sectors in the EU, creating new jobs, 
playing key roles in global value chains and spurring 
innovation.
Creative industries are increasingly a source of growth 
in the EU
Creative industries account for 3.3 % of total EU GDP and 
3 % of employment, and are among the most dynamic 
sectors in the EU. Although employment growth was 
uneven across subsectors, overall employment in the 
creative industries increased by an average of 3.5 % 
a year in 2000–07, compared to 1 % a year for the EU 
economy as a whole. Software consulting accounted 
for more than half of creative industries’ employment 
growth in the EU-27 in 2000–07. Indeed, the employ-
ment growth rate for software consultancy in the EU-27 
was about 5.2 % per year on average in 2000–07. Within 
software publishing, the video games industry is one 
of the fastest-growing industries worldwide. The Baltic 
states and other new Member States have the highest 
annual employment growth rates in the creative indus-
tries. Among the EU-15 countries, Portugal and Ireland 
report a higher than average increase. The fast growth 
of the creative industries in the EU is partly due to catch-
ing up in the less developed EU countries. Demand fac-
tors and a strong entrepreneurial culture are further 
job creation factors. Creative industries are dominated 
by micro firms (95 % have fewer than 10 employees) 
coexisting with very large corporations. They typically 
include large shares of self-employed and highly skilled 
professionals.
The increasing importance of skills and creativity in the 
EU job market is clearer when one looks at professions 
that are ‘creative’ in essence, regardless of whether they 
belong to the ‘creative industries’ proper or to more trad    -
(2)    The concept of creative industries is very close to another concept of creative 
and cultural industries used in the ‘Green Paper — Unlocking the potential 
of cultural and creative industries’: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-policy-
development/doc2577_en.htm
itional activities. Occupations considered as   ‘creative’ 
include, for example, professions such as mathemat-
icians or engineers, along with writers, creative and per-
forming artists and artistic or entertainment   professions. 
What they all have in common is that they produce 
intangible assets such as ideas, knowledge and informa-
tion that increase firms’ value added. In the EU-15, cre-
ative occupations grew at around 3 % per year on aver-
age between 2002 and 2008, with the highest growth 
for artistic and entertainment occupations (5.7 %), fol-
lowed by social science and related professionals (5.0 %), 
and architects, engineers and computing professionals 
(each 3.2 %). Creative occupations are growing within 
and outside the creative industries, indicating that cre  -
ativity is spreading to other sectors. Similar trends can be 
observed for the new Member States (though fewer data 
are available here).
New empirical evidence is given on how the creative 
industries strengthen regional growth. Recent findings 
at the regional level for 10 EU countries show that the 
creative industries had a positive and significant effect 
on the growth rate of local GDP per capita in 2002–07. 
However, in terms of the related but different concept 
of ‘creative occupations’, there is no consensus on the 
impact of the creative workforce on regional growth.
Although there are not many tradable creative services, 
the EU’s position on the global markets is bolstered by 
the most tradable parts of the creative sectors. Europe is 
one of the world’s leading exporters of creative indus-
tries’ products. There was an increase in the revealed 
comparative advantage of the EU in publishing, music 
records, audiovisuals (film) and most notably in the new 
media (digital records) — with strong growth in video 
games.
Creative industries stand out because of their propen‑
sity for innovation
Some creative industries are among the most potentially 
innovative of all EU sectors. Firms in software consult-
ancy and supply are the most innovative of the service 
industries. The architecture and advertising industries 
have a higher than usual share of firms introducing new 
or significantly improved services.
Creative industries are not only innovators themselves 
but have also been an important driver for innovation. 
As far as supply chain relationships are concerned, they 
account for increasing inputs in the development of 
other sectors. A creative industry like industrial design 
contributes substantially to the production process and 
product design innovations of several manufacturing 
industries, such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, min-
erals, glass and ceramics, motor vehicles and tobacco. 
Conversely, some creative industries are major users of 16
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new technologies, playing a key role in stepping up the 
spread of technological innovations. Outside the ICT sec-
tor itself, publishing and software firms were among the 
earliest users of the Internet and e-business practices.
Reinforcing the growth and innovation potential of 
creative industries: action needed!
Creative industries tend to be small-scale organisations, 
which makes them natural candidates for small business 
policies. They tend to be more prone to rationing of fund-
ing, and many submarkets of the creative industries urge 
the authorities to provide for a level playing field of com-
petition. Certain creative sectors may justify consider-
ation for targeted approaches because of their public util-
ity aspect. They do a lot to generate innovation and build 
knowledge. Underinvestment must therefore be avoided. 
Appropriate education and training are also essential to 
provide the sector with the skills it needs to grow.
More coordination, networking and sharing of best prac-
tices will enable all creative industries and occupations 
to optimise their growth prospects and contribute to 
the economy as a whole. EU policies can help in the dis-
semination of best practice.
Ultimately, the impact of the creative industries is not 
only economic and thus calls for more than national 
or local action. While the welfare effects are difficult to 
quantify, it is clear that some of the creative industries 
facilitate structural adjustment in declining regions. 
They can boost social cohesion and get the less well off 
more involved in cultural activities. Where concerted 
and coordinated action would increase the economic 
and social impact of creative industries, the EU can play 
a role. EU prerogative areas such as intellectual property 
rights or the single market for services are the bedrock 
of creative industries. A recent Amsterdam declaration 
on the ‘European Creative Industries Alliance’ and a 
Green Paper (3) on cultural and creative industries are 
some recent initiatives on competitiveness and innov-
ation in this sector.
7.  Conclusions
The European Competitiveness Report 2010 examines the 
potential impact of the boom years on competitiveness. 
The accumulation of large imbalances has the potential 
to distort significantly the allocation of resources in our 
economies. However, a glance at the evidence shows 
that export performance does not seem to have been 
severely affected by these developments. As for prod-
(3)    ‘Green Paper — Unlocking the potential of cultural and creative industries’: 
http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-policy-development/doc2577_en.htm
uctivity growth, construction and real estate activities 
have attracted much investment in countries affected by 
housing bubbles; there is no obvious impact on aggre-
gate productivity so far but these distorted investments 
have the potential to hamper the ability of affected 
countries to generate income in the future to compen-
sate for the interest burden.
Nonetheless, the financial and economic crisis hit inter-
national trade in intermediate goods (especially parts 
and components) quite hard, accounting for something 
like 50 % of all international trade. It also disrupted some 
of the established international supply chains (e.g. in the 
automotive industry) and resulted in some changes to 
multinational corporations’ sourcing strategies, such 
as shifting to domestic suppliers. If confirmed, this may 
have longer-term consequences — by at least temporar-
ily restricting the internationalisation of certain compan-
ies’ activities and perhaps by delaying the recovery in 
some industries.
EU firms’ R & D and innovation activities, especially in 
high-tech industries, are still predominantly domestic, 
but are becoming increasingly internationalised, as the 
need to adapt products to foreign markets brings prod-
uct development closer to local markets. Firms’ location 
decisions are also increasingly based on the provision of 
strategic resources, such as ensuring access to scientific 
and technological capabilities and to human capital. A 
detailed analysis of a specific high-tech product shows 
that the value captured has little to do with the physical 
flows of goods within the supply chain: major parts of 
the value are attributed to design, R & D, brand, mar-
keting, distribution and management. This shows how 
important it is to keep a strong grip on these activities.
Maintaining and developing a position of maximum 
strength for the EU and the Member States in the inward 
and outward cross-border flows of R & D & I is crucial 
to keep the EU economies competitive and dynamic in 
the medium and long term. Inward foreign research, 
development and innovation offer great potential for 
the transfer and diffusion of knowledge and innovation 
across all business sectors. They can complement EU 
homegrown activities and help R & D & I to catch up in 
certain sectors and technologies, they can help achiev-
ing a critical mass and agglomeration of these capaci-
ties in certain areas and countries, and they may help 
to smooth and sustain a steady R & D & I effort in times 
of crisis. Key policies and measures for maintaining and 
attracting new R & D & I include: enhancing the quality 
of science and technology (S & T) bases and the mobility 
of researchers and S & T personnel; widening the scope 
and tightening up the enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights, including the competitiveness and efficiency 
of the patenting system; promoting R & D & I partner-
ships and consortia — open to foreign (intra and extra-
EU) business and research organisations — fostering 17
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competition and cooperation, integration and spillovers 
into EU innovation systems; promoting an international 
regulatory dialogue and a level playing field in public 
R & D & I support measures; and adopting proactive 
standards and public procurement policies with a view 
to developing a dynamic single market for research, 
development and innovation in the EU. There may well 
be considerable benefits for firms, the EU’s innovation 
systems and the economy as a whole from outward 
R & D & I flows by EU firms, in particular SMEs. Potential 
benefits include opening up and seizing opportunities 
in new and fast-growing markets, adapting innovative 
products to local requirements and preferences, and 
gaining access to foreign sources of knowledge which 
are of strategic importance for certain businesses.
The European producers of key enabling technologies 
seem to be well placed in the international arena, and 
Europe is in principle in a strong position in all six iden-
tified KETs. KET research is often at the technological 
frontier. However, more coordination between research 
and industry is needed, over and above the coordinating 
effect of market mechanisms. Incentives for networking 
and clustering can be helpful. Best practices should be 
disseminated between and within the Member States. 
Promoting higher education and training will be essen-
tial to secure a supply of skilled personnel. In addition, 
venture capital markets are needed to commercialise 
the results of KETs, and they in turn need a supportive 
regulatory environment. Public programmes may be 
needed to provide additional funds for start-up and 
early stage financing.
Creative industries have great potential for reinforcing 
economic growth and creating new jobs. They have 
long been among the fastest-growing sectors in the EU; 
they play a key role in global value chains and they spur 
innovation. Moreover, creative occupations are growing 
within and outside the creative industries, i.e. creative 
professions are spreading to other sectors. The EU is 
one of the world’s leading exporters of creative indus-
tries’ products. Their importance, however, is not purely 
economic — they can facilitate structural adjustment in 
declining regions and do a lot to enhance social cohe-
sion and inclusion. EU policies can therefore play a role 
in strengthening intellectual property rights and the sin-
gle market for services. The creative industries must be 
brought into the scope of SME policies; they need access 
to proper financing facilities and creative companies 
need to be helped to grow.19
Introduction
This is the 13th edition of the Commission’s European 
Competitiveness Report since the 1994 Industry Council 
resolution which called on the Commission to report 
annually. Competitiveness is taken here to mean a sus-
tained rise in the standard of living of a nation or region 
and as low a level of involuntary unemployment as pos-
sible. For an industrial sector, the main competitiveness 
criterion is maintaining and improving its position in the 
global market.
As  in  previous  years,  the  report  approaches  the 
issues using insights from economic theory and 
  empirical research, and its ambition is to contribute 
to policy  making by drawing attention to trends and 
  developments and by discussing policy options. Its 
main subjects continue to be related to productivity, this 
being the most reliable indicator for competitiveness 
over the longer term, and other microeconomic issues 
underpinning the EU’s future economic developments, 
in particular its Europe 2020 strategy.
Chapter 1 presents a snapshot of recent economic devel-
opments in a period of financial and economic crisis and 
the beginning of recovery. In addition, the boom period 
2000–07 is explored in order to analyse its likely impact 
on European competitiveness.
Chapter 2 analyses trade in intermediate products and 
EU manufacturing supply chains with a view to shed-
ding light on the relative importance of trade in inter-
mediates in overall EU-27 trade and in individual coun-
tries. The questions addressed in this chapter include 
the share of these products in overall trade in exports 
and imports, the changes over time and what factors are 
driving these changes and the geographical structure of 
trade in intermediate goods. There is also a case study 
from the high-tech area, which addresses the issue of 
who ‘captures’ the value of the production process. 
Finally the chapter examines the extent to which trade 
in intermediaries has been affected by the economic cri-
sis (including a comparison with other product categor-
ies) and how the crisis has affected EU manufacturing 
supply chains.
The issue of foreign corporate research and develop-
ment and its impact on innovation in the European 
Union is addressed in Chapter 3. The aim is to study why 
firms internationalise R & D and innovation, analyse 
R & D & I activities of foreign-owned firms in the EU by 
sector, country and technology, and examine the activ-
ities of EU firms outside the European Union. The chapter 
also investigates whether — and how — foreign-owned 
and domestically owned firms differ in their innovation 
behaviour and how they transform innovation into prod-
uctivity and employment growth.
Chapter 4 on key enabling technologies (KETs) discusses 
their role in increasing wealth by boosting innovation 
and raising productivity, and the performance of Europe 
(firms as well as public institutions) in producing new 
technology compared to the main competing regions 
(North America and east Asia). The analysis looks at the 
industrial sectors and fields of application that are most 
affected by different KETs, their likely medium-term 
growth potential and which factors are likely to drive 
technological and commercial success.
The main objective of Chapter 5 is to give a comprehen-
sive picture of the innovation performance and com-
petitiveness of the creative industries, along with their 
relative size and economic performance in the EU-27 
countries. It explores what drives creative industries’ 
growth and their impact on the wider economy in dif-
ferent forms. These include: a direct contribution to the 
economy (employment and some output measures); 
spillovers into the wider economy; the direct, but less 
quantifiable, contributions of the creative industries to 
innovation; and their role in improving the quality of life. 
The scope and opportunities for policy intervention are 
then explored.21
1.1.  The crisis as a major adjustment
With the exception of the 2001 slowdown, the period 
1995–2006 was one of remarkable stability for the indus-
trialised countries. In the EU in particular, it was a period 
of sustained growth, more people in employment and 
higher income per capita. In some countries, however, 
stability concealed the accumulation of significant dis-
equilibria that in 2008 brought on a global recession of a 
severity unseen since the oil shocks in the 1970s.
1.1.1.  A big recession
Individual countries had experienced similar recessions 
in the recent past but this recession is unusual for its 
combination of a big drop in economic activity and its 
global nature: most countries in the world were touched 
in one way or another. In the EU, with the sole exception 
of Poland, all Member States saw their production fall, 
from around 3 % in Belgium and France to double-digit 
drops for Ireland and the Baltic states. Latvia suffered 
the biggest contraction, with a 26 % drop in GDP com-
pared with its peak value in 2007.
While most countries emerged from the trough in 2010, 
none of them, again with the exception of Poland, 
recovered to the level of real GDP they had in 2007. The 
varied picture showed in Figure 1.1 reflects differing 
patterns during the boom period 2000–07. As will be 
discussed below, several Member States were affected 
by large speculative bubbles and were afterwards hit 
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Figure 1.1:   The magnitude of the contraction: real GDP current (bars) and maximum (dots) drop with 
respect to peak (*)
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(*) Seasonally adjusted data; the last data are for first-quarter 2010 when available; otherwise fourth-quarter 2009 data are used.
Source: Eurostat, quarterly national accounts.22
European Competitiveness Report 2010
hard by the ensuing readjustment; countries not suf-
fering from these asset pricing distortions were quickly 
affected by contagion — through international trade 
and through problems in the international supply chain. 
This is particularly true of many of the new Member 
States.
1.1.2.  Sudden drop and slow recovery in the labour 
market
With a few exceptions, in the boom years, i.e. the period 
from 2000 to 2007, the unemployment rate fell in most 
European countries. For some, however, the crisis 
reversed the situation within a few quarters, and they 
now have significantly higher unemployment rates. The 
experience of previous recessions is that employment 
takes something like two to four times the length of the 
recession to return to its earlier level (4). So with this rule 
of thumb, employment is expected to remain below its 
peak level for one to four years in the EU.
Needless to say, the experience across Member States 
is quite uneven, and depends on institutional arrange-
ments that vary considerably across the EU. Not sur-
prisingly, the scale of job cuts and the increase in 
unemploy  ment was particularly sizeable in the coun-
tries hardest hit (e.g. the Baltic states, Ireland and 
(4)    See the discussion in Section 1.2 in the European Competitiveness Report 2009 
or the European Commission (2009a).
Spain). Given the magnitude of the recession, other 
countries, notably Germany, experienced only modest 
losses in employment. The unevenness of perform-
ance reflects the nature of the recession as well as 
labour market institutions. For instance, when employ-
ers regard demand shocks as temporary, they tend to 
smooth their labour responses (5); this appears to be 
the case with Germany, which was affected primarily 
by the collapse in global trade. In contrast, large labour 
changes and reorganisations are the best response to 
permanent demand shocks that involve large sectoral 
restructuring; this appears to be the case in, say, Spain 
and Ireland, both of which had major problems with 
a housing bubble.
In the midst of such a crisis, and over and above the 
issue of recovery, it is reasonable to wonder about the 
impact on economic performance in the medium to 
long term. The European Competitiveness Report 2009 
examined the potential impact of the recession on 
long-term productivity growth; all in all, the conclu-
sion was that the recession need not have a negative 
impact on the rate of technical change in the years to 
come. This is because a recession includes two types 
of mechanisms: those that impinge negatively on 
economic efficiency, but also those that improve our 
ability to increase productivity in the future. Further-
more, understanding those mechanisms makes it pos-
(5)  Section 1.4 in the European Competitiveness Report 2009.
Figure 1.2:   Breakdown of unemployment in 2009
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1.2.  The years before the crisis
The period preceding the crisis was characterised by 
remarkable stability: steady income growth, low infla-
tion and growing employment.
1.2.1.  Aggregate trends and the crisis
Table 1.1 sets out average annual growth rates for the 
five-year intervals 1996–2000 and 2001–05, and for the 
sible to design economic policies to tone down the 
negative and amplify the positive effects (6) in order to 
avoid a slow recovery followed by an era of sluggish 
growth (7). 
The present edition of the European Competitiveness 
Report examines the potential impact of the boom years 
on competitiveness. The abovementioned accumulation 
of serious imbalances has a potential to significantly dis-
tort the way resources are used in our economies, and 
hence productivity growth in the years to come.
(6)    For instance, the ‘Product market review 2009’ (European Commission 
(2009b)) examines the negative impact of the crisis on R & D (Section 4.1) 
and, accordingly, discusses policy measures that attempt to tone down the 
potentially negative impact (Section 4.2). 
(7)    European Commission (2009a) discusses the possible impact of the crisis on 
potential output and a scenario with lower permanent growth rates is not 
ruled out.
Figure 1.3:   GDP, employment and productivity growth rates in the EU-27
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Box 1.1: Competitiveness and external competitiveness
Competitiveness refers to the overall economic performance of a nation measured in terms of its ability to provide 
its citizens with growing living standards on a sustainable basis and broad access to jobs for those willing to work. 
In short, competitiveness refers to the institutional and policy arrangements that create the conditions under 
which productivity can grow sustainably. (Productivity growth is the only source of sustained income growth, in 
turn the backbone of growing living standards.)
When applied to international trade, however, competitiveness, or external competitiveness, may convey a dif-
ferent and more specific meaning. Unless otherwise stated, in this chapter external competitiveness refers to the 
ability to export goods and services in order to afford imports, and hence it will be summarised by world market 
shares (the share of exports in total exports).24
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Table 1.2 shows that in 2009 employment contracted 
less in the EU-27 (- 2 %) than in the US (- 3.5 %), reflect-
ing the lower responsiveness of EU labour markets. 
The crisis also has the potential to affect labour sup-
ply in the short and medium term, by changing either 
the total population (e.g. via reduction of immigra-
tion flows) or the participation rates. On the one hand, 
recessions tend to discourage labour entry (e.g. young 
people may decide to stay longer in full-time educa-
tion) and encourage exit (early retirement for older 
workers). On the other hand, households affected by 
significant income reductions may delay retirement 
decisions, and formerly inactive household members 
years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009. As mentioned, the 
unprecedented fall in GDP per capita in 2009 was some-
what uneven, but all EU countries were affected, reflect-
ing the severity and dire consequences of the economic 
and financial crisis. The GDP per capita fall was particu-
larly sizeable in some of the EU-12 countries (particularly 
in the Baltic states, ranging from - 13.6 % in Estonia to 
- 17.5 % in Latvia and Lithuania, but also in Hungary, 
Romania and Slovenia, at - 6 % to - 9 %), thus wiping 
out part of their previous performance and catch-up 
achievements within the EU. Some of the EU-15 coun-
tries were also severely hit, such as Ireland and Finland 
(with a GDP per capita fall of 8 % and 7.3 % respectively).
Table 1.1: Real GDP per capita growth and GDP level in PPS
Annual growth rate of GDP per capita (1) 2009 GDP  
per capita  
(in PPS; EU-27 = 100) (3)   1996–2000 (2) 2001–05 (2) 2006 2007 2008 2009
BE 2.64 1.14 2.10 2.18 1.04 - 3.58 114.9
BG - 0.21 6.66 6.59 6.17 6.01 - 5.40 41.2
CZ 1.60 3.82 6.47 5.55 1.41 - 5.46 80.5
DK 2.44 0.95 3.00 1.22 - 1.78 - 4.72 117.4
DE 1.88 0.53 3.29 2.59 1.43 - 4.88 116.2
EE 7.19 8.32 10.18 7.39 - 3.47 - 13.62 62.0
IE 8.44 3.64 2.76 3.50 - 4.91 - 7.96 131.1
EL 2.91 3.72 4.10 4.06 1.61 - 1.54 94.8
ES 3.65 1.73 2.44 1.70 - 0.73 - 4.92 103.3
FR 2.36 0.93 1.53 1.72 - 0.14 - 2.65 107.4
IT 1.87 0.31 1.46 0.82 - 1.80 - 5.20 101.7
CY 2.49 1.42 2.15 2.93 2.65 - 1.67 98.3
LV 6.34 8.86 12.85 10.55 - 4.13 - 17.57 48.6
LT 5.20 8.32 8.49 10.44 3.30 - 17.54 53.2
LU 4.70 2.37 3.92 4.83 - 1.73 - 4.85 268.0
HU 4.25 4.49 4.13 1.12 0.82 - 6.38 63.0
MT 3.88 0.33 2.65 3.10 1.61 - 2.97 77.6
NL 3.43 0.82 3.24 3.38 1.61 - 4.93 129.9
AT 2.82 1.04 2.85 3.13 1.70 - 4.03 123.6
PL 5.42 3.13 6.31 6.83 5.00 1.21 60.8
PT 3.68 0.25 1.03 1.64 - 0.17 - 3.07 78.3
RO - 1.00 6.50 8.07 6.55 6.45 - 7.79 45.3
SI 4.35 3.57 5.44 6.22 2.39 - 7.04 86.1
SK 3.25 4.97 8.42 10.31 6.14 - 5.90 71.6
FI 4.54 2.24 4.50 3.76 0.58 - 7.27 110.5
SE 3.23 2.19 3.66 1.81 - 0.92 - 5.05 120.4
UK 3.13 2.03 2.26 1.91 - 0.06 - 5.21 116.4
EU-15 2.57 1.12 2.43 2.03 - 0.02 - 4.56 110.6
EU-27 2.70 1.43 2.77 2.39 0.32 - 4.46 100.0
US 3.15 1.45 1.72 1.15 - 0.50 - 3.34 147.3
(1) GDP per capita is measured in 2000 prices.
(2) Geometric average.
(3) PPS = Purchasing power standards.
Source: AMECO database, European Commission.25
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Labour productivity in the EU-27 appears to be recover-
ing faster than GDP (see Figure 1.3) due to the adjust-
ment lags of employment. Table 1.3 shows a substantial 
variation in measured labour productivity across coun-
tries, reflecting the patchy nature and the magnitude of 
economic shocks, flexibility and response in labour and 
market adjustments, the stage in the business cycle and 
the strength of the recovery, etc.
may seek to enter the labour force, particularly when 
labour markets are flexible and the recovery starts to 
generate new job opportunities. The participation rate 
in the EU-27 has indeed fallen from 65.9 % in 2008 
to 64.6 % in 2009 (roughly the level attained in 2006 
and 2007). The participation of young workers (aged 
15–24) appears to have accentuated its declining trend 
in 2009 (8).
(8)    For details, see Chapter 3 ‘Youth and segmentation in EU labour markets’ in 
‘Employment in Europe 2010’ (forthcoming).
Table 1.2: Annual growth rate of employment (1)
  1996–2000 (2) 2001–05 (2) 2006 2007 2008 2009
BE 1.22 0.71 1.19 1.63 1.88 - 0.84
BG - 0.26 1.53 3.34 2.82 3.27 - 2.03
CZ - 0.82 0.21 1.94 2.66 1.55 - 2.03
DK 1.02 0.05 1.99 2.69 0.83 - 2.61
DE 0.81 - 0.16 0.62 1.66 1.40 - 0.30
EE - 2.03 1.10 5.38 0.75 0.17 - 8.98
IE 5.72 2.91 4.30 3.56 - 0.82 - 7.79
EL 0.55 1.35 2.03 1.36 0.11 - 0.91
ES 3.88 3.26 3.92 3.02 - 0.61 - 6.63
FR 1.40 0.64 0.98 1.35 0.53 - 1.77
IT 0.98 1.25 1.96 1.24 0.32 - 1.13
CY 1.24 3.08 1.76 3.25 2.63 - 0.35
LV - 0.54 1.66 4.70 3.58 0.74 - 11.86
LT - 1.12 0.86 1.83 2.78 - 0.48 - 8.25
LU 4.13 3.13 3.64 4.42 4.71 1.09
HU 1.26 0.23 0.73 - 0.10 - 1.19 - 2.99
MT 0.75 0.83 1.31 3.18 2.42 - 0.61
NL 2.55 0.33 1.70 2.60 1.44 - 0.11
AT 0.92 0.68 1.40 1.80 1.76 - 1.47
PL - 0.37 - 0.61 3.21 4.43 3.78 - 0.70
PT 2.11 0.28 0.51 - 0.03 0.44 - 2.29
RO - 1.89 - 1.35 0.69 0.36 0.28 - 3.28
SI - 0.29 0.36 1.50 2.98 2.87 - 2.59
SK - 0.79 0.58 2.29 2.12 2.94 - 2.04
FI 2.27 0.86 1.76 2.21 1.61 - 2.87
SE 0.82 0.22 1.69 2.16 0.91 - 2.22
UK 1.26 0.93 0.87 0.68 0.73 - 1.97
EU-15 1.47 0.86 1.49 1.60 0.70 - 1.92
EU-27 1.01 0.65 1.63 1.78 0.95 - 2.03
US 1.78 0.68 1.87 1.10 - 0.44 - 3.53
(1) Employment in persons; all domestic industries (national accounts).
(2) Geometric average.
Source: AMECO database, European Commission.26
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was in a different high-tech sector: ‘Electrical and optic-
  al equipment’. Within services, value added growth 
was higher for ‘Transport, storage and communication’ 
and ‘Financial intermediation’; the latter was an excep-
tion in the sense that it is the only services sector with 
higher productivity growth than the average of manu-
factures. Labour-intensive services like ‘Construction 
and real estate’ display negative productivity growth 
due to relatively higher employment growth, prob-
ably associated with the boom described in Section 1.3 
below.
1.2.2.  Industrial trends
At the sectoral level, the years preceding the crisis 
confirmed historical trends like the faster productivity 
growth of manufactures compared with services (see 
Table 1.4), notably in high-tech sectors like chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals. This is also true for ‘Electrical and 
optical equipment, including ICT manufacturing’, as 
well as the associated service industry ‘Transport, stor-
age and communication’, which includes ICT services. 
The highest productivity and value added growth rate 
Table 1.3: Annual growth rate of real labour productivity (1)
  1996–2000 (2) 2001–05 (2) 2006 2007 2008 2009
BE 2.17 0.65 1.29 1.52 - 1.09 - 0.97
BG 1.68 3.68 3.17 2.78 2.69 - 2.94
CZ 1.94 4.47 5.03 4.04 0.51 - 0.06
DK 1.08 1.18 0.81 - 0.38 - 2.31 - 0.85
DE 2.01 1.30 2.86 0.69 - 0.04 - 2.27
EE N/A 6.50 4.82 6.53 - 2.26 3.04
IE 5.15 3.08 1.44 3.19 - 0.17 1.45
EL 2.86 3.06 - 0.53 4.64 1.88 - 0.13
ES 0.25 0.75 0.84 1.69 0.82 4.92
FR 2.13 1.44 2.72 - 0.14 - 0.24 - 0.87
IT 0.89 0.11 0.29 0.21 - 0.94 - 1.66
CY 2.08 0.96 1.46 1.47 0.92 1.26
LV N/A 6.95 7.96 7.53 - 1.21 - 2.22
LT 4.29 6.59 6.77 5.70 1.61 - 10.90
LU 2.61 1.34 2.29 1.44 - 4.23 - 1.57
HU 2.53 3.21 3.81 1.34 1.88 - 3.98
MT N/A 0.85 3.95 - 0.44 - 0.79 - 1.41
NL 1.75 1.58 1.58 1.56 0.87 - 3.50
AT 1.79 1.16 2.56 2.24 0.31 - 2.38
PL 6.17 3.75 2.94 2.28 1.57 5.75
PT 3.41 0.93 1.40 2.78 - 0.40 - 0.96
RO N/A 8.95 6.20 5.43 6.45 N/A
SI N/A N/A 6.03 4.54 - 1.20 - 5.53
SK 4.93 4.87 6.84 8.26 2.56 0.77
FI 2.81 2.08 3.45 2.13 - 0.34 - 1.02
SE 2.48 2.80 2.88 - 0.59 - 1.69 - 1.70
UK 2.52 1.99 2.27 1.75 1.03 - 1.95
EU-15 1.77 1.23 1.80 1.09 0.07 - 0.96
EU-27 N/A N/A 1.77 1.09 0.01 N/A
US 2.38 2.49 0.82 1.46 1.36 N/A
(1) GDP at 2000 prices over total hours worked.
(2) Geometric average.
Source: AMECO database, European Commission.27
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added to R & D in the US, compared with barely 12 % in 
the EU. In short, the EU does not invest enough in R & D, 
either in absolute or in relative terms, and a look at the 
sectoral distribution of R & D intensity in manufacturing 
clearly shows that it is the high-tech sectors that under-
perform compared to their American counterparts (11).
(11)    Even if it is debatable if these R & D expenditures are cost efficient, or what 
the sense is of seeking causality between R & D and performance, these 
  differences undoubtedly reflect a thriving and innovative market economy 
in the US compared to the EU.
1.2.3.  R & D in EU industries
Before the crisis the US spent significantly more on R & D 
than the EU, both in absolute terms and as a percentage 
of GDP; the widest gap is in business enterprise R & D 
expenditure. The distribution of total manufacturing 
R & D expenditure shows a relatively similar pattern 
between the EU-14 and the US (9)(10). However, when 
looking at the relative effort, R & D expenditure as a per-
centage of value added (see Figure 1.4), it transpires that 
US businesses make significantly more effort than their 
EU counterparts, particularly in sectors considered to be 
high-technology. For instance, ‘C33 Medical precision 
and optical instruments’ devotes close to half of its value 
(9)    The EU-14 stands for the EU-15 minus Luxembourg. No data for the EU-27 
were available at this level of disaggregation.
(10)    The lion’s share goes to ‘C23T25 Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products’, 
which accounts for roughly 27 % of total manufacturing R & D expenditure 
on either side of the Atlantic. In the EU-14, the ‘C34 Motor vehicles’ sector 
stands out, accounting for 20 % of total manufacturing R & D, contrasting 
with only 10 % in the US.
Table 1.4: Sectoral labour productivity; annual average % change 1995–2008
NACE – 31 
sector  
classification
Sector Labour 
productivity
Value  
added 
Employment
A Agriculture 3.2 1.0 - 2.2
B Fishing 0.0 - 1.7 - 1.7
C Mining and quarrying 1.1 - 1.7 - 2.8
D Manufacturing 2.6 2.1 - 0.6
DA Food products, beverages and tobacco 0.4 0.4 0.0
DB Textiles and textiles products 1.4 - 1.8 - 3.2
DC Leather and leather products - 0.8 - 3.9 - 3.1
DD Wood and wood products 1.6 0.6 - 1.0
DE Pulp, paper products; publishing and printing 1.9 1.0 - 0.9
DF Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 2.8 - 0.1 - 2.9
DG Chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres 4.1 3.3 - 0.8
DH Rubber and plastic products 1.5 2.3 0.8
DI Other non-metallic mineral products 2.1 1.2 - 1.0
DJ Basic metals and fabricated metal products 2.3 2.1 - 0.2
DK Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 3.0 2.2 - 0.8
DL Electrical and optical equipment 6.3 5.9 - 0.3
DM Transport equipment 1.8 2.7 0.9
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 0.3 0.9 0.6
E Electricity, gas and water supply 2.3 1.5 - 0.8
F Construction - 0.4 1.1 1.5
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles 1.3 2.6 1.3
H Hotels and restaurants - 0.4 2.1 2.4
I Transport, storage and communication 3.0 3.8 0.8
J Financial intermediation 2.9 3.4 0.5
K Real estate, renting and business activities - 1.0 3.4 4.4
L Public administration and defence 0.5 1.0 0.5
M Education 0.0 0.9 1.0
N Health and social work 0.5 2.2 1.7
O Other community, social, personal service activities - 0.1 2.1 2.3
Total 1.3 2.4 1.0
Source: Eurostat.28
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Europe. Some Member States saw investment in dwell-
ings — that is, housing excluding non-residential and 
civil engineering — increase by several points of GDP 
(see Box 1.2). In line with previous major recessions 
combined with a banking crisis, ‘[t]he crisis was pre-
ceded by a long period of rapid credit growth, low risk 
premiums, abundant availability of liquidity, strong 
leveraging, soaring asset prices and the development 
of bubbles in the real estate sector’ (12).
This chapter examines the potential impact of the 
boom years on competitiveness. The accumulation of 
large distortions has the potential to significantly dis-
tort the way resources are allocated in European econ-
omies. The following sections examine this possibility.
(12)    From the introduction to European Commission (2009c); see Chapters 1 ‘Root 
causes of the crisis’ and 2 ‘The crisis from a historical perspective’. See also 
European Commission (2010b), ‘Surveillance of intra-euro-area competitive-
ness and imbalances’.
1.3.  Growing imbalances and external 
competitiveness
This period of relative stability, with the exception 
of the slowdown in 2001, came to an abrupt end in 
2007 when signs of unrest in the US subprime mort-
gage market and of a slowdown started to become 
apparent.
1.3.1.  Soaring asset prices
Seen in retrospect, the 2000–07 period can be seen 
as an incubation period; these were the boom years, 
notably in the housing sector in the US, but also in 
Figure 1.4:   Sectoral R & D intensity
0 10 20 30 5 15 25 35 40 50 45
C27  Basic metals
C28  Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
C26  Other non-metallic mineral products
C21T22  Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing
C20  Wood and products of wood and cork
C15T16  Food products, beverages and tobacco
C23T25  Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products
C17T19  Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
C15T37  Manufacturing
C29  Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.
C31  Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c.
C32  Radio, television and communication equipment
C35  Other transport equipment
% of value added
C36T37  Manufacturing n.e.c. and recycling
C30  O‹ce, accounting and computing machinery
C34  Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
C33  Medical, precision and optical instruments
EU-14
US
Note:    Sector classification is ISIC Rev.3.1; R & D expenditure is Anberd, i.e. it includes R & D activities carried out in the business 
enterprise sector, regardless of the origin of funding; data for the EU-14 is 2005, for the US 2006; the EU-14 is the EU-15 minus 
Luxembourg; no data for EU-12 countries is available at this level of disaggregation.
Source: OECD STAN indicators (2009 edition).29
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1314
(13)  For Spain and Ireland see, for instance, Ahearne et al (2008) or Díaz and Raya 
(2009). For an overview of EU countries see Setzer, van den Noord and Wolff 
(2010).
(14)  This is further clarified by the examination of the Bank of International Settle-
ments’ consolidated bank statistics; see pp. 18–21 in the BIS Quarterly Review, 
June 2010.
Figure 1.5:   The rise in investment in dwellings
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Note:    Investment in dwellings does not comprise non-residential construction and civil engineering.
Source: AMECO database, European Commission.
Box 1.2: Accumulated distortions
For a decade or more in some countries, notably the UK, Denmark, Ireland and Spain, house prices increased over 
their fundamental value. Prices went up because economic players expected them to increase in a speculative 
spiral that made investment in dwellings attractive to households compared to other forms of investment. The 
distortion did not affect all countries, but where it did it was not a minor one. In countries like Spain, for instance, 
at the height of the boom period, around 2005–06, house prices increased by 15 % a year (13).
This means that for years millions of households and firms made consumption-saving decisions counting on 
trends in the price of houses that subsequently proved to be unsustainable. Households invest most of their 
  savings in property. Large and sustained increases in the price of houses led them to overinvest in housing and to 
overstate their wealth, pulling down their savings rate. If houses constituted an attractive investment for locals, 
the same was true for foreigners, directly or indirectly. In 2000–06, on average, countries with a large housing 
boom also experienced a substantial change in their lending/borrowing position. In some cases it was a dramatic 
change; Spain for instance was a net lender by the end of the 1990s and was borrowing almost 10 % of its GDP 
annually in 2007. To see this graphically, the housing bubble can be linked to the increase in investment in dwell-
ings, measured in percentage points of GDP, during the boom period: Figure 1.6 relates the housing bubble dur-
ing 2000–06 to the change in the net lending/borrowing position in the same period. With regard to this figure, 
countries like Germany and Austria appear to have become lenders to countries like Spain, Ireland and Estonia (14).30
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These flows of capital further fuelled the behaviour of households, misguided by the trend in housing prices. The 
rising consumption rate financed by these incoming flows of capital induced a deterioration of the commercial 
balance with the rest of the world (see Figure 1.7 and 1.8). When the boom came to an end, accumulated distor-
tions gave way to the corresponding adjustment process. Once the value of houses drops — or is thought to be 
going to drop in the future — a large portion of perceived wealth vanishes, leading to a major adjustment of 
consumption and saving. Consumption drops and saving increases to rebuild net wealth. Moreover, if liabilities 
are substantial with respect to assets, the saving rate will grow further in an effort to deleverage. In the countries 
most affected by the housing bubble the increase in the savings rate in 2007–09 ranges from 3 percentage points 
of disposable income in the UK to 11 points in Spain. That these increases are related to the previous intensity in 
investment in dwellings is illustrated in Figure 1.9 (15).
Likewise, the countries that accumulated a sizeable deterioration of net exports during the boom years 
(Figure 1.7) were those that suffered most from the subsequent collapse of private consumption at the outbreak 
of the crisis (see Figure 1.9 and 1.10).
Figure 1.6:   Investment in dwellings and net lending/borrowing
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15 
(15)  For a description of the mechanics and magnitude of the adjustment in the 
US, see Robert A. Solow (2009), ‘How to understand the disaster’, New York 
Review of Books, 56(8). Retrieved 20 May 2010 from http://www.nybooks.
com/  articles/2265531
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Figure 1.7:   Changes in net exports 2000–06
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Figure 1.8:   Changes in saving rates and net exports 2000–06
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Figure 1.9:   The rise in the private saving rate 2007–09
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Figure 1.10:   The fall in private consumption 2007–09
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1.3.2.  Growing distortions and external 
competitiveness
Growing imbalances during the boom period could 
have had an impact on factors that will condition prod-
uctivity growth, and hence could affect the performance 
of some Member States beyond their recovery from the 
recession (see Box 1.3). For instance, the real estate 
boom could have diverted resources from productive 
sectors, damaging productivity growth, or nominal 
wage inflation could erode the international competi-
tiveness of domestic firms, notably in countries within 
the euro area.
 In particular, much attention has been paid to the large 
changes in the trade balance of many countries illus-
trated in Figure 1.7. The excess of imports over exports is 
often associated with a loss of external   competitiveness. 
Table 1.5: A summary view of the bubble
Boom period Crisis
Country
Increase in  
% points 
of GDP in 
investment  
in dwellings 
2000–06
Change in  
net lending  
2000–06 
 
 
Change in 
private saving 
2000–07  
(% GNDI) 
 
Change of  
net exports 
2000–07  
(in % points of 
GDP) 
Change in 
private saving 
2007–09  
(% GNDI) 
 
% fall in 
private 
consumption 
from 2007–08  
to 2009 
% fall in GDP 
from 2008 to 
2009 
 
 
Belgium BE 0.92 - 0.76 0.93 0.92 1.15 - 1.64 - 2.01
Czech 
Republic
CZ - 0.39 3.07 - 1.51 7.99 1.65 - 0.20 - 1.68
Denmark DK 1.89 1.55 - 1.32 - 3.60 3.85 - 4.84 - 4.47
Germany DE - 1.39 7.93 4.76 6.72 - 1.13 0.23 - 3.55
Estonia EE 4.17 - 10.20 - 5.50 - 7.71 7.67 - 22.30 - 14.58
Ireland IE 5.66 - 4.69 1.89 - 3.25 3.44 - 7.86 - 10.05
Greece EL 1.86 - 0.90 0.23 2.41 4.28 - 1.79 - 0.69
Spain ES 3.23 - 5.20 - 4.80 - 3.65 11.13 - 5.41 - 3.43
France FR 1.22 - 3.01 - 0.57 - 2.77 1.07 0.82 - 1.44
Italy IT 0.76 - 1.99 - 1.40 - 1.17 0.17 - 2.50 - 3.00
Cyprus CY 3.27 - 1.88 - 9.16 - 7.10 6.31 - 3.01 - 1.75
Latvia LV 0.92 - 16.96 - 5.82 - 13.12 17.29 - 26.62 - 18.62
Lithuania LT 0.77 - 3.00 0.96 - 7.07 7.95 - 16.99 - 16.94
Luxembourg LU - 0.37 - 0.69 0.75 12.47 - 4.19 - 0.56 - 4.05
Hungary HU 0.24 0.52 - 1.20 5.25 2.82 - 7.98 - 1.69
Malta MT 1.84 5.79 - 0.78 8.69 - 5.66 1.16 0.26
Netherlands NL 0.43 2.60 1.18 3.10 - 1.81 - 2.51 - 4.31
Austria AT - 0.79 3.61 1.28 4.11 0.89 0.36 - 1.77
Poland PL - 0.25 3.25 - 2.10 3.55 3.19 2.25 5.42
Portugal PT - 1.93 - 0.23 - 3.63 3.37 2.65 - 0.79 - 1.54
Romania RO 0.82 - 6.73 - 2.53 - 8.59 9.79 - 10.54 - 4.54
Slovenia SI 0.28 0.38 - 0.09 1.76 - 0.02 - 1.41 - 6.04
Slovakia SK - 2.12 - 5.08 - 0.82 1.44 - 2.44 - 0.67 - 5.79
Finland FI 0.77 - 2.97 0.16 - 3.94 - 1.52 - 2.12 - 7.17
Sweden SE 1.43 3.48 4.92 1.48 - 1.29 - 1.07 - 3.09
United 
Kingdom
UK 1.22 - 0.77 3.44 - 1.37 3.00 - 3.22 - 3.63
United 
States
US 1.17 - 3.20 0.26 - 1.23 4.57 - 0.85 - 1.28
Japan JP - 0.45 1.44 - 0.46 0.22 - 0.15 - 1.67 - 6.12
Source: AMECO database, European Commission.34
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As the story goes, so-called surplus countries like Ger-
many were able to compete more effectively in inter-
national markets (e.g. by keeping wages low) and then 
invested abroad the surplus of its trade balance, thus 
financing the commercial deficit of other less well-per-
forming countries, the deficit countries like Spain. This 
view, however, cannot explain some of the key facts 
discussed in Box 1.2. In particular, it does not explain 
why the ‘surplus’ countries typically saw their saving 
rate soar during the boom period while deficit countries 
experienced the opposite, as illustrated in Figure 1.8 (16).
The remainder of this section argues that the deteri-
oration of the trade balance is only reflecting capital 
flows — in turn reflecting differences in asset prices 
across countries — and that external competitiveness, 
as measured by export performance, was neither play-
ing an important role in this deterioration nor being 
substantially affected by these developments. In other 
words, as we shall discuss below, in the EU trade deficits 
were related to significant capital flows within Member 
States while external competitiveness seemed to be 
more related to developments in productivity.
1.3.3.  Rising unit labour costs, cause or consequence?
The boom years witnessed a major increase in unit 
labour costs (ULC) in certain countries, generally the so-
called deficit countries. It has been suggested that large 
(16)  Box 1.5 below examines in detail the cases of Germany and Spain. Both 
before and during the crisis, these countries constitute two polar cases as far 
as the experience of the last decade is concerned.
(17)  In European Commission documentation an imbalance only occurs when 
there is a market or policy failure. Hence, housing bubbles like those exam-
ined in this chapter would be indeed classified as an imbalance.
increases in ULC could explain, if not the crisis, at least its 
depth and duration.
However, the development of ULC does not seem to 
have had a significant effect beyond being associated 
with corresponding increases in the general level of 
prices. As discussed below, if there is a relation between 
ULC and export performance, it is weak and of a second-
ary order of magnitude compared with the deterioration 
of the trade balance (and hence the former cannot be 
the cause of the latter).
A bubble economy may affect the development of 
wages because the inflows of capital will not be entirely 
directed to the demand for foreign goods. As these 
flows increase demand for domestic goods beyond 
productivity, domestic prices will rise, thereby applying 
upward pressure on nominal wages and increasing ULC. 
But this is a nominal effect, not necessarily affecting real 
wages in net terms (18).
Figure 1.11(a) can thus be seen as not only reflecting 
a logical relation between nominal wages and prices, 
but also suggesting that real wages did not deviate 
from productivity that much during the boom period. 
This can be seen from the absence of any link between 
nominal unit labour costs and the share of ‘compensa-
tion of labour’ in national income, i.e. real unit labour 
costs, in Figure 1.11(b). Changes in the general level of 
prices have brought down real wages and left labour’s 
share of income at its slightly declining level of recent 
years.
(18)  Even inside a monetary union, this nominal effect is not necessarily translated 
into a real effect; it will depend on the extent to which these wage distortions 
are concentrated in non-tradables or tradables sectors; see Box 1.4 below.
Box 1.3: Imbalances do not (necessarily) reflect distortions
If two trading countries, for whatever institutional reasons, have two different saving rates, they will always have 
a commercial deficit and surplus respectively, because the saving country will permanently finance a level of 
imports higher than exports in the consuming country. This type of equilibrium is sometimes said to entail an 
‘imbalance’ in the literature (17). However, as long as prices correctly reflect preferences and technology, it does 
not need to reflect any fundamental problem. A typical case would be fast catching-up developing countries that 
constitute attractive investment opportunities.
In contrast, when some prices are sending the wrong signal, similar ‘imbalances’ may be reflecting true distor-
tions that, accumulated, may lead to an adjustment process that can take the form of a recession like the current 
one. The flows of capital referred to in Section 1.3.1 reflected the overpricing of certain assets in certain countries. 
Correcting this deviation of prices from the fundamental value of the assets was the first stage in readjusting the 
consumption-saving behaviour of households and was the ultimate cause of the downturn.
In other words, an ‘imbalance’ may or may not signal an underlying problem, depending on whether it reflects 
some mispricing. That is most likely the reason why even ex post there is no consensus on whether the so-called 
‘global imbalances’ are at the origin of the crisis (see Suominen (2010) and references therein).35
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monised index of consumer prices) grew by 18 % and 
ULC by 14 %, and the share of labour in income fell by 
5 % (see again Figure 1.11(b)) (19).
(19)  Manipulating the definition of ULC, one can prove that the gap between the 
growth rates of ULC and the general level of prices is approximately the per-
centage change in the share of wages in income.
To test this conjecture one can compare the increase 
in nominal wages over the general level of prices with 
the increase in productivity. This is done in Figure 1.12, 
where it can be seen that, with some exceptions, wher-
ever nominal wages increased over the general level of 
prices during the boom years, it was because produc-
tivity was increasing by a similar magnitude. That real 
wages have not grown beyond productivity in most 
European economies is confirmed by the general down-
ward trend of the share of wages in national income 
during 2000–07: for the EU-27 as a whole, prices (har-
Figure 1.11:   Rising unit labour costs, inflation and the share of labour in income
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Figure 1.12:   Real wages and productivity: changes 2000–07
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1.3.4.  World market shares
The emphasis on nominal labour costs is generally justi-
fied by the open character of our economies. However, 
exports’ performance, as measured by world market 
shares, does not seem to be affected by changing labour 
costs either — even if there is a good reason for this to 
be the case in theory, at least within the euro area.
It is not surprising, then, that the rise in unit labour costs 
bears no relation to the changes in unemployment rates 
during this period (Figure 1.13). In short, labour market 
institutions do not seem to have played any great role 
in the boom period beyond their ability or inability to 
track productivity without causing inflation (mostly in 
non-tradables sectors, see Box 1.4).
Figure 1.13:   Rising unit labour costs and unemployment
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Figure 1.14:   Rising unit labour costs and changing world market shares
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to a compound effect resulting from the fast increase of 
the level of trade during this period, in turn due to the 
rise of emerging economies.
The focus, however, should be on Figure 1.18. It is in 
regard of this figure that it is clear that countries with 
a housing bubble — inside the euro area like Spain or 
outside it like Denmark — retained their market share 
reasonably well. Germany increased its export share by 
10 % but the contribution of intra- and extra-EU trade is 
roughly the same; France lost ground in both intra- and 
extra-EU markets, and by the same magnitude as the UK, 
which is not in the euro area. This is evidence against 
the hypothesis that countries like Spain or France, with 
relatively high unit labour costs, have lost market shares 
to countries like Germany, with lower unit labour costs, 
because of a deterioration of ‘cost-competitiveness’ in 
the euro area.
In principle, increasing the nominal cost of labour may 
affect the competitive position of domestic firms in inter-
national markets. This is particularly true in countries in 
a monetary union where there is no national currency, 
and hence no possibility of depreciation or devalu-
ation. However, Figure 1.14 compares the changes 
in nominal unit labour costs in the boom period with 
changes in world market shares as measured by the 
share of exports in total world exports; the only obvious 
fact that arises from this chart is the large expansion in 
EU-12 Member States in this post-enlargement period. 
Focusing on intra-EU trade and distinguishing between 
euro area and non-euro area countries does not reveal 
any obvious pattern either.
One possible explanation for the lack of any relation 
between ULC and export shares is that trading sectors 
face competitive pressures that prevent nominal wages 
growing much faster than productivity or, alternatively, 
limit the ability of firms to pass the increasing cost of 
labour through to higher prices. There is some evidence 
for this (see Box 1.4).
The share of exports in world exports for most European 
countries has been roughly constant or decreasing since 
2000. This general decreasing trend is most likely due 
Figure 1.15:   Rising unit labour costs and intra-EU trade for euro and non-euro areas
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Box 1.4: Unit labour costs in tradables and non-tradables
Most economic activity in large countries is domestic. The aggregate evolution of unit labour costs (ULC) may 
reflect wage developments in sectors not exposed to trade. A case in point is that of Spain, an economy displaying 
one of the largest housing bubbles as well as one of the largest increases in ULC. In the boom times the general 
level of prices rose by 24 %, 8 points above euro area inflation. Nevertheless, the deflator of exports rose by 15 %, 
a point below the euro area level. This is no exception: the long-term behaviour of ULC differs between tradables 
and non-tradables as illustrated in Figure 1.16 for the EU as a whole.
This differing behaviour may stem from two different forces. On the one hand, industry, typically producing trad-
ables, is more exposed to international competition than are services. On the other hand, the faster productivity 
growth in manufacturing compared with services may also explain a large share of this differing behaviour.
Figure 1.16:   Sectoral unit labour costs in the EU-27; index 1995 = 100
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Figure 1.17:   Share of exports in world exports 2000–07
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estate bubble and the performance of exports during 
the boom period. In other words, the growing imbal-
ances of the boom period do not seem to have had a 
very clear impact on external competitiveness; if any 
impact, this happened through growing nominal labour 
1.3.5.  Summary
In short, net exports only reflect capital flows caused 
by mispriced assets, not losses of external competitive-
ness. In fact, there is no clear relation between the real 
Figure 1.18:   Contribution to changes in the share of exports in world exports 2000–07  
by extra- and intra-EU trade
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1.4.    The impact of the boom on industry and 
competitiveness
From the discussion in the previous section, the boom 
period does not seem to have had any obvious impact 
on external competitiveness as measured by the ability 
to maintain export shares. True, the boom period has 
affected nominal wages and prices but there is no sys-
tematic impact on exports. Countries like France with 
moderate increases in ULC or even reductions in real 
effective exchange rates (REER) (21) have lost substantial 
international market shares (see again Figure 1.18) while 
others, like Spain, with large increases in ULC and REER, 
have more or less kept their market shares.
Nevertheless, this lack of impact on exports (exter-
nal competitiveness) does not rule out the possibility 
that these developments may have distorted the way 
resources are allocated within countries and across 
sectors, hampering productivity growth in the years to 
come (competitiveness as productivity growth).
(21)  The real effective exchange rate (REER) is another common indicator of exter-
nal competitiveness; see Graph I.1 in European Commission (2010a).
costs, and of a secondary order of magnitude compared 
with the accumulated imbalances and the ensuing con-
traction (20).
What about productivity growth? If large capital inflows 
during the boom period are not used productively to 
eventually generate resources to pay back the exter-
nal debt, they are hampering the ability of countries to 
generate income in the future while at the same time 
increasing the interest burden on these economies.
This is the possibility explored in the next section.
(20)  At this point it may be worth recalling that this chapter examines the impact 
of growing imbalances in competitiveness and external competitiveness. To 
conclude that the evolution of the ability to export does not seem to bear 
a clear relationship to these imbalances is not to say that they are not fun-
damental to understand the crisis and the recovery. First, countries more 
affected by these distortions tended afterwards to be more hard hit by the 
recession, as illustrated in Figure 1.10. Second, the accumulation of imbal-
ances yielded in many cases a leveraged household and corporate sector — 
this is a promise of a slow recovery in countries affected by the bubble (see 
Kocherlakota (2010) and McKinsey Global Institute (2010)).
Figure 1.19:   Changes in productive investment and investment in dwellings in 2000–06
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gate level. (Productive investment here is gross fixed 
capital formation excluding dwellings but including 
non-residential construction and civil engineering.) In 
other words, countries that increased considerably their 
investment in dwellings also increased their productive 
investment.
1.4.1.    Has the housing bubble crowded out productive 
investment?
The most obvious distortion one would expect is not 
apparent: it does not seem that investment in dwell-
ings crowded out productive investment at the aggre-
Figure 1.20:   Changes in lending/borrowing position and productive investment in 2000–06
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Box 1.5: Two polar cases
The cases of Spain and Germany illustrate two contrasting experiences in the boom period. Examining the differ-
ent paths followed by these two economies may help us to understand the imbalances and the different behav-
iour during the subsequent adjustment.
One major argument is that unit labour costs are not growing enough in Germany. Figure 1.21 shows for 2000–07 
nominal compensation per employee and productivity defined as real value added per person in employment in 
the respective sector.
A glance at these charts reveals two significant differences. First, unit labour costs (ULC), the ratio of these indexes, 
are increasing in all sectors in the Spanish economy and decreasing in most German sectors. Second, productivity 
is up in most German sectors, often on a significant scale, while for Spanish sectors productivity is either falling 
or growing only modestly. In the light of the discussion about the role of aggregate ULC and export performance 
in the previous section, the second fact is more likely to be the relevant one, and the one explaining the roughly 
10 % increase in market share of German exports in 2000–07.
This interpretation is further strengthened by Table 1.6. As mentioned above, the two countries differ markedly 
in their experience over recent years. In particular, ULC increased significantly in Spain during the boom period. 
However, these differences are not reflected in the distribution of exports between the EU and the rest of the 
world. If anything, between 2000 and 2007 Spain displays a slight bias towards low-tech exports. For Germany 
there is no obvious trend; this is consistent with Figure 1.18 above, where the increase in the world market shares 
of Germany is shown to be due as much to intra-EU trade as to extra-EU trade.44
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Figure 1.21:   Nominal wages and productivity in 2007 (index 2000 = 100)
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In this context, countries affected by the housing boom 
showed different patterns regarding manufacturing. 
In Spain, for example, employment in manufacturing 
increased (3.5 %), especially in manufacturing of food, 
chemicals, rubber products, mineral and metal prod-
ucts, machinery and transport equipment — taking into 
account branches with larger relative weights. At the 
same time, the number of people employed in manu-
facturing in Ireland fell by 8 %, with decreases virtually 
across the board.
If there is any distortion, it is that countries engaged 
in heavy borrowing have also increased their produc-
tive investment. It is a small effect, though; from Figure 
1.20 it is clear that the largest changes in productive 
investment in 2000–06 occurred in new Member States, 
which were also the target of substantial foreign direct 
investment.
1.4.2.  Employment growth in construction and real 
estate services
In 2000–07 employment in the EU-27 increased by more 
than 6 %, from 211 million to 224 million. The employ-
ment rate improved by more than 3 percentage points 
in 2000–07 (see Table 1.7). Some of the countries with 
low or average employment at the beginning of the 
decade managed to increase their rates to close to the 
Lisbon target (e.g. Estonia, Ireland and Latvia).
Table 1.6: Export characteristics — A comparison between Germany and Spain
Germany Spain
Share of 
exports over 
total exports
Share of 
exports to the 
EU over total 
exports
Share of 
exports over 
total exports
Share of 
exports to the 
EU over total 
exports
2000 2007 2000 2007 2000 2007 2000 2007
CTOTAL GRAND TOTAL 100.0 100.0 63.2 63.3 100.0 100.0 72.4 70.0
C01T05 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.9 0.7 65.9 75.1 6.0 5.4 90.7 90.0
C10T14 Mining and quarrying 0.2 0.2 80.5 79.1 0.5 0.5 51.8 46.4
C15T37 Total manufacturing 96.0 91.2 63.3 62.1 91.6 91.4 72.2 70.1
C15T16 + Food beverages and tobacco 4.0 3.9 80.9 81.4 8.1 8.6 71.9 74.9
C17T19 + Textiles leather and footwear 3.8 2.7 74.6 72.9 6.4 5.5 67.4 66.4
C20 + Wood and cork 0.6 0.7 70.7 72.4 0.7 0.7 73.2 72.3
C21T22 + Pulp paper printing and publishing 3.2 2.8 72.9 73.2 3.1 2.5 69.7 74.8
C23T25 + Chemical rubber plastics and fuel 17.1 18.3 59.0 62.7 16.2 19.9 62.7 58.3
C26 + Non-metallic products 1.4 1.2 64.2 63.1 3.3 2.9 60.1 64.8
C27T28 + Basic metals and fabricated metal products 7.9 9.0 68.8 67.5 7.8 9.9 69.4 75.2
C29T33 + Machinery and equipment 33.0 30.2 60.0 53.5 16.3 14.4 68.9 64.1
C34T35 + Transport equipment 23.2 21.2 62.6 63.3 27.5 25.3 84.0 80.1
C36T37 + Manufacturing n.e.c. and recycling 1.9 1.8 66.2 71.2 2.3 1.7 65.9 68.5
HITECH High technology manufactures 19.1 17.3 60.8 61.1 9.3 9.5 70.8 68.8
MHTECH Medium-high technology   manufactures 48.0 46.7 59.8 57.3 42.9 41.4 79.1 74.7
MLTECH Medium-low technology   manufactures 14.1 15.9 67.4 66.4 18.8 21.6 60.0 60.3
LOTECH Low technology manufactures 13.4 11.9 74.7 75.5 20.6 19.0 69.5 71.8
ICTMAN ICT manufactures 11.3 8.9 66.7 60.7 6.0 4.0 76.0 78.0
Source: OECD STAN bilateral trade and own calculations.46
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the labour market but the role of immigrant workers 
became important: they helped to alleviate capacity 
constraints in the sector and at the same time contrib-
uted to the increasing demand for housing (23).
(23)  See Aherne et al. (2008).
As expected, the role of construction in employment 
changed considerably during 2000–07 (at the EU level 
by 17 %, which is more than 2 million people in absolute 
terms). A significant drop can be observed only in Ger-
many, Austria and Portugal, while the role of construc-
tion gained in importance in almost all the other coun-
tries, especially in Ireland, Spain and the Baltic states 
(see Table 1.8) (22). Generally, this can be explained on 
the one hand by rising demand for housing requiring 
huge numbers of construction workers, and by huge 
infrastructural development works (motorways, roads, 
railways, etc.) on the other. The share of construction in 
total employment exceeded 13 % in Ireland and Spain 
(see Figure 1.23). This could have caused tensions in 
(22)  Bover and Jimeno (2007) examined the relationship between house prices 
and labour demand in the construction sector. They found substantial cross-
country differences in the time series correlation of house prices and sectoral 
composition of employment. Countries with more building possibilities, like 
Spain, experienced a high sectoral allocation of employment and displayed 
larger elasticities of labour demand in construction with respect to house 
prices than countries that were not affected by the housing boom. 
Table 1.7: Employment rates
2000 2007 Growth in employment rates, 
2000–07, percentage points Employment rates, %
EU–27 62.2 65.4 3.2
Belgium 60.5 62.0 1.5
Bulgaria 50.4 61.7 11.3
Czech Republic 65.0 66.1 1.1
Denmark 76.3 77.1 0.8
Germany  65.6 69.4 3.8
Estonia 60.4 69.4 9.0
Ireland 65.2 69.1 3.9
Greece 56.5 61.4 4.9
Spain 56.3 65.6 9.3
France 62.1 64.3 2.2
Italy 53.7 58.7 5.0
Cyprus 65.7 71.0 5.3
Latvia 57.5 68.3 10.8
Lithuania 59.1 64.9 5.8
Luxembourg  62.7 64.2 1.5
Hungary 56.3 57.3 1.0
Malta 54.2 54.6 0.4
Netherlands 72.9 76.0 3.1
Austria 68.5 71.4 2.9
Poland 55.0 57.0 2.0
Portugal 68.4 67.8 - 0.6
Romania 63.0 58.8 - 4.2
Slovenia 62.8 67.8 5.0
Slovakia 56.8 60.7 3.9
Finland 67.2 70.3 3.1
Sweden 73.0 74.2 1.2
United Kingdom 71.2 71.5 0.3
United States 74.1 71.8 - 2.3
Japan 68.9 70.7 1.8
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.47
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in Ireland (24). Finally, the growing importance of hous-
ing investment was reflected in the growing number 
of employees in the real estate sector (almost 500 000 
  people — a 24 % increase at the EU level). Real estate, 
renting and business activities together registered an 
increase of 5.8 million employees (26 %), with ‘other busi-
ness activities’ (NACE 74) playing the most significant role.
(24)  More widely available and lower-cost housing financing contributed to the 
rapid growth of mortgage debt in several countries (IMF, 2008). For instance 
in Ireland, residential mortgage lending grew annually by 25 % on average in 
the period 2000–06 (Malzubris, 2008). In Estonia credit inflows progressively 
accelerated: gross debt liabilities increased on average by 32 % annually in 
2005–07 and by 20 % in 2000–04 (Lamine, 2008). 
Another activity related to the housing boom is the bank-
ing sector. The role of the financial sector in employ-
ment increased, especially in the countries affected by 
the housing boom and where the role of external finan-
cial sources became more important in those years. 
Significant increases occurred in most new Member 
States (the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland) and 
Figure 1.22:   Employment in construction out of total employment
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Figure 1.23:   Changes in value added and productivity in the EU-25 (*) in the boom period 2000–07
- 30 - 10 10 - 20 0 20 30 40 50 60
Chemicals and chemical products
Coke, re￿ned petroleum and nuclear fuel
Rubber and plastics
Basic metals and fabricated metal
Machinery, n.e.c.
Transport equipment
Other non-metallic mineral
Electrical and optical equipment
Manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling
Electricity, gas and water supply
Construction
Wholesale and retail trade
Hotels and restaurants
Transport and storage and communication
Transport and storage
Post and telecommunications
Finance, real estate and business services
Financial intermediation
Real estate, renting and business activities
Real estate activities
Renting of m&eq (**) and other business activities
Community social and personal services
Public administration and defence
Other community, social and personal services
Private households with employed persons
Education
Health and social work
Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel
Wood and of wood and cork
Textiles, textile, leather and footwear
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and ￿shing
Total industries
Pulp, paper, printing and publishing
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(*) The EU-25 refers to Member States as of 1 May 2004.
(**) machinery and equipment.
Source: EU KLEMS research database and own calculations.50
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In countries affected by the housing boom (e.g. Estonia, 
Ireland, Spain, United Kingdom) the relative weight of 
manufacturing investment shrank considerably during 
this period. In these economies real investments were 
typically reallocated to the non-tradable sectors (25), 
especially to construction and real estate (26). These fig-
ures come, however, with a caveat: it is difficult to dis-
entangle this drop and the increasing role of market 
services compared with manufacturing in the European 
economy (a long-term structural trend) (27). Figure 1.24 
depicts the evolution of investment by type of assets in 
the EU-27. Taking into account the asset type distribu-
tion of gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), the role of 
housing and other construction investment increased 
significantly in the EU during the review period. At the 
same time the share of metal products and machinery 
dropped considerably. This points partly to less invest-
ment in tradable sectors, but it is also in line with a gross 
value added share and employment loss in manufactur-
ing and the increasing role of services in general.
(25)  Brixiova et al. (2009).
(26)  In Estonia, for instance, the shares of the construction and the real estate 
sectors in total fixed investment exceeded the weight of the sectors in total 
value added, while in manufacturing the investment share fell increasingly 
below the share in total value added in 2005–07 (Lamine, 2008).
(27)  European Commission (2004).
Inspection of productivity changes at the sectoral level 
does not reveal a very clear pattern. Again, it is diffi-
cult to disentangle the possible impact of the boom 
years from secular trends. Breaking down productivity 
changes by broad sectors shows, not surprisingly, that 
it is in industry where the largest increases in productiv-
ity, 10 %, are recorded (which could possibly explain the 
behaviour of export shares, see Figure 1.17). The only 
clear impact of the housing boom is in the construc-
tion and real estate sectors: productivity was down in 
construction by more than 5 %, mainly because of the 
flow of workers (particularly migrant workers) reflected 
in Figure 1.22.
1.4.3.  The allocation of productive investment
In Section 1.4.1 we argued that aggregate productive 
investment was not crowded out by investment in 
dwellings. Another kind of distortion, however, would 
be that part of this productive investment was dispro-
portionately directed to housing-related sectors to the 
detriment of other productive sectors. There is some 
evidence in this direction.
Figure 1.24:   GFCF in the EU-27 by asset types (in % of GDP)
0 %
25 %
20 %
10 %
15 %
5 %
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Other construction Construction housing Other products
Agriculture Transport Metal products and machinery
6.4 %
2.0 %
5.0 %
5.7 %
1.5 %
6.1 %
1.9 %
4.9 %
5.7 %
1.6 %
5.6 %
1.9 %
4.9 %
5.6 %
1.6 %
5.2 %
1.9 %
5.1 %
5.7 %
1.6 %
5.2 %
1.9 %
5.2 %
5.7 %
1.6 %
5.3 %
1.9 %
5.4 %
5.8 %
1.6 %
5.3 %
2.0 %
5.7 %
6.0 %
1.7 %
5.6 %
2.1 %
5.7 %
6.2 %
1.7 %
Source: Eurostat, national accounts and own calculations.51
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estate activities. It is not clear, however, whether the 
magnitude of this distortion is enough to provoke a 
prod      uctivity slowdown in the coming years.
1.5.  The impact of the crisis on industry
Both by international standards and in comparison with 
other parts of the EU economy, the EU manufacturing 
and construction industries were very severely hit by the 
global recession. Output dropped in all sectors but one, 
and jobs were lost on a massive scale.
1.4.4.  Summary
In short, if the boom years have affected future prod-
uctivity growth, the effect does not seem to be obvi-
ous. Apart from the growth in employment in hous-
ing-related sectors, there is no obvious deviation from 
secular trends: decreasing weight of manufacturing in 
employment and value added caused by faster prod-
uctivity growth relative to services. If anything, there 
is some evidence that productive investment has been 
disproportionately directed to construction and real 52
European Competitiveness Report 2010
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ter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2010. By mid-2009 out-
put had dropped by even more, but it then started to 
recover and this general recovery has continued in 2010. 
The volume of output is now some 7 % higher than at 
the lowest point in 2009, and around a quarter of the 
total drop from the 2008 peak to the 2009 nadir has 
been recovered.
However, as Figure 1.25 shows, the overall recovery is 
not reflected in all manufacturing sectors. In some sec-
tors (notably furniture, coke and refined petroleum 
products, tobacco products and beverages) output is 
still diminishing and may not yet have reached its low-
est level. In other sectors the drop in output was far 
greater than the average manufacturing output loss 
(motor vehicles, trailers and semitrailers - 39.5 %; basic 
metals - 35.8 %; machinery and equipment - 30.5 %), 
and although output has since started to recover it still 
has some way to go to make up the average of nearly 
- 15 % across all manufacturing sectors, as reflected in 
Figure 1.25.
The effects of the crisis were not identical across sec-
tors, however. Some manufacturing sectors fared better 
than manufacturing as a whole, and others considerably 
worse. Examples of sectors outperforming other manu-
facturing sectors during the crisis include food products 
and basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical 
preparations. At the other end of the scale, sectors such 
as motor vehicles, trailers and semitrailers, machinery 
and equipment, textiles, wearing apparel, leather and 
leather-related products suffered the greatest job losses 
and output reductions. The construction industry, being 
highly cyclical, also falls in the latter category.
Whereas manufacturing industry as a whole started to 
recover by mid-2010, some of the worst-affected manu-
facturing sectors were still shrinking and may not yet 
have reached their lowest level and the start of recovery. 
A similar scenario might await the construction industry.
1.5.1.  Output
Across the manufacturing industry as a whole, output 
fell by almost 15 % from its cyclical peak in the first quar-
Figure 1.25:   Construction and manufacturing sector output in first-quarter 2010  
(index first-quarter 2008 = 100)
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recession, representing very weak investment activ-
ity in the business sector. These two categories, given 
their large shares in total, had the most significant effect 
on the production index of total industry. Households 
responded to the changed circumstances quite rapidly, 
as reflected in the sharp contraction for durable goods. 
Non-durable consumer goods recorded only a maxi-
mum drop of 5 % compared with the pre-crisis peak.
Looking at individual EU countries’ performance in 
industries, the largest GDP contraction and decline in 
industrial output occurred in small open economies 
like Estonia or Slovakia, but their impact on EU indus-
trial output as a whole was not significant, because of 
their relatively small weights. In contrast, Germany, 
representing the highest share in EU industrial out-
put, contributed considerably to the fall in EU indus-
trial performance. Italy, representing the fourth largest 
weight in industrial value added, showed the second 
largest impact on the overall EU industrial production 
index (28).
1.5.2.  Employment
Employment in manufacturing industry, which accounts 
for around 16 % of total EU employment, fell by 11.8 % 
from its peak in the first quarter of 2008 to the first quar-
ter of 2010. Though it fell short of the 15 % reduction in 
output over the same period, the fall nonetheless meant 
(28)  European Commission (2010c).
The figure also shows the remarkable resilience of the 
pharmaceutical sector (basic pharmaceutical products 
and pharmaceutical preparations), where output now 
stands at a higher level than in 2008. The recession ini-
tially caused output to drop slightly in the pharmaceut-
ical sector too, but it quickly returned to positive growth 
and has since bucked the trend of negative growth in 
other sectors. The food sector has also been able to keep 
up production remarkably well in spite of initial output 
reductions and despite having had to shed more than 
3 % of its workforce (see the next section).
Output in the construction industry fell by 16.2 % from 
the first quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2010, and 
may have fallen further since. As in some manufacturing 
sectors, the construction industry may yet have to reach 
it lowest output level of this cyclical downturn before 
returning to positive growth.
Taking into account the change of production and 
employment in terms of end-use categories (inter-
mediate goods, capital goods, consumer durables, con-
sumer non-durables and energy) the following can be 
observed.
Intermediate goods (accounting for the largest weight 
of the total) suffered most during the crisis, indicating 
significantly less demand for goods used in manufac-
turing production. Production of capital goods showed 
the largest drop as compared to the period before the 
Figure 1.26:   Production index change of end-use categories in the EU-27
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that more than 4 million jobs were lost in manufactur-
ing, representing nearly two thirds of all job losses in the 
EU from the first quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 
2010. No other part of the EU economy has suffered job 
losses on a similar scale.
Employment diminished in all manufacturing sectors 
from the first quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2010; 
in two sectors, textiles and wearing apparel, job losses 
were in excess of 20 %. The manufacture of leather and 
related products also suffered similar cuts in numbers. 
This is the reason for the diminished shares of overall 
employment for these three sectors in Figure 1.27. It 
is worth noting that while the job losses in the textiles 
and leather sectors were proportionate to the out-
put reductions in those sectors from 2008 to 2010, the 
wearing apparel sector employed 22.5 % fewer   people 
in the first quarter of 2010 than the same quarter of 
2008 but the remaining workforce produced more than 
85 % of the 2008 sector output, reflecting higher labour 
productivity.
Several manufacturing sectors reported job losses of 
less than 5 % during the period: food products (- 3.1 %), 
basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical 
preparations (- 4.0 %) and coke and refined petroleum 
products (- 4.9 %). This explains why the relative shares 
of these three sectors in overall employment increased 
between 2008 and 2010, as depicted in Figure 1.27.
Employment in the construction industry, which repre-
sents around 6 % of total EU employment, fell by 13.9 % 
from the first quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2010, 
or by more than 2 million jobs. As a consequence, the 
share in overall employment of manufacturing and con-
struction diminished from 30.5 % to 30.1 %.
As regards end-use categories, however, the largest 
drops were registered in capital and intermediate goods 
in terms of production, while job losses were more sig-
nificant in other categories (durables and non-durables). 
Comparing the two figures (Figures 1.26 and 1.28), it 
can be seen that while enterprises responded to the 
changed circumstances very fast by reducing produc-
tion, job losses were more gradual and more protracted.
1.6.  Conclusions
The European Union is in the midst of a considerable 
downturn. The recession originated in a major readjust-
ment of consumption and saving behaviour of house-
holds after a boom period in which considerable dis-
tortions were accumulated — in other words, a classic 
demand-side recession.
A close inspection of the boom years 2000–07 shows 
that if these growing distortions had any impact on 
competitiveness, it was probably only modest and 
mostly associated with distortions in the allocation 
of labour across sectors within countries affected by a 
speculative bubble. External competitiveness does not 
seem to have been affected by these developments; 
large increases in unit labour costs in some Member 
Figure 1.27:   Industry sectors and construction, relative shares of employment
30.5 %
8.1 %
8.7 %
7.6 %
4.7 %
3.8 %
4.1 % 3.6 %
3.6 %
3.6 %
3.3 %
2.6 %
2.9 %
2.4 %
2.6 %
1.9 %
1.5 %
1.2 %
1.3 %
1.0 %
0.4 %
0.3 %
0.3 %
0.1 %
30.1 %
8.9 %
8.6 %
7.8 %
4.8 %
3.9 %
3.8 % 3.7 %
3.7 %
3.4 %
3.0 %
2.8 %
2.7 %
2.4 %
2.3 %
2.0 %
1.5 %
1.3 %
1.2 %
1.0 %
0.4 %
0.4 %
0.3 %
0.1 %
Construction
Food products
Metal products
Machinery, equipment
Motor vehicles
Recorded media
Furniture
Rubber/plastic products
Electrical equipment
Non-metallic mineral products
Wearing apparel
Chemical products
Wood products
Basic metals
Textiles
Transport equipment
Paper products
Pharmaceutical products
Leather products
Beverages
Other manufacturing
Coke, petroleum
Computers, electronics
Tobacco products
Note:  Employment in first-quarter 2008 (55 million) and first-quarter 2010 (48.5 million).
Source:   Monthly note on economic recovery in manufacturing, construction, and selected service industries, Enterprise and Industry 
DG, European Commission, June 2010.56
European Competitiveness Report 2010
that are more severely affected by the crisis are likely to 
undergo a longer readjustment process, especially as far 
as employment is concerned, because of the construc-
tion sector workers who will have to be redeployed to 
other sectors. Other countries which suffered collateral 
damage through trade and integration in the global 
supply chain will probably recover faster.
States have not been reflected in the share of exports in 
world trade, even within the euro area. One explanation 
for this apparent paradox may be the different setting of 
nominal wages in the tradable and non-tradable sectors. 
In turn, these differences may also explain the growth in 
employment of some domestic sectors in bubble econ-
omies, notably the construction sector. Those countries 
Figure 1.28:   Labour input index change of end-use categories in the EU-27
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2.1.  Introduction
Where does your mobile come from? This simple 
question is not easy to answer. It has probably been 
assembled using components from different countries, 
using services both from domestic and foreign econ-
omies. This multi-country nature of products is not just 
a feature of more complex high-tech products such 
as mobile phones and cars. Rarely is a product made 
up entirely of components or inputs from the country 
where it is finally assembled or sold; at least some of the 
components and services involved to bring the product 
to the customer are often purchased abroad. This is the 
case for direct inputs, when firms purchase intermediate 
inputs for production domestically and abroad, but even 
more so for indirect inputs. A component from a par-
ticular country might already include other inputs from 
other countries, and these are thus used indirectly for 
production purposes. Conversely, companies might ship 
high-tech components to other countries where assem-
bly of the final product takes place. The complex nature 
of supply chains at a detailed level of individual prod-
ucts has been documented in a number of case stud-
ies for various products, such as T-shirts (Rivoli, 2004), 
Barbie dolls (Tempest, 1996), computers (Kraemer and 
Dedrick, 2002), the iPod (Linden, Kraemer and Dedrick, 
2007; Varian, 2007) and Boeing (Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2009).
The purpose of the study
The aim of this chapter is to shed light on the rela-
tive importance of trade in intermediates in overall 
trade for the EU-27 and individual country groups, its 
specific structure and trends over time. The chapter 
therefore answers the following questions: What is 
the extent of trade in intermediate products in overall 
trade, in both exports and imports? Has the share of 
intermediate trade changed over time and, if so, was 
this driven within or between sectoral shifts? Are there 
specific differences in the way that some countries 
mostly act as providers and others as users of inter-
mediate inputs?
Section 2 of this chapter analyses specialisation patterns 
with respect to intermediate trade across countries. 
The magnitude of two-way trade and the geographical 
structure of intermediates over time are also analysed.
The importance of trade in intermediates with respect 
to user industries is analysed in Section 3 for the follow-
ing questions. What is the extent of intra-industry link-
ages across particular industry groups, including service 
industries, and — more importantly for this study — 
what is the share of imported intermediates across these 
industry groups and to what extent has this changed 
over time? Given the complex nature of the inter  -
national production process, the chapter also provides a 
detailed case study for a particular product, addressing 
the question: Who captures the value of the production 
process?
The economic crisis has had a severe impact on trade 
flows, and trade in intermediates may have played a par-
ticular role. The effect of the financial crisis on intermedi-
ates trade is analysed in Section 4 where the following 
questions are addressed: To what extent has trade in 
intermediates been more affected than other product 
categories? Does the stronger impact on intermediates’ 
trade stem from an overall decline in trade for industries 
with high shares of parts and components trade, or has 
there been a common break which has led to an overall 
disruption of supply chains?
These questions have to be addressed at different   levels 
of analysis: at the level of the total economy, for par-
ticular industries or product groups and, finally, at the 
level of individual firms or even products. At the more 
aggregate levels, the complex nature of international 
linkages is reflected particularly in trade patterns reflect-
ing aggregate supply chains. This chapter therefore also 
contains analyses at different levels of aggregation, 
using detailed trade data, and data from input-output 
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ucts in total imports and exports for each of the four 
product categories in 2008 (30). The share of imported 
intermediate inputs for the EU-27 is 53.7 %, and thus 
accounts for the greatest bulk of imports. Consumer 
goods are the second largest category, with 22.6 %, 
closely followed by capital goods (17.6 %). This broad 
structure of imports is found in most countries, with few 
exceptions. Along with Germany, five central and east 
European countries (Slovenia, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia) show the highest shares of inter-
mediates. One explanation for this could be that these 
countries are more specialised in manufacturing, and 
that industries in these countries find cross-border pro-
duction networks particularly important. This will be dis-
cussed in further detail below.
Table 2.1 also indicates that exports of intermediates 
constitute an important part of trade for all countries. 
Patterns of intermediate exports are compared to the 
other categories of goods. Shares of the different prod-
uct categories for the EU-27 are very similar to those for 
imports. Intermediate goods account for more than half 
of exports, with a share of 53.7 %, while exports of con-
sumer goods and capital goods account for 22.6 % and 
17.6 % respectively.
The observed large shares of intermediate imports and 
exports in almost all countries indicate that a clear dis-
tinction between typical outsourcing and target coun-
tries is not useful, so such classifications have to be 
made with caution. Furthermore, this points towards the 
existence of a significant amount of intra-product trade, 
which will be considered in more detail below.
So far, analyses have focused on the situation in 2008. 
The public and academic debate on trade in intermedi-
ates has as its major concern the changes with respect 
to the importance of trade in intermediates and the rela-
tive importance of cross-border production networks. 
On this question, Table 2.2 presents an index of nom-
inal import and export values for 2008, expressed as an 
index where the value in 1999 equals 1. The respective 
changes in shares are expressed in percentage points 
for the four end-use categories between 1999 and 2008.
The value of EU-27 intermediate imports increased 
faster than other categories of goods, by 85 %, closely 
followed by consumer goods imports, which increased 
by 82 %. This resulted in a 2.75 % higher share of inter-
mediates in 2008 compared to 1999. Consequently, 
the shares of capital goods and the mixed product cat-
egory fell. However, some individual countries experi-
enced much stronger increases in the value of inter-
mediate imports over this period, for all product types. 
This group of countries mainly consists of the EU-12, 
(30)  Detailed explanations on data used and classifications applied in the study 
can be found in the annex.
statistics. There is also a case study for a particular prod-
uct, the Nokia N95. For a detailed description of the data 
used, see Annex A. Each of these datasets has its merits. 
Detailed product level trade data allows for differentiat-
ing products regarding their use as intermediate inputs, 
capital goods or consumer goods or at even more 
detailed categories, though such a distinction might not 
be clear in a number of cases (29).
Relying solely on trade statistics, however, does not 
provide a complete picture of manufacturing supply 
chains. In particular, it does not reveal cross-industry dif-
ferences with respect to sourcing structures. The reason 
for this is that imports of intermediate products cannot 
be attributed to industries using trade statistics. As an 
example, even if there are data on the imports of a par-
ticular intermediate product, trade data cannot show 
which industries imported the products, nor the extent 
to which the imports are used in the production process. 
This can, however, be studied using information from 
input-output tables as discussed in detail below. At the 
level of particular products, the actual supply chains and 
strategies of firms can only be revealed using detailed 
case studies looking at sourcing structures, national or 
international, for each individual component of that 
product.
2.2.  Patterns of trade in intermediate 
products
Production structures are increasingly adapting and 
adjusting to more international sourcing structures and 
cross-border production networks. This is a prominent 
feature of the globalisation process. Accordingly, it is 
commonly argued that intermediate goods trade as a 
share of total trade is increasing because of international 
outsourcing. Firms distribute their production activities 
and develop their supply chains over different loca-
tions according to comparative advantages in a broader 
sense. They also take the legal situation into account in 
potential target countries for outsourcing. Such trends 
in trade structures of intermediates versus other product 
types for the EU-27 countries over the last decade are 
analysed in this section. It is based on descriptive ana-
lysis and common methods in the trade literature, with 
an emphasis on trade in intermediates.
2.2.1.  The extent of trade in intermediates
To document the relative importance of trade for the 
EU-27 and the individual Member States, Table 2.1 
presents the shares of imported and exported prod-
(29)  To stick to the example of a mobile phone, this can be used for personal pur-
poses (chatting with friends) or in production processes (negotiating with 
clients).61
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also includes some countries from the new Member 
States, e.g. Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria, along with 
countries from the EU-15 such as the United Kingdom 
and Finland. Another group of countries experienced 
increases in the share of intermediate goods imports. 
This group includes Germany, Spain, Austria, Italy and 
Sweden, to name a few from the EU-15, but also   Slovakia, 
Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Poland. Thus, although 
there has been a general tendency towards a higher 
for which the increase tends to be above 3 % (31). The 
value of imports has also grown for these countries in 
the other product categories. It might therefore be more 
informative to look at the extent to which the structure 
of imports has shifted over time, as indicated by the 
respective shares (32).
Interestingly, the share of imported intermediate inputs 
even decreased for a number of countries. This group 
(31)  See Tables A.5 and A.6 in the annex for details.
(32)  See Table A.5 in the annex for details.
Table 2.1: Share of end-use categories in total imports and exports in 2008 (in %)
Imports Exports
Inter- 
mediates
Consumer
goods
Capital
goods
Mixed
category
Inter- 
mediates
Consumer
goods
Capital
goods
Mixed
category
Belgium 55.4 24.8 12.2 7.6 55.8 25.6 10.6 8.0
Bulgaria 52.4 19.6 21.5 6.5 61.9 24.6 8.4 5.0
Czech Republic 59.5 17.7 19.7 3.1 55.0 15.2 21.9 7.9
Denmark 48.2 27.4 19.9 4.5 41.8 35.7 20.9 1.6
Germany 58.0 19.3 17.8 4.9 49.0 16.0 23.8 11.1
Estonia 51.9 21.7 15.0 11.4 58.0 20.9 11.6 9.5
Ireland 44.5 25.8 24.4 5.3 53.0 30.9 16.0 0.1
Greece 38.7 34.5 20.2 6.7 54.5 35.3 9.6 0.6
Spain 55.2 23.6 14.3 6.9 50.2 24.5 11.9 13.4
France 52.6 25.0 16.0 6.4 49.1 25.6 19.0 6.2
Italy 54.7 22.9 14.3 8.2 50.2 26.8 19.4 3.5
Cyprus 45.7 29.2 12.9 12.2 34.8 48.0 11.6 5.7
Latvia  46.2 27.3 18.5 8.0 56.6 26.5 13.6 3.3
Lithuania 46.7 24.7 20.2 8.4 52.4 22.2 12.0 13.3
Luxembourg 43.8 15.9 32.0 8.3 50.6 9.5 37.8 2.1
Hungary 60.8 15.4 19.5 4.3 46.7 19.5 26.6 7.3
Malta 59.4 26.4 9.6 4.6 68.2 22.2 8.2 1.4
Netherlands 51.1 20.3 24.7 3.9 52.1 20.3 24.1 3.5
Austria 54.2 22.0 17.8 6.0 55.7 18.1 21.6 4.6
Poland 57.5 17.4 20.2 4.9 51.8 28.6 13.0 6.6
Portugal 50.7 26.0 16.5 6.8 53.3 28.4 11.5 6.8
Romania 53.9 18.7 21.4 6.0 57.8 21.8 12.8 7.5
Slovenia 56.6 16.7 16.2 10.5 51.7 22.8 12.7 12.8
Slovakia 62.3 17.1 15.8 4.8 47.7 23.9 11.1 17.4
Finland 51.8 19.2 21.6 7.4 53.0 7.4 33.9 5.8
Sweden 55.1 21.7 17.9 5.2 58.1 15.4 19.9 6.6
United Kingdom 46.8 28.1 17.3 7.7 50.7 22.8 17.3 9.3
EU-27 53.7 22.6 17.6 6.1 51.2 21.6 19.6 7.6
Source: Eurostat Comext, wiiw calculations.
Table 2.2:   Changes in import and export values and import and export shares by end-use categories  
for the EU-27
Index 1999 = 1 Change in shares (in percentage points)
Inter- 
mediates
Consumer
goods
Capital
goods
Mixed
category
Inter- 
mediates
Consumer
goods
Capital
goods
Mixed
category
Imports 1.85 1.82 1.55 1.49 2.75 0.74 - 2.38 - 1.12
Exports 1.87 1.84 1.64 1.69 1.99 0.46 - 1.94 - 0.51
Source: Eurostat Comext, wiiw calculations.62
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explains the high growth rates. Within the EU-15, typ-
ical exporter countries such as Germany performed only 
slightly better than the EU-27 average across product 
categories. However, exports for other larger countries 
such as the United Kingdom, France and Italy grew 
below the average growth rate.
Finally, the extent to which there are differences in these 
patterns among industries is presented. Table 2.3 shows 
the shares of imported and exported intermediates in 
total imports and exports by industry for the EU-27 (33). 
Imports of intermediates range from almost zero for 
industries manufacturing tobacco and wearing apparel, 
to very high shares, up to 100 %, for industries manufac-
turing basic metals. It turns out that these patterns are 
relatively stable over time and very similar across coun-
tries. Correlation analyses yield correlation coefficients 
for all cases above 0.8 and in most cases above 0.9 (34). 
The structures for exports are very similar to those for 
imports, as documented in Table 2.3.
(33)  With respect to imports an important aspect here is that these industries 
should not be considered as ‘importing industries’ rather than imports of 
products ‘typically produced by those industries’. For example, 22.5 % of 
imports corresponding to NACE 15 (food and beverages) are considered 
as being intermediate products; however, these products might be used in 
other industries for production purposes, e.g. in the hotels and restaurants 
sectors. The use of imported intermediates of a particular product across 
industries will be considered in the second part of the study.
(34)  More specifically, the correlation coefficients of trade shares are calculated by 
product categories in the industries considered (e.g. the share of intermedi-
ate imports in industry X) across countries or for a particular country for the 
first and last year available.
share of imported intermediate goods, almost half the 
countries in the EU-27 experienced a decline in the 
share of imported intermediates and the extent in these 
changes differed markedly across countries. One may 
note that these general tendencies are not a result of the 
economic crisis which hit the world economy in 2008.
A similar pattern, though at slightly different magni-
tudes, is found for changes between 1999 and 2007. 
EU-27 exports of intermediates displayed the highest 
growth rate, closely followed by exports of consumer 
goods. Growth rates of exports were higher than those 
for imports, though the difference is relatively small in 
the case of intermediates and consumer goods in par-
ticular. The specific patterns of individual countries 
across product categories are again rather mixed (see 
Table A.5 in the annex for details). One should, however, 
notice that growth rates for the EU-12 are often higher 
for product groups other than intermediates. This group 
of countries started from a rather low level, which partly 
Table 2.3: Shares of intermediate imports and exports by industry for EU-27 in 2008 (in %)
Imports Exports
15 Food and beverages 22.5 17.0
16 Tobacco 0.9 0.4
17 Textiles 50.8 62.5
18 Wearing apparel 0.8 2.3
19 Leather 12.3 14.4
20 Wood products 95.2 97.9
21 Pulp and paper 83.4 80.1
22 Publishing 26.7 30.7
23 Coke 92.5 77.1
24 Chemicals 69.8 63.5
25 Rubber and plastics 72.7 73.4
26 Other non-metallic 90.0 91.1
27 Basic metals 100.0 100.0
28 Metal products 80.3 81.5
29 Mach. and equipment 43.6 39.7
30 Office machinery 17.4 19.0
31 Electrical machinery 75.7 73.3
32 Radio and television 37.6 32.6
33 Instruments 16.1 15.4
34 Motor vehicles 37.7 35.1
35 Transport equipment 46.4 36.2
36 Furniture and n.e.c. 19.0 18.4
Source: Eurostat Comext, wiiw calculations.63
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tures, this reveals that there is also a lot of intraregional 
trade in intermediates among EU-12 countries taking 
place, showing that outsourcing is important not only 
between advanced and less advanced economies, but 
also within similarly developed countries.
A comparison of the geographical patterns for EU-27 
exports of the four product categories shows that the 
share of exports of consumer goods to the EU-15 is large 
(62.8 %) when compared with intermediates (58.1 %) 
and capital goods (48.6 %). EU-27 exports of intermedi-
ate and capital goods to EU-12 countries are larger than 
the other categories of goods. This pattern is reversed 
for the advanced OECD countries. For the other coun-
try groups, capital goods exports are more important, in 
particular for the BRIC countries and the ‘rest of world’ 
category.
Whether this pattern is stable over time is analysed 
below. Table 2.5 provides evidence for the EU-27 over 
the period 1999–2008. The EU-15 and the advanced 
OECD countries have seen large declines in market 
shares of total EU-27 imports, by - 4.6 and - 5.3 percent-
age points respectively, whereas the EU-12 and BRIC 
countries have gained market shares, by 3.9 and 4.9 per-
centage points respectively. Considering the EU-27, one 
thus finds a significant shift from imports sourced from 
EU-15 countries towards imports from EU-12 countries. 
Once again, there is considerable country differenti-
ation with respect to changes in geographical patterns. 
A common feature is that the EU-12 and BRIC countries 
have gained in all countries, whereas the advanced 
OECD countries have lost market shares.
It remains to be considered whether these shifts are 
  similar for all product categories or whether there is a 
specific pattern for intermediate products. The EU-15 
countries have lost market share in all categories, but 
these have been more pronounced for capital goods 
and for the category of mixed goods. Similarly, the 
advanced OECD countries have lost market share 
to a large extent in capital goods (- 9.52 %) and in 
2.2.2.  Geographical structures of trade in 
intermediates
Intermediate inputs can be sourced from different coun-
tries or groups of countries around the world. Table 2.4 
provides information on the groups of countries from 
which intermediate goods are sourced, and on the 
countries to which they are exported. Considering the 
EU-27 as a whole, one sees that the bulk of intermedi-
ate products are sourced from EU-15 countries. With 
respect to other country groups, the advanced OECD 
countries account for 11.1 %, the EU-12 and BRIC coun-
tries account for equally large shares, of 8.7 %, while the 
Asian countries account for only 3.8 %. For these other 
country groups, the variation across EU-27 countries is 
even larger. Thus, in 2008, almost 70 % of intermediates 
were sourced from within the EU-27.
The sourcing structures of intermediates are somewhat 
different from those of the other product categories. 
The EU-15 and EU-12 groups account for about 70 % 
of imports of intermediates, consumer goods and cap-
ital goods, and an even higher share for the mixed cat-
egory, at 84.6 %. But there are some differences for the 
other sourcing partners: for example, the BRIC coun-
tries account for 13.5 and 13.0 %, respectively, for con-
sumer goods and capital goods, but for only 8.7 % for 
intermedi  ates. On the other hand, the advanced OECD 
countries have relatively high shares, at 11.1 % of inter-
mediates and 13.7 % of capital goods respectively.
Similarly, the bulk of intermediate exports from EU-27 
countries are destined for the EU-15 countries. The 
EU-15 share is 58.1 % for the EU-27 and thus only slightly 
lower when compared to imports. The EU-12, the 
advanced OECD countries and the ‘rest of world’ (RoW) 
receive one 10th each of EU-27 exports. The share of 
EU-27 exports to the BRIC countries is 5.9 %, whereas 
only 3.3 % of EU-27 exports are destined for the Asian 
countries. Furthermore, the share of exports from EU-12 
countries to other EU-12 countries is also very large 
in most cases. Together with results on import struc-
Table 2.4: Import structures by end-use categories and partner countries for the EU-27 in 2008 (in %)
EU-15 EU-12 Adv. OECD Asia BRIC Rest of world
Imports
Intermediates 60.9 8.7 11.1 3.8 8.7 6.7
Consumer goods 59.0 8.8 7.8 3.7 13.5 7.3
Capital goods 55.1 6.8 13.7 7.7 13.0 3.7
Mixed category 73.9 10.7 8.8 2.2 1.1 3.3
Exports
Intermediates 58.1 10.1 11.6 3.3 5.9 10.9
Consumer goods 62.8 8.4 13.4 2.1 4.3 9.0
Capital goods 48.6 9.2 12.8 3.7 9.9 15.7
Mixed category 57.0 6.9 18.2 1.2 5.3 11.4
Source: Eurostat Comext, wiiw calculations.64
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These shifts in market shares can be related to changes 
in relative unit values reflecting emerging cost advan-
tages or quality upgrading. This issue is analysed by 
means of changes in unit value ratios and market shares 
between 1999 and 2008 (35). The analysis shows that 
the EU-12 countries have been successfully upgrading 
the quality of goods exported to the EU-27 markets. A 
similar pattern is found for BRIC countries, though with 
less pronounced quality upgrading. These patterns are 
similar across product categories and seem to be more 
pronounced in high-technology industries in general (cf. 
Figure 2.1).
An analogous exercise on the exporter side reveals 
that, within the EU-27 countries, France and the United 
Kingdom in particular have been losing export shares, 
defined as exports of the particular country divided by 
total EU-27 exports (36).
2.2.3.  Revealed comparative advantages in trade in 
intermediates
The patterns described above point towards the coun-
tries or groups of countries which tend to specialise in 
the production of intermediates relative to other prod-
uct categories. It is, however, not easy to discern from 
the descriptive analysis alone whether particular coun-
tries or groups of countries have tended to specialise 
in the provision of intermediate inputs compared 
to others and to what extent this has changed over 
time. This section sheds light on this issue by using 
a measure of revealed comparative advantages (see 
Box 2.1) at the level of end-use categories and groups 
of countries.
(35)  See the annex for a detailed explanation of the methodology.
(36)  The details of the analyses are available in the background study for the 
chapter.
  intermediates (- 5.32 %). The BRIC countries have gained 
mostly in capital goods (9.64 %), with the gain being 
similar in magnitude to the decline in OECD countries. 
The BRIC countries’ gains in market share in consumer 
goods amounted to 5.21 %, and 4.94 % for intermedi-
ates. Finally, the second biggest winners in terms of 
increasing market share are the EU-12 countries, which 
have seen gains ranging from 5.98 % in the category of 
mixed goods to 3.18 % in consumer goods.
Thus, a marked shift occurred in this period within 
Europe, from EU-15 to EU-12 countries as suppliers of 
intermediate products. However, the EU-12 countries 
started from a relatively low level of exports. It is inter-
esting to note that these gains and losses were of a simi-
lar magnitude. Simultaneously, there was a significant 
reorientation towards the BRIC countries at the expense 
of the advanced OECD countries. Thus one observes a 
reorientation of sourcing structures within the EU as well 
as in extra-EU import patterns.
The geographical pattern of EU-27 exports has also 
changed over the last 10 years. EU-27 export shares to 
the EU-15, advanced OECD countries and Asia declined, 
while EU-27 export shares increased to the EU-12, BRIC 
and the ‘rest of world’. These patterns can with a few 
exceptions also be found for individual EU-27 countries. 
Considering the EU-27 change in geographical export 
structure across the product categories, one finds that 
exports to the EU-15 declined much more for capital 
goods and for the mixed category of products. The 
export shares increased for these product categories to 
the BRIC countries and the ‘rest of world’. The changes 
are most similar across product categories with respect 
to the EU-12, the advanced OECD countries and Asia.
Table 2.5: Changes in export and import shares by end-use category and sourcing region for EU-27,  
1999–2008 (in percentage points)
EU-15 EU-12 Adv. OECD Asia BRIC Rest of world
Imports
Intermediates - 4.57 3.87 - 5.32 - 0.81 4.94 1.89
Consumer goods - 3.06 3.18 - 1.93 - 2.49 5.21 - 0.90
Capital goods - 5.31 4.22 - 9.52 - 0.23 9.64 1.20
Mixed category - 5.87 5.98 - 2.16 - 0.46 0.67 1.84
Exports
Intermediates - 5.06 3.90 - 3.42 - 0.62 3.09 2.11
Consumer goods - 3.86 3.82 - 2.86 - 0.06 2.46 0.50
Capital goods - 10.95 4.59 - 3.95 0.02 6.11 4.17
Not classified - 14.50 3.98 - 1.38 0.49 4.75 6.66
Source: Eurostat Comext, wiiw calculations.65
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Figure 2.1:   Changes in market shares and unit value ratios for intermediates by industry groups,  
1999–2008
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parative advantage in other categories: for example, 
Cyprus, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia have a comparative advantage in con-
sumer goods. In all cases, the group of other advanced 
countries shows a positive index for intermediates, but 
a negative one for consumer goods, contrary to the pat-
tern discussed above. With respect to the BRIC coun-
tries, these — with the exception of Russia — seem to 
have a comparative advantage in producing consumer 
goods, thus being relatively large importers of inter-
mediates in producing final goods. The exception is 
Russia, for which primary goods are included. With 
respect to the group of other advanced countries, they 
all seem to have a comparative disadvantage, whereas 
they have comparative advantages in exports of con-
sumer goods, though there have been some shifts over 
time.
Table 2.6 reports the results of this analysis for all coun-
tries included in the exercise. Looking at the figures for 
2007, it is interesting to note that the set of countries 
with a comparative disadvantage is rather heteroge-
neous. With respect to the EU-27, this set includes 
advanced economies such as Germany, Denmark, and 
Italy on the one hand and EU-12 countries, e.g. Slova-
kia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic 
on the other hand. This should, however, not be inter-
preted as a comparative disadvantage or advantage 
with respect to factor endowments or productivities, 
but rather reflects the structure of national industries or 
within-industry specialisation.
Many of the countries which have a revealed compara-
tive disadvantage in intermediates show a strong com-
Box 2.1: Measuring revealed comparative advantages
In the literature, various measures of revealed comparative advantages (RCA) have been proposed, early examples 
being Balassa (1965) and Vollrath (1991). Greenaway and Milner (1993) provide good discussions of the measures 
used in the literature. Vollrath’s third measure of revealed competitiveness is used here:
where   and   denotes exports and imports respectively and   denotes an index for the product category under 
consideration and   is an index for country. The first term denotes the relative export advantage, which is analo-
gous to the Balassa index, and the second term denotes the relative import advantage. The index ranges from 
minus infinity to plus infinity and is symmetric around zero. A positive value reveals a comparative advantage. 
One accounts for double counting by excluding the respective country in the aggregates over countries and the 
particular product categories in the product aggregates. The index was calculated for a group of 40 countries 
comprising a significant part of world trade.68
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The analysis below takes a closer look at the magnitude 
of this phenomenon and how it has evolved over time. 
This analysis is performed by applying the Grubel-Lloyd 
index at the level of product categories (see Box 2.2 for 
technical details).
2.2.4.  Two-way trade in intermediate products
The analysis so far might have hidden the fact that there 
is — as in total trade — a lot of two-way trade taking 
place, i.e. countries being both exporters and importers 
of intermediates as well as in other product categories. 
Table 2.6: Revealed comparative advantage index, 1999 and 2007
Intermediates Consumer goods Capital goods
1999 2007 1999 2007 1999 2007
EU-27 - 0.061 - 0.028 0.138 0.024 0.088 0.164
EU-15
Belgium - 0.09 - 0.05 0.15 0.20 - 0.21 - 0.29
Denmark - 0.35 - 0.14 0.57 0.41 - 0.09 - 0.16
Germany 0.12 - 0.13 - 0.60 - 0.37 0.42 0.51
Ireland 0.11 0.19 0.40 0.06 - 0.24 0.00
Greece - 0.03 - 0.02 0.81 0.34 - 1.73 - 1.27
Spain - 0.40 - 0.20 0.43 0.26 - 0.53 - 0.54
France - 0.15 - 0.06 0.01 - 0.01 0.09 0.02
Italy - 0.41 - 0.26 0.65 0.30 0.07 0.27
Luxembourg 1.11 1.16 - 0.40 - 0.49 - 1.00 - 0.58
Netherlands - 0.29 - 0.20 0.30 0.17 - 0.02 0.19
Austria 0.31 0.07 - 0.26 - 0.23 - 0.16 0.08
Portugal - 0.43 - 0.15 0.81 0.36 - 0.87 - 0.54
Finland 0.10 - 0.01 - 1.22 - 1.12 0.51 0.61
Sweden 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.36 - 0.30 0.19 0.11
United Kingdom 0.13 0.20 - 0.27 - 0.29 0.04 - 0.14
EU-12
Bulgaria - 0.45 - 0.01 1.18 0.48 - 1.21 - 1.22
Czech Republic 0.09 - 0.20 - 0.08 - 0.11 - 0.50 0.04
Estonia 0.34 0.47 0.15 0.05 - 0.66 - 0.65
Cyprus - 1.24 - 0.45 1.18 0.54 - 0.76 - 0.15
Latvia 0.88 0.84 - 0.02 0.02 - 1.65 - 1.01
Lithuania - 0.32 - 0.05 0.57 0.35 - 1.29 - 0.85
Hungary - 0.50 - 0.42 0.58 0.21 - 0.06 0.27
Malta 0.14 0.72 0.28 - 0.13 - 0.37 - 0.65
Poland - 0.32 - 0.11 0.91 0.67 - 0.78 - 0.80
Romania - 0.78 - 0.06 1.35 0.54 - 1.04 - 0.89
Slovenia - 0.10 - 0.04 0.62 0.44 - 0.72 - 0.56
Slovakia  - 0.43 - 0.77 0.15 0.46 - 0.63 - 0.57
Other advanced economies
Australia 1.08 1.13 - 0.15 - 0.27 - 1.93 - 1.91
Canada 0.37 0.76 - 0.17 - 0.57 - 0.48 - 0.55
Japan 0.19 0.14 - 1.51 - 1.67 0.85 0.67
USA 0.49 0.31 - 0.85 - 0.84 0.13 0.15
BRIC countries
Brazil 0.13 - 0.14 0.78 0.81 - 0.76 - 0.34
China - 1.61 - 1.19 3.07 2.42 - 0.41 0.10
India - 1.23 - 0.77 2.91 1.99 - 1.23 - 1.49
Russia 1.36 1.78 - 2.28 - 2.11 - 1.76 - 2.16
Other
Indonesia - 0.11 0.37 1.41 0.93 - 1.39 - 1.35
Mexico - 0.69 - 0.47 0.93 0.66 0.12 0.08
South Korea - 0.95 - 0.62 0.67 - 0.69 0.52 0.61
Turkey - 1.01 - 0.95 2.40 1.63 - 1.46 - 0.65
Note:  EU-27 includes intra-EU trade.
Source: UN Comtrade, wiiw calculations. 69
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  Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, Portugal, Luxembourg and 
Estonia. But there are also a number of countries for 
which two-way trade increased. This was particularly the 
case in countries where two-way trade was low in 1999. 
Two-way trade increased particularly strongly for Latvia, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia and to a lesser extent for 
the Czech Republic (37).
Thus, despite its potentially different nature, there is 
also a considerable amount of two-way trade occurring 
in intermediates trade, blurring the distinction between 
typical producer and user countries of intermediates still 
further (Stehrer et. al., 2010).
Intra-EU trade in intermediate goods is more charac-
terised by two-way trade than extra-EU trade. Two-
way trade in intermediates increased for trade with all 
regions except the countries constituting the ‘rest of 
world’, for which it decreased slightly. Two-way trade 
with the EU-12 increased by a third between 1999 and 
2008, which may reflect stronger interlinkages between 
industries in the EU-15 and EU-12.
(37)  For a detailed comparison to other product categories, changes over time 
and industry-specific results see Stehrer et al. (2010).
Generally, the index tends to be higher for consumer 
and capital goods compared to intermediate products. 
Taking country averages, the index in 2008 is 0.35 for 
intermediates, 0.40 for consumer goods and 0.39 for 
capital goods. However, there seems to be no clear pat-
tern, although countries with a high index value in one 
category also tend to have higher values for other prod-
uct categories. This may be due to country-specific fac-
tors such as country size and income per capita being 
the most important determinants of intra-industry trade. 
A more striking fact is the large variation across coun-
tries. This is shown graphically in Figure 2.2 for inter-
mediate goods trade, which also indicates changes in 
the index between 1999 and 2008.
The share of two-way trade in intermediates ranges 
from more than 50 % in Germany and France to less 
than 10 % in Malta. As expected, larger and more devel-
oped countries in terms of per capita income tend to 
have a higher index. Interestingly, the index decreased 
for a number of countries between 1999 and 2008. This 
was the case for France, the United Kingdom, Spain, 
Box 2.2: Measuring two-way trade
To measure two-way trade the common method is the Grubel-Lloyd index (Grubel and Lloyd, 1975). The ana-
lyses in this study use a version of this index correcting for trade imbalances (see Greenaway et al., 1994) which 
is calculated as:
This index is used for product categories and country groups based at the CN 8-digit level. The index ranges from 
0 to 1 and can be interpreted as the share of two-way trade in total trade of this category. Whenever an export 
or import value is reported but no corresponding import or export value in the partner country, this is set to zero 
though it is not possible to know whether the value is missing and consequently should be positive or zero. The 
alternative to skip those observations would result in higher two-way trade indices but the same conclusions 
would hold.70
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intermediates. The question is to what extent particular 
industries are users of intermediates in general, and to 
what extent the structure of intermediate inputs is dif-
ferentiated across industries and countries. On top of 
this, one might wonder about the extent to which these 
intermediate inputs are imported or sourced domestic-
ally, which is also a concern of this section and relates 
to the discussion of imported intermediates above. 
It then leads naturally to considering the structure of 
2.3.  Manufacturing supply chains and 
services
The analysis in the previous section is based on detailed 
trade data providing information on which products 
or product groups are traded between different coun-
tries. This does not however reveal anything about the 
industry using a particular product. A semi-conductor 
or light bulb might be used in different industries as 
Figure 2.3:   EU-27 two-way trade in intermediates by region, 1999 and 2008
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Note:  Figures based on CGLI measure.
Source: Eurostat Comext, wiiw calculations.
Figure 2.2:   Two-way trade in intermediates, 1999 and 2008
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shares decreased in most countries only in medium-
low-tech industries. Differences among countries are 
again large. Interestingly, the EU-12 display decreasing 
service input shares in all four technology categories, 
which is surprising. Slovakia is an exception, in that low-
technology service input shares and especially medium-
low-tech service input shares increased. This is surpris-
ing, given the generally lower shares of services in total 
manufacturing inputs in those countries.
Studying the push effect of manufacturing reveals 
that material inputs account for an average of 33 % in 
trade and hotels and in community services, creating 
the largest push effects in these service industries. The 
share is smaller in business services, at 22 %, and also 
in transport services (16 %). Generally, the differences 
between countries are not pronounced, with larger dif-
ferences being found in business services. Interestingly, 
the EU-12 are among the countries with relatively large 
input shares, especially in business services and com-
munity services. Material input shares declined between 
1995 and 2005 in all service categories and among all 
countries. Variations are less marked; Poland is the 
only country where material input shares increased in 
three service industries. Overall, it seems that the push 
factor of manufacturing on services is slightly larger 
than the direct pull factor. However, while the former 
declined over the last 10 years, the pull effect increased 
substantially.
2.3.2.  Imports of intermediate inputs by industry
This section takes a closer look at the structure and 
changes in imported versus domestically sourced inter-
mediates. Specifically, patterns of imported intermedi-
ate inputs by user industry will be analysed with a focus 
on cross-industry and cross-country differences. First, 
the developments over time for the aggregate manu-
facturing and services respectively are analysed. The 
aggregates are then broken down into different types 
of manufacturing and services industries.
The analysis is based on Eurostat’s symmetric input-
output tables, product by product, which are computed 
for the total economy, the domestic economy and for 
imports. This enables the role of imports in the economy 
to be investigated in more detail.
Import shares increased among all manufacturing indus-
tries and almost all countries between 1995 and 2005, 
with only very few exceptions (see Figure 2.4 below). 
The figure presents the ratio of imported to domes-
tic intermediates in 1995 and 2005 for the Member 
States for which data is available. The largest shares of 
imported intermediates are found in the smaller Mem-
ber States, reflecting their smaller size and lesser ability 
to produce all necessary intermediates domestically.
inputs, either sourced domestically or internationally, 
for a   particular product. This will also be shown in this 
section, namely in the case study on the Nokia N95. The 
analysis will show that there are considerable linkages 
between the manufacturing and service sectors which 
are in most cases increasing over time, particularly when 
considering both direct and indirect linkages. A second 
result is that the share of imported intermediates has 
grown over time. This implies that despite increasing 
interlinkages across industries, the domestic multiplier 
effects are roughly constant or even falling slightly.
2.3.1.  Interlinkages between manufacturing and 
services
On the one hand, manufacturing industries use ser-
vice inputs, i.e. act as clients of the service sector and 
hence create a ‘pull’ effect, by demanding service inputs 
as intermediates. On the other hand, manufacturing 
industries sell products to the services sector, i.e. pro-
vide products and hence create a ‘push’ effect (38). The 
pull effect is measured by the share of service inputs 
in manufacturing industries which are classified below 
by technology categories. Service inputs include both 
market and non-market services and represent direct 
service components embodied in manufacturing. The 
push effect is captured by the share of material inputs in 
services, detailed below by service categories (39).
Overall, high-tech industries received the largest share 
of service inputs in 2005, hence creating the largest 
pull effect. The average for all countries is 24.4 %. The 
second-largest share was held by low-tech industries 
(23 %), followed by medium-high-tech industries with 
22 %. Medium-low-tech industries required slightly 
fewer service inputs, at 17 %. These figures hide large 
differences across countries. The EU-12 and Portugal 
had smaller service shares across all manufacturing 
industries, with the sole exception of Hungary, which 
had a relatively higher service input share in medium-
low-tech industries.
There are large differences between countries, and these 
are most pronounced for the medium-high-tech indus-
tries. The differences range from 7 % of service inputs 
in Slovakia to 70 % in Ireland. When studying changes 
in the size of the shares between 1995 and 2005, ser-
vice input shares increased in low-technology industries 
in almost all countries, which might be interpreted as 
outsourcing to upgrade production. In high-technol-
ogy industries as well as in medium-high-tech indus-
tries, many countries saw service input shares increase, 
though less so in the latter category. Service input 
(38)  This terminology follows European Commission (2009), p. 79.
(39)  For details on the classification of material and service inputs see Timmer et 
al. (2008).72
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76 % in Slovakia in the upper range, and 29 % in France 
and 33 % in Germany in the lower range.
The largest increase occurred in the medium-low-tech 
industries. The most pronounced import share increases 
for all four technology categories were in Slovenia and 
Slovakia. However, import shares also rose in the EU-15 
countries. There were above-average increases in 
  Austria, Ireland, Germany, Sweden and Spain.
Analysing the share of imported intermediates in total 
intermediates in four service categories yields a differ-
ent picture. Import shares are much smaller in service 
industries than in manufacturing industries, since fewer 
services are traded internationally. The services sec-
tor also has more SMEs than the manufacturing sector. 
The shares are about 17 % for trade and hotels, and 
16 % for business services and community services. 
The share of imported intermediate goods is larger for 
transport services, at 26 %. It is interesting to note that 
the share of SMEs is smaller in these service industries 
than in others. In addition, differences among countries 
are small, with Italy displaying the lowest import shares 
and Ireland the highest. Import shares increased in most 
countries between 1995 and 2005, though there was 
much variation and no common picture. Import shares 
in   business services decreased for three new Member 
States (  Hungary, Estonia, Slovakia).
Output multipliers and their changes over time can be 
used to study changes in inter-industry linkages across 
sectors. By using output multipliers, both direct and 
Even though import shares of intermediates increased 
in most countries for service industries between 1995 
and 2005, it was less pronounced than for manufactur-
ing (see Figure 2.5). In fact, import shares decreased by 
some 5 % in Irish service industries between 1995 and 
2005.
Moving to less aggregated industries, Table 2.7 presents 
the share of intermediate imports in total intermediate 
inputs. Data are only available for the benchmark years 
1995, 2000 and 2005.
Taking the shares of imported intermediates in total 
intermediates in four types of manufacturing industries 
first, data show that imported intermediates are most 
significant in high-tech industries, where they account 
on average for 55 % of total inputs in 2005. Imports still 
account for 50 % of all intermediates in medium-high-
tech industries and 48 % in medium-low-tech indus-
tries. Low-tech industries require substantially fewer 
imports, amounting to some 30 % of intermediates on 
average. Interestingly, the new Member States Estonia, 
Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia, and also Ireland, and 
to some extent Austria, show the largest import shares 
in almost all technology categories. This may be due 
to the fact that they are all small open economies and 
also due to the new Member States’ increased need for 
imported intermediates, as they are not able to source 
all necessary supplies of inputs domestically. The differ-
ences among countries are most pronounced for high-
technology industries. Imported intermediates amount 
to 94 % in Estonia, 89 % in Hungary, 85 % in Ireland and 
Figure 2.4:   Ratio of imported to domestic inputs in EU manufacturing industries, 1995 and 2005 (in %)
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Source: Eurostat input-output tables, wiiw calculations.73
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slightly declining, indicating that imports of intermedi-
ates have been increasing over time.
2.3.3.  Case study: the Nokia N95 mobile phone
The standard level of trade analysis is usually under-
taken by sector, industry, product group or labour skill-
groups, as in Sections 2 and 3 above. Global trade and 
globalisation of economic activities, however, occur 
at a much finer level of aggregation — at the level of 
tasks (see for example Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 
(2008) for a theoretical approach). Stages of production 
that used to be performed by the same company in the 
same geographic location are now fragmented around 
the world. The various stages are either owned and con-
trolled by one manufacturer, or owned and con  trolled 
by independent suppliers. This forms the system of 
  global supply chains — increasingly not only for goods, 
but also for services. Services have become increasingly 
involved in international trade due to digitalisation.
A supply chain refers to the global flows of intermedi-
ate goods/services — both provided in-house and 
purchased from outside, unaffiliated, companies — 
involved in providing a good/service for final consump-
tion. In each step, the vendor employs inputs, conducts 
its own value-adding activities and transfers its out-
put to the other participants in the supply chain. The 
sum of all value-adding activities equals the final retail 
price before any applicable taxes. Figure 2.6 represents 
indirect effects are taken into account. It is, however, 
necessary to distinguish carefully between the effects 
of changes in interlinkages — which can be studied by 
analysing total multiplies — and the effects of a change 
in the share of imported intermediates by calculat-
ing domestic multipliers only. Total output multipliers 
are calculated from input-output tables which include 
imports of intermediate goods, while domestic multi-
pliers are based on the domestic input-output tables 
which do not include imports. The fact that a significant 
share of intermediates is sourced from abroad therefore 
implies that the domestic multipliers evolve differently 
from total multipliers. For the domestic multipliers, one 
would expect an increase due to an overall increase in 
linkages across industries, whereas the fact that interme-
diates are sourced from abroad would work in the other 
direction. In a recent study, the European Commission 
(2009) reports the average of multipliers over 22 coun-
tries at the product level and highlights important dif-
ferences when considering the total and the domestic 
multipliers. This is done by showing that the sectors 
with the highest total multipliers and domestic multipli-
ers do not coincide. A similar exercise was undertaken 
by Stehrer et al. (2010) for three EU-15 countries (Austria, 
Germany, Spain). The most important finding was that 
the domestic multipliers are between 20 % and 40 % 
lower compared to the total multipliers on average. This 
difference even widened over the periods considered. 
The total multipliers were increasing in most countries, 
pointing towards increasing interlinkages, whereas the 
domestic multipliers were roughly constant or even 
Figure 2.5:   Ratio of imported to domestic inputs in EU services industries, 1995 and 2005 (in %)
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a   stylised supply chain for the Nokia N95. In the case of 
tangible components, there are typically four to eight 
layers between Nokia and the extraction of metals and 
minerals from the earth’s crust (Nokia, 2009a). All com-
ponents embed intangible assets in some form, and 
conform to one or more industry standards. In the case 
of intangible components — licensed and purchased 
embedded and standalone software — the flows can-
not be readily mapped in a similar manner, but there are 
typically fewer layers. The actors in the supply chain of 
the N95 are categorised into five groups in the figure: 
mines and refiners, component vendors and sub-assem-
blers, software and technology providers and licensers, 
the actual phone assembly by Nokia, or by an original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM), as well as wholesale 
and retail distribution by telecommunication network 
operators and/or by general traders. Unlike some of 
its competitors, Nokia maintained significant in-house 
manufacturing and assembly capacity and thus relied 
less on OEMs (40). In the case of the N95, all final assem-
bly was done by Nokia itself. It did not use providers of 
electronic manufacturing/assembly services (EMSs) or 
outsource this task.
2.3.3.1.  Who captures value — where the value is created?
Since gross domestic product (GDP) can be measured 
as the sum of the values added by all organisations 
in a particular country, it is often interesting to know 
where within the supply chain the value capturing takes 
place. This is not an easy task, as companies are reluc-
tant to reveal the geography of their operations even at 
the level of the firm, let alone at the level of a specific 
offering. It is nevertheless possible to do some calcula-
tions that are fairly accurate at least as far as broader 
regions are concerned. The geographical allocations of 
the country of final sales and final assembly depend on 
the individual case. For instance, in the case of an N95 
assembled in Salo, Finland, destined for the German 
market, 2.1 % would go to Finland and 14.5 % to Ger-
many. The outcome would be different in the case of 
assembly in Beijing, China, destined for the US market. 
An average was calculated for all potential combinations 
of assembly locations and destination markets. The aver-
age is presented in Figure 2.7 (41).
The best estimate is that, on average, overall, 55 % of the 
value added of the Nokia N95 is captured in the EU-27. 
(40)  In 2007 Nokia outsourced 20 % of its total manufacturing volume (including 
all models) of mobile device engines (Nokia 20-F report, 2007, p. 36).
(41)  In 2007, the basic principle of Nokia was that smartphones for the European 
market were manufactured in Europe and correspondingly smartphones 
for the Asian market were manufactured in Asia. According to the available 
information, smartphones for the US market are mainly manufactured in Asia. 
Thus using these three as guidelines, potential combinations are: assembled 
in EU and sold in EU; assembled in EU and sold in other countries; assembled 
in Asia and sold in Asia; assembled in Asia and sold in North America; assem-
bled in Asia and sold in other countries. 
This is a remarkably large share for a truly global prod-
uct. Even in the case of final assembly in China and final 
sales in the US, the EU-27 captured 51 % of the value 
added — despite the fact that the phone was ‘made in 
China’. While final assembly is obviously the main step in 
the physical incarnation of the product, this stage only 
commands 2 % of the overall value added. On the other 
hand, the distribution channel and particularly its final 
retail loop capture a large share of the value added — 
worth many times more than the final assembly. Taking 
into account the value added tax or sales tax, the value 
added received by the country of final sales is even 
bigger.
How is it possible that the EU-27 can capture so much 
of the value from a seemingly minor role? The simple 
reason is that Europe was dominant in the branding, 
development, design and management of the N95 
and related processes. To uncover these geograph-
ical connections often requires some detective work. 
Take, for example, the case of the N95’s main processor 
and Texas Instruments (US). The hardware design was 
made in Dallas (US) and in Nice (France). Much of the 
software design and its integration to hardware were 
of Indian origin. Besides Dallas, the processor was also 
manufactured in Japan. A single component might be 
imported and exported several times, at least if the ‘in 
transit’ status is not determined appropriately. Even if 
it is, imports and exports are measured in gross value 
terms, although the value added at any given location 
may be small.
The information and communication technologies (ICT) 
sector and the N95 handset take into account a specific 
industry and a specific case while looking at the whole 
industrial landscape. However, they represent the elec-
tronics industry as a whole quite well and lead the way 
in global industrial transformation. Many industries are 
following suit. On the other hand, there are industries 
where unbundling of production has been the rule for 
decades, but localisation decisions differ from those 
observed in electronics.
The most notable example is the automobile industry, 
where outsourcing and separation of different stages 
of production have proceeded quite far. Advanced ICT 
has facilitated outsourcing offshore, but much of the 
production has remained regional rather than becom-
ing global. The simple reason is transportation costs. ICT 
helps to coordinate the activities of international supply 
chains, but intercontinental shipping of some auto parts 
is costly compared to electronics components.
Hence there are regional clusters or hubs specialising 
in auto parts within a reasonable distance from the 
final assembly. Nevertheless, the same logic applies; 
manufacturing that was originally done by the same 
company in the same factory is today dispersed into a 76
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network of hundreds of suppliers and subcontractors 
to achieve advantages through economies of scale and 
specialisation.
The current economic crisis has spurred a discus-
sion about the way in which global supply chains are 
affected. Has some of the offshore production been 
brought back onshore to its original location, or will it 
be? There are arguments for and against this scenario. 
While the need to seek more cost-advantageous loca-
tions has probably only increased for some producers, 
the crisis has revealed the vulnerability and unpredict-
ability of production chains for others. The net effect is 
likely to be relatively small.
Unbundling and trade in tasks will most likely expand 
in services as a consequence of digitalisation. More and 
more services are becoming tradable once digitally 
transformed. Firms — both in manufacturing and ser-
vices — will grow their offshore outsourcing of services 
to a much greater extent than ever happened in manu-
facturing. In addition to manufacturing, other tasks such 
as product development have also been transferred to 
low-cost countries.
Figure 2.6:   The stylised supply chain of the Nokia N95 mobile phone
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Figure 2.7:   The value added breakdown by regions taking into account the value added created in the 
country of final sales
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2.4.  The role of intermediates in the trade 
collapse in the EU-27: cause, effect or 
both
The trade collapse following the financial market tur-
bulence of September 2008 which peaked in the win-
ter months of 2008/09 was in many respects unprece-
dented. The trade slump was even steeper than in the 
Great Depression (Eichengreen and O’Rourke, 2009), and 
it occurred on a global scale with an extraordinarily high 
degree of synchronisation (Araújo and Martins, 2009; 
Araújo, 2009). Moreover, the decline in global trade in 
real terms was much more pronounced than that of real 
GDP. This also reflects a change in the structure of glo-
bal trade, which is increasingly characterised by vertical 
specialisation across countries, i.e. countries are not ne  -
cessarily specialised in the production of goods, but in 
certain stages of production of particular goods. Vertical 
specialisation implies that countries produce and export 
large amounts of intermediate products, parts and com-
ponents in particular, which are then further processed 
or assembled in other parts of the world.
Hence, before a country exports a final product, a series 
of related trade flows of intermediate goods (including 
imports of primary, semi-finished goods and parts and 
components) will already have taken place. If, as was the 
case during the crisis, demand declines in many parts of 
the world, this affects not only the trade flows of finished 
goods, but also related trade flows in semi-finished goods 
and parts and components. By this mechanism, trade in 
intermediate goods increases the sensitivity of trade with 
respect to changes in the business cycle. The increas-
ing role of international supply chains and consequent 
vertical specialisation led to a significant increase in the 
income elasticity of trade that is well documented in the 
literature (e.g. Cheung and Guichard, 2009; Freund, 2009). 
For the EU-15, this elasticity was 1.95 during the period 
1961 to 1984, which means that global trade changed by 
1.95 % when world GDP changed by 1 %. The elasticity 
increased to 2.45 % in the period 1985 to 2009.
In 2009, however, global trade took a stronger blow 
than suggested by the long-term elasticity of trade, as 
the decline in real global trade outstripped the decline 
of GDP by a factor of 5 (IMF, 2009). Various explanations 
for the disproportionate trade collapse of 2008–09 have 
been suggested, including increased trade costs due to 
the credit crunch (Escaith and Gonguet, 2009), protec-
tionist tendencies by major trading partners (Evenett, 
2009) and a composition effect, i.e. the industries most 
involved in international trade were hit harder by the 
decline in global demand.
What has happened to intermediate goods and in par-
ticular to parts and components — a subgroup that 
accounts for approximately 30 % of the EU-27 trade in 
intermediates — during the crisis is interesting per se, 
given their important role in international supply chains. 
Parts and components are of particular interest because 
they are the goods category most closely associated 
with the notion of international intra-industry vertical 
supply chains in the actual debate. They are therefore 
those most likely to be influenced by potential structural 
changes that may have occurred during the crisis due to 
the sourcing decisions of companies operating globally. 
This section analyses in more detail the development of 
the EU-27 export and import of parts and components 
using monthly trade data.
2.4.1.  The impact of the crisis on trade flows by end-
use categories
The first step in the analysis of the impact of the crisis 
on trade flows is to compare the decline in various end-
use categories, including parts and components, with 
that of overall trade. Looking first at the development 
of aggregate exports during the crisis, Figure 2.8 reveals 
that export volumes declined sharply between October 
2008 and January 2009, when the index of aggregate 
exports reached its trough at a level of 77 % compared 
to the September 2008 volume, i.e. a decline of 23 % in 
real values. The start and the intensity of the trade col-
lapse were similar on the import side, but the decline 
was somewhat more extended, lasting until April 2009, 
when the volume index reached its low at 80 %. Hence, 
during the peak of the crisis, the export decline of 24 % 
was larger than the decline in imports, which amounted 
to 20 % in real terms.
Differences are also observable for the initial recovery 
phase discernible on the export side, starting in Febru-
ary/March 2009 and — setting aside the seasonal drop 
in August — lasting until October 2009, the last avail    -
able observation for this analysis. In contrast, for 
imports, no real recovery can be detected before Sep-
tember 2009, so that one year after the outbreak of the 
crisis, the index level of exports was 4 percentage points 
above the import level, despite the initially stronger 
drop in export volumes. These differences in the recov-
ery of trade volumes largely reflect differences in the 
overall recovery from the crisis, which appears to be 
more sluggish in the EU-27 than in other regions, par-
ticularly Asia and China.
Against this background, the most outstanding point 
that emerges from Figure 2.8 is that parts and compo-
nents actually registered the most pronounced drop in 
trade volumes both on the export and on the import 
side, followed by capital goods. For example, in Janu-
ary 2009, imported parts and components stood at 
about 62 % of their September 2008 volume level, and 
remained at a very low level until September 2009, 
when they began to recover. Both on the export and on 
the import side, EU-27 trade in parts and components 78
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remained depressed at around 75 % of its September 
2008 level at the end of the observation period. In con-
trast, the trade volume of consumption goods fell less 
sharply than other goods categories.
2.4.2.  The share of parts and components in overall 
trade declined due to the crisis
The more than proportionate decline in the trade of 
parts and components led to a decline in the share of 
these goods categories when pre-crisis and post-crisis 
averages are compared (42). More precisely, for exports, 
the share of trade in parts and components decreased 
by 2.3 percentage points, from 17 % to 14,7 %. For 
imports, the relative decline amounted to 1.1 percent-
age points, from 15.5 % to 14.4 %. But the fact that parts 
and components were the most strongly hit goods cat-
egory of EU-27 trade makes them particularly important 
for explaining the trade collapse (43).
One explanation for the strong decline in parts and com-
ponents trade could be a change in the structure of trade 
with respect to trade in parts and components, i.e. a par-
tial reversal of the trend towards ever-deeper and more 
complex forms of vertical specialisation. Such a trend 
reversal may have been triggered by a less favourable 
international environment, with the higher cost of trade 
finance and potentially protectionist policies imple-
mented by trading partners. Another explanation for 
the strong decline in parts and components trade, which 
may be a rival as well as a complementary factor, is again 
a composition effect, similar to that mentioned above. 
According to this hypothesis, the trade slump was strong-
est in trade in parts and components because important 
industries in world trade which are also intensive in parts 
and components trade, such as the automobile industry, 
were relatively harder hit by the shock in global demand 
than other industries. The causality in this hypothesis is 
assumed to run from industries to shares in parts and 
components in total manufacturing trade. If the compos-
ition effect drives the strong downward movement of 
trade in parts and components, the stronger decline in 
this product category should vanish at the level of individ-
ual industries. On the other hand, if international supply 
linkages were partly disrupted as a consequence of the 
crisis, as suggested by the first explanation, the share of 
this category in total trade should have declined both at 
the total manufacturing level and for individual industries.
(42)  Pre-crisis averages are calculated for January 2008 to September 2008 and 
post-crisis averages for the period October 2008 to October 2009.
(43)  Note that the more than proportionate decline of parts and components is 
not the result of the multiplicative effect that trade in intermediates intro-
duces into the trade statistics.
2.4.3.  Parts and components trade and trade collapse 
across industries
This section takes a closer look at the share of parts and 
components trade in individual industries. Figures 2.9 
and 2.10 present the shares of parts and components 
trade in individual industries for exports and imports 
on the vertical axes, and the industry-specific index of 
the trade decline on the horizontal axes. The horizontal 
axes show development between September 2008 and 
the month displaying the lowest value after Septem-
ber 2008. The series is constructed as an index with the 
level in September 2008 equal to 100. The lines cross-
ing the data point ‘total manufacturing’ indicate the 
shares of parts in components trade and the index of 
trade decline for total manufacturing for comparison, 
respectively.
These figures show that vertical specialisation, as meas-
ured by parts and components trade, plays an import-
ant role in roughly half of manufacturing industries, 
mainly those with medium- and high-tech intensity. 
Industries with a high degree of vertical specialisation 
are found above the vertical line through ‘total manu-
facturing’. The highest degree of vertical specialisation 
in EU-27 exports is found in the electrical machinery 
industry (NACE 31), with 57 % of exported goods con-
stituting trade in parts and components, followed by 
the machinery and equipment industry (NACE 29), 
with a share of 39 % in parts and components trade 
(see Figure 2.9). In the transport equipment (NACE 35) 
and automotive industry (NACE 34), parts and compo-
nents account for 36 % and 34 % of industry exports 
respectively. The industry ranking by share of parts and 
components imports looks very similar, despite some 
differences.
While the electrical machinery industry (NACE 31) has 
the highest share of parts and components in imports, 
with 55 %, it is followed by transportation equipment, 
with 45 % (see Figure 2.10). The machinery and equip-
ment industry, the radio and television industry (NACE 
32) and the automotive industry also have relatively 
high shares of parts and components in imports (see 
Figure 2.10). So, despite some differences in the precise 
ranking, the importance of parts and components is 
very similar on both the export and import side, with the 
five industries mentioned being those with the highest 
degree of vertical specialisation.79
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Figure 2.8:   Development of EU-27 exports and imports by end-use categories  
during the crisis (trade volumes, September 2008  = 100)
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Figure 2.9:   Index of real export values against share of parts and components trade of individual industries
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Figure 2.10:   Index of real import values against share of parts and components trade of individual industries
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The composition effect hypothesis could serve as a 
plausible explanation for the strong decline in parts and 
components trade only if those industries with a high 
share of parts and components trade suffered from a 
more than proportionate slump. As indicated above, 
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 show graphically the relationship 
between each industry’s share of parts and components 
in total EU-27 export and imports (vertical axis) and the 
severity of the trade decline that the respective industry 
suffered (horizontal axis). The industries’ positions along 
these dimensions are shown relative to the entire manu-
facturing sector (NACE 15–36). The severity of the trade 
decline of each industry is measured by its index of real 
trade value at the time of its post-crisis monthly low.
September 2008 values serve as the base month. Conse-
quently, a low index number indicates a strong decline 
in the real export or import value. Therefore, industries 
that experienced a strong decline relative to manufac-
turing are found on the left hand side in Figures 2.9 and 
2.10 while industries that fared relatively well, such as 
the chemical industry (NACE 23), are found on the right 
hand side. The index numbers on the horizontal axes 
are related to the share of parts and components in the 
same industry, which are shown on the vertical axis. The 
figures show that there is indeed a large degree of vari-
ation in the growth performance of individual sectors 
(see dispersion along the horizontal axis). Focusing first 
on industries with the most pronounced declines of real 
trade values, the exports and imports of the automotive 
industry (NACE 34) experienced the strongest declines, 
amounting to about 45 % of its September 2008 
level (44). In line with the composition effect hypothesis, 
the automotive industry is also among the industries 
with the highest share in parts and components trade. 
Though developments in the automotive industry 
were devastating, other industries singled out as hav-
ing high shares in the parts and components trade did 
not perform as badly. Nevertheless, the machinery and 
equipment industry (NACE 29) experienced a decline in 
real trade values, clearly above the average, as did the 
imports attributed to the electrical machinery industry 
(NACE 31) and the radio and television industry (NACE 
32). The same is, however, true for a series of other 
industries with hardly any trade in parts and compo-
nents such as publishing and printing (NACE 22), rubber 
and plastics (NACE 25), mineral products (NACE 26) and 
basic metals industry (NACE 27). Moreover, the transport 
equipment industry (NACE 35) registered a below-aver-
age decline on the import side.
Thus, Figures 2.9 and 2.10 indicate only a very weak 
negative correlation between the industries’ decline 
in exports and imports respectively during the   crisis. 
The share of parts and components trade lends limit  ed 
(44)  Since Figures 2.9 and 2.10 measure the industries’ total export and import indi-
ces, the trade declines are equal to 100 minus the respective index number.
support to the composition effect as the principal 
explanation for the strong decline in the parts and 
components trade and the related loss in the relative 
importance of this goods category in overall exports 
and imports.
Moreover, Figure 2.11 shows that the crisis also led to a 
decline in the share of parts and components in over-
all EU-27 trade in almost all industries where vertical 
supply chains play a major role, such as the electrical 
machinery industry (NACE 31), the mechanical equip-
ment industry (NACE 29) and the motor vehicles indus-
try (NACE 34).
This picture supports the hypothesis that some of the 
established international supply chains were disrupted. 
This could be the result of changes in the sourcing strat-
egies of multinational corporations, such as shifting 
to domestic suppliers or bringing back onshore activ-
ities that were previously offshore. With respect to the 
decline in the share of parts and components at indus-
try level in overall EU-27 trade, a third factor, inventory 
adjustments, may explain developments. While inven-
tories may certainly influence developments of trade 
values in intermediate goods in the short term, they are 
unlikely to be the major factor, because trends towards 
just-in-time delivery for production reduce the impact 
of inventory adjustments on developments of exports 
and imports. Moreover, trends for semi-finished goods 
do not show the same patterns as parts and compo-
nents; this also supports the case of potential change in 
the structure of trade with respect to trade in parts and 
components.
2.5.  Summary and conclusions
The analyses of trade in intermediates point towards 
their relative importance compared to other product 
categories and their dynamics over time. The share of 
intermediate imports in total EU-27 trade amounts to 
around 55 % of total trade. Trade in intermediates is 
not too distinct from trade in other product categories 
despite its relative importance and its nature.
The study shows that the shares of imported intermedi-
ates in total trade are rather stable for each industry, and 
that there is a high correlation of these shares across 
countries at industry level. This suggests that specialisa-
tion patterns might play an important role in explaining 
cross-country differences and changes over time. The 
analyses showed that there has been a general trend 
towards increasing shares of trade in intermediates over 
time. The slightly larger increase in trade in intermedi-
ates as compared to other product categories is mostly 
due to a shift towards more knowledge-intensive indus-
tries in which imports of intermediates are more import-
ant than in other industries.82
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Some important changes in intermediates trade 
have occurred over the last decade with respect to 
the geographical structure of trade. Considering 
EU-27 imports first, a common trend is that the EU-15 
countries, the advanced OECD countries and the 
Asian countries have lost market shares in all prod-
uct categories, whereas the EU-12 countries and the 
BRIC countries have gained market shares. A striking 
aspect is that these shifts can be observed across all 
industry categories. In particular, import shares from 
BRIC countries increased relatively strongly in high-
tech industries at the expense of EU-15 and advanced 
OECD countries, whereas the EU-12 gained mostly 
in high-tech consumer goods. The shifts are similar 
for other industry categories, but less pronounced. 
A similar pattern can be observed for EU-27 exports, 
Figure 2.11:   Index of real export values against share of parts and components trade of individual 
industries — Decline from September 2008 to post-crisis industry low
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with rising export shares observed for EU-12 and BRIC 
countries.
Overall, the analysis suggests that the pattern of 
trade in intermediates and its change over time 
tend not to be too different from other product cat-
egories, despite its more complex role as an input in 
the production process. As such, there seems to be 
no requirement for specific or distinct policies with 
respect to different product categories. The findings 
are suggestive of the importance of the international 
supply of products used in production processes 
which have to be taken into account in any bilateral 
policy measures. A further finding is that the industry 
dimension, i.e. specialisation patterns, shapes gen-
eral patterns and volumes of trade in intermediates 
for individual countries. In some cases, the results 
indicate that trade in intermediates might serve as 
an important vehicle for successful trade integra-
tion into world markets, and may allow countries to 
overcome adverse initial specialisation patterns, thus 
allowing for dynamic shifts in comparative advantage 
structures through learning effects. Countries such as 
China (but also others) show particularly dynamic pat-
terns in higher-tech industries or products, not only 
with respect to consumer goods, but also to inter-
mediate products.
The analyses show that most countries are both export-
ers and importers (i.e. the share of two-way trade is quite 
high) even at detailed industry levels. Smaller emerging 
economies, i.e, the EU-12, are relatively more specialised 
in trade in intermediates as compared to other econ-
omies. Again, these specialisation patterns can be found 
both in imports and exports.
By using EU domestic and import symmetric input-
output tables, analyses of the share of imported inter-
mediate inputs in total intermediate inputs by industry 
were performed. The analyses were undertaken for 
both manufacturing and services industries. Imported 
intermediates are most important for high-technology 
manufacturing industries with an import share of about 
55 %. Imports of intermediates are also important in 
medium-high-tech industries, where the import share 
amounts to 50 % and to 48 % in medium-low-tech 
industries, but less so in low-tech industries, where only 
some 30 % of input goods are imported. Again, there 
are quite substantial country differences indicating 
larger shares for small economies. These country differ-
ences seem to be more pronounced in high-tech indus-
tries. These shares, with a few exceptions, rose over the 
period from 1995 to 2005. Regarding service industries, 
imports generally play a much less important role, ran-
ging from around 16 % in trade and hotels to about 
26 % in transport services. Differences across countries 
for services industries are smaller compared to manu-
facturing industries.
The analyses indicate an increase of the linkages 
between industries and countries over time. The 
increase in inter-industry linkages means that an 
industry facing an increase in demand requires more 
inputs from other industries to satisfy that demand 
than before. The increased industry linkages between 
countries mean that more of an industry’s demand for 
inputs is satisfied from suppliers in another country 
than before. Calculations of output multipliers from the 
input-output tables show that there is an increase in the 
total output multipliers for the EU-15 economies, but a 
decrease for EU-12 economies, thus pointing to stronger 
inter-industry linkages for the former set of countries. 
When looking at domestic multipliers, the former group 
shows more or less constant multipliers, implying that 
increased imports of intermediates are the triggers for 
increased linkages in terms of multiplier effects.
Given the complexity of the production process and its 
international relations, aggregated trade data might 
not be the best source of information when aiming at a 
detailed analysis of supply chains at the level of firms or 
even products. In this case, detailed information about 
the unbundled supply chains in one particular case — 
Nokia N95 mobile phone — has been used to address 
these questions in more detail. It turns out that, on aver-
age, Europe captured 55 % of the total value added. 
The N95 was assembled both in Europe and China. 
When the device was assembled and sold in Europe, 
Europe’s share of the value rose to 68 %. Even when 
it was assembled in Beijing and sold in the US market, 
Europe captured as much as 51 % of the value. The final 
assembly, although important, represents only a frac-
tion of the overall value added of a high-tech product 
such as the mobile phone. The capture of value is largely 
detached from the physical flows of goods within the 
supply chain. Major parts of the value are attributed 
to design, R & D, branding, marketing and distribution 
and management of these functions. The estimates 
based on trade statistics and national accounts tend 
to give a somewhat biased and inadequate picture of 
how value added spreads geographically. The only way 
to shed some light on the issue, given the availability 
of statistical data, is to conduct case studies. The black 
box needs to be opened to understand the very nature 
and consequences of production unbundling. The case 
study shows that an analysis which takes service flows 
into account and uses value added-based informa-
tion comes up with strikingly different conclusions on 
global trade flows to analyses which use gross values 
of flows of goods. This suggests that concerted efforts 
should be made to develop value added-based trade 
statistics. The current system was developed for the ‘old 
paradigm’ globalisation, where trade and specialisation 
in the international economy were based on compara-
tive advantages of sectors. In order to dig deeper into 
the consequences of global trade in tasks, value added-
based data on trade flows are needed.84
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Finally, when analysing the impact of the crisis on EU-27 
trade flows, a series of explanations has been offered for 
the trade collapse in the winter months of 2008/09. The 
increasing role of trade in intermediates plays a central 
role in most of them. A first reason for this is the styl-
ised fact that the larger share of trade in intermediates 
caused the income elasticity of trade to increase, which 
was reconfirmed here for EU-15 trade. One of the major 
results of the analysis is that parts and components were 
also the goods category worst affected by the crisis, 
standing at about 62 % of its September 2008 volume 
at the peak of the crisis. As a result, the relative impor-
tance of parts and components in EU-27 trade declined, 
with the post-crisis share of parts and components 
in EU exports and EU imports falling by 2 % and 1 % 
respectively. This decline appears to be rather small, but 
when individual industries are considered, the changes 
become more pronounced for those with a high share 
of parts and components trade, reaching 7 percentage 
points for the share of parts and components in EU-27 
exports in the electrical machinery industry. This result 
supports the hypothesis that some of the international 
supply chains established in the course of globalisa-
tion were negatively affected because of changes in the 
sourcing strategies of multinational firms in reaction to 
a less friendly trading environment.
The results of the analysis of the parts and components 
trade also revealed that a composition effect is not 
the major explanation for the very pronounced slump 
in parts and components exports and imports of the 
EU-27. So, while the composition effect and possibly 
also inventory adjustments may have contributed to 
the more than proportionate decline in the exports and 
imports of parts and components, they seem to be insuf-
ficient to fully account for the changes seen. In any case, 
the severe decline in trade in parts and components is 
one of the elements explaining why the trade slump 
was even more pronounced than suggested by long-
term income elasticity of trade. By viewing the recovery 
of trade flows, a rapid upturn in EU-27 trade could be 
expected if the strong decline in parts and components 
trade were primarily driven by the inventory cycle, as 
empty stocks have to be refilled. There is, however, a 
risk that the disruption of existing supply chains, caused 
by the financial crisis, may have a dampening effect on 
trade during the recovery.
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Annex
Data and classifications
Trade statistics
The analysis is firstly based on the EU Comext trade 
database which provides data at the detailed Com-
mon Nomenclature (CN) 8-digit level. The analysis is 
restricted to the period 1999–2008. This database pro-
vides information on export and imports at the detailed 
CN 8-digit product level with all other countries in the 
world as partner countries. The CN 8-digit nomencla-
ture includes about 11 500 product codes on average 
per year for which data on both values and quantities 
(in kilograms) of imports and exports are available. 
The information on the quantities traded is later on 
used to calculate unit values or unit value ratios. One 
important aspect is that the CN 8-digit classification is 
slightly changed every year. Thus an average of about 
500 product codes are replaced per year, although 
the overall number of products in the nomenclature is 
roughly constant. Whenever these changes in classifica-
tion pose some problems, these are circumvented by 
aggregating the data to the CN 6-digit level which cor-
responds to the HS 6-digit classification for which the 
revisions are less problematic. For the detailed product-
level data, correspondences exist to NACE industries 
(at the 2- and 3-digit levels) and to end-use categories 
known as ‘broad economic categories’ (BEC) classifica-
tion as provided by the UN. Table A.1 shows the list of 
BEC categories. At the 1-digit level there are seven cat-
egories classified, which are broken down into primary 
goods and processed goods in the case of the first three 
1-digit product categories, parts and accessories as a 
subgroup of capital goods and transport equipment 
goods. Passenger motor cars are included in this last 
category. At the 3-digit level, parts of the groupings are 
further classified, according to whether the products 
are mainly used by industry or for household consump-
tion. This more detailed classification of products allows 
one to aggregate up to somewhat higher aggregates 
to consider trade in intermediates, in final consumer 
goods and in capital goods separately. There are, how-
ever, various different ways in which this aggregation 
can be done and various suggestions are made in the 
literature. This study follows the definitions suggested 
by the OECD, as shown in Table A.3 (see Miroudot et al. 
(2009) for an example (45)). The table provides evidence 
that this classification is not a one-to-one correspond-
ence as many products might be used by households 
for final consumption as well as by industries as inputs 
in the production process. The most important example 
of this might be passenger cars, which are therefore not 
(45)  Examples for slightly different classifications are Gaulier et al. (2007) or 
  Frensch and Wittich (2009).
classified. Together with motor spirits (BEC 321), this cat-
egory is, however, reported separately.
Note that this is a rather broad definition of trade in 
intermediate products, as it also includes primary prod-
ucts (111, 21, 31) as intermediates. An example would be 
milk produced in country A and exported to country B 
for the production of cheese (46). This broad definition 
is used in most parts of the study; however, whenever 
it is advantageous, a more narrow definition is used, by 
separating single BEC codes or groups of these.
An additional aspect concerns the detailed list of part-
ner countries. As it is not possible to show the relevant 
figures for all partner countries, it is necessary to build 
country groups. The country groups considered are 
listed in Table A.2.
The EU-15 includes all countries that have been mem-
bers of the EU since 1995, and the EU-12 includes all 
countries that joined in 2004 or later (thus this group 
includes all central and east European countries 
together with Cyprus and Malta). The EU-15 and EU-12 
together are denoted the EU-27. There is also a set of 
advanced OECD countries not included in the EU-15 or 
EU-12 (Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, Switzerland, US), a group of Asian countries 
(including Hong Kong, Indonesia, Macau, Malaysia, Phil-
ippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Viet-
nam), the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and 
finally a ‘rest of world’ (RoW) category.
In some cases, trade data from UN Comtrade at the 
detailed HS 6 product level are used. There is also a cor-
respondence to BEC categories for these data. This data-
base allows the inclusion of other countries as reporter 
countries in the analysis.
Data from input-output tables
The analysis in Section 3 is based on the EU KLEMS data, 
which distinguish intermediates input by energy, mater-
ial and services. These data are based on the respective 
use of tables for each country and allow inclusion of 19 
countries in the analysis. Here, the focus is mainly on 
the inputs of services in manufacturing and on mater-
ial inputs in services. One should note that this analysis 
is based on nominal values. Total and domestic input-
output tables provided by Eurostat are used to calculate 
the share of imported intermediates by industry. See 
(46)  There are many definitions of supply chains. All of them share this broad view 
as expressed in the following statement: ‘Entire network of entities, directly 
or indirectly interlinked and interdependent in serving the same consumer or 
customer. It comprises of vendors that supply raw material, producers who 
convert the material into products, warehouses that store, distribution centres 
that deliver to the retailers, and retailers who bring the product to the ultimate 
user.’ (http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/supply-chain.html).87
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(P & C). The two groups of final goods — capital goods 
and consumption goods — are treated separately in 
line with OECD guidelines. Another important differ-
ence in this classification is that product groups for 
passenger cars (BEC category 51) are subsumed under 
consumption goods (instead of the catch-all group of 
category ‘not classified’ or ‘mixed’). This finer split-up of 
intermedi  ates is motivated by the fact that — though 
all intermediate goods enter the production process — 
the various categories of intermediates reacted very 
differently during the crisis. Location and sourcing deci-
sions for primary goods are probably quite different to 
those for parts and components, which also include a 
high share of inter-company trade of multinationals. 
The analysis of trade in parts and components which, in 
contrast to primary and semi-finished goods, include a 
high share of technologically sophisticated goods may 
in general be a more appropriate proxy for vertical spe-
cialisation within particular industries (47).
(47)  Trade statistics as used here, in fact, only allow intra-industry vertical special-
isation to be revealed because products are always allocated to the industry 
that typically produces this product and not to the industry where it is used 
for production purposes.
Eurostat (2008) for a detailed outline of the compilation 
of European supply and use and symmetric input output 
tables. The manufacturing industries are grouped into 
four groups which are listed in Table A.3.
Monthly trade statistics
The analysis of the trade collapse (Section 4) builds on 
detailed (CN 8-digit level) monthly trade data for the 
EU-27 from the Comext database, which provides the 
same level of detail as the yearly trade data described 
above. However, this section opted for a more refined 
categorisation of end-uses, which is more relevant 
for the analysis of the trade collapse. In particular, the 
analyses in Section 4 follow the approach in Gaulier et 
al. (2007) and separate the broad category of intermedi-
ates of the OECD classification into (i) primary goods, 
(ii) semi-finished goods and (iii) parts and components 
Table A.1: BEC classification
1-digit Description 2-digit Description 3-digit Description
1 Food and beverages 11 Primary 111 Mainly for industry Intermediates
112 Mainly for household  Consumption 
consumption
12  Processed 121 Mainly for industry Intermediates
122 Mainly for household Consumption
consumption
2 Industrial supplies n.e.s. 21 Primary Intermediates
22 Processed Intermediates
3 Fuels and lubricants  31 Primary Intermediates
32 Processed 321 Motor spirit Not classified
322 Other  Not classified
4 Capital goods  
(except transport 
  equipment) 
and parts and 
accessories thereof 
  41  Capital goods  Capital goods 
42 Parts and accessories Intermediates
5 Transport equipment 
and parts and
accessories thereof
51 Passenger motor cars  Not classified
52 Other 521 Industrial Capital goods
522 Non-Industrial Consumption
53 Parts and accessories Intermediates
6 Consumer goods n.e.s 61 Durable Consumption
62 Semi-durable Consumption
63 Non-durable Consumption
7 Goods n.e.s Consumption
Table A.2: Country groupings
EU-15 Old Member States
EU-12 New Member States
AOECD Advanced OECD
ASIA Asia
BRICS BRICs
RoW Rest of world88
European Competitiveness Report 2010
Calculations of unit value ratios
The value of exports to the EU-27 of commodity   by 
country   in year   is denoted by   and the quantity 
(measured in tons) by  , and the export unit value is 
defined as
The unit values of country  ’s exports to the EU are then 
compared to the unit values of total EU imports (from 
the world, including intra-EU trade) by calculating the 
logs of the unit value ratios
Here,   denotes the unit value of 
total EU imports for a particular commodity   in year  .
Taking the logarithm ensures a symmetric aggrega-
tion across products for ratios larger and smaller than 
(see below). In logs, the ratio is thus larger (smaller) 
than zero if the export unit value of country   is larger 
(smaller) than the unit value of total EU imports. The unit 
value ratios to the level of product categories and indus-
try groups are aggregated. This is done by constructing 
a weighted sum of the unit value ratios   across the 
products belonging to a particular industry group   
and product group  . The weight used for a particular 
commodity   in such an aggregation is the share of its 
export value in the industry’s or product group’s exports 
of country c. Denoting the set of commodities   belong-
ing to an aggregate   by   the weights are 
calculated as
The unit value ratio for a particular aggregate   is then
Table A.3: Industry classification
NACE Description Group
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages Low
16 Manufacture of tobacco products Low
17 Manufacture of textiles Low
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur Low
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery,  
harness and footwear
Low
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture;  
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
Low
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products Low
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media Low
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel Medium low
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products Medium high
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products Medium low
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products Medium low
27 Manufacture of basic metals Medium low
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment Medium low
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. Medium high
30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers High
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. Medium high
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus High
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks High
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers Medium high
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment Medium high
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. Low
Note:  The classification of industries in technology intensities is based on Hatzichronoglou (1997) and Loschky (1998).89
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This measure can be interpreted analogously to the unit 
value ratios for a particular commodity as mentioned 
above. Since this exercise is performed for groups of 
partner countries (i.e. countries exporting to the EU-27), 
index   has to be interpreted as a group of partner coun-
tries (Asian countries, BRIC countries, etc.).
The market shares of a particular country (group)   
in EU-27 markets (or individual countries or country 
groups) is defined as
i.e. the export values from country   of product category 
 relative to total import values of the EU-27.
For the EU-27’s exports a similar exercise is performed. 
However, one has to keep in mind that using the EU 
Comext database does not allow use of total exports 
to the world (from all countries) as a unit for compari-
son as this dataset provides information on exports and 
imports of EU-27 countries only, thus excluding trade 
flows between non EU members. Consequently, the unit 
value ratios for exports is defined as
where   denotes the unit value of exports for country 
 being a member of the EU-27 and   denotes the 
unit value of total EU-27 exports to the world. Export 
shares are defined as the share of country  ’s exports to 
the world in total EU-27 exports in the respective prod-
uct and industry categories.
Table A.4: Change in import values and import shares by end-use categories
Index 1999 = 1 Change in import shares (in percentage points)
Intermediates Consumer Capital Not Intermediates Consumer Capital Not
goods goods classified goods goods classified
Belgium 1.92 2.32 1.70 1.95 - 1.64 3.67 - 1.93 - 0.10
Bulgaria 5.04 5.18 5.26 4.31 - 0.17 0.45 0.85 - 1.13
Czech 
Republic
3.55 3.58 3.28 3.14 1.10 0.45 - 1.22 - 0.33
Denmark 1.77 1.85 1.69 1.71 - 0.04 1.12 - 0.92 - 0.16
Germany 1.92 1.42 1.59 1.20 6.79 - 3.63 - 1.12 - 2.04
Estonia 3.16 2.97 2.68 7.48 - 1.29 - 2.03 - 3.13 6.45
Ireland 1.09 1.84 1.16 1.12 - 6.12 8.42 - 1.76 - 0.54
Greece 1.77 2.14 1.51 1.49 - 0.50 5.60 - 3.75 - 1.35
Spain 2.09 2.33 1.47 1.31 3.98 3.92 - 4.60 - 3.29
France 1.59 1.65 0.99 1.59 4.23 2.90 - 7.63 0.50
Italy 1.67 1.80 1.30 1.30 2.50 2.58 - 3.23 - 1.85
Cyprus 3.09 2.31 1.99 4.11 5.64 - 5.12 - 4.67 4.15
Latvia 3.91 3.55 3.34 5.41 1.66 - 1.69 - 2.40 2.42
Lithuania 3.87 3.78 4.45 7.69 - 3.10 - 2.26 1.46 3.91
Luxembourg 1.98 1.46 3.00 1.96 - 2.44 - 6.77 9.76 - 0.55
Hungary 2.35 2.51 2.75 3.56 - 3.37 0.15 1.93 1.29
Malta 1.06 1.48 1.15 1.20 - 5.77 5.71 - 0.08 0.14
Netherlands 1.98 1.78 1.90 1.33 2.57 - 1.19 0.22 - 1.61
Austria 1.90   1.67 1.60 1.59 3.81 - 1.25 - 1.88 - 0.68
Poland 3.09 3.08 2.89 3.21 0.74 0.16 - 1.14 0.24
Portugal 1.45 1.54 1.25 1.00 1.99 2.55 - 1.83 - 2.70
Romania 4.87 5.65 6.67 35.18 - 8.44 0.06 3.32 5.06
Slovenia 2.69 2.41 2.40 3.09 1.38 - 1.49 - 1.48 1.58
Slovakia 5.02 4.64 4.41 5.23 2.04 - 0.80 - 1.59 0.34
Finland 1.83 1.91 1.80 2.50 - 1.31 0.36 - 0.87 1.83
Sweden 1.84 1.87 1.58 1.38 2.27 1.25 - 2.07 - 1.45
United 
Kingdom 1.27 1.58 1.19 1.17 - 1.73 4.59 - 1.90 - 0.96
EU-27 1.85 1.82 1.55 1.49 2.75 0.74 - 2.38 - 1.12
Source: Eurostat Comext, wiiw calculations.90
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Table A.5: Change in export values and export shares by end-use categories
Index 1999 = 1 Change in import shares (in percentage points)
Intermediates Consumer Capital Not Intermediates Consumer Capital Not
goods goods classified goods goods classified
Belgium 2.01 2.26 1.68 1.33 1.77 3.59 - 1.69 - 3.67
Bulgaria 4.92 2.78 5.17 8.69 8.75 - 12.87 1.53 2.58
Czech 
Republic
3.60 3.80 5.91 3.67 - 5.77 - 0.70 7.14 - 0.67
Denmark 1.91 1.48 1.45 2.82 5.92 - 3.85 - 2.74 0.67
Germany 1.96 2.11 1.88 1.65 0.89 1.45 - 0.51 - 1.83
Estonia 3.70 2.57 3.63 119.95 0.10 - 9.13 - 0.20 9.22
Ireland 1.28 2.16 0.94 0.21 - 3.68 11.37 - 7.35 - 0.34
Greece 2.09 1.27 2.50 0.70 10.07 - 12.32 3.06 - 0.81
Spain 1.97 1.97 1.63 1.39 3.81 1.84 - 1.44 - 4.21
France 1.41 1.52 1.00 1.18 3.44 3.38 - 6.12 - 0.69
Italy 1.76 1.43 1.59 1.75 3.80 - 3.68 - 0.37 0.24
Cyprus 2.49 1.91 2.33 19.82 3.27 - 8.68 0.35 5.06
Latvia 3.54 3.72 10.04 6.09 - 7.34 - 2.00 8.20 1.14
Lithuania 6.66 3.69 12.36 11.46 3.31 - 15.33 5.96 6.06
Luxembourg 1.62 1.32 6.77 1.96 - 18.67 - 6.48 25.42 - 0.28
Hungary 2.65 2.54 4.09 3.65 - 5.44 - 3.26 7.34 1.36
Malta 0.96 0.99 1.06 14.09 - 2.11 0.17 0.59 1.34
Netherlands 2.35 1.90 2.09 2.05 4.01 - 2.89 - 0.91 - 0.20
Austria 1.98 2.10 2.34 1.62 - 1.99 0.48 2.71 - 1.21
Poland 4.88 3.81 4.90 6.40 3.10 - 5.80 0.83 1.86
Portugal 1.78 1.13 1.90 0.89 9.77 - 8.12 2.69 - 4.34
Romania 5.35 2.04 7.18 13.26 12.52 - 22.99 5.33 5.14
Slovenia 2.84 2.22 3.51 3.85 0.27 - 6.16 2.49 3.41
Slovakia 4.30 6.72 5.65 5.59 - 8.59 5.85 1.13 1.61
Finland 1.36 1.93 1.68 2.66 - 6.91 1.50 2.96 2.45
Sweden 1.60 1.71 1.30 1.67 1.83 1.44 - 3.74 0.47
United 
Kingdom
1.24 1.36 0.87 1.52 1.84 2.69 - 6.52 2.00
EU-27 1.87 1.84 1.64 1.69 1.99 0.46 - 1.94 - 0.51
Source: Eurostat Comext, wiiw calculations.91
3.1.  Introduction
The internationalisation or globalisation of economic 
activity is one of the most significant changes the world 
economy has experienced over the last 30 years. Firms 
have considerably expanded their business through 
exports and foreign direct investment (FDI). A strong 
impetus for this expansion came from the opening of 
new markets in China, India and other emerging econ-
omies and the economic integration of the former com-
munist countries in central and eastern Europe into the 
world economy.
Globalisation does not only change trade and FDI flows. 
It also opens up access to new knowledge, and it shapes 
and transforms the innovation processes of firms. It 
poses new requirements in terms of the knowledge 
needed to compete on domestic and international mar-
kets. To meet these requirements, an increasing number 
of firms, in particular large multinational enterprises 
(MNEs), locate research, development and innovation 
activities outside their home countries. This is what has 
become known as the internationalisation of corporate 
R & D and innovation (Narula and Zanfei, 2005; OECD, 
2008; Dunning and Lundan, 2009).
The aim of this chapter is to study the internationalisa-
tion of R & D and innovation for the European Union. 
Section 2 of the chapter gives a brief overview of the 
motives of firms when they internationalise R & D and 
innovation. Section 3 looks at R & D and innovation 
activities of foreign-owned firms in the EU by sector, 
country and technology. Section 4 examines the activ-
ities of EU firms outside the European Union. Sections 
5 and 6 investigate whether — and how — foreign-
owned and domestically owned firms differ in their 
innovation behaviour. Section 7 investigates how both 
groups transform innovation into productivity and 
employment growth. Section 8 draws conclusions from 
the analysis.
3.2.    Motives of firms when they internationalise 
R & D and innovation activities
The decision of a firm to go abroad with R & D and other 
innovation activities is a trade-off between the benefits 
of doing R & D and innovation at various locations and 
the costs associated with the decentralised organisation 
of R & D and innovation.
Benefits of doing R & D and innovation abroad are 
related to the generation and acquisition of new know-
ledge which is not available in the home country. The 
literature describes two principal strategies which 
emerge from this knowledge motive (von Zedtwitz and 
Gassmann, 2002; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; Narula 
and Zanfei, 2005): first, overseas R & D and innovation 
seek to create localised, market-oriented knowledge 
which helps firms to adapt existing technologies and 
products to foreign markets and to boost the overall 
revenue they generate from these assets (‘asset-exploit-
ing’ strategy). R & D and innovation often follow other 
economic activity, in particular production and sales, to 
locations abroad and are in most cases an extension of 
existing overseas production and marketing activities. 
As a result, countries with strong economic ties in for-
eign trade and FDI are also integrated in corporate R & D 
and innovation. Second, R & D and innovation activities 
of MNEs abroad focus on creating the kind of techno-
logical and scientific knowledge that may find applica-
tion in the whole enterprise group. This is known as the 
‘asset-augmenting’ strategy. Research suggests that 
asset-exploiting strategies still prevail, although asset 
augmenting is gaining in importance (le Bas and Sierra, 
2002).
Another important motive for overseas R & D and innov-
ation activities — besides a lack of knowledge — are 
capacity bottlenecks in the home country. In a number 
of cases, firms move abroad because they cannot find 
enough research staff at their headquarters location. 
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3.3.    Mapping the internationalisation of R & D 
and innovation activities in the EU
3.3.1.  Internationalisation at the EU-27 level
The analysis starts by examining the degree of inter-
nationalisation and characteristics of foreign-owned 
R & D and innovation activity in the EU Member States. 
R & D and innovation in firms is a multifaceted process 
that cannot really be described or measured by refer-
ence to a single data source. It is therefore important 
to look at a variety of data sources to capture different 
aspects of innovation behaviour (see Annex ‘Measuring 
the internationalisation of R & D and innovation’).
Patent data from the European Patent Office (EPO) is 
a rich source for surveying the innovation activities of 
foreign-owned firms in the EU as well as cross-border 
links between EU Member States and countries outside 
the EU. Patent documents include the location of the 
applicant and the location of the inventor of a particular 
patent. By comparing the two, one can derive a meas-
ure for the foreign ownership of patent inventions in a 
particular country. The share of foreign-owned patents 
in all patent applications of a country will be used as an 
indicator for the internationalisation of R & D and innov-
ation in that country.
The data reveal that the internationalisation of R & D and 
innovation has increased considerably in the EU. The 
share of foreign-owned patents in all patent inventions 
in the EU-27 at the EPO (48) climbed from about 10 % 
in 1990 to around 17 % in the years 2002 to 2007. This 
upward trend is even more striking in terms of absolute 
numbers: the total number of foreign-owned patents 
rose from 2 772 in 1990 to 9 677 in 2005, an increase of 
249 %. Domestically owned patent inventions, by con-
trast, increased by 88 % in the same period.
Despite a rising degree of internationalisation, foreign-
owned patents are still an exception. Patents owned by 
domestic applicants — individuals, firms, universities or 
other organisations — still account for the bulk of R & D 
and innovation in the EU. The data give no indication 
of any substitution or crowding-out of domestic by for-
eign-based activity.
Figure 3.1 further distinguishes between patent inven-
tions owned by applicants located in EU-27 countries 
(intra EU), in other European countries (other Europe) 
and in countries outside Europe (extra Europe in Fig-
ure 3.1). Between 1990 and 1998, internationalisation 
increased steadily in all three groups. Since 1998, there 
has been a diverging development between the three 
(48)  EPO Patstats database, October 2009 edition.
The internationalisation of R & D and innovation has also 
been fuelled by cross-border mergers and acquisitions.
Cost differences between countries, in contrast, seem 
to be less important for R & D and innovation than for 
production, and only relevant for certain locations. Evi-
dence from innovation surveys and econometric studies 
shows cost advantages having only a modest influence 
compared to other locational advantages (Thursby and 
Thursby, 2006; Kinkel and Maloca, 2008; Belderbos et al., 
2009; European Commission JRC IPTS, 2009b).
The internationalisation of R & D and innovation can 
create advantages for enterprises; such advantages are 
not however cost-free. The costs of internationalisation 
(Gersbach and Schmutzler, 2006; Sanna-Randaccio and 
Veugelers, 2007) comprise first of all the foregone bene-
fits of R & D centralisation, including economies of scale 
and scope from specialisation and a tighter control over 
core technologies. Second, additional costs arise from 
higher coordination efforts and the cost of transferring 
knowledge within the MNE. Despite its public-good 
characteristics, transferring knowledge is an expensive 
process because of its ‘tacit’, localised and context-
related nature. Third, concentrating innovation activ-
ity in the home country is favoured by various linkages 
between the firm and the host country innovation sys-
tem. Patel and Pavitt (1999) and Narula (2002) point out 
that many firms are strongly embedded in their home 
country innovation system, with ties that include formal 
R & D cooperation schemes with domestic universities 
and research centres, and informal networks that have 
grown from doing business together in the past. Infor-
mal networks between firms may also evolve from staff 
undergoing joint training at universities and research 
centres and from labour mobility.
It is also important to consider the influence of differ-
ences across technologies and sectors. The knowledge 
bases of technologies and sectors differ in their degree 
of tacitness, their cumulativeness, appropriability and 
spatial concentration, or the degree to which they draw 
on and refer to knowledge external to the firm (Marsili, 
2001; Malerba, 2005a,b). These differences translate into 
different degrees of internationalisation of R & D and 
innovation at the sectoral and technology levels. A high 
degree of tacitness, for example, makes it more difficult 
and expensive to transfer knowledge between the par-
ent company and the affiliate. This may reduce intra-firm 
knowledge transfer, but may also call for a more decen-
tralised organisation of R & D and innovation, because 
many tasks can only be done at the affiliate.93
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and its single market consistently attracted more than 
60 % of all US overseas R & D expenditure from 2001 to 
2007, followed by Canada (with a much smaller share of 
around 10 %). R & D expenditure of US MNEs in   Brazil, 
Russia, India and China (referred to as BRICs) is still at a 
low level, but is growing fast. R & D in Japan and South 
Korea, by contrast, is stagnating or increasing only 
slightly.
The upward internationalisation trends can also be 
observed in data on R & D expenditure by foreign-
owned affiliates, provided by the OECD FATS database 
and Eurostat. Sweden is the country with the longest 
time series in these databases. The share of foreign-
owned affiliates in the Swedish manufacturing sector 
increased from 14.5 % (1990) to 40 % in 2007. The share 
of foreign-owned affiliates in manufacturing sector 
R & D expenditure also expanded in large countries such 
as France (1994:15.4 %; 2007: 21.1 %). Upward inter-
nationalisation trends are the general rule for all coun-
tries for which data are available.
The upward trend is confirmed by patent data. Both 
datasets — R & D expenditure and patent data — indi-
cate that small and medium EU countries tend to have a 
higher degree of internationalisation of R & D and innov-
ation (as is the case for trade and FDI). Figure 3.3 illus-
trates the relationship between size and the degree of 
internationalisation by comparing the absolute number 
of patent inventions (horizontal axis) with the share of 
foreign-owned patent inventions (vertical axis).
groups. First, the share of foreign-owned patent inven-
tions with applicants from outside Europe stagnated 
at between 6 % and 7 %. Second, the share of ‘other 
Europe’ and in particular intra-EU ownership   continued 
to increase, at least until 2002, reflecting R & D and 
innov  ation integration and exploitation of single mar-
ket opportunities as well as efforts to support the emer-
gence of a European research area.
Later, around 2002 (after peaking at almost half of all 
foreign-owned patents invented in the EU-27), the 
share of intra-EU applicants began to lose ground. As 
a consequence, the overall degree of internationalisa-
tion of innovation and R & D in the European Union has 
remained fairly stable over more recent years, as meas-
ured by cross-border patent ownership.
3.3.2.  Trends at the country level
The increasing internationalisation of R & D and innov-
ation is also reflected in R & D expenditure. Figure 3.2 
shows — as an example — R & D expenditure by over-
seas subsidiaries of US multinationals in millions of US 
dollars for the period 2001–07.
US MNEs devote substantial resources to R & D activ-
ities abroad, particularly in the EU-27. Expenditure has 
increased considerably since 2001 in all EU countries 
depicted in Figure 3.2 (except for France, for which 
there is a relative stagnation in that period). The EU 
Figure 3.1:   Share of foreign-owned patents in all domestic patent inventions in the  
EU-27 by country groups, 1990–2007, EPO
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lute number of patent inventions: Malta, the Bal-
tic states, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Luxem-
bourg. Large EU countries such as Germany, France 
The countries with the highest share of foreign-
owned patent inventions in the EU according to 
Figure 3.3 all have a comparatively small abso-
Figure 3.2:   R & D expenditure of overseas subsidiaries of US multinational firms, 2001–07 (million USD)
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Figure 3.3:   Share of foreign-owned patent inventions and total number of patent inventions by country, 
2003–07, EPO
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affiliates for the countries for which data are available 
(see Table 1 in the annex). Smaller EU countries and 
the United Kingdom have high shares of foreign R & D 
expenditure, while other large Member States exhibit 
low levels. Finland is also the least internationalised 
country in terms of R & D expenditure by foreign-owned 
affiliates. Countries with a high share of foreign-control-
led R & D expenditure include Austria, the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, Ireland and Slovakia. (In these five coun-
tries, foreign-owned affiliates account for the majority 
of total manufacturing R & D expenditure.)
As observed (see Figure 3.1 above), intra EU-27 cross-
border R & D and innovation activities account for about 
half of all foreign-owned patents in the EU-27 and con-
tributed in large measure to the overall performance 
and internationalisation dynamics in the European 
Union. Figure 3.4 shows the 20 most important country 
pairs in terms of the absolute number of cross-border 
patents in the European Union. The values in Figure 3.4 
are bidirectional; the value of a country pair A/B includes 
both patents invented in country B and applied for 
by country A, and patents invented in country A and 
applied for by country B.
With almost 2 500 foreign-owned patents, Germany/
France is the most important country pair within the 
EU. Almost two thirds of these patents are German and 
have a French applicant; the other third consist of French 
  patents with a German applicant. The pair ranked second 
or Italy, by contrast, exhibit moderate levels of 
internationalisation.
But there are also exceptions to this rule. The United 
Kingdom has a considerably higher share of foreign-
owned patent inventions than other countries of com-
parable size. This is due to Japanese and US multination-
als which have chosen the UK as their main location in 
the EU. The UK is also the EU country with the largest 
inward FDI stock of all EU Member States in absolute 
terms.
Other positive outliers are Austria and Belgium. Their 
high level of internationalisation can be explained in 
part by their proximity to a large neighbouring coun-
try. Research has identified geographical and cultural 
proximity (including a common language) as factors 
that promote R & D internationalisation between two 
countries (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Pot-
terie, 2001; Eden and Miller, 2004, Picci, 2010). Finland, 
by contrast, is the EU country with the lowest degree of 
internationalisation (more than 90 % of the impressive 
number of patents granted in the country in 2003–07 
are the result of Finnish organisations’ R & D and innov-
ation efforts). This correlates with a comparatively small 
stock of inward FDI and R & D expenditure by foreign-
owned affiliates in Finland.
Similar cross-country internationalisation patterns can 
be observed for R & D expenditure by foreign-owned 
Figure 3.4:   20 largest country pairs in terms of cross-border ownership in the EU-27, 2003–07, EPO
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Medium-sized and small Member States play an 
important role in intra-EU integration in R & D and 
innovation. But not all such countries are equally 
represented. The internationalisation of R & D and 
innovation within Europe mainly involves R & D 
and innovation-intensive countries. There are 702 
possible country pairs in the EU-27, but only half 
of them (370) are connected by foreign-owned pa  -
tent. In 332 cases, there is no relationship. Examples 
for these ‘missing links’ are Greece/Austria, Finland/
Slovenia, Finland/Netherlands and Belgium/Ireland. 
Other links, by contrast, are considerably stronger in 
relative terms than the absolute number of foreign-
owned patents between two countries would sug-
gest (see Box 3.1).
is   Germany and the Netherlands — again, the majority of 
these foreign-owned patents are German. Pair number 
three also involves Germany, this time together with 
Austria.
The country pairs reveal some important facts about 
intra-EU internationalisation. First, 15 of the top 20 
country pairs feature Germany, France or the United 
Kingdom, which are also the three largest countries in 
terms of patents granted. Second, the dominant pattern 
in Figure 3.4 links a large and a medium-sized or small 
country. In almost all cases, the large and the medium or 
small country are neighbours, share a certain degree of 
cultural similarity (e.g. a common language) and have a 
long-standing business relationship indicated by a large 
mutual stock of FDI.
Box 3.1: Strong and weak links between EU Member States
The strength of cross-border links in absolute numbers of patents may be distorted by the size and patenting 
activity levels of different countries. A look at relative numbers is therefore useful to identify country links which 
are not based solely on the size of the country but on above-average strength of cross-border ownership. This can 
be done by calculating an index relating the strength of the relationship between two countries to their relative 
size within Europe in terms of the number of cross-border patents. The notion is similar to that of other specialisa-
tion indexes, such as the revealed technological advantage (RTA) index:
Note:  : Number of patents;  a: applicant country;   : inventor country.
In addition, the analysis corrects for outliers in two ways. First, countries with less than 50 cross-border patents 
‘are dropped’. Second, values are not reported for country pairs in which both partners have individually less than 
500 cross-border patents in total (third row and third column from the end in Table 3.1). This filter results in 15 
applicant countries (Cyprus, Malta and the EU-15 countries, except Greece and Portugal), 19 inventor countries 
(the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and the EU-15, except Luxembourg) and 205 possible 
country pairs (Table 3.1).
The table shows that there are considerable differences in the strength of the links between two countries: 25 of the 
205 pairs have a very strong link with a value greater than 2, indicating that the number of foreign-owned pa  tents 
between two countries is twice the number that would result from a uniform distribution across EU countries on 
the basis of their overall number of cross-border patents. Many of these strong country links can be explained 
by a common language, geographic proximity or a long history of economic integration; examples include links 
between the Nordic countries or between Austria and Germany, Ireland and the UK, or France and Belgium.
But not all countries which are close in terms of geography or culture have strong ties; the number of foreign-
owned patents involving Belgium and the Netherlands, for example, is surprisingly low. In contrast, there are also 
some surprisingly strong links in Table 3.1, which can hardly be explained by geographic or cultural proximity. 
These pairs are somewhat idiosyncratic, i.e. firm-specific, results of managerial intentions, strategies and action. 
Italy, for example, is more important for Belgium as an inventor country in relative terms than France. Finland is 
the largest applicant country of foreign-owned patents in Portugal in relative terms, as is Germany in Slovenia. 
The majority of the medium and small countries have at least one ‘missing link’ (last row and column to the right; 
there are, for example, no cross-border patents between Austria and Greece or between Finland and Slovenia).97
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3.3.3.  Technologies and sectors
Technology, along with the industrial sector of firms, 
determines in large measure the level of international-
isation of R & D and innovation. Technologies and sec-
tors differ in their degree of tacitness, their cumulative-
ness, appropriability, spatial concentration and degree 
to which they draw on and refer to knowledge external 
to the firm (Marsili 2001; Malerba 2005a, b).
Technologies do not only differ in the level of internation    -
alisation but also in their absolute size and growth 
rates. Figure 3.6 sets out the level of internationalisa-
tion in 30 different technologies based on patent data. 
(Patents invented in the EU were assigned to one of 
30 technologies, according to their IPC codes, and these 
30 technologies were grouped into six broad technology 
fields — see Dachs et al. (2010) for details). The share of 
foreign-owned patents in all patents granted in the EU-27 
per technology (horizontal axis) is related to growth in 
the total number of patents in the EU-27 between the 
periods 1991–95 and 2003–07 (vertical axis). In add-
ition, the size of the circle representing a certain tech-
nology illustrates the scale of the technology in terms 
of the absolute number of patents granted in the EU-27 
between 2003 and 2007.
Figure 3.6 confirms that R & D and innovation activities 
still predominantly take place in the home country, but 
that there is considerable variation across technologies. 
The share of foreign-owned patents is, first, lowest (7 %) 
for ‘space technology, weapons’ (with the correspond-
ing industries concentrated in a few Member States) 
and, second, highest (32 %) for ‘telecommunication’ (a 
technology characterised by rapid change, a low degree 
EU countries reveal different patterns in terms of inward 
and outward internationalisation of R & D and innov-
ation, as measured by cross-border patents. Country 
A inward internationalisation means patents granted 
in country A and owned by another country. Outward 
internationalisation, on the other hand, refers to patents 
owned by country A but granted in another country. 
Figure 3.5 depicts outward and inward internationalisa-
tion measured by the total number of cross-country pa-
tents. Three groups of countries can be identified here:
•  Inward is stronger than outward internationalisation 
in the United Kingdom, Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
Greece and all EU-12 countries except Cyprus. These 
countries are more host than home countries for 
R & D and innovation internationalisation. With the 
exception of Austria and the UK, internationalisation 
tends to be low in absolute terms in these countries, 
which can be explained by a lack of domestic MNEs 
investing in other countries.
•  Outward internationalisation is stronger in the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Luxembourg, Ire-
land and Cyprus. A common feature of these small 
and medium countries is that they are home to a 
number of multinational firms which actively pursue 
internationalisation.
•  In Germany, France, Belgium and Denmark, inward 
and outward flows are about equally proportioned. 
Countries in this group take different positions 
depending on the partner. Germany, for example, is 
a major location for patents held by French, Dutch, 
Swedish or Finnish multinationals, but is not very 
active in the last three countries.
Medium and small Member States in particular tend to have strong links with only a limited number of EU part-
ners (while links to the other EU countries tend to be weak or even non-existent). Links are also often limited to 
one direction (e.g. the importance of Italy as an inventor country for Belgian applicants is not mirrored by Belgium 
as an inventor country for Italian applicants).
The majority of intra-EU cross-border patents are owned by organisations located in EU-15 countries. Cross-border 
patents between the EU-12 and the EU-15 countries and within the EU-12 are still rare. One important exception 
is patenting activity between Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Germany is both the most important inventor 
country for the EU-12 in absolute terms and also by far the most important applicant country for foreign-owned 
patents in the EU-12. Other countries with growing relationships to the EU-12 are Austria, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, France and Finland.
R & D expenditure data are sparser but tend to confirm the main patterns found in EU cross-border patents. For 
example, German multinationals account for 15.6 % of all foreign-owned patents in France between 2003 and 
2007. The corresponding share of German subsidiaries in total foreign-controlled R & D expenditure in France 
between 2003 and 2006 is 16.1 %. The EU-15 were home to more than three quarters of foreign affiliates’ R & D 
expenditure in Slovakia’s manufacturing sector in 2007 (Slovakia is the only EU-12 country with comprehensive 
and up-to-date inward R & D flows). The corresponding figure for Poland in 2006 is at similar level (71.7 %). R & D 
expenditure by foreign affiliates of EU-15 firms in the EU-12 may suggest a higher degree of R & D and innovation 
integration that is not yet reflected in the patent data.99
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Generally speaking, there is no clear relationship 
between the growth rate, the absolute size and the level 
of internationalisation of a particular technology. High 
and increasing internationalisation is found in ‘telecom-
munication’ and ‘information technologies’, two key 
technologies at the heart of the Europe 2020 flagship 
initiative on ‘A digital agenda for Europe’ (European 
Commission, 2010b). Technologies in the field ‘chem-
icals, pharmaceuticals’ (coloured green in Figure 3.6), 
by contrast, all have high levels of internationalisation, 
but differ considerably in growth rates. The same is 
true of the technological field ‘mechanical engineering, 
machinery’ (light blue). Here, different growth rates go 
along with a common low level of internationalisation.
of cumulativeness and the leading role of a number of 
MNEs with R & D and innovation activities distributed 
over several countries). Third, the majority of the tech-
nologies are spread in an intermediate range with limits 
fixed by the two technologies mentioned previously.
With their high and increasing degree of internation-
alisation and large number of cross-border patents, 
‘telecommunication’ and ‘information technologies’ 
have been two important drivers of the international-
isation of R & D and innovation in the EU. This can also 
be observed in R & D data. Other technologies with an 
above-average degree of internationalisation include 
various chemical technologies and different technolo-
gies from the electronics field. But internationalisation is 
not only about ‘high technology’. ‘Agriculture and food’, 
where a quarter of all patents are foreign-owned, is also 
among the most internationalised technologies. This 
is a technology with a considerable degree of product 
variation and adaptation to differing consumer tastes in 
different EU countries, which may require a high degree 
of decentralisation (Filippaios et al., 2009).
Figure 3.5:   Absolute number of intra-EU cross-border patents by country, 2003–07, EPO
- 6 000
6 000
- 2 000
0
- 4 000
2 000
4 000
i
n
v
e
n
t
e
d
 
i
n
o
w
n
e
d
 
b
y
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
 
c
r
o
s
s
-
b
o
r
d
e
r
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
s
outward
inward
SE BE AT IT ES DK NL UK DE FR FI LU IE HU PT CZ PL CY SI MT SK EL BG RO LV EE LT
Source:   European Patent Office, ZEW/AIT calculations.100
European Competitiveness Report 2010
Figure 3.6:   Share of foreign-owned patents (2003–07), growth (1991–95 to 2003–07) and number of 
patents (2003–07) in the EU-27 by technology (EPO)
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Box 3.2: Internationalisation in technologies for renewable energy generation
Rising prices for fossil fuels and the global warming threat have placed technologies for renewable energy gener-
ation (REG) in the spotlight at Member State and EU levels. The EU is the leader in the development of REG tech-
nologies, and this box maps the internationalisation of R & D and innovation in REG cross-cutting technologies, 
focusing on its specific needs rather than on any traditional technological or sectoral classification.
To identify REG in the patent classification, the definition proposed by the OECD (2009b) is followed. This includes 
the following six technologies: wind power, solar energy, geothermal energy, marine (ocean) energy, biomass 
energy and waste-to-energy. This gives 2 911 EPO patents for the period 2003–07. REG technologies reveal high 
growth rates — the number of REG patents in the EU increased by 422 % from 1991–95 to 2003–07. At the same 
time, REG is still a niche technology, with only 0.9 % of all patents granted in the EU.
According to the OECD (2009c, p. 53), the EU-27 accounts for the majority of worldwide PCT (Patent Cooper  ation 
Treaty) patent applications in REG, with a share of around 37 %, followed by the US (20 %) and Japan (19 %). 
Within the EU-27, research and innovation in REG is concentrated in a small number of countries; only Germany, 
Denmark and Spain exhibit above-average specialisation in the period 2003–07. Five more countries — Austria, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom — have some role to play in REG. Together, these eight 
countries account for 92.5 % of all REG patents in the EU. Data on R & D expenditure on REG are very incomplete, 
but seem to support the finding from patent data that the EU-27 and the aforementioned EU Member States are 
very well positioned in technologies for renewable energy generation (OECD 2009a).
The level of foreign patent ownership in REG is significantly lower than for other technologies: 89 % of all patents 
are domestically owned, 6 % owned by organisations from other EU countries, 1 % by other European countries 
and 5 % by organisations from outside Europe. More than 90 % of the extra-European foreign-owned patents are 
owned by organisations from the US. Domestically owned and foreign-owned patent inventions in REG increased 
at a similarly fast pace.101
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is predominantly intra-EU, while ‘information tech-
nologies’ have a high share (49 %) of patent applicants 
from outside Europe.
‘Telecommunication’ and ‘information technologies’ 
are at the heart of the EU 2020 flagship initiative on ‘A 
digital agenda for Europe’. Both technologies give a 
vivid illustration of the power and importance of inter-
nationalised R & D and innovation. ‘Telecommunication’ 
illustrates the importance of strengthening the intern  al 
market and intra-EU flows of R & D and innovation. 
‘Information technologies’ illustrates the importance 
of extra-EU (from the US in particular) flows of R & D 
Figure 3.8 shows that at technology level too inter-
nationalisation of R & D and innovation involves — 
to a considerable degree — European countries. The 
importance of extra-European ownership (which 
is mostly US ownership) is lowest in ‘agriculture 
and food’ and ‘nuclear engineering’, and highest in 
‘engines, pumps and turbines’, ‘environment, pollu-
tion’ and ‘information technologies’. It is also interest-
ing to see that the two technologies with the highest 
level and growth rates of internationalisation — ‘tele-
communication’ and ‘information technologies’ — 
have very different positions in terms of the applicant’s 
location. Internationalisation in ‘telecommunication’ 
The above-average specialisation of Germany and Denmark in REG may be because these are the only countries 
in the EU with a noticeable share of foreign-owned patents in REG (see Figure 3.7 below). This indicates that when 
deciding to internationalise R & D and innovation, firms go primarily to areas that have achieved a critical mass of 
development and technological leadership, although they may not necessarily have the lowest wages and costs. 
The example of REG shows that such factors as technological specialisation, favourable market conditions and the 
availability of specialised knowledge are the main attractors for foreign-owned R & D and innovation.
Above-average specialisation and technological leadership, however, also create outward R & D and innovation. 
Denmark predominantly hosts R & D and innovation from German and Spanish firms, while Germany hosts a con-
siderable number of US-owned, but also Danish-owned, patents in REG. REG accounts for about a quarter of all 
German-owned patents in Denmark, which is a considerable amount given the share of REG in total patent inven-
tions. Spain, the third country with above-average specialisation in REG in the EU, has only a few foreign-owned 
patents in REG. Spanish firms, however, are very active in Denmark in this field.
Figure 3.7:   Number of REG patents by inventor country and applicant location,  
1991–95 and 2003–07, EPO
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  precision, optical and time measuring instruments 
(NACE 33), computers and office machinery (NACE 30), 
food products and beverages (NACE 15) and pharma  -
ceuticals (NACE 24.4). Together, these six sectors 
account for about two thirds of all foreign-owned 
patents in the EU-27. In contrast, internationalisation 
of R & D and innovation is lowest in manufacturing of 
tobacco products (NACE 16), wood and wood products 
(NACE 20) and metal products (NACE 28) — all so-called 
‘low-technology’ sectors. This sectoral specialisation cor-
responds with the observation that FDI is concentrated 
in technology-intensive industries (Barba Navaretti and 
Venables, 2004).
A similar overall picture emerges when looking at R & D 
expenditure by foreign-owned affiliates (see Table 1 in 
the annex). Foreign-owned affiliates tend to account 
for a higher share of sectoral R & D expenditures in the 
chemical and electrical industries, while mechanical 
and innovation as the EU seeks to catch up in these 
technologies.
Patent applicants from other European (non-EU, Switz-
erland in particular) countries tend to be less important: 
they are almost non-existent in ‘Telecommunication’ 
or ‘Audiovisual technology’ (technologies for which 
intra-EU cross-border patents are preponderant), but 
important in ‘Space technology, weapons’, ‘Handling, 
printing’, ‘Medical engineering’ and ‘Biotechnology’ 
(technologies in which intra-EU cross-border patents 
are not dominant).
Moving from the technology to the sectoral perspec-
tive (49) (see Figure 3.9 below), the most internationalised 
sectors in terms of R & D and innovation are the manu-
facturers of electronics (NACE Rev. 1.1   Section 32 — this 
also includes producers of telecommunication equip-
ment), electronic components (NACE 32.1), medical, 
(49)  Patents are assigned to sectors using the transformation matrix proposed by 
Schmoch et al. (2003).
Figure 3.8:   Location of applicants for foreign-owned patents by technology, 2003–07, EPO
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seems to be lower than in manufacturing. This finding, 
however, is tentative due to weak data coverage of the 
service sector.
3.4.  R & D and innovation activities of EU 
firms abroad
Outward internationalisation — the degree to which 
organisations from the EU-27 countries do R & D and 
innovation outside the EU — is often referred to as 
‘  offshoring’, a term suggesting that overseas R & D and 
innovation substitute for and replace similar activities 
in the home countries. The economic literature offers a 
more differentiated view on outward internationalisation, 
pointing out that overseas R & D and innovation are often 
complements to and not substitutes for similar activities 
in the home country. These activities support the use of 
company assets by adapting existing technologies to 
  foreign markets and generating knowledge not available 
in the home country (Narula and Zanfei, 2005).
Figure 3.10 shows the share of patents granted abroad 
compared with total national patent applications, based 
on triadic patent data (50). In all the four areas depicted 
in Figure 3.10, overseas patents account for a modest 
(50)  Triadic patents help to circumvent the so-called ‘home office bias’ and enable 
a global comparison to be made. They are patents which have been applied 
for at all three major patent offices: the EPO, the US Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO). See annex on ‘Measur-
ing the internationalisation of R & D and innovation’.
industries — including the automotive sector — tend to 
have lower shares in most countries. A recent study by 
the European Commission (2010c) shows that for the ICT 
sector in Europe, above 40 % of all R & D centres belong 
to companies with headquarters outside Europe. The 
variation in internationalisation levels in a single sector 
across different countries, however, is considerable. Sec-
tors may have a high share of foreign-owned affiliates in 
total R & D expenditure in one country and a low share 
in another.
From a sectoral perspective, it has to be remembered 
that the internationalisation of R & D and innovation is 
not restricted to manufacturing industries. Multinational 
firms exist in a number of service sectors as well. Exam-
ples include the software, finance, business services and 
transport sectors. The internationalisation of R & D and 
innovation in services, however, is more difficult to meas-
ure than in manufacturing, because firms in a number of 
service sectors engage in R & D less frequently, and many 
service innovations cannot be protected by patents.
The OECD FATS database includes data on R & D 
expenditure by foreign-owned affiliates in some service 
sectors (see Table 1 in the annex). The figures indicate 
that in knowledge-intensive services such as finance, 
insurance or business services, foreign-owned affiliates 
account for between 16 % (Germany) and 60 % (Ireland) 
of total R & D expenditure. In trade, repair, hotels and 
restaurants, the share is considerably higher. Altogether, 
the degree of internationalisation in service industries 
Figure 3.9:   Share of foreign-owned patents by industrial sector, 2003–07, EPO
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Figure 3.11 splits up the foreign-owned patent applica-
tions of the EU, the US and Japan according to the place 
of residence of the inventor(s) in the following seven 
areas: EU-27, other Europe, US, other America, Japan, 
other Asia and the ‘rest of world’ (ROW).
The data confirm that internationalisation is still pre-
dominantly a matter for the EU, the US and Japan. The 
US is the most important host country for EU overseas 
patents by far, as is the EU for the US. For Japanese 
overseas inventions, the US is more important than the 
EU. Other Asian countries such as China, India or South 
Korea still play a limited role as host countries of the tri-
adic countries’ overseas patents. In relative terms, the 
US is more active in Asian countries than the EU. These 
differences, however, are small compared to the scale of 
the EU–US relationship.
European Patent Office (EPO) data confirm the predom-
inant role of the US for EU outward R & D and   innovation 
activities. Figure 3.12 shows that the US accounts for 
60 % of all overseas patents applied for by EU entities 
at the EPO. This share is virtually unchanged over time. 
The BRIC share in total EU-27 outward R & D and innov-
ation (51) is still small compared to the US, but rising fast. 
The BRIC countries already account for a larger share of 
EU overseas patents than Japan or Canada.
(51)  The BRIC share of EU outward R & D and innovation depicted here should 
not be confused with the share these countries hold on the world market for 
certain technologies.
fraction of overall patent applications (around 11 % in 
the EU and US and around 3 % in Japan, in the period 
2001–05).
The share of overseas patents in all patent applica-
tions in the BRIC countries is already higher than the 
corresponding value for Japan. However, the number 
of BRIC patents granted overseas is still very low. The 
BRIC countries are still mainly a host country for foreign- 
owned research and only to a much lesser degree a 
home country for companies doing R & D and innov-
ation abroad.
The US and the EU appear to have taken differ-
ent paths from 1990 to 2005. The share of overseas 
activities of US organisations decreased, while R & D 
and innovation of EU organisations outside the EU 
increased considerably. This mirrors the trends in 
inward internationalisation (observed in Figure 3.1 
above). In the early 1990s most of the cross-border 
patents involving an EU Member State and a non-
EU country were granted in the EU and owned by an 
organisation from outside the EU. Today, the outward 
dimension, especially with the US as partner country, 
is of almost equal importance. In the case of some 
medium-sized Member States, most notably the Neth-
erlands, the outward dimension is clearly dominant. 
Technologies with higher levels of EU outward R & D 
activities include semiconductors, macromolecular 
chemistry, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and agriculture 
and food, while technologies such as machine tools or 
transport exhibit a level of outward R & D internation-
alisation below the EU average.
Figure 3.10:   Share of overseas patents in total patent applications (1991–95 and 2001–05)
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Figure 3.11:   Location of overseas patents applied for by the EU-27, the US and Japan (2000–07)
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(52)  Here, the EU is regarded as a single entity; overseas patents include all patents granted outside the EU-27.
Figure 3.12:   Location of overseas patents (52) applied for by the EU-27, 1990–2006, EPO
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gests that the share of firms which go abroad with R & D 
(‘R & D offshoring’ in the terminology of the survey) is 
below 4 % in most of the countries studied. The EMS 
data confirm that R & D internationalisation strategies 
are predominantly a matter for large firms. Outward 
R & D is very rarely found among SMEs. The average size 
of a firm with R & D offshoring in the sample is 1 602 
employees in 2005, compared to 195 in non-offshoring 
firms. There is also a strong correlation between R & D 
intensity and R & D internationalisation: higher levels 
of R & D offshoring firms are found among R & D inten-
sive firms. So the results presented in this section in fact 
relate to the activities of only a very small number of 
firms.
EMS and other survey results indicate that lack of know-
ledge is one of the most important motives for R & D 
internationalisation. It is therefore not surprising that 
the United States — still the most advanced country in 
many technologies — is the most important location of 
EU R & D and innovation outside the European Union 
(see Figure 3.12). Besides being a large market, the US 
offers favourable conditions for R & D and potential spill-
overs from competitors, suppliers or universities.
All in all, the rising share of innovation and R & D invest-
ment in some emerging countries indicates that today’s 
(US–EU) bipolar world may become multipolar in the 
future, taking in China, India and other countries not yet 
The 2008 EU survey on R & D investment business trends 
(European Commission JRC IPTS, 2009b) points to simi-
lar results. It includes data on R & D investment by 114 
European companies, 35 of them having a high, 68 a 
medium and 27 a low R & D intensity. R & D expend-
iture data may be more accurate than patent data with 
respect to shifts of R & D expenditure from manufactur-
ing to the service sector and other R & D activities that 
do not lead to patents. Just over 20 % of the R & D car-
ried out by these companies was located outside the EU. 
Almost half of the extra-EU R & D investment is directed 
to the US and Canada. R & D investment in China (2.7 % 
of the total) and India (3.5 %) remains relatively insig-
nificant. There are significant differences between firms 
with high, medium and low R & D intensities. High R & D 
intensity firms are the most internationalised ones. 
This higher share is due to the greater importance of 
the US and Canada, and to a lesser degree India and 
China, as locations for R & D for the high R & D intensity 
companies.
Outward internationalisation in R & D and innovation 
at aggregate or sectoral level may mask a considerable 
degree of variation at company level. In most countries, 
in particular large countries, only a minority of firms 
export or invest abroad (Bernard et al., 2007; Greenaway 
and Kneller, 2007). The fraction of firms with overseas 
R & D and innovation activities is even smaller. The Euro-
pean Manufacturing Survey (EMS — see Box 3.3) sug-
Box 3.3: The European Manufacturing Survey: motives for R & D internationalisation
The European Manufacturing Survey (EMS) is a survey on product, process, service and organisational innovation 
in European manufacturing. It is conducted every three years in 12 European countries by a consortium led by 
Fraunhofer ISI. The focus is on the introduction of new production technologies, organisational innovation — this 
includes workplace organisation, but also outsourcing and offshoring — and service innovation in manufacturing.
The sample features 3 120 firms with more than 10 employees from six European countries with a sufficiently 
large number of firms: Germany (accounting for about half the sample), followed by Switzerland, Austria, Spain, 
the Netherlands and Slovenia. The largest sector in the sample is the manufacturing of transport equipment, 
including cars, with a share of around 9 %, followed by electronic and optical equipment (6 %) and the chemical, 
petroleum and pharmaceutical industry (5 %).
To investigate the motives for R & D internationalisation in more detail, the analysis distinguishes whether a firm is 
moving its R & D to a high- or low-income country. High-income countries include North America, Japan and the 
EU-15, while low-income countries comprise the EU-12, South America and the BRIC countries. The two groups of 
destination countries are clearly associated with different motives and offer different locational advantages (Fig-
ure 3.13). R & D offshoring to high-income countries is significantly more often associated with the wish to gain 
access to knowledge. Labour cost advantages play less of a role in offshoring to high-income countries.
Low-income countries, on the other hand, are associated with advantages from lower labour costs, but also with 
market expansion and proximity to clients. This indicates that firms identify growing markets mainly in low-
income countries, and try to support market development there with R & D facilities. Here then, the internation-
alisation of R & D is mainly a reaction to growing market shares of emerging countries. There is no significant 
difference between the two country groups with respect to overcoming capacity bottlenecks in R & D, which is 
the most frequent motive.107
Chapter 3 — Foreign Corporate R & D and Innovation in the European Union
or disadvantages in innovation and, in the medium 
term, in growth and employment at the aggregate level.
It is therefore important to understand the characteris-
tics of foreign-owned innovation activity in more detail 
in order to assess the impact of internationalised innov-
ation and R & D on the EU Member States. This section 
will investigate whether there are differences between 
foreign-owned and domestically owned firms in innov-
ation input intensity, innovation output intensity and in 
cooperation with organisations in the host country.
The analysis is based on data from the Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS) 2006 (micro-data available in the 
Eurostat Safe Centre, see Box 3.4 and annex to this chap-
ter). Innovation behaviour is measured by four variables:
•  Innovation input intensity is defined as the innov  ation 
expenditure of the firm in 2006 as a share of turnover 
in the same year. Innovation expenditure includes 
internal and external R & D, machinery, equipment 
and software, other external knowledge and training 
related to innovation.
•  Innovation output intensity is measured by the share 
of turnover generated with products new to the mar-
ket in the total turnover of the firm. The reference 
period is 2004–06. Products new to the market are a 
subset of all product innovations that are new to the 
firm.
•  Domestic cooperation includes cooperation with any 
type of partner outside the enterprise group in the 
host country. The reference period is 2004–06.
well integrated in the international division of labour in 
science and technology. The BRIC countries, in particu-
lar China, have made impressive progress in science and 
technology (OECD 2007).
The ‘Innovation union’ flagship initiative recently 
adopted by the Commission as part of the Europe 2020 
strategy aims at increasing the attractiveness of the EU 
as a location of R & D and innovation investments and 
at promoting international cooperation on research and 
innovation (European Commission, 2010a, d). Enhancing 
Europe’s strength in science and technology is the best 
way to maintain Europe’s attractiveness for foreign R & D 
and innovation. From a European perspective, the EU-15 
countries — despite large labour cost differences — still 
offer considerable locational advantages to firms com-
pared to the BRIC countries, but also to the EU-12. These 
include access to excellent knowledge and a skilled S & T 
workforce that helps overcome capacity bottlenecks.
3.5.  Performance differences between 
foreign and domestically owned firms 
in the EU
Foreign-owned firms account for a considerable share of 
the R & D and innovation activities in EU Member States. 
Their share is above average in high-technology sectors 
and in medium-sized and small countries. From a pol-
icy point of view, this raises the question of differences 
between domestically owned and foreign-owned firms. 
If there are substantial differences in innovation behav-
iour between the two groups, countries with a large or 
small share of foreign ownership may have advantages 
Figure 3.13:   Motives for R & D internationalisation and destination country, 2004–06
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between countries in northern, southern and eastern 
Europe.
FOFs exhibit lower innovation input intensity than both 
DGFs and DnGFs. Innovation output intensity, on the 
other hand, is higher in two of the three country groups. 
There is even more variation in innovation output 
intensity when looking at the country level. Innovation 
cooperation is more frequent among DGFs than among 
FOFs, and more frequent among FOFs than among 
DnGFs. The same hierarchy can be observed for science 
cooperation. There is no single country where DnGFs 
have a higher propensity to cooperate than FOFs. Differ-
ences between DGFs and FOFs, however, are consider-
ably smaller than between FOFs and DnGFs.
In addition, descriptive statistics suggest that group 
membership, besides foreign or domestic ownership, 
is decisive for differences between the three groups in 
cooperation behaviour. In many respects, differences 
between DnGFs and DGFs are greater than between 
FOFs and DGFs. It can be assumed that FOFs and DGFs, 
but not DnGFs, share some factors that favour innov-
ation and cooperation. One of these is size. Bearing in 
mind that DnGFs are considerably smaller than both 
DGFs and FOFs in the sample — they have fewer than 
50 employees on average, compared to a mean of 
between 100 and 150 for DGFs and FOFs —the gaps in 
•  Domestic cooperation with science includes only 
external cooperation with universities and research 
centres in the host country. The reference period is 
2004–06.
The analysis distinguishes between three types of firms:
•  domestically owned non-group firms (DnGF); this 
type of firm is not affiliated to an enterprise group 
and is typically a small- or medium-sized firm;
•  domestically owned group firms (DGF); this type of 
firm belongs to a domestic enterprise group, and 
could be a domestic multinational;
•  foreign-owned firms (FOF); this type of firm is domi-
ciled in the country, but owned by a firm or individ-
ual from another country.
3.5.1.  Descriptive analysis of differences in innovation 
behaviour between domestic and   foreign-owned 
firms53
Descriptive results reveal some important differences 
between the three groups of firms. Figure 3.14 reports 
the means of each of the four abovementioned variables 
for FOFs, DGFs and DnGFs. In addition, it distinguishes 
(53)  We thank Sergiu-Valentin Parvan from Eurostat for his support.
Box 3.4: The Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 2006
The descriptive and multivariate analysis of this section is based on a sample drawn from the Community Innov-
ation Survey (CIS) 2006. CIS is a survey on innovation behaviour of firms in the Member States of the EU, Norway 
and Iceland. Eurostat (53) provides access to CIS data at company level. The sample used for this analysis includes 
315 375 firms (weighted) from 17 European countries. Spain has the largest share of the sample with about 45 %, 
followed by the Czech Republic and Romania (around 8 % each). Data from Germany, France, Italy and the UK 
were not available for the analysis.
Some 83 % of the firms in the sample are domestically owned non-group firms (DnGFs), another 11 % are domes-
tically owned group firms (DGFs) and 7 % of the firms are foreign-owned (FOFs).
In the sectoral taxonomy of Peneder (2010), which classifies sectors according to their innovation intensity, 19 % 
of the firms are from a non-innovation sector. Some 31 % of the firms are from the low innovation sector, 10 % 
from low–medium innovation and another 22 % from medium innovation sectors. Medium-high and high innov-
ation sectors account for 18 % of the sample. The share of firms in the medium-high and high innovation sectors 
is considerably larger among foreign-owned firms than among domestically owned firms. In addition, foreign-
owned firms are, on average, considerably larger than both domestically owned group and non-group firms. The 
latter are also smaller than domestically owned group firms.
The vast majority of the foreign-owned firms in the sample — 72 % — are from another EU-15 country. The sec-
ond largest group are firms from the US. Canadian and Australian firms were added to the US firms. Together, 
this group accounts for 14 % of all foreign-owned firms. The remaining firms have a parent company from 
another European, but non-EU, country (6 %), from the EU-12 (4 %), from an Asian country (2 %) or from another 
country (2 %).109
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3.5.2.  Innovation behaviour of foreign-owned firms in 
a multivariate analysis
Descriptive statistics reveal differences between foreign-
owned and domestically owned firms, and between 
group and non-group firms, but are unable to tell 
whether these differences are related to foreign owner-
ship or to differences between the groups in terms of 
other variables such as firm size and sector.
In order to disentangle the effects of foreign ownership 
from other characteristics, four econometric models 
with the variables of the descriptive analysis as depend-
ent variables are estimated. Independent variables 
include firm size, international market orientation, R & D 
orientation, incoming spillovers, public funding, the 
sector of the firm and country dummies. To account for 
influences from the sectoral level, the analysis employs 
a new taxonomy of economic sectors according to 
their innovation intensity proposed by Peneder (2010). 
cooper  ation can evidently be explained in many ways 
by the specific challenges small- and medium-sized 
firms (SMEs) face in the innovation process rather 
than by domestic and foreign ownership. Smaller 
firms, for example, may find it more difficult to raise 
the resources to maintain cooperation over a longer 
period of time and are usually less R & D oriented, which 
may indicate that they lack the capabilities to put the 
results of the cooperation to good use (see for example 
Schmidt (2005)).
Similar differences between DnGFs, DGFs and FOFs can 
also be observed for innovation input and output inten-
sity. FOFs are superior in many cases to DnGFs, but per-
form worse than DGFs, which are themselves domestic-
ally owned multinationals in a number of cases.
Figure 3.14:   Variables describing innovation behaviour by ownership status and location of the firm, means
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of view, a high propensity of foreign-owned firms for 
domestic cooperation is positive, because cooperation 
is a main channel for spillovers of knowledge between 
foreign-owned firms and organisations in the host 
country.
But there may be other factors that facilitate cooper-
ation and are not accounted for in the regression, 
because a higher propensity to cooperate is also found 
in DGFs. The high degree of cooperation between FOFs 
and the science sector in the host country in particular 
indicates that asset-exploiting and asset-augmenting 
strategies are often inseparable (Criscuolo et al., 2005). 
In addition, joint projects between research organisa-
tions and firms have other goals than the creation of 
new knowledge; the joint supervision of PhD and Mas-
ter’s theses, for example, is a way to recruit new employ-
ees (Schartinger et al., 2002).
3.5.3.  Innovation behaviour and the home country of 
foreign-owned firms
Foreign-owned firms are embedded in the corporate 
culture and standards of their enterprise group and 
their home countries. Activities abroad are shaped 
by these factors to a considerable degree (Forsgren, 
2008, Chapter 7). The corporate culture of an enterprise 
group affects the behaviour of the subsidiary, even if 
its staff and management are mostly locals. Firms with 
a specific background may find it harder to enter local 
networks and tap into localised knowledge than firms 
from a neighbouring country because of the ‘liability of 
foreignness’ (Eden and Miller, 2004). It is therefore feas-
ible that not only foreign ownership but also the home 
country of the FOF matters when it comes to innovation 
performance.
To analyse differences between foreign-owned firms of 
different home countries in more detail, a subsample of 
the CIS 2006 which includes only foreign-owned firms 
was used (see Box 3.4 for details).
Descriptive statistics provide evidence of differences 
between FOFs from different home countries (see Fig-
ure 3.15). Innovation input intensity of FOFs from ‘other’ 
countries is significantly higher than that of any other 
group in Figure 3.15. This can be explained by the pres-
ence of a number of very R & D intensive Israeli firms in 
the ‘other countries’ subsample.
Innovation output intensity, by contrast, is higher for 
firms with an Asian, US, Canadian or Australian par-
ent company or a parent company from another non-
European country than for an FOF from another EU-27 
country. Science cooperation is more frequently found 
among US and ‘other’ firms than among EU-27 and 
Asian firms.
It   distinguishes between six sectoral aggregations, 
which refer to different levels of innovativeness.
The analysis employs a Heckman-selection model with 
the decision to innovate as selection equation. Innov-
ation input intensity, innovation output intensity, the 
propensity for external cooperation and the propensity 
for cooperation with science in the host country are the 
dependent variables of the function equation.
The results of the regression analysis (see Table 2 in 
the annex) indicate that performance differences 
between foreign-owned and domestically owned 
firms can be explained by company characteristics to 
a considerable degree. Coefficients for size, sectoral 
affiliation, R & D activities, received funding or sector-
  al affiliation are significant in a number of cases (see 
Table 2 in the annex). The relationship between size 
and innovation activity, for example, is U-shaped in a 
number of cases, indicating differing advantages and 
disadvantages of small and large firms in the innov-
ation process. Small firms are more flexible and can 
react faster to new technological or market opportun-
ities, while large firms have more internal resources, 
can spread the risk and uncertainty over more projects 
and have more potential application areas for a new 
invention.
After correcting for company characteristics, the results 
of multivariate analysis confirm that FOFs have a lower 
innovation input intensity compared to DnGFs, but reap 
similar or even higher benefits from products new to the 
firm (the coefficient for innovation output, however, is 
only significant at the 10 % level). This behaviour of FOFs 
fits well into the ‘asset-exploiting’ strategy described in 
the literature (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; Narula and 
Zanfei, 2005): FOFs benefit from technology received 
by the parent company to a considerable degree; the 
FOF can also rely on technological expertise and sup-
port from other parts of the group. Hence, innovation 
input of the FOF can be lower, but innovation output 
is similar to or even higher than that of a domestically 
owned firm.
There is a significant positive correlation between for-
eign ownership and cooperation after checking for 
company characteristics. FOFs have a higher propen-
sity than DnGFs to cooperate with all types of domes-
tic organisations. The same is true for DGFs. A similar 
result is found for cooperation with science. This posi-
tive and highly significant relationship between for-
eign ownership and innovation cooperation can be 
explained by the knowledge requirements of FOFs. A 
lack of knowledge in the home country is one of the 
main driving forces for the internationalisation of R & D 
and innovation. This gives FOFs a strong incentive to 
enter into cooperation with domestic organisations 
to gain access to this knowledge. From a policy point 111
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cultural background find it hard to link to local networks 
and the host country.
US/Canadian/Australian firms, however, enjoy an 
advantage over EU-27 firms in science cooperation, as 
indicated by a significant and positive coefficient. One 
can only speculate about the reasons for this premium; 
it may be because US MNEs are still the technological 
leaders in many areas, in particular in ICT and biotech-
nologies. US-owned affiliates may therefore be attract-
ive cooperation partners. In addition, the corporate 
culture of US, Canadian or Australian firms may be more 
open for science–industry cooperation, and this prefer-
ence may be transferred to their affiliates in Europe. Dif-
ferences between EU-27 firms and other home country 
groups are not significant.
3.6.  A dynamic perspective on innovation 
performance differences between 
foreign and domestically owned firms
Sections 3.2 to 3.4 have highlighted the long-term shift 
towards a higher degree of internationalisation in R & D 
and innovation at the EU-27 level as well as at the coun-
try level. The previous section brought out some import-
ant differences and similarities in innovation behaviour 
between domestically owned firms and foreign-owned 
The differences from descriptive analysis are only partly 
confirmed by the results of regression analysis (Table 3 
in the annex). Regression results show no significant 
association between innovation input intensity and the 
home country at the usual significance levels. Thus, the 
differences observed in the above figure are more likely 
to be due to different firm sizes, different sectoral affili-
ations or other factors than to the country of origin.
Innovation output intensity, on the other hand, is signifi-
cantly lower for FOFs from the EU-27 than for non-EU-27 
firms. By further distinguishing between various home 
countries, it can been seen that this effect is mainly due 
to Asian and US/Canadian/Australian firms, which are 
likely to introduce radical innovations in their home 
markets first and then transfer them to their European 
subsidiaries. The experience they have gained in their 
home markets with these new products may explain the 
performance differences compared with EU-27 firms.
There are no significant results for external coopera-
tion in general. Cooperation with science, in contrast, 
is negatively associated with Asian ownership at the 
5 % error level. This indicates that subsidiaries of Asian 
groups cooperate significantly less often with universi-
ties and research centres than FOFs owned by EU-27 
parent companies, after checking for company charac-
teristics. This may be because firms with a very different 
Figure 3.15:   Innovation input and output intensity and cooperation by country of origin of the foreign-
owned firm, means
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ation. The analysis makes use of the Mannheim Innov-
ation Panel (MIP — see Box 3.5 below).
The subsequent subsections first present trends in time 
series for different indicators. The indicators include the 
measures for innovation input intensity and innovation 
output intensity used in the previous section. In add-
ition, innovation input is measured by R & D intensity, 
which is the share of R & D expenditure in the firm’s 
turnover in 2006. Additional innovation output indica-
tors include the share of firms with process innovation, 
the share of firms with product innovation and the share 
of firms which introduced products new to the firm, but 
not new to the market. Measures for innovation cooper-
ation include cooperation with all domestic partners, 
with foreign partners, with clients and suppliers and 
with scientific organisations.
Since differences in innovation behaviour over time 
between domestically owned and foreign-owned firms 
can have various causes, panel data regression methods 
are employed. The econometric analysis makes it possible 
to gauge the effect of different forms of ownership on the 
respective innovation indicator and to separate its effect 
from the impact of other company characteristics, indus-
try and time effects. The econometric analysis checks for 
firm size, firm age, region, export intensity, creditworthi-
ness (only for innovation input) and innovation intensity 
(only for innovation output and cooperation). A main 
advantage of panel data is that they also make it pos  sible 
to check for unobserved heterogeneity among firms. 
Random effects probit or tobit models are estimated, 
depending on the nature of the innovation indicator.
firms in a cross-section from various European coun-
tries. This section complements the preceding ones by 
making a dynamic analysis of performance differences 
between foreign-owned and domestically owned firms 
at the company level.
Given that innovation is key for firms’ competitiveness, 
globalisation raises two questions which are of particu-
lar interest from a policy point of view. First, do foreign-
owned affiliates persistently differ from domestically 
owned firms? Or do foreign-owned firms change their 
innovation behaviour after entering the foreign market 
and adjust to innovation strategies and to the level of 
innovation of firms in the host country?
Globalisation increases international competition in the 
home market. This can stimulate innovation by innov-
ation competition or cooperative innovation activities. 
Thus, it is interesting to see whether foreign-owned 
firms become more embedded in domestic networks 
over time in terms of interacting with domestic custom-
ers, suppliers or science institutions.
This section investigates how the innovation behav-
iour of foreign-owned and domestically owned firms 
has developed over the last 20 years using a long 
panel data set. Unfortunately, the dynamic analysis is 
restricted to foreign-owned and domestically owned 
firms in Germany, since this is the only country for which 
a long innovation panel exists. But, as pointed out in 
  Section 3.3, Germany is an important country in the EU 
regarding the internationalisation of R & D and innov-
Box 3.5: The Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP)
The Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) is an annual survey carried out by the Centre for European Economic 
Research (ZEW), infas Institute for Applied Social Sciences and Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI), 
on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). The MIP represents the German 
contribution to the CIS. In contrast to the CIS, however, the surveys are conducted annually and can be linked 
over time.
The sample taken from the MIP and used in this section contains 110 324 observations over the years 1992–2008. 
About two thirds of these observations refer to domestically owned non-group firms (DnGFs). Some 28 % of 
the firms in the sample belong to domestically owned group firms (DGFs). In total 8 084 observations are from 
foreign-owned firms, accounting for roughly 7 %. These 8 084 observations can be attributed to 2 305 individual 
foreign-owned firms.
Around half of the observations come from manufacturing and another 43 % from service industries. Compared 
to the overall distribution, foreign-owned firms are overrepresented in high-tech manufacturing industries like 
chemicals, electrical engineering, machinery, vehicles, medical/precision and optical instruments and metals, and 
in the banking and insurance sector. DnFGs have above-average shares in services, in particular in retail and trans-
port services. The sample also reveals some interesting details about the home country of the foreign-owned firm. 
Firms from outside Europe and the US are more frequently found in industries like electrical engineering, chem-
icals and machinery (nearly 40 % of all US subsidiaries belong to these three sectors). The foreign ownership by 
European firms is spread more across industries. In particular, they own firms belonging to the metal, machinery 
and chemical industries. Together, these three industries account for 34 %.113
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These differences in innovation input over time may 
reflect differing innovation strategies or different 
ownership-specific advantages on the part of FOFs. 
On the other hand, since FOFs are typically larger firms 
that belong to high-tech industries such as chemicals, 
machinery or electrical engineering, it might not be 
surprising that FOFs in general and non-European firms 
in particular outperformed DGFs and DnGFs over the 
period 1992–2008.
Panel estimations draw a differentiated picture of FOFs’ 
innovation input over the last 20 years (see Table 4 in 
the annex): FOFs in Germany exhibit on average sig-
nificantly higher innovation input intensity than DnGFs, 
but less than DGFs. This result differs from the cross-sec-
tional analysis in the previous chapter, which showed 
a significantly negative effect of foreign ownership on 
innovation input intensity after checking for company 
characteristics.
The fact that FOFs have demonstrated relatively higher 
innovation input intensities over the last 20 years is 
mainly due to FOFs belonging to groups from outside 
Europe. They tend to outperform FOFs from EU countries, 
which themselves spend significantly less on innovation 
than DGFs and DnGFs. However, as time goes by, the ini-
tial stimulating effect of foreign ownership on innovation 
intensity fades. That is, there is convergence in innovation 
intensity at the firm level over time after market entry.
In a third step, the section explores the results of a 
‘quasi experiment’ to see whether there is any con-
vergence in innovation behaviour after market entry. 
For foreign-owned firms which have been created by 
an acquisition, this experiment asks ‘what would the 
innovation behaviour of the firm have looked like after 
a certain period if it had not been taken over by the 
foreign-owned firm’? This part of the analysis identifies 
firms which were taken over by a foreign-owned MNE, 
traces their innovation behaviour after the acquisition 
and compares it to domestically owned firms that have 
not been taken over, using either random effects probit 
or tobit models.
3.6.1.  Innovation input
Consistent with the findings of the previous section, 
FOFs show lower innovation input intensity than DGFs 
and DnGFs over time. This is not true though of every 
single year.
The result is different for R & D intensity. FOFs show the 
highest R & D intensity among all firms (Figure 3.16). 
This is mainly driven by FOFs belonging to groups from 
outside Europe. The time trends for most of the above 
innovation indicators reveal similar patterns, except for 
the share of sales of new products and, in part, for innov-
ation expenditure.
Figure 3.16:   R & D intensities by ownership, 1992–2008
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Foreign ownership in general makes for successful mar-
ket novelties. Compared to DGFs, FOFs have a lower 
share of sales with new products in general, but not 
with the more technologically advanced market novel-
ties. This pattern holds true independently of the coun-
try of origin. This may well be explained by the higher 
innov  ation expenses in particular for market introduc-
tion or by better sales channels and networks of the 
part of firms belonging to a (larger) group. However, 
this   stimulating effect on market novelties seems to 
work only for more established FOFs, as suggested by 
the outcome of the quasi experiment. That is, there is no 
higher innov  ation success with market novelties in firms 
that have been acquired by a foreign company in the 
first five years after the acquisition.
Consistent with this finding, newly established FOFs 
would seem to have a stronger focus on improving their 
success with product innovations which are only new to 
the firm but are not new to the market. More precisely, 
firms which have been taken over by a foreign company 
achieve a significantly lower share of sales with new-to-
the-firm innovations in the year of takeover. However, 
they are able to improve their innovation success in the 
years after the takeover, with the result that there are no 
longer any differences three or five years after the take-
over (Dachs et al., 2010). Thus, convergence again kicks 
in after market entry.
3.6.3.  Innovation cooperation
The dynamic analysis confirms the cross-sectional 
result from the previous section: both FOFs and DGFs 
are associated with a significantly higher propensity to 
cooperate than DnGFs. FOFs, independently of their 
parent company’s country of origin, are more frequently 
engaged in innovation cooperation.
The dynamic analysis cannot, however, support the view 
that FOFs in Germany are more likely to cooperate with 
domestic partners in general and with domestic science 
organisations in particular compared to German firms in 
the last 20 years. FOFs prefer foreign firms and suppliers 
as cooperation partners. Similarly, domestically owned 
firms prefer domestic partners. The econometric ana-
lysis leads one to suppose that the difference is coun-
try-induced, rather than a time effect. The finding that 
FOFs are not significantly more interested in domestic 
innovation partnerships than national firms is surprising 
since FOFs could benefit from the host country know-
ledge. Note that in countries where no such pattern can 
be observed it is not possible to draw any conclusion as 
to whether FOFs are not interested in domestic partners 
because they have similar or fewer market motives and 
technological capabilities than international operating 
firms, or whether they find it harder to acquire suitable 
innovation partners.
The higher R & D intensity of FOFs is because relatively 
more FOFs are large firms and belong to technology-
intensive industries. Foreign ownership itself does not 
boost R & D intensity. The finding that FOFs behave in 
a way similar to DGFs and DnGFs with respect to R & D 
expenditure is consistent across different home coun-
tries of FOFs. The quasi experiment further shows that 
the R & D intensity of newly born FOFs does not differ 
from that of domestically owned firms just in the year 
of the acquisition, but also in the subsequent five years. 
Only in large upswing phases do FOFs tend to react dif-
ferently by investing a significantly higher proportion of 
sales in R & D (Dachs et al., 2010).
3.6.2.  Innovation output
The greater innovation efforts of DGFs are only partly 
reflected in the figures on innovation output. In the 
last two decades, DGFs have proved to be more likely 
to introduce new products (either new to the firm or to 
the market) than FOFs or DnGFs. There are thus grounds 
for supposing that DGFs pursue a more pronounced 
strategy geared towards the introduction of product 
innovations.
Another finding is that the country of origin matters for 
product innovation strategies. The negative effect that 
foreign ownership exerts on product innovation, how-
ever, is driven mainly by the behaviour of FOFs from 
other EU countries, which are less likely to   introduce 
new products compared to DGFs, even given the same 
innovation intensity. This finding indicates a lower 
innov      ation productivity of FOFs from EU-27 countries 
compared to DGFs. Non-EU and US subsidiaries, how-
ever, do not significantly differ in their product innov-
ation strategy compared to DGFs.
Over time, both FOFs and DGFs are more successful in 
generating market novelties than DnGFs. This is partly 
consistent with the cross-sectional analysis of the pre-
vious section, which showed a significant effect on 
market novelties only for FOFs. Hence, FOFs and DGFs 
are more likely to be technology leaders. Once again, 
though, market novelty strategies of FOFs differ with 
respect to their parents’ country of origin. Compared 
to the results for product innovation, there is — surpris-
ingly — no indication that non-European firms are more 
strongly oriented towards market novelties. European 
subsidiaries, though less innovative in terms of introdu-
cing product innovations in general, behave in a similar 
way to DGFs with respect to the introduction of market 
novelties. This is even more remarkable given their gen-
erally lower innovation intensities. It shows that when 
investing in other EU countries, European firms are 
more strongly oriented to the introduction of market 
novelties.115
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still positive) absolute productivity gains from investing 
in innov  ation. However, there are no differences in terms 
of relative productivity gains (productivity growth).
3.7.2.  Employment effects
Employment effects are closely related to product  ivity 
effects. If process innovation leads to an increase in 
prod    uctivity, firms are able to produce the same with 
less input and thus, all other things being equal, at lower 
unit cost. At the same time, the reduction in unit cost 
allows the innovative firm to lower its output prices, 
resulting in higher demand for the product and higher 
output. The magnitude of this compensating price 
effect depends on the amount of price reduction, the 
price elasticity of demand, the degree of   competition 
and the behaviour and relative strength of different 
agents within the firm (Garcia et al., 2002).
Product innovation, by contrast, affects employment 
mainly via demand effects. When a new product has suc-
cessfully been introduced to the market, it creates new 
demand for the innovating firm. Note that this demand 
effect can be the result either of market expansion or of 
business-stealing at the expense of the firm’s competi-
tors. In addition to this direct demand effect, there are 
usually some indirect employment effects. If the new 
product replaces (partially or totally) the old one, labour 
demand for the old product will decrease, and the over-
all effect is ambiguous. However, in the case of comple-
mentary demand relationships, the innovation causes 
the demand for existing products to rise as well. Product 
innovation may also have productivity effects. The new 
or improved product may require a change in produc-
tion methods and input mix, which could either reduce 
or increase labour requirements (Harrison et al., 2008).
The employment effects of innovation will be examined 
by reference to a model recently developed by Harri-
son et al. (2008). This makes it possible to disentangle 
some of the relationships between employment, prices 
and production discussed above and establishes a link 
between employment growth rate and innovation out-
put in terms of sales growth stemming from innovative 
products. The latter can be directly calculated with CIS 
data.
The econometric results reveal that employment growth 
is lower in FOFs, and in DGFs, compared to DnGFs after 
controlling for country and industry effects. In the ser-
vice sector, employment growth rates of FOFs are even 
lower than DGFs. But not all FOFs behave in the same 
way. In manufacturing, FOFs with a parent company 
from another European country grow more slowly than 
North American affiliates. FOFs from European coun-
tries, however, tend to perform better than FOFs from 
the rest of the world.
3.7.    Productivity and job creation of foreign 
and domestically owned firms
Innovation is not an end in itself, but seeks to improve 
the firm’s competitiveness and performance. Thus, 
innovation has to be assessed in the light of economic 
success or, more generally, by its impact on company 
performance measures (Janz, 2003). More jobs and 
higher productivity are two major performance meas-
ures which are also high on the political agenda. Hence, 
this section broadens the analysis to take in the effects 
of innovation on productivity and employment and 
examines differences between FOFs, DnGFs and DGFs in 
these respects using CIS data. This gives an insight into 
how internationalisation changes the productivity and 
job creation of firms moderated by innovation.
3.7.1.  Productivity effects
With respect to productivity, countries can benefit from 
the presence of FOFs in two ways: directly through 
higher productivity in foreign-owned firms, and indir-
ectly through productivity increases in domestically 
owned firms as a result of knowledge spillovers or fiercer 
competition.
A first important finding with regard to productivity is 
that FOFs in Europe operate at higher productivity levels 
than both DnGFs and DGFs (see Table 5 in the annex). In 
addition, the country of origin does not matter for prod-
uctivity. Both FOFs from other EU countries and FOFs 
from outside the EU exhibit a similar productivity lead 
over DnGFs and DGFs. The productivity advantage of 
FOFs is in line with the literature, which holds that only 
the most productive firms go abroad with foreign direct 
investment (Helpman et al. 2004).
Evidence for higher productivity growth rates of FOFs 
is mixed. FOFs show slightly higher growth rates than 
DGFs, but not DnGFs, after controlling for size and other 
company characteristics. Due to data constraints it is 
not possible to measure indirect (spillover) effects on 
the productivity of DGFs and DnGFs. However, the fact 
that the growth rates are similar for FOFs and domestic  -
ally owned firms gives at least indirect evidence that 
domestic    ally owned firms do not fall too far behind 
foreign-owned firms.
One major channel for strengthening productivity is 
innovation (see Box A.1 in the annex). Rising innov-
ation activity (measured either as innovation input 
or as innov      ation output) has a stimulating effect on 
productiv    ity levels and productivity growth. This works 
through product innovation. The innovation-productiv-
ity nexus turns out to be similar in DnGFs, DGFs and 
FOFs from outside the EU. FOFs from another EU coun-
try, on the other hand, achieve significantly smaller (but 116
European Competitiveness Report 2010
products or, in other words, the shifting demand for 
the existing product;
•  the net contribution of product innovations on 
employment for product innovators.
Figure 3.17 shows this detail of employment growth in 
manufacturing by ownership status for the period 2004–06 
based on the regression results (54). Similar calculations, 
not reported here, have been done for the period 2002–04.
Process innovations generally play only a minor role for 
employment change in all sub-samples. Foreign-owned 
firms experience a much higher general productivity trend 
than domestically owned firms, leading to greater job 
losses. Affiliates from another EU Member State achieve 
the strongest general productivity gains due to organisa-
tional changes, sales of less productive firm components, 
the acquisition of more productive firms, improved capital 
endowment and learning or spillover effects.
(54)  Note that this divides up actual average employment growth. This growth 
rate turned out to be higher in foreign-owned firms, which can be explained 
by industry and country effects. Ownership itself, all other things being equal, 
has a significantly negative effect on employment growth. For each group of 
firms, industry and country effects are captured by the general productivity 
trend.
But can these differences between foreign-owned and 
domestically owned firms be attributed to differences 
in process and product innovation performance? To 
answer this question, the average employment growth 
of each group is separated into four components:
•  the change in employment due to a general industry 
and country-specific productivity trend in the pro-
duction of old products (productivity gains unrelated 
to process innovation);
•  the net employment contribution made by pro-
cess innovations related to the production of old 
products, which is the result of displacement effects 
brought about by process innovations and the com-
pensatory demand effects responding to cost and 
price reductions;
•  employment change associated with output growth 
of old products for firms that do not introduce new 
Figure 3.17:   Breakdown of employment growth by ownership, manufacturing, 2004–06
Employment growth in manufacturing 2004￿06,
decomposed into:
General productivity trend in production of old products
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product innovation on employment growth, both of 
which more than compensate job losses resulting from 
general productivity gains and displacement effects 
of process innovations. New products make an even 
greater absolute and relative contribution to employ-
ment growth for both non-European and European 
affiliates.
Both observations accord with the literature (Dunning, 
1981; Caves, 1996 (1974); Markusen, 2002). Foreign-
owned affiliates have access to superior technology and 
organisational and management capabilities internal to 
the multinational firm which domestically owned firms 
might not have. These capabilities allow foreign-owned 
firms to enjoy higher productivity gains than the aver-
age domestically owned firm.
A second advantage of foreign-owned firms is that they 
can utilise existing products and technologies of the 
parent company, and learn from their experience with 
product innovation in other countries. This may help 
them to reap higher output growth from new products, 
which translates into a higher contribution to employ-
ment growth.
These negative employment changes, however, are out-
weighed in each subsample by the output growth for 
old products and by the contribution of new products to 
employment growth. In general, output growth for old 
products spurs employment more than product innov-
ation for all types of firms. Interestingly, job creation aris-
ing from increased demand for existing products is high-
est for affiliates from another EU Member State, closely 
followed by domestically owned unaffiliated firms.
The main difference between foreign-owned and 
domestically owned firms lies in the contribution of 
product innovation to employment growth. This is 
smaller in absolute terms than the contribution of old 
products in absolute terms. New products, however, 
play a much stronger role in employment creation in 
foreign-owned affiliates than in domestically owned 
unaffili  ated firms or firms belonging to a domestic 
group in both periods. Here, affiliates of EU and non-EU 
MNEs tend to be similar.
Similar relationships can be observed in services (Fig-
ure 3.18). Again, employment growth is driven mainly 
by shifts in demand for old products, and the effects of 
Figure 3.18:   Breakdown of employment growth by ownership, services, 2004–06
Employment growth in services 2004–06, 
decomposed into:
General productivity trend in production of old products
Net contribution of process innovation
Output growth due to old products
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ation input intensity than domestically owned firms, 
but achieve a similar innovation output, which is the 
key determinant in assessing the contribution these 
firms make to growth. This confirms that their innov  -
ation efforts are based to a considerable degree on tech-
nologies, brands and other assets they receive from the 
parent company or other parts of the enterprise group. 
A number of differences between foreign-owned and 
domestically owned firms are due to related firm charac-
teristics — foreign-owned firms are larger, have higher 
absorptive capacities or operate more often in technol-
ogy-intensive sectors.
One important finding is that cooperation with domes-
tic partners, in particular domestic universities and 
research centres, is frequent among foreign-owned 
firms. The analysis reveals that foreign-owned firms 
have at least the same propensity to cooperate with 
external organisations in the host country as domestic-
ally owned firms. This seems to indicate that foreign-
owned firms are well embedded in the national innov-
ation systems of their host countries. Moreover, if 
cooperation is viewed as a two-way relationship, it fol-
lows that knowledge from foreign-owned firms has the 
potential to spill over to domestic organisations. Hence, 
host economies can benefit from the knowledge the 
foreign-owned subsidiary receives from its enterprise 
group. Foreign-owned firms therefore can act as agents 
of international technology diffusion and as bridges 
between organisations in the host country and foreign 
sources of knowledge.
Foreign-owned firms show significantly higher prod-
uctivity levels (measured by sales per employee) than 
domestically owned firms. The country of origin has no 
influence on the strength of the effect. Foreign-owned 
firms also show higher levels of productivity growth, 
although here the differences with domestically owned 
firms are considerably smaller and less significant. Prod-
uctivity growth is mainly related to output growth for 
old products and the effects of product innovation, 
but not process innovation. There are no major differ-
ences between foreign-owned firms, domestic group 
enterprises and domestic unaffiliated firms in the way 
innov  ation affects productivity levels. Subsidiaries of 
European MNEs, however, seem to benefit less from 
innovation expenditure than do subsidiaries of non-
European MNEs.
Foreign-owned firms also differ from domestically 
owned firms in the way they transform new technolo-
gies into employment growth. Foreign-owned firms 
shed more jobs in the wake of general productivity 
increases; these are, however, overcompensated for 
by the employment-creating effects of higher sales of 
old products and product innovation in foreign-owned 
firms, which are higher than in domestically owned 
enterprises.
3.8.  Summary and policy implications
The above analysis has yielded various insights into the 
internationalisation of R & D and innovation in the Euro-
pean Union.
The level of internationalisation of R & D and innov-
ation has been on the increase in the EU since 1990. 
Today, some 17 % of all patents granted in the EU-27 
are owned by foreign organisations from inside or out-
side Europe. Increases in foreign and domestic activities 
indicate that the two complement one another and sat-
isfy different needs, rather than being substitutes. The 
Innovation Union Flagship initiative recently adopted 
by the Commission as part of the Europe 2020 strategy 
therefore aims at increasing the attractiveness of the EU 
as a location of R & D and innovation investments and 
at promoting international cooperation on research and 
innovation (European Commission, 2010a, d).
Small and medium EU Member States show a higher 
degree of internationalisation than large countries. 
There are at least five countries in the EU where for-
eign-owned firms currently hold more than 50 % of 
R & D expenditure in manufacturing. Cultural and geo-
graphical proximity between countries goes a long 
way to explaining the internationalisation of R & D 
and innovation. Despite high levels of internationalisa-
tion in the EU-12, the bulk of foreign-owned R & D and 
innovation activity takes place between EU-15 Member 
States.
A high share of foreign-owned R & D and innovation 
activity can be found in technology-intensive sectors, 
such as electronics, pharmaceuticals, office equipment 
and the computer industry. Innovation in services is less 
affected by internationalisation in R & D expenditure 
than manufacturing.
Outward internationalisation of EU firms has increased 
as well over the last decade. Today, some 10 % of all 
EU patent (triadic) applications are based on inven-
tions made outside the EU. The preferred location for 
overseas R & D and innovation of EU firms is the United 
States. Similarly, the EU is the preferred location for US 
firms.
Outward R & D and innovation activities of EU firms in 
China, India, Brazil or other emerging economies start 
from low levels but are rising fast. Bearing in mind that 
overseas R & D activities follow outward foreign direct 
investment to a considerable degree, the share of the 
BRIC countries in EU overseas R & D and innovation 
activities can be expected to rise considerably in the 
future.
Multivariate analysis reveals that foreign-owned firms 
(at least from a static perspective) have a lower innov-119
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Thursby, 2006). These factors are often more important 
than financial incentives, like tax breaks for foreign-
owned firms (56).
Countries which are successful in attracting and bene-
fiting most from foreign R & D and innovation tend to 
have stable macroeconomic conditions and policies and 
dynamic scientific and technology bases. They are also 
keen to foster capabilities for innovation in both foreign-
owned and domestically owned firms. This conclusion 
is underpinned by the finding that many differences 
between foreign-owned and domestically owned firms 
are related to company characteristics such as size, sec-
toral affiliation and export orientation rather than to for-
eign ownership as such.
Moreover, R & D and innovation activities of foreign-
owned firms are often the last step in their expansion 
at a certain location and are preceded by investment 
in production or sales activities. The most appropriate 
way to encourage R & D-intensive foreign-owned firms 
is to give them backing throughout their expansion by 
administrative simplification, matchmaking with domes-
tic partners and other ‘after-care’ services following mar-
ket entry (Guimón, 2009).
Policies which strengthen the links and integration of 
foreign-owned firms into domestic innovation net-
works, particularly with other firms in the host country, 
can deliver substantial benefits. Both supplier and user 
links to foreign-owned firms, as well as pre-competitive 
cooperation schemes with foreign-owned competitors, 
can help domestically owned firms to learn from these 
internationally experienced companies. Learning and 
technology transfer from foreign-owned firms can con-
tribute in three ways to competitiveness:
•  Foreign-owned firms tend to apply more advanced 
innovation management techniques, including ideas 
for successfully commercialising new products.
•  Foreign-owned firms — with their higher product-
ivity levels — may have technologies that can help 
domestically owned firms to advance their own pro-
duction methods and product portfolios.
•  Finally, domestically owned firms can use their con-
tacts to foreign-owned firms to learn for their own 
internationalisation activities, including R & D and 
innovation internationalisation. Linking domestic-
ally owned and foreign-owned firms may also 
include ways and means of raising the capacities of 
domestic  ally owned firms to absorb and make use of 
external knowledge.
(56)  The 2008 EU survey on R & D (European Commission JRC IPTS, 2009b) points 
to some further differences between firms. High R & D intensity firms appear 
to give relatively more importance to tax incentives.
Together, these three effects result in net employment 
growth, including higher demand for skilled personnel. 
Overcoming capacity bottlenecks in the home coun-
try is indeed one of the main reasons why firms take 
their R & D and innovation activities abroad. Combin-
ing this finding with the fact that foreign-owned firms 
tend to operate more in technology-intensive indus-
tries, foreign-owned R & D and innovation activities 
in a country may also trigger structural change in the 
sense of boosting the share of high- and medium-tech 
industries.
What challenges and opportunities emerge for the EU?
Empirical evidence shows that foreign-owned firms con-
tribute in many ways to a country’s innovative capacity 
and performance. They innovate differently, but not 
necessarily less intensively than domestically owned 
firms. Foreign-owned firms have a lower innovation 
input intensity (after controlling for their main charac-
teristics), but a similar innovation output, which is the 
key determinant in assessing the growth contribution of 
these firms.
There is no evidence that the presence of foreign-owned 
firms is detrimental to national innovation systems, e.g. 
by siphoning off knowledge resources or crowding out 
innovation by domestically owned firms.
A survey of current internationalisation policies (Dachs 
et al., 2010) showed that the principle of non-discrim-
ination is adopted in all EU Member States. There is very 
little formal discrimination against foreign-owned firms 
with respect to access to funds or other restrictions of 
their business activities, as long as they are domiciled 
in the country. There may, however, be certain de facto 
preferences in some Member States for domestically 
owned firms in national innovation programmes.
The analysis in this chapter reveals no evidence in sup-
port of negative discrimination against (by limiting the 
activities of) foreign-owned firms (55).
The empirical findings indicate no support for positive 
discrimination either (e.g. by offering special incentives 
to foreign-owned firms). The high level of R & D and 
innovation activities of foreign-owned firms indicates 
that the EU is an attractive location for these types of 
activities. Empirical evidence suggests that the decisive 
factors in attracting R & D and innovation activities of 
foreign-owned firms are economic stability, high mar-
ket growth expectations or the excellence of the sci-
ence sector, IPR protection and the availability of S & T 
personnel (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2000; Thursby and 
(55)  In addition, limiting the activities of foreign-owned firms would violate EU 
competition law.120
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In addition, support for SMEs to take their R & D and 
innovation activities abroad and forge links to specific 
foreign sources of knowledge may also yield consider-
able benefits for these firms. Empirical evidence sug-
gests that internationalising innovation may boost the 
economic performance of the SME in the home coun-
try. Foreign-based R & D and the exploitation of innov-
ations in foreign markets help SMEs to significantly 
increase employment at domestic locations (Rammer 
and Schmiele, 2008). Large domestic multinational firms 
do not need support from public policy to intensify their 
international linkages.
There may be advantages from making the Euro-
pean research area and the framework programme 
more open to non-EU firms, universities and other 
organisations. Cooperation between EU and non-EU 
organisations within the framework programme could 
strengthen links between Europe and other parts of the 
world. Linking MNEs more closely to domestic research 
organisations in joint projects may step up the transfer 
of knowledge between foreign and domestic partners.
Another channel for knowledge spillovers from foreign-
owned firms to the domestic innovation system is staff 
mobility (see, for example, Kaiser et al. (2008)). Creating 
a culture that encourages spin-offs by employees of 
domestic and foreign-owned multinationals can foster 
growth and create more jobs.
There are some issues related to the internationalisation 
of R & D and innovation where a pan-European discus-
sion and further comparisons of actual policies in the 
Member States would be beneficial: one of these is the 
treatment of non-domiciled foreign-owned firms (with 
no subsidiary in a Member State) in national funding 
schemes for R & D and innovation.
The locational advantages of the European Union could 
be enhanced by removing more barriers to trans-Euro-
pean R & D and innovation activities. One example is the 
European patent. A single EU patent with centralised 
application and litigation procedures and a sound appli-
cation and renewal fee structure could have a stimulat-
ing effect on R & D and innovation by foreign-owned 
firms in particular.
There is some evidence that supporting domestically 
owned firms’ outward R & D and innovation activities 
can be advantageous for a national innovation system. 
R & D and innovation activities abroad help to gear 
innova  tive products to the requirements and prefer-
ences of foreign markets, which in turn increases the 
sales potential of domestic innovations. In addition, 
foreign R & D and innovation improves access to for-
eign knowledge sources, which can be used to advance 
domestic R & D and innovation, e.g. by accessing new 
research findings or lead markets abroad. So far, there 
have only been very few national programmes that 
actively support foreign R & D and innovation by domes-
tically owned firms. This may be because of concerns of 
knowledge leaking out or of using taxpayers’ money to 
support R & D at foreign locations. Empirical evidence 
suggests, however, that the internationalisation of firms 
will strengthen the entire business, i.e. also business 
activities in the home country (see, for example, Europe 
Economics (2010), Pfaffermayr (2004)).
It is not possible from today’s perspective to fully ascer-
tain the effects of the economic and financial crisis 
on the internationalisation of R & D and innovation. 
Innov    ation and R & D, however, show a high degree of 
robustness and consistency over time (Filippetti and 
Archibugi, 2010), which suggests that the crisis will have 
only minor consequences. Evidence from panel data 
described above indicates that R & D and other innov-
ation expenditure by both foreign-owned and domes-
tically owned firms is affected in the same way by the 
business cycle. In a cyclical downward trend, foreign-
owned firms tend to keep up their higher R & D invest-
ment for a longer time. A high degree of foreign-owned 
R & D activity in a country may therefore even have a 
stabilising effect on gross national R & D expenditure in 
times of crisis.
There are several ways in which the European Commis-
sion can help firms to benefit from the internationalisa-
tion of R & D and innovation.
At the EU level there could be programmes linking EU 
partners with non-EU industrial partners in joint R & D 
and innovation projects. These would indirectly stimu-
late both inward R & D investment by non-EU firms and 
active R & D internationalisation of EU firms. It might be 
beneficial for unaffiliated, small- and medium-sized firms 
in particular (see SBA, Principle VIII), encouraging invest-
ment in research by SMEs and getting them to take 
part in transnational research activities — which can 
be achieved in part by getting them actively involved 
in the seventh RTD framework programme. The ana    lysis 
has shown that this group cooperates considerably less 
with domestic partners. There are specific obstacles to 
cooperation in SMEs, such as a lack of resources and 
long-term funding of R & D, which are found less fre-
quently in large firms.121
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Innovation surveys, in particular the   Community Innov  -
ation Survey (CIS) and the European   Manufacturing 
Survey (EMS), are a second data source employed in 
this chapter. Innovation surveys provide detailed infor-
mation on goals, hindering factors,   financial inputs and 
outcomes of corporate innov  ation processes. This study 
employs CIS data in the multi  variate analysis featuring in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6, and EMS data in Chapter 3.
An advantage of innovation survey data is that they 
cover the whole innovation process, not just R & D, and 
usually include the service sector. They often include 
information on various company characteristics, which 
makes it possible to relate innovation activity to com-
pany size, sector and employment structure, etc. Disad-
vantages of innovation survey data include problems 
with their scope and definitions (Salazar and Holbrook, 
2004) and with data access. This chapter employs firm-
level data from the CIS and the EMS.
A third data source is R & D expenditure of foreign affili-
ates published by national statistical offices. The big-
gest advantage of data on R & D spending by foreign 
subsidiaries is that it allows a direct comparison with 
R & D expenditure at the sectoral or aggregate level. The 
broad coverage of national R & D surveys makes them 
highly representative and includes R & D in the service 
sector. However, a number of countries have not yet 
extended their R & D surveys to cover the ownership sta-
tus of the firm, and coverage is still poor at the sectoral 
level, with respect to outward internationalisation. Data 
on R & D expenditure by foreign affiliates is presented 
in Section 3.
Annex
Measuring the internationalisation of R & D and 
innovation
There are at least three approaches to measuring the 
internationalisation of R & D and innovation activities. 
Patent data feature the location of the applicant and the 
location of the inventor of a particular patent. By com-
paring the two, it is possible to derive a measure for the 
foreign ownership of domestic patent inventions, which 
can be used as an indicator for the internationalisation 
of R & D and innovation (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe 
de la Potterie, 2004; Belderbos et al., 2009). Patent data 
are available in great detail for many countries, years 
and technologies. There are, however, some shortcom-
ings that must be considered (see also the preceding 
chapter), such as: time lags between application and 
invention; not all inventions being patentable; differ-
ences in the propensity to patent between sectors (with 
very few patents in the services sector); no indication of 
its application or economic value; and potential distor-
tions from ‘strategic’ patenting.
This study employs two types of patent data — that pro-
vided by the European Patent Office (EPO) and that on 
triadic patents which have been applied for at all three 
major patent offices, the EPO, the US Patent and Trade-
mark office (USPTO) and the Japanese Patent Office 
(JPO). The number of triadic patents is relatively small, 
especially in more recent years. However, triadic pat-
ents help to circumvent the ‘home office’ bias in patents 
which results from the tendency of an inventor to apply 
at the patent office of her/his home country first. As a 
consequence of this bias, US inventors are overrepresen-
ted at the USPTO, while European inventors dominate 
the EPO.125
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Table A.2:   Impact of foreign ownership and domestic group membership on innovation and cooperation 
behaviour of EU firms
COEFFICIENT lintens turnmar co_dom_ex co_dom_sci
domgp - 0.0733 (**) 0.0075 0.2627 (***) 0.3417 (***)
(0.0320) (0.0050) (0.0426) (0.0518)
forown - 0.1505 (***) 0.0107 (*) 0.1372 (***) 0.2736 (***)
(0.0374) (0.0056) (0.0484) (0.0508)
lemp - 0.8864 (***) - 0.0177 (**) 0.0318 0.0056
(0.0523) (0.0078) (0.0726) (0.0762)
lemp2 0.0445 (***) 0.0017 (**) 0.0117 (*) 0.0117 (*)
(0.0049) (0.0007) (0.0067) (0.0065)
rrdin 0.4960 (***) 0.0459 (***) 0.5086 (***) 0.6099 (***)
(0.0264) (0.0041) (0.0372) (0.0495)
spill 0.3566 (***) 0.0495 (***) 0.6778 (***) 1.0018 (***)
(0.0485) (0.0074) (0.0667) (0.0849)
mar_int - 0.2823 (***) 0.0367 (***) - 0.0107 - 0.0280
(0.0541) (0.0088) (0.0612) (0.0683)
finsup 0.8309 (***) 0.0228 (***) 0.5042 (***) 0.6738 (***)
(0.0274) (0.0044) (0.0389) (0.0454)
low 0.2552 (***) 0.0332 (***) 0.4666 (***) 0.3310 (***)
(0.0751) (0.0121) (0.1038) (0.1179)
med_low 0.6288 (***) 0.0259 (**) 0.4486 (***) 0.2691 (**)
(0.0754) (0.0121) (0.1014) (0.1119)
med 0.8903 (***) 0.0351 (***) 0.4959 (***) 0.3177 (***)
(0.0730) (0.0117) (0.0993) (0.1102)
med_high 0.8746 (***) 0.0298 (**) 0.4988 (***) 0.4242 (***)
(0.0739) (0.0118) (0.0996) (0.1111)
high 1.4314 (***) 0.0862 (***) 0.6488 (***) 0.6317 (***)
(0.0746) (0.0119) (0.1016) (0.1116)
Constant - 1.3666 (***) - 0.0388 - 2.3949 (***) - 2.8199 (***)
(0.2805) (0.0480) (0.3765) (0.4880)
Wald chi2 5 108.10 (***) 858.56 (***) 1 545.60 (***) 952.22 (***)
Observations 78 403 85 456 84 677 84 677
Uncensored observations 20 797 18 484 27 071 27 071
Note:    Lintens is the ln of innovation expenditures as percentage of turnover in 2006; turnmar is the share of turnover generated by 
market novelties in 2006. co_dom_ex is 1 if the enterprise had cooperation agreements during 2004–06 with suppliers, clients 
or customers, competitors or other firms, consultants, commercial labs, private R & D institutes, universities, government or 
public research institutes at the national level. Co_dom_sci is 1 if the enterprise had cooperation agreements during 2004–06 
with universities, government or public research institutes at national level. Domgp identifies domestically owned group enter-
prises, forown is 1 if the firm is foreign-owned. Description of the other independent variables (see Dachs et al. (2010)): Size 
(lemp): ln (total number of employees) in the reference year 2006; Size2 (lemp2); Intramural R & D (rrdin): 1 if the enterprise is 
engaged in intramural (in-house) R & D; 0 otherwise; External Spillovers (spill): Sum of scores of importance of the following 
information sources for the innovation process [number between 1 (low) and 3 (high)]: sources from Professional and industry 
associations, sources from scientific journals, trade/scientific publications and sources from professional conferences, trade fairs, 
meetings; (rescaled between 0 and 1); International market-orientation (mar_int): 1 if a firm exported goods or services during 
the years 2004–06; 0 otherwise; Public funding (finsup): 1 if the firm got public funding for innovation from local or regional 
authorities, or from central government, or from the EU; 0 otherwise; Sectoral affiliation (none, low, low_med, med, med_high, 
high): taxonomy of economic sectors (six categories) according to their innovation intensity (Peneder 2010); sectors are classi-
fied according to cumulativeness of the knowledge base, appropriability conditions, technological opportunity and creative vs. 
adaptive strategies.
   Lintens and turnmar are estimated by Heckman regression; co_dom_ex and co_dom_sci are estimated by Heckman Probit; 
(***), (**) and (*) denote statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % test level; standard errors in parentheses; observations 
cover innovative and non-innovative firms; uncensored observations relate to firms with innovation activities; the test is a Wald 
test that all coefficients in the regression model (except the constant) are 0.
  Country dummies are not reported in the table.
Source: ZEW/AIT calculations, CIS2006, Eurostat127
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Table A.3: Innovation and cooperation behaviour of FOFs from different home country groups
COEFFICIENT lintens turnmar co_dom_ex co_dom_sci
asia 0.269 0.0857 (**) - 0.192 - 0.3840 (**)
(0.220) (0.0423) (0.142) (0.167)
noneu 0.0418 0.0562 - 0.0290 0.0266
(0.233) (0.0431) (0.140) (0.147)
usca - 0.0690 0.0289 (*) 0.0796 0.3010 (**)
(0.138) (0.0166) (0.115) (0.124)
other 0.534 - 0.0465 (*) - 0.160 0.119
(0.329) (0.0244) (0.185) (0.198)
lemp - 0.9390 (***) - 0.0503 (*) - 0.0276 - 0.200
(0.222) (0.0298) (0.184) (0.183)
lemp2 0.0370 (*) 0.00390 0.0158 0.0252 (*)
(- 0.0191) (0.00255) (0.0145) (0.0136)
rrdin 0.4870 (***) 0.0307 (**) 0.5100 (***) 0.6000 (***)
(0.115) (0.0138) (0.0724) (0.0879)
spill 0.0682 0.0183 0.6700 (***) 1.3380 (***)
(0.236) (0.0296) (0.179) (0.187)
mar_int - 0.0179 0.0074 - 0.2250 (**) - 0.125
(0.168) (0.0164) (0.107) (0.110)
finsup 0.5750 (***) 0.0308 (*) 0.5130 (***) 0.6530 (***)
(0.118) (0.0173) (0.0828) (0.0918)
low - 0.111 0.111 (***) 0.449 (**) 0.0371
(0.369) (0.0214) (0.222) (0.260)
med_low 0.536 0.0622 (***) 0.3810 (*) - 0.0244
(0.369) (0.0154) (0.218) (0.250)
med 0.6580 (*) 0.0656 (***) 0.3770 (*) 0.0052
(0.362) (0.0168) (0.215) (0.249)
med_high 0.8030 (**) 0.0882 (***) 0.5630 (***) 0.4790 (**)
(0.351) (0.0157) (0.209) (0.242)
high 1.0000 (***) 0.1170 (***) 0.6270 (***) 0.4440 (*)
(0.364) (0.0167) (0.215) (0.245)
Constant - 0.318 0.2130 (**) - 1.9750 (**) - 1.688
(0.947) (0.0952) (0.786) (1.027)
Wald chi2 226.74 (***) 158.27 (***) 298.31 (***) 241.45 (***)
Observations 7 782 8 650 8 525 8 525
Uncensored Observations 3 149 2 911 3 892 3 892
Note:    Lintens is the ln of innovation expenditures as percentage of turnover in 2006; turnmar is the share of turnover generated 
by market novelties in 2006. co_dom_ex is 1 if the enterprise had cooperation agreements during 2004–06 with suppliers, 
clients or customers, competitors or other firms, consultants, commercial labs, private R & D institutes, universities, govern-
ment or public research institutes at the national level. Co_dom_sci is 1 if the enterprise had cooperation agreements during 
2004–06 with universities, government or public research institutes at national level. Domgp identifies domestically owned 
group enterprises, forown is 1 if the firm is foreign-owned. Description of the other independent variables (see Dachs et al. 
(2010)): Size (lemp): ln (total number of employees) in the reference year 2006; Size2 (lemp2); Intramural R & D (rrdin): 1 if the 
enterprise is engaged in intramural (in-house) R & D; 0 otherwise; External Spillovers (spill): Sum of scores of importance of the 
following information sources for the innovation process [number between 1 (low) and 3 (high)]: sources from Professional and 
industry associations, sources from scientific journals, trade/scientific publications and sources from professional conferences, 
trade fairs, meetings; (rescaled between 0 and 1); International market-orientation (mar_int): 1 if a firm exported goods or serv-
ices during the years 2004–06; 0 otherwise; Public funding (finsup): 1 if the firm got public funding for innovation from local 
or regional authorities, or from central government, or from the EU; 0 otherwise; Sectoral affiliation (none, low, low_med, med, 
med_high, high): taxonomy of economic sectors (six categories) according to their innovation intensity (Peneder 2010); sectors 
are classified according to cumulativeness of the knowledge base, appropriability conditions, technological opportunity and 
creative vs. adaptive strategies.
   Lintens and turnmar are estimated by Heckman regression; co_dom_ex and co_dom_sci are estimated by Heckman Probit; 
(***), (**), (*) denote statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % test level; Standard errors in parentheses; observations 
cover innovative and non-innovative firms; Uncensored observations relate to firms with innovation activities; the test is a Wald 
test that all coefficients in the regression model (except the constant) are 0.
  Country dummies are not reported in the table.
Source: ZEW/AIT calculations, CIS2006, Eurostat.128
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Table A.4:   Impact of foreign ownership and domestic group membership on innovation and cooperation 
behaviour of EU firms, panel regressions
Dependent Variable
Innovation input
intensity
Innovation output
intensity
Cooperation with
domestic partners
Cooperation with
domestic science
Ownership
DGF 0.972 (***) 1.452 (**) 0.029 (**) 0.011
(0.198) (0.666) (0.015) (0.007)
FOF - - - -
FOFEU -0.902 0.526 0.034 0.004
(0.598) (1.536) (0.039) (0.018)
FOFNONEU 0.171 0.620 0.042 0.034
(0.706) (1.763) (0.042) (0.023)
FOFUS - - - -
FOFROW - - - -
Innov. Intensity in t-1 1.799 (***)
(0.224)
Firm size 1.018 (***) -4.608 (***) 0.079 (***) 0.040 (***)
(0.074) (0.772) (0.005) (0.003)
East Germany (0/1) 1.146 (***) -1.587 (***) 0.112 (***) 0.045 (***)
(0.264) (0.365) (0.016) (0.009)
Firm age -1.800 (***) 0.376 (***) -0.018 (**) -0.010 (***)
(0.118) (0.019) (0.007) (0.003)
Export intensity 3.670 (***) 9.188 (***) 0.131 (***) 0.080 (***)
(0.310) (1.144) (0.025) (0.013)
Creditworthiness 0.431 16.180 (***)
(0.417) (0.549)
Constant -1.877 -35.964 (***)
(2.532) (2.428)
Year dummies (1) 0.000 (***) 0.000 (***) 0.000 (***) 0.000 (***)
Industry dummies (1) 0.000 (***) 0.000 (***) 0.000 (***) 0.000 (***)
sigma_a 13.372 (***) 19.351 (***)
(0.116) (0.414)
sigma_e 11.385 (***) 19.431 (***)
(0.054) (0.237)
rho 0.58 0.498
LL -5 160.070 -4 775.694
W: DGF = FOFEU 0.002 (***) 0.543 0.925 0.681
W: DGF = FOFNONEU 0.254 0.634 0.883 0.285
Note:    Estimation method: random effects tobit model. (1) Year and industry dummies are included but not reported. Reported is only 
the p-value of a test on joint significance. W: DGF = FOFEU reports the p-value of a test on joint significance of DGF and FOF, EU 
(H0: not jointly significant). W: DGF = FOFNONEU reports the p-value of a test on the difference between DGF and FOF, non-EU 
(H0: no significant difference). Sigma_a and sigma_e denotes the standard deviation of the individual fixed/random effects and 
the idio  syncratic error term, respectively. 
(***), (**) and (*) denote statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % test level; standard errors in parentheses; observations 
cover innovative and non-innovative firms.
Source:  ZEW — Mannheim Innovation Panel, ZEW/AIT calculations.129
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Table A.5:   Effects of foreign ownership and innovation on productivity in EU firms
Traditional approach
Productivity level Productivity growth
Innovation
Innovation intensity 0.096 (***) 0.096 (**) 0.106 (***) 0.007 (***) 0.007 (***) 0.010 (***)
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Process innov. -0.058 (**) -0.058 (**) -0.058 (**) -0.058 (**) 0.000 -0.000 (**)
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Ownership (reference: 
DnGF)
DGF 0.218 (***) 0.219 (***) 0.124 (**) -0.009 -0.010 -0.035 (*)
(0.015) (0.015) (0.052) (0.009) (0.009) (0.019)
FOF 0.383 (***) - - 0.009 - -
(0.028) (0.011)
FOFEU - 0.376 (***) 0.177 (**) - 0.013 -0.043
(0.039) (0.089) (0.013) (0.041)
FOFNONEU - 0.389 (***) 0.319 (**) - 0.005 -0.063 (*)
(0.034) (0.119) (0.010) (0.033)
Innovation * Ownership
Innovation  
intensity * DGF - - -0.016 - - -0.004
(0.009) (0.003)
Innovation  
intensity * FOFEU - - -0.034 (**) - - -0.009
(0.012) (0.006)
Innovation  
intensity * FOFNONEU - - -0.012 - - -0.012 (**)
(0.017) (0.005)
CDM model
Productivity level Productivity growth
Innovation
Product innovation 
output 0.491 (***) 0.405 (***) 0.453 (***) 0.034 (***) 0.028 (***) 0.030 (***)
(0.021) (0.026) (0.030) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)
Process innov. -0.097 (***) -0.101 (***) -0.105 (***) -0.004 -0.002 -0.002
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Ownership
DGF 0.121 (***) 0.147 (***) -0.151 -0.001 0.001 0.005
(0.020) (0.019) (0.111) (0.006) (0.007) (0.038)
FOF 0.197 (***) 0.231 (***) -0.082 0.004 0.010 -0.033
(0.021) (0.022) (0.127) (0.007) (0.009) (0.050)
Innovation * Ownership
Product innov.  
output * DGF - - -0.082 (***) - - 0.001
(0.030) (0.010)
Product innov.  
output * FOF - - -0.089 (***) - - -0.013
(0.037) (0.014)
Note:    The dependent variable is labour productivity measured by sales per employee and labour productivity growth, respectively. 
Labour productivity is explained either by innovation input (innovation intensity measured by the innovation expend  itures 
as percentage of turnover; traditional approach) or product innovation output (share of sales with new products; CDM 
model). Further explanatory variables include process innovation (dummy — yes/no) and a set of dummy variables indi-
cating ownership: DGF (domestically owned group firm), FOF (foreign-owned firm), FOFEU (foreign-owned firm from an 
EU country), FOFNONEU (foreign-owned firm from a non-EU country). Reference group is DnGF (domestically owned non-
group firm). The third estimation further includes interaction terms between innovation input (output) and ownership. 
Additional control variables (not reported here) include firm size (log. number of employees), physical capital (log. investment 
per employee), human capital (share of high skilled employees), export intensity, country dummies and industry dummies. 
The CDM model only reports the final stage. The hypothesis on equal effects of DGF and FOF on productivity growth in the 
  traditional approach is rejected at the 10 % level (p value: 0.093). 
(***), (**) and (*) denote statistical significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % test level; standard errors in parentheses; observations 
cover innovative and non-innovative firms.
Source: CIS 3, Eurostat, ZEW/AIT calculations.130
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Box A.1: Linking productivity to innovation
There is an enormous amount of work examining the factors underlying productivity and productivity growth. 
Two different approaches can be distinguished. The traditional approach uses a Cobb-Douglas (CD) production 
function as its theoretical framework to explain productivity, augmented by knowledge capital as an additional 
input besides labour and physical capital. Taking logs and assuming constant returns to scale lead to the following 
estimation equation:
,
where   denotes labour,   labour productivity,   physical capital per employee,   knowledge capital and   
exogenous technological change.   measures how much a firm benefits in terms of a percentage increase in 
production if it boosts its innovation investment by 1 %. Instead of the productivity level, one can similarly derive 
the productivity growth. To compare domestically owned firms, the specification will be enhanced by including 
ownership dummy variables.
The second approach is based on the CDM model by Crepon, Duguet and Mairesse (Crepon et al., 1998). It was 
developed because the traditional approach does not take into account the fact that not all firms are engaged in 
innovation, which can lead to biased results. Furthermore, the link between innovation input and innovative out-
come remains a black box. The CDM approach is a three-step model consisting of four equations. In the first step, 
firms decide on the strength of the expected profits whether to engage in innovation activities (selection equa-
tion) and on the amount of money to invest in innovation. If the firm opts to innovate, the second step describes 
the relationship between innovation input and innovation output (knowledge production function, see Pakes 
and Griliches, 1984). The third step is similar to the traditional approach. An augmented CDM production func-
tion is estimated in which productivity results from knowledge capital, now proxied by innovation output, and 
other explanatory factors. Innovation input is proxied by innovation intensity; the share of sales of new products 
measures innovation output.131
4.1.  Introduction
What products will be demanded in the future, what 
will producers be able to offer, and which production 
processes will be available in years to come? These cru-
cial questions are of course impossible to answer and it 
would be foolhardy to make an attempt: history is full of 
examples of futile prophecies, guesses and market ana-
lyses that over time have proved to be wide of the mark.
It is however possible to say something meaningful about 
the technologies that will be crucial to the development 
of a multitude of new products and processes in many dif-
ferent industries and fields of application. Such key enab-
ling technologies are attracting increasing interest, not 
least in difficult economic times, as they are seen as the 
route to new and better products and processes, capable 
of generating economic growth and employment and 
strengthening the competitiveness of the economy. They 
are moreover expected to provide significant economic 
benefits, offering a widening variety of uses in an increas-
ing number of application areas and industries.
The discussion of key enabling technologies is not new. 
The concept is in fact closely related to the concept of 
general purpose technologies coined by Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg (1995) and further developed notably by 
Helpman (1998) and Lipsey et al. (2005). The link was 
already established in the introduction to Bresnahan 
and Trajtenberg (1995):
    ‘Most general purpose technologies play the 
role of “enabling technologies”, opening up 
new opportunities rather than offering com-
plete, final solutions. For example, the prod-
uctivity gains associated with the introduction 
of electric motors in manufacturing were not 
limited to a reduction in energy costs. The 
new energy source fostered the more efficient 
design of factories, taking advantage of the 
newfound flexibility of electric power.’ (Bresna-
han and Trajtenberg, op. cit., p. 84)
In 2002 the Commission presented an industrial pol-
icy communication (European Commission, 2002) in 
which it called on the European Union to reinforce 
its position in certain enabling technologies such as 
information and communication technologies (ICT), 
electronics, biotechnology and nanotechnology. This 
is reflected in the current framework programme for 
research, technological development and demonstra-
tion activities (2007–13), as well as its specific pro-
grammes, where key enabling technologies feature 
prominently. Furthermore, one of the chapters of 
the European Competitiveness Report 2007 (European 
Commission, 2007a) included a survey of existing lit-
erature on a number of future key technologies: ICT, 
microsystems, advanced and smart materials and 
nano- and biotechnologies. In 2009 the Commission 
presented a stand-alone communication on key enab-
ling technologies (2009a) accompanied by a working 
document on the state of play regarding these tech-
nologies in Europe (2009 b), both of which are central 
to this chapter. Two recent strategy communications, 
on Europe 2020 (2010a) and on a digital agenda for 
Europe (2010b), have further underlined the import-
ance of key enabling technologies.
There is no universally accepted definition or agreed list 
of key enabling technologies. For the purpose of this 
chapter, the definition in European Commission (2009a) 
will be used.
Moreover, the key enabling technologies examined in 
this chapter — nanotechnology, industrial biotechnol-
ogy, advanced materials, micro and nanoelectronics 
including semiconductors, photonics and advanced 
manufacturing technologies — are essentially the same 
as in European Commission (2009a), the only difference 
being that given the importance of process innovation 
in industrial competitiveness and the important role of 
advanced manufacturing as enabler of process innov-
ation, advanced manufacturing technologies have 
been added and will be considered alongside nano-
technology, industrial biotechnology, advanced mater-
ials, micro and nanoelectronics and photonics. Including 
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Figure 4.1 is a schematic representation of the links 
between key enabling technologies, at the core of the 
process and interacting with one another, and some 
of their applications, which is where value, growth and 
employment are created. In many cases small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a vital role, often 
as part of a cluster, in the development and commercial-
isation of applications, whereas their role in the devel-
opment of key enabling technologies is more limited 
because they lack the necessary resources.
The case of environment applications may serve as 
an illustration of the links in Figure 4.1. Due to scarce 
resources and the need to meet climate change targets, 
the market for eco-friendly technologies is expected to 
continue to grow faster than the economy as a whole, 
as it has done in recent years. Key enabling technolo-
gies such as nanotechnology for filtering polluted water 
or used in desalination plants, advanced manufacturing 
technologies and advanced materials to come up with 
environmentally friendly building materials and indus-
trial biotechnology are some of the technologies likely 
to play a role on this expanding market.
advanced manufacturing technologies in the analysis is 
in line not only with European Commission (2009a) but 
also with European Commission (2007a).
4.2.  Applications of key enabling 
technologies
An important aspect of key enabling technologies 
which is clearly expressed in the quoted paragraph 
from Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) but is perhaps 
less clear from the definition in Box 4.1 is that whilst 
developing and mastering a key enabling technology is 
likely to require considerable input of resources (capital, 
time, labour, R & D), the direct return on that investment 
tends to be disproportionally small. It is instead the 
applications it enables that are expected to create jobs, 
growth and wealth in the economy and boost competi-
tiveness. A number of current and future applications 
are discussed further in Section 4.5, while existing esti-
mations of market potential are reported in Section 4.6. 
Europe’s competitiveness is assessed in Section 4.7, fol-
lowed by implications and priorities in Section 4.8.
Box 4.1: Definition of key enabling technologies (KETs)
KETs are knowledge-intensive and associated with high R & D intensity, rapid innovation cycles, high capital 
expenditure and highly skilled employment. They enable process, goods and service innovation throughout the 
economy and are of systemic relevance. They are multidisciplinary, cutting across many technology areas with 
a trend towards convergence and integration. KETs can assist technology leaders in other fields to capitalise on 
their research efforts (European Commission, 2009a).
Figure 4.1:   Key enabling technologies and some areas of application
KETs
Telecommunications
Automotive
Foodstu￿s
Chemicals
Electronics Environment
Pharmaceuticals
Construction
Aerospace
Textiles Energy
Source:   Adapted from Confindustria (2009).133
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Applying new technologies early and broadly often 
requires close interaction between the producers and 
users of these technologies (Fagerberg, 1995; Porter, 
1990). Competitiveness effects of new technologies 
strongly depend on the speed of their diffusion and 
on the rate at which the opportunities they present are 
exploited. Being the first to generate new scientific find-
ings is not a sufficient condition for securing economic 
returns from new technologies. The main challenge for 
any innovation project, including innovations based on 
key enabling technologies, is to balance technologic-
al opportunities originating from research with user 
needs, cost-efficient production and the capabilities of 
business partners (suppliers, distributors, users), without 
losing sight of the innovative strategies of competitors. 
As a consequence, innovators use a variety of inputs to 
orient their innovative activities.
From a macroeconomic point of view, key enabling 
technologies can increase productivity and wealth 
through more efficient use of production factors and 
through structural change. Within a production func-
tion environment, their positive productivity effects 
may be reflected in a higher rate of technical progress. 
Alternatively, one may model the effect of key enabling 
technologies as a separate input factor; a stock of new 
knowledge resulting from R & D. Efforts to develop key 
enabling technologies result in larger knowledge stocks 
and increased output. Within a sector-specific produc-
tion function environment, key enabling technologies 
are likely to shift sector shares since the output of sectors 
that produce such technologies and can obtain prod-
uctivity advantages from them is likely to grow faster. 
In a dynamic perspective, positive productivity effects 
from structural change driven by key enabling technolo-
gies are likely since technology sectors will experience 
above-average productivity growth.
Given the considerable resources needed to develop 
key enabling technologies, might it be preferable not 
to make the investment, wait for them to be developed 
elsewhere and then either purchase or acquire them 
through cooperation with external partners? There 
are at least two arguments against such a ‘free-rider’ 
approach. First, developing commercial applications 
based on key enabling technologies often requires 
a certain degree of technological competence in order 
to absorb and apply new knowledge, as well as close 
interaction between fundamental research and indus-
trial innovation. The need for interaction often mani-
fests itself in the forming of clusters, a topic which is dis-
cussed in Section 4.7.7. Second, first-mover advantages 
are particularly important in the case of path-breaking 
technologies. First-mover advantages include learning 
and reputation effects as well as standard-setting and 
developing innovation-friendly regulation. The issue of 
first movers is discussed further in Section 4.3 below.
4.3.  Key enabling technologies and the 
economy
The development of a key enabling technology can 
be regarded as a technological push to the innovation 
efforts of firms and can be expected to raise the overall 
level of innovation activities in an economy (Helpman, 
1998; Baptista, 1999; van Ark and Piatkowski, 2004). 
Moreover, research has shown that innovative firms are 
often more productive and grow faster than other firms, 
indicating a higher level of competitiveness (Crépon et 
al., 1998; Griffith et al., 2006; Harrison et al., 2008; Janz 
et al., 2004). Similarly, greater innovativeness in terms of 
the degree of novelty and the amount of R & D effort 
tends to be associated with higher economic perform-
ance in terms of productivity and growth (Peters, 2008).
Box 4.2: The economics of key enabling technologies
The economic rationale for developing key enabling technologies can be illustrated in the framework of a know-
ledge-augmented Cobb-Douglas production function:
 where  ,  ,   and   are the input factors physical capital, labour, material, and knowledge; 
,  ,   and   are their associated partial output elasticities;   is total factor productivity and   is output in the 
economy. Developing and mastering key enabling technologies can be expected to have a positive effect on   
,   and  . The effects on  ,  ,   and the four elasticities will depend on the degree of substitution, efficiency 
and other factors.
Another way of looking at the introduction of applications of key enabling technologies is in the context of the 
production frontier of the economy. Developing a key enabling technology will expand the production set so that 
previously unobtainable output combinations become feasible while previously possible combinations can be 
obtained at a lower cost, using fewer inputs. It should however be noted that the outward shift of the production 
frontier associated with the expansion of the production set is unlikely to be a parallel shift: in all likelihood the 
new equilibrium output will differ in its composition from the old equilibrium.134
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An important issue in this respect is the timing of 
new markets. Economies able to open up new mar-
kets before others could gain a temporary monopoly, 
as a source of additional income. More importantly, 
in a dynamic sense such first-mover advantages can 
translate into positive cumulative effects (Porter, 
1990). These cumulative effects may result from net-
work effects among producers, suppliers and users 
who can learn from each other and leverage econ-
omies of scale and scope. In addition, first movers may 
be able to define global standards, establish global dis-
tribution channels and build up a reputation as tech-
nology leaders. Follow-up innovations can build on 
the accumulated knowledge in a specific field of tech-
nology. These cumulative effects will also act as entry 
barriers and can secure a long-term lead in a specific 
technology.
History abounds with examples of such cumulative tech-
nological advantages, e.g. in aircraft, space and defence 
technologies (USA), microelectronic household applica-
tions (Japan) and mechanical engineering (Germany). 
Cumulative technological advantages can be reinforced 
by adapting education, innovation, production and pol-
icy systems to the specific needs of the leading technol-
ogy sector. While such adaptations support the further 
advancement of these technologies, they may also be 
a source of lock-in effects and path dependence which 
can make it more difficult to adjust to new upcoming 
technologies.
4.4.  Public policy in support of key enabling 
technologies and applications
As pointed out above, turning key enabling technolo-
gies into commercial applications typically requires 
close interaction between fundamental research, 
which is often publicly funded and carried out by 
universities or research organisations, and industrial 
innovation and R & D. There is a need for exchange of 
knowledge between these two sectors and for incen-
tives for researchers in the public sector to engage 
actively in technology transfer. There is also a need for 
firms to possess the right technological skills to absorb 
and apply the new technologies, including the abil-
ity to conduct in-house R & D and the organisational 
skills to manage innovation processes and integrate 
new technologies into existing business practices. A 
third need is for an adequate regulatory framework to 
be developed and adapted in parallel with the tech-
nological progress achieved, in order to foster com-
mercialisation of applications. Interaction between the 
developers of new technologies and the designers of 
the regulatory framework will facilitate an innovation-
oriented regulatory framework. Being the first to intro-
duce such a framework can also generate a competi-
tive advantage.
Key enabling technologies play a crucial part in accel-
erating technical progress. In general, applying them 
will enable producers to use labour, capital, energy and 
other inputs more efficiently. It is important to stress that 
unlike other drivers of technical progress — diffusion of 
existing technologies, improving skills through educa-
tion and training and learning from good practice — key 
enabling technologies are more likely to result in leaps in 
efficiency levels, particularly when their use affects many 
sections of the economy simultaneously. The case of 
information and communication technologies illustrates 
the point. The productivity growth generated by them 
was due mainly to their wide diffusion across many dif-
ferent industries, including sectors with traditionally low 
technology intensities (in terms of the amount of new 
technology used in production) such as retail or trans-
portation. In addition, the particularly strong productiv-
ity impact of ICT resulted from their network character-
istics. Productivity stemmed not only from a firm’s own 
use of ICT but also from the use by business partners 
(suppliers and customers) since ICT fostered more effi-
cient external business processes. Technologies exert-
ing less significant network effects are likely to result in 
lower economy-wide productivity gains.
However, ICT have also shown that there may be sub-
stantial time lags between the invention and first appli-
cation and the economic impact of a new technology. 
For many new technologies the most important appli-
cations may not be evident in the early stages of tech-
nology development. Potential applications typically 
emerge from the interaction of suppliers, producers and 
users of a new technology, through learning by using 
(Rosenberg, 1982) and from fierce competition among 
technology producers who are seeking competitive 
advantages by customising the new technology to the 
needs of users. More complex technologies tend to 
generate particularly high returns to adoption (Arthur, 
1989).
A preliminary conclusion is therefore that the scale of 
the effects on productivity from a key enabling technol-
ogy will depend on: (i) the speed and breadth of its dif-
fusion across sectors and users; (ii) the extent to which 
its use gives rise to network effects; and (iii) how mature 
it is, in terms of the various technological applications 
and innovative solutions developed in its wake.
A second dimension of the macroeconomic importance 
of key enabling technologies is that they can open up 
entirely new markets, or at least step up product qual-
ity in existing markets. Such industrial change is likely 
to involve higher levels of input-output relations since 
entirely new products on new markets and higher-qual-
ity products are likely to command higher output prices 
per unit. Opening up new markets can also help unlock 
additional demand and new resources for production, 
thereby increasing net output.135
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cesses and optical features that differ radically from those 
of their micro/macroscale counterparts. Similarly, many 
materials exhibit new characteristics as nanomaterials, 
adding to the variety of application areas and implying 
that nanotechnology can have a significant impact in 
every industry where materials are processed and used. 
These changes in properties and characteristics are at the 
heart of the innovative power of nanotechnology.
4.5.1.1.  Background and current state
Nanotechnology is a relatively young technology into 
which systematic research began in the 1960s. The 
original idea was to construct complex materials and 
devices out of single atoms (molecular nanotechnology) 
but since the 1990s all work related to nanostructures 
is regarded as being part of nanotechnology. Since the 
mid-1990s, nanotechnology research has been develop-
ing an increasing number of industrial applications, illus-
trated by the fast-growing number of nanotechnology 
patents (Figure 4.2) and by growing sales of products 
using nanomaterials or produced with the help of nano-
technological processes.
Figure 4.2 shows how the rapid growth in nanotechnol-
ogy patents in recent years is attributable to rising num-
bers of North American, east Asian and European appli-
cants (57) whereas the number of patent applications 
from the rest of the world remains low. The most active 
applicants from the three leading regions between 2000 
and 2007 were Hewlett-Packard (USA; 107 applications), 
Samsung (South Korea; 169 applications) and Commis-
sion à l’énergie atomique (France; 111 applications). Fur-
thermore, Figure 4.2 shows how North America (mainly 
the USA) has forged ahead since becoming the lead 
applicant region in 1992. It also shows how in recent 
years applications from east Asia (mainly Japan and 
South Korea) have overtaken European applications. 
This is made even clearer in Figure 4.3, in which the 
number of patent applications from the three leading 
regions is related to their GDP levels. It is clear that once 
the differences in GDP have been accounted for, North 
American and east Asian application intensities are very 
similar. European researchers, on the other hand, are 
falling behind and should, given Europe’s GDP, account 
for 50 % more patent applications in order to match the 
intensities of their North American and east Asian coun-
terparts.
Within Europe, German applicants account for most 
nanotechnology patent applications (34 %) at EPO/
PCT, followed by France (17 %), the UK (14 %) and the 
(57)  In this chapter Europe is defined as all EU Member States plus Albania, 
Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, 
Montenegro, Norway, San Marino, Serbia, Switzerland and the former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia; North America as Canada, Mexico and the USA; 
and east Asia as China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.
For these reasons, and because of the first-mover advan-
tage described above, it is vital to put in place a com-
prehensive and coherent public policy covering all areas 
from the funding of academic research and industrial 
R & D projects to cooperation and networking initiatives, 
public awareness measures, standardisation, promotion 
of venture capital supply and education and training 
(OECD, 2009a). Networks and clusters constitute a par-
ticularly important aspect of public policy. Clusters are 
important because they facilitate exchange between 
different scientific disciplines and fields of technology, 
as well as interaction among actors from public research 
and various industries. They also encourage knowledge 
spillovers and mutual learning, and provide a breeding 
ground for ventures commercialising new technologies 
(Enright, 2003; Keeble and Wilkinson, 1999; Sternberg, 
1996). The importance of clusters is further discussed in 
Section 4.7.7.
4.5.  Six key enabling technologies: history, 
current state, applications
This section describes briefly the six technologies that 
are the focus of this chapter, their current state of devel-
opment and how they may be applied. It neither repre-
sents a complete list of applications nor seeks to distin-
guish between current and future applications. It does 
however aim to give an impression of the importance 
of each technology as a generator of future prosperity 
and utility.
4.5.1.  Nanotechnology
Nanotechnology is a generic term for the design, manu-
facturing and application of structures, devices and sys-
tems for analysis and control on a molecular or atomic 
scale, defined as 100 nanometres (nm) or smaller. It can 
involve scaling down materials to a nanolevel (‘top-
down nanotech’) by means of physical techniques 
such as lithography, cutting, etching, electro-spinning 
or milling. For instance, this approach has enabled the 
construction of integrated circuits based on structures 
of 32 nm in semiconductor production. An alterna-
tive approach (‘bottom-up nanotech’) is to create new 
materials directly at a nanoscale, typically using physic-
al, chemical and biological methods such as depos-
ition, nanoparticle synthesis or liquid-phase processes. 
Controlled self-assembly of molecules and their macro-
structures based on the manipulation of individual 
atoms is a predicted extension of the latter approach 
and is expected to lead to the discovery of completely 
new dimensions of nanotechnology.
Nanoscale (≤ 100 nm) structures frequently possess elec-
trical and magnetic properties, surface and mechanical 
properties, stability, chemical processes, biological pro-136
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In relation to its GDP, however, Germany is not the main 
producer of nanotechnology patent applications in 
Europe. Switzerland (overrepresented in nanoanalytics 
and nanoelectronics) has by far the highest application 
intensity, followed by the Netherlands (overrepresented 
in nanoelectronics and nanomagnetics), with Germany 
in third place.
Netherlands (8 %) (Figure 4.4). German applications 
increased particularly fast from 1997 onwards and are 
overrepresented (in relation to Europe as a whole) in 
nanomaterials and nanoanalytics. It is interesting to 
note that in recent years applications from European 
countries that are not among the eight countries with 
the largest number of nanotechnology patent appli-
cations have increased markedly, indicating stronger 
efforts in nanotechnology in those countries.
Figure 4.2:   Number of nanotechnology patent applications (EPO/PCT) by region of applicant, 1981–2005
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Figure 4.3:   Nanotechnology patent application intensity (number of EPO/PCT patents per trillion of GDP 
at constant PPP US dollars), 1991–2005
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4.5.2.  Micro and nanoelectronics, including 
semiconductors
Micro and nanoelectronics refers to semiconductor 
components as well as highly miniaturised electronic 
subsystems and their integration in larger products 
and systems. Miniaturisation is the main technological 
driver, with several benefits in terms of cost reduction, 
faster propagation over shorter distances and, in the 
case of nanoelectronics, new and interesting proper-
ties at atomic and molecular levels. As pointed out in 
the previous subsection, semiconductor production 
has already mastered 32 nm structures in integrated cir-
cuits. Technical progress is expected to result in a further 
reduction of structural widths (BMBF, 2005) and the next 
step in semiconductor production will be to build 22 nm 
structures, expected to be achieved in 2011.
Recent advances in miniaturisation have meant that 
some of the latest microelectronics could in fact be 
called nanoelectronics as they are measured in nano-
metres. In a narrow sense though, nanoelectronics can 
be limited to techniques based on silicon and to a struc-
tural width of less than 100 nm, and in many cases nano-
electronics refers to structures so small that inter-atomic 
interactions and quantum mechanical properties need 
to be studied extensively (BMBF, 2002).
4.5.1.2.  Nanotechnology applications
By combining disciplines such as physics, chemistry 
and biology, nanotechnology applications cover a wide 
spectrum ranging from materials, electronics and 
chemicals to process engineering, transportation and 
medicine. Notwithstanding their enormous potential, 
most of the nanotechnological products and processes 
commercialised so far rely on a few nanomaterials such 
as carbon nanostructures, silver and gold nanoparticles 
and nanowires, and nanoscale metal oxides (PCAST, 
2008). By no means exhaustive, Table 4.1 nevertheless 
gives a flavour of the wide range of existing and future 
applications of nanotechnology.
It is evident from the examples in Table 4.1 that nano-
technology applications are relevant in a number of dif-
ferent sectors. It is therefore not surprising that it is the 
key enabling technology with the most links to other 
KETs; nanotechnology is in fact strongly linked to all the 
other five technologies in this chapter.
Figure 4.4:   Nanotechnology patent applications (EPO/PCT) by country, 1981–2005
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It is clear that east Asian applicants dominate the world 
market for patents and have done so since 2001, with 
North America trailing in second place and Europe 
in third. The number of patent applications from the 
rest of the world is very limited by comparison. The 
most active applicants from the three leading regions 
in the period 2000–07 were Infineon (Germany; 1 525 
applications), Tokyo Electronics (Japan; 1 498 applica-
tions) and Applied Materials (USA; 1 051 applications). 
It should however be noted that in east Asia both Mat-
sushita (Japan; 1 392 applications) and Samsung (South 
Korea; 1 077 applications) made more applications 
in that period than the leading North American appli-
4.5.2.1.  Background and current state
Although the first computer was invented in the 1940s 
and the principles behind mobile telephone communi-
cation have been known since the 1920s, microelectron-
ics dates back no further than 1958, with the discovery 
of the integrated circuit (BMBF, 2005). Following the 
invention in 1971 of the first microprocessor, successive 
waves of advances in miniaturisation and nanotech-
nology have led to ever-smaller, cheaper and more 
effective components and systems. This rapid growth is 
reflected in the number of patent applications shown in 
Figure 4.5.
Table 4.1: Examples of current and future nanotechnology applications, by industry
Industry Established 
nanoproducts
Recent market launch Prototype stage Concept stage
Chemicals Nanopowder
Nanostructured active
agents
Nanodispersions
Carbon nanotubes
Nano-polymer
composites
Hybrid composites
Nano porous foams
Switchable adhesives
Electro-spun
nanofibres
Self-healing materials
Self-organising
composites
Molecular machines
Electronics Silicon electronics
Nanoscale transistors
Polymer electronics
Nanodots/nanowires
Spintronics
CNT field emission
displays
MRAM memories
Phase-change
memory
MEMS memory
CNT data memory
CNT inter-connected
circuits
Nanojoining
Molecular electronics
Nanowires for electricity 
production
Spintronic logics
Orbitronics
Optics Ultra-precision optics
Anti-reflection layers
LED and diode lasers
Nanobeam x-ray
photochromics
Nanoresolution in
microscopes
OLED
2D photonic crystals
Waveguiding
EUV lithography
optics
Quantum-dot lasers
3D photonic crystals
Electrochromics
All-optical computing
Optical meta-
materials
Data transmission via
surface plasmons
Medicine,
Pharmaceuticals
Nanoparticles as
contrast media
Nanoscale drug
carriers
Nanomembranes for
dialysis
Nanoscale sunscreens
Tissue engineering
Nanostructured
hydroxylapatite as bone 
substitute
Quantum-dot markers
Nano cancer therapy
Nanodentistry
Skin-delivered
vaccines
Biocompatible
implants
Selective drug
carriers
Nanoprobes and
nanomarkers for 
molecular imaging
Tissue engineering
Antimicrobial planes
Artificial organs
through tissue 
engineering
Nano-engineered gels
for supporting nerve 
cell growth
Neuro-coupled
electronics for active 
implants
Environmental  
technologies
Nanostructured
catalysts
Nanomembranes for
sewerage
Anti-reflection layers
for solar cells
Nano-optimised
micro-fuel cells
Iron-nanoparticles for
groundwater sanitation
Nano-titanium oxide
for photo catalysis
Large-area polymer
solar cells
Nanosensorics for
environmental 
monitoring
Nano-catalysts for
hydrogen generation
Artificial
photosynthesis
Quantum-dot solar
cells
Nanoscale rust for
cleaning water
Automotive Nanostructured
coatings
Nanocoated diesel
injectors
Nanostructured
admixtures for tyres
Nanoparticles as
diesel additives
Nano-optimised
lithium-ion batteries
LED headlights
Anti-fog surfaces
Thin-film solar cells
for car roofs
Nano-optimised fuel
cells
Nano-adhesives in
production
Switchable, self-
healing coatings
Adaptive body shell
for lower air resistance
Textiles Nanoparticles for dirt
repellence
Nanosilver for
antibacterial textiles
Nanocontainers for
scent impregnation
Nano-titanium oxide
for UV protection
Aerogels for thermal
protection
Ceramic nanoparticles
for abrasion resistance
Phase-change
materials for active 
thermal regulation
Textile-integrated
OLEDs
Electrically
conductive textiles
Textile-integrated
sensorics/actorics 
for control of body 
functions
Textile-integrated
digital assistance 
systems
Source: Luther and Bachmann (2009), Gennesys (2009), background study.139
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nology (cf. Figure 4.4), except for a more prominent role 
played by Dutch applicants. Germany again dominates 
(41 %), followed by France (16 %), with the Netherlands 
and the UK in third place (12 % and 11 % respectively).
When differences in GDP are taken into consideration, 
Germany no longer leads in terms of application inten-
sity but is relegated to second place by the Netherlands, 
which exhibits much stronger application intensities 
in micro and nanoelectronics than its European peers, 
cant. Figure 4.5 also shows how east Asia (mainly Japan 
and South Korea) has increased its lead since 2001. The 
dominant position of east Asian applicants is made even 
clearer when related to GDP (see Figure 4.6). Microelec-
tronic patent application intensities in east Asia are 
more than twice as high as in North America or Europe, 
which follow the same stagnating pattern.
The European picture concerning micro and nanoelec-
tronic patent applications is similar to that of nanotech-
Figure 4.5:   Number of micro and nanoelectronics patent applications (EPO/PCT) by region of applicant, 
1981–2005
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Figure 4.6:   Micro and nanoelectronics patent application intensity (number of EPO/PCT  
patents per trillion of GDP at constant PPP US dollars), 1991–2005
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nological processes include various chemicals, plastics, 
biofuels, detergents, vitamins and enzymes. Industrial 
biotechnology is also used in the final stages of prod-
uction of textiles, leather and paper (BMBF, 2008). It is 
distinct from medical (‘red’) and agricultural (‘green’) 
biotechnology.
Industrial biotechnology competes with other produc-
tion methods, in particular chemical synthesis. It tends 
to be more environmentally friendly since it uses renew-
able raw materials such as vegetable oils and starch, and 
produces less harmful by-products and higher yields, 
all of which combine to reduce dependence on fos-
sil resources. However, biotechnological processes are 
not always less energy-intensive; they sometimes need 
considerably more energy than other processes. Even 
so, industrial biotechnology presents an opportunity to 
improve the quality of existing products and develop 
completely new products which cannot be produced 
by traditional synthetic methods and processes (OECD, 
2009c; OECD, 2009d; OECD, 2010).
4.5.3.1.  Background and current state
Ancient examples of the practical application of biotech-
nology — brewing beer, making wine and cheese and 
baking leavened bread, to name but a few — suggest 
it was developed in parallel with agriculture. However, 
it was only thanks to the scientific work of Louis Pasteur 
and his peers in the 19th and 20th centuries that the 
processes behind the old techniques could be explained 
and bettered, and new processes discovered. Mod-
ern biotechnology dates back to the early 1970s when 
notably in the area of x-ray, where it is overrepresented 
in comparison with Europe as a whole.
4.5.2.2.   Applications of micro and nanoelectronics including 
semiconductors
Traditionally, micro and nanoelectronic components 
and systems have been applied mainly in the ICT sec-
tor, in applications such as memories, displays and 
processors, as well as products enabling communica-
tion between devices or systems. In recent decades 
advances in miniaturisation have meant that micro 
and nanoelectronic applications have expanded into 
new sectors such as the automotive, medical and 
consumer goods sectors, with products ranging from 
sensors to toys being based on semiconductors (Con-
findustria, 2009). This expansion of micro and nano-
electronics into new sectors of application is set to 
continue.
Micro and nanoelectronic applications are often linked 
to one or more other key enabling technologies. The 
closest links are with nanotechnology, photonics and 
advanced manufacturing technologies.
4.5.3.  Industrial biotechnology
Industrial biotechnology, also known as white bio-
technology, means the use of microorganisms such as 
mould, yeast, bacteria and enzymes in industrial pro-
cesses to produce biochemicals, biomaterials and bio-
fuels. The many products manufactured using biotech-
Figure 4.7:   Micro and nanoelectronics patent applications (EPO/PCT) by country, 1981–2005
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cations coming from the rest of the world. The three 
leading biotechnology patent applicants in the period 
2000–07 were all European: BASF (Germany; 235 appli-
cations), Novozymes (Denmark; 159 applications) and 
Evonik Degussa (Germany; 136 applications), followed 
by DuPont and University of California (both US) with 
126 and 119 applications respectively. The leading east 
Asian applicants were all Japanese, led by Matsushita, 
but in terms of numbers did not come close to the lead-
ing European or North American applicants.
Patent application intensities, adjusted for differences 
in GDP, are depicted in Figure 4.9. It is evident how the 
slowdown in biotechnology patenting in Europe and 
North America since 2000/01 has enabled east Asian 
applicants to reach almost the same application inten-
sities as in North America.
In Europe, most biotechnology patent applications 
come from German applicants (Figure 4.10), particularly 
in the area of established biochemicals where German 
applications are overrepresented in relation to Europe 
as a whole. Another contributing factor behind Ger-
many’s present dominance is that the rate of German 
biotechnology applications almost doubled in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s, from around 110 a year to over 
200. The UK and France, both of which are overrepre-
sented in applications concerning enzymes, have 12 % 
each of all European EPO/PCT applications, followed by 
the Netherlands with 9 % on the back of a particularly 
high number of applications in fermentation. Applica-
tions from European countries that are not among the 
top eight countries represent around 20 % of all Euro-
pean EPO/PCT applications.
recombinant DNA technology was first developed (Euro-
pean Commission, 2007b). Recent advances in genome 
research and microbiology have enabled more targeted 
use of molecular biology, for instance in the discovery 
of enzymes as biocatalysts or using bacteria to produce 
medical substances (BMBF, 2008). As a result the use of 
enzymes for the production of foods, detergents, tex-
tiles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and pulp and paper is 
well established.
The importance of industrial biotechnology differs 
across industries. In basic chemicals only 1.5 % is based 
on biotechnology. In active pharmaceutical ingredi-
ents the share of biotechnology sales exceeds 18 % 
(OECD, 2009d). Biotechnology-based polymers are 
the most important biomaterials and are produced in 
quantities estimated at between 300 000 and 600 000 
tonnes per year but still represent less than 1 % of 
total polymer production (European Commission, 
2007b; OECD, 2009c). In pulp and paper on the other 
hand, biotechnological applications account for 10 %, 
in detergents 30 % and in some food production pro-
cesses (e.g. some fruit juices) up to 100 % (European 
Commission, 2007b).
Figure 4.8 shows the increase in biotechnology pat-
ent applications from 1981 to 2005 and how European 
and North American applicants have dominated in 
the past but suffered from a slowdown in patenting 
activity in the early years of the new century, allowing 
east Asian applicants to close the gap to some extent. 
European and North American applicants account for 
around 35 % each of all biotechnology applications, 
with east Asia at 23 % and the remaining 7 % of appli-
Figure 4.8:   Number of biotechnology patent applications (EPO/PCT) by region of applicant, 1981–2005
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4.5.3.2.  Industrial biotechnology applications
Established applications such as using enzymes in the 
production of foodstuffs, detergents, textiles, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals and other products have already been 
mentioned in the previous subsection, as have fermen-
tation and basic chemicals. More recent applications 
of industrial biotechnology include the use of waste 
from farming or forestry for the production of biochem-
icals and biofuels (Confindustria, 2009). Biopolymers, 
whether produced from waste or otherwise, are still in 
When adjusting the data in Figure 4.10 for GDP differ-
ences, however, it emerges that Germany has only the 
fourth highest patent application intensity in industrial 
biotechnology, behind Switzerland, Denmark and the 
Netherlands.
Figure 4.9:   Biotechnology patent application intensity (number of EPO/PCT patents  
per trillion of GDP at constant PPP US dollars), 1991–2005
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Figure 4.10:   Biotechnology patent applications (EPO/PCT) by country, 1981–2005
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communication was created and the term photonics was 
coined (Jahns, 2001; European Commission, 2008).
4.5.4.1.  Background and current state
Though photonics is a relatively young technology 
into which systematic research began in the 1960s, its 
foundation was the discovery by Einstein that light is 
composed of indivisible, energy-rich elementary units 
(quanta) which we now call photons. Developments 
in several other sciences from the 1960s on paved the 
way for rapid advances in photonics in recent dec-
ades, as illustrated by the increasing number of patent 
applications shown in Figure 4.11. It is interesting to 
note that until 2001 the three regions from which most 
photonics patent applications came followed more 
or less the same pattern and their shares of the total 
number of applications were very similar, whereas from 
2001 to 2005 the numbers levelled out in Europe and 
North America but continued to rise in east Asia, whose 
share of total EPO/PCT applications in photonics conse-
quently rose to 42 %, compared to 29 % for Europe and 
27 % for North America.
The most active applicants from the three leading 
regions in the period 2000–07 were Samsung (South 
Korea; 1 029 applications), Osram and its owners 
Siemens (Germany; 964 applications), Matsushita (Japan; 
750 applications) and 3M (USA; 748 applications).
The dominance of east Asian applicants over European 
and North American applicants is even more striking when 
differences in GDP are taken into account. Patent applica-
an early development phase (European Commission, 
2007b). Examples include biopolymers based on lactic 
acid, polyhydroxyalkanoates, bio-propanediol and bio-
acrylamide. In biofuels, the bioethanol and biodiesel 
industries are in a similar state of technological devel-
opment. Another relatively new application is bioreme-
diation of contaminated water, soil, air and solid waste, 
using mainly microorganisms to transform contamin-
ations into less harmful substances. Even less developed 
is the new discipline of synthetic biology using DNA 
synthesis and genetic engineering. Its potential applica-
tions include energy production, bioremediation, smart 
materials, biomaterials and sensors and detection sys-
tems (European Commission, 2007b).
There are close links between many applications of 
industrial biotechnology and other key enabling tech-
nologies, notably nanotechnology and advanced mater-
ials.
4.5.4.  Photonics
Photonics is the science and technology of generat-
ing, detecting and managing light. It is defined in Jahns 
(2001) as the use of photons as carriers of energy and 
information, thereby in a way gradually assuming the 
role previously played by electrical and electronic pro-
cesses. It is a cross-sectoral technology, bringing together 
the disciplines of physics, nanotechnology, materials sci-
ence, biotechnology, chemistry and electrical engineer-
ing (European Commission, 2008). With the develop-
ment in the 1960s of electronics, laser technology and 
fibre optics, the technological environment for optical 
Figure 4.11:   Number of photonics patents (EPO/PCT) by region of applicant, 1981–2005
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around 20 % more patent applications in relation to 
their GDP than Germany.
In relation to the European average, German patent 
applications are overrepresented in solar cells, an area 
where French and UK applicants are underrepresented. 
The latter are instead overrepresented in laser applica-
tions and optical devices (the UK also in lighting). Appli-
cants from the Netherlands are overrepresented in pat-
ent applications concerning lighting.
tion intensities are almost twice as high in east Asia (mainly 
Japan and South Korea) as in Europe and North America.
In Europe as well as globally, Germany has a very strong 
position in terms of EPO/PCT applications. Figure 4.13 
illustrates the dominance of German applicants and 
how far away it has moved from France, the UK and the 
Netherlands. However, Germany has only the third high-
est patenting intensity when GDP is factored in: appli-
cants from the Netherlands and Switzerland submitted 
Figure 4.12:   Photonics patent application intensity (number of EPO/PCT patents per trillion of GDP  
at constant PPP US dollars), 1991–2005
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Figure 4.13:   Photonics patent applications (EPO/PCT) by country, 1981–2005
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efficiently, or the production of cleaner energy (solar 
cells). Although by no means exhaustive, Table 4.2 gives 
an idea of the range of existing and future applications 
of photonics.
As has been made clear in the preceding subsection, 
there are close connections between photonics and 
most other key enabling technologies, in particular nano-
technology, micro and nanoelectronics including semi-
conductors, biotechnology and advanced manufactur-
ing technologies.
4.5.4.2.  Photonics applications
By combining disciplines such as physics, nanotechnol-
ogy, materials science, biotechnology, chemistry and 
electrical engineering, applications of photonics cover 
a variety of sectors including information processing, 
communication, imaging, lighting, displays, manu-
facturing, life sciences and healthcare and safety and 
security (European Commission, 2008). Its exceptional 
properties — which include being focusable, travelling 
at the speed of light and combining ultra-short pulses 
with high power — make it a key enabling technology 
to consider when developing new applications. Photon-
ics can furthermore be considered a green technology 
insofar as it enables conventional applications (such as 
lighting, data communication) to be developed more 
Table 4.2: Examples of current and future photonics applications, by field of industry
Field of technology  Examples of applications
Production technology Laser materials processing systems 
lithography systems (IC, FPD, mask)
Lasers for production technology objective 
lenses for wafer steppers
Optical measurement and machine 
vision
Machine vision systems and components 
Spectrometers and spectrometer modules 
Binary sensors
Measurement systems for:
— semiconductor industry
— optical communications
— other applications
Medical technology and life sciences Lenses for eyeglasses and contact lenses 
Laser systems for medical surgery, therapy 
and cosmetics
Endoscope systems
Microscopes and surgical microscopes
Medical imaging systems (only photonics-
based systems)
Ophthalmic and other in vivo diagnostic 
systems
Point of care diagnostic systems
Systems for in vitro diagnostics, 
pharmaceutical and biotech R & D
Data communication Optical transmission, networking and coding 
systems for core and access networks
Components for optical networking systems
IT: consumer electronics, office 
automation, printing
Optical disk drives
Laser printers and copiers, PODs, fax and 
MFPs
Digital cameras and camcorders
Scanners
Barcode scanners
Systems for commercial printing
Lasers for IT
Sensors (CCD, CMOS)
Optical computing
Terahertz systems in photonics
Lighting Lamps
LEDs
OLEDs
Displays LCD displays
Plasma displays
OLEDs and other displays
Projection displays
Display glass and liquid crystals
Solar energy Solar cells (organic and inorganic) Solar modules (organic and inorganic)
Security, safety and defence 
photonics
Vision and imaging systems, including 
periscopic sights
Infrared and night vision systems
Ranging systems
Munition/missile guiding systems
Military space surveillance systems
Avionics displays
Image sensors
Lasers
Terahertz systems
Optical systems and components Optical components and optical glass
optical systems (‘classical’ optical systems)
Optical and optoelectronic systems
Source: Photonics21 (2007), background study, Commission services.146
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The recently renewed interest in advanced materi-
als is due to the latest materials having application 
rates nearly three times higher than previous genera-
tions of materials. It has been estimated that the eight 
most important materials entering the market in the 
first seven decades of the 20th century — electromet-
als, synthetic ammonia, nylon, styrene, etc. — had an 
average of 2.7 applications per material, whereas the 
14 latest advanced materials (including nanocrystals, 
nanocomposites, nanotubes and organic electronic 
materials) have on average 8.6 applications per material 
(Moskowitz, 2009).
Figure 4.14 shows the increase in patent applications in 
advanced materials in recent decades, illustrating the 
growing number of applications enabled by continued 
innovation. The graphs are very similar to those in Fig-
ure 4.11 for photonics in the sense that the European 
and North American numbers are very similar and have 
stagnated in the early years of the 21st century, whereas 
east Asian applications have continued to increase and 
resulted in east Asia becoming the primary source of 
EPO/PCT patent applications in advanced materials, with 
37 % of all applications. Even so, the most active appli-
cants in the period 2000–07 were all European or North 
American: BASF (Germany; 1 410 applications), DuPont 
(USA; 1 303 applications), Dow (USA; 1 170 applications), 
3M (USA; 1 101 applications), Evonik Degussa (Germany; 
885 applications), Arkema (France; 796 applications) and 
Bayer (Germany; 646 applications). The most active east 
Asian applicant was Fujifilm (Japan) with 602 EPO/PCT 
patent applications.
The differences between the three main regions become 
even more evident when GDP is taken into account, 
as shown in Figure 4.15 below. It also shows that the 
increase in the number of European and North Ameri-
can patent applications from 1991 to 2005 was similar 
to their respective GDP increases, leaving the patent 
application intensity more or less constant, whereas east 
Asian applications increased faster than the rate of GDP 
growth.
4.5.5.  Advanced materials
The meaning of advanced materials has shifted over 
time and nowadays tends to include materials pos-
sessing new and different types of internal structures 
and exhibiting innovative properties and higher added 
value, as a result of modifying and improving structures 
and properties (Moskowitz, 2009). The importance of 
advanced materials lies in their potential applications 
in various sectors such as aerospace, construction 
and healthcare, and the reduction in costs, resource 
consumption and environmental impact as well as 
improved performance often associated with the sub-
stitution of existing materials. More efficient use of 
resources and smaller environmental impact are espe-
cially important aspects for Europe and other parts of 
the world where natural resources are scarce (Confind-
ustria, 2009).
4.5.5.1.  Background and current state
Efforts to improve the material base for the manufac-
ture of goods, allowing for higher product quality and 
new product characteristics, go back a very long way in 
human history. In modern times, the focus was initially 
on improving metals by introducing new alloys with 
superior performance characteristics (such as steel) and 
exploring the industrial applicability of new metals (such 
as aluminium). In addition, a number of innovations took 
place in the field of non-metallic materials such as glass, 
ceramics and concrete. In the late 19th century the focus 
shifted to chemicals and a large number of synthetic 
materials were invented as a result. In the 20th century 
the focus shifted again and most efforts went into build-
ing up so-called ‘macrostructures’ or ‘superpolymers’ by 
linking together molecular units into super-long chains 
(e.g. polyethylene, styrene, Teflon) possessing desirable 
physical and chemical properties (Moskowitz, 2009). 
The latest shift took place in the late 1970s and involved 
customisation of the atomic structure of materials by 
creating, manipulating and reconfiguring molecular or 
atomic units within a wide range of material categories. 
Despite the shifts in priorities over time, material innov-
ations still occur along all the lines mentioned above.147
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represented in high-performance materials, alloys and 
energy-efficient materials. UK applicants, which tend to 
submit more applications in layered materials, energy-
efficient materials and nanomaterials than the European 
average, are responsible for 10 % of all European EPO/
PCT applications concerning advanced materials.
Applicants from Germany account for almost half of all 
European patent applications in advanced materials 
and, as Figure 4.16 suggests, Germany strengthened 
its position in recent decades. In relation to Europe as 
a whole, German applicants are overrepresented in 
macroscaled materials. French applicants account for 
around 14 % of all European applications and are over-
Figure 4.14:   Number of advanced materials patent applications (EPO/PCT) by region of applicant, 
1981–2005
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Figure 4.15:   Advanced materials patent application intensity (number of EPO/PCT patents per trillion of 
GDP at constant PPP US dollars), 1991–2005
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It is clear that advanced materials are essential for the 
further development of many other key enabling tech-
nologies, in particular nanotechnology, micro and nano-
electronics including semiconductors, and photonics.
4.5.6.  Advanced manufacturing technologies
Advanced manufacturing technologies comprise all 
technologies that significantly increase speed, decrease 
costs or materials consumption and improve operating 
precision as well as environmental aspects such as waste 
and pollution from manufacturing processes. They are 
not a single technology but a combination of different 
technologies and practices that aim at improving manu-
facturing processes. Material engineering technologies 
(including cutting, knitting, turning, forming, pressing, 
chipping), electronic and computing technologies, 
measuring technologies (including optical and chem-
ical technologies), transportation technologies and 
other logistic technologies are some of the many tech-
nologies that come together to form advanced manu-
facturing technologies.
The importance of promoting the development of 
advanced manufacturing technologies was highlighted 
in all four scenarios presented in FutMan (2003) and 
a recently launched US study on the creation of new 
industries through science, technology and innovation 
is expected to pay particular attention to advanced 
manufacturing technologies (STPI, 2010).
4.5.5.2.  Advanced materials applications
Advanced materials, being a true general purpose tech-
nology, can be applied widely across industries as well 
as in service sectors such as health, software, architec-
ture and construction, telecommunication and engin-
eering services. Moreover, thanks to recent advances 
and new priorities, the average number of applications 
per new advanced material is now three times higher 
than in previous decades (Moskowitz, 2009).
The most important application areas for advanced 
materials change over time due to shifting priorities and 
scientific progress. Right now semiconductors, automo-
tive and aircraft, energy and environment, medicine and 
health, construction and housing and various process 
technologies (including mechanical engineering and 
automation, packaging and logistics, textiles and cloth-
ing) are the main application areas. Other major applica-
tions are in defence and security.
Turning to future applications, Schumacher et al. (2007) 
have surveyed technological foresight studies and have 
concluded that the main priority will be to develop new 
applications of advanced materials in medicine, ICT and 
entertainment, textiles and smart materials. Another pri-
ority concerns security, where new applications such as 
nanomaterials and smart materials for protection, iden-
tity authentication and alarm systems will be needed. A 
third priority concerns energy and addresses applica-
tions such as solar materials, fuel cells and materials for 
energy efficiency.
Figure 4.16:   Advanced materials patent applications (EPO/PCT) by country, 1981–2005
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tions in all three main regions over the last three dec-
ades reflects the growing importance manufacturing 
firms attach to advanced manufacturing technologies 
and the opportunities that advances in other fields have 
offered in recent years.
It is also clear from Figure 4.17 that European applicants 
dominate, representing nearly half of all EPO/PCT appli-
cations. North American applications represent less than 
30 % of the total and east Asian applications around 
20 %. The four leading EPO/PCT applicants in the world 
in the period 2000–07 were all from Europe: Siemens 
(Germany; 1 847 applications), Robert Bosch (Germany; 
1 348 applications), Continental (Germany; 635 applica-
tions) and Endress+Hauser (Switzerland; 589 applica-
tions), followed by Fanuc (Japan; 574 applications) and 
Honeywell (USA; 573 applications).
Europe is where most EPO/PCT applications originate 
even after differences in GDP have been factored in, 
as Figure 4.18 illustrates. The application intensities of 
North America and east Asia are very similar, whereas 
the European application intensity has always been 
more than 50 % higher.
Germany is by far the most active European country in 
terms of EPO/PCT applications, with almost half of all 
European patent applications in advanced manufactur-
ing technologies, due mainly to Germany’s strong per-
formance in tools, measuring and control. As Figure 4.19 
shows, there was a particularly strong increase in Ger-
man patent applications from 1993 to 2000, and again 
from 2002 onwards, which was not replicated in other 
European countries. French applicants account for 14 % 
4.5.6.1.  Background and current state
It could be argued that advanced manufacturing tech-
nologies are the oldest key enabling technology known 
to man, as the never-ending quest to do things in 
a better way is as old as human civilisation. This quest 
is usually rewarded in incremental steps, in the form of 
innovations and method improvements, but disruptive 
changes do occur from time to time, usually as a result 
of a new general purpose technology emerging. (Exam-
ples include the steam engine, electrical motor, and 
computing.) Another peculiarity of advanced manu-
facturing technologies is that progress and innovation 
stem not only from technology producers but also from 
the users. In fact, in some specialised manufacturing 
industries there are no external providers of advanced 
manufacturing technologies, forcing manufactur-
ing firms to develop on their own the skills needed to 
advance manufacturing methods.
In recent decades there has been a clear trend away 
from traditional engineering technologies to the inte-
gration of computer technology into manufacturing 
processes and to enabling the vertical integration of 
planning, engineering design, control, production and 
distribution processes. Another trend, automation, 
allows increasingly complex manufacturing processes to 
be performed without any manual intervention. Robot-
ics, automation technologies and computer-integrated 
manufacturing are the keywords in this context.
Figure 4.17 shows the number of EPO/PCT patent appli-
cations over time from Europe, North America, east Asia 
and the rest of the world. The increase in patent applica-
Figure 4.17:   Number of advanced manufacturing technology patent applications (EPO/PCT)  
by region of applicant, 1981–2005
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cations of advanced manufacturing technologies are 
in robotics, computer-assisted design and computer-
integrated manufacturing. Furthermore, robots are 
expected to become much more flexible and easy to use 
over the next few years, paving the way for a new era of 
robotics, improving the quality of life by delivering effi-
cient services and, in so doing, combating an expected 
shortage of skilled labour of up to 6 million people by 
2020. In addition, high labour costs are a particularly 
compelling reason for European manufacturing firms 
and UK applicants for 10 % of all European patent appli-
cations. When adjusted for differences in GDP the appli-
cation intensities of Germany and Switzerland are very 
similar, the Swiss intensity being slightly higher.
4.5.6.2.  Applications of advanced manufacturing technologies
Given the current focus on increased automation and 
integration of computers, it is natural that most appli-
Figure 4.18:   Advanced manufacturing technology patent application intensity  
(number of EPO/PCT patents per trillion of GDP at constant PPP US dollars), 1991–2005
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Figure 4.19:   Advanced manufacturing patent applications (EPO/PCT) by country, 1981–2005
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gies shows that many of the most important applica-
tion areas were not envisaged at the early stages of 
technological development but emerged later through 
interaction of users and producers, and sometimes just 
by chance.
Furthermore, products based on key enabling technolo-
gies often serve as inputs into more complex products. 
For instance, nanomaterials may be used in a wide var-
iety of manufactured products from different industries. 
Semiconductors can be applied to a range of instru-
ments, machinery and equipment. Biotechnologically 
produced enzymes may be found in a number of food 
or chemical products. New photonic applications such 
as OLED displays can be used in electronic, automotive 
and telecommunication devices. Advanced materials 
and advanced manufacturing technologies can be used 
to produce virtually any kind of commodity. As a conse-
quence market potential estimates will vary depending 
on the underlying definition of key enabling technolo-
gies (as there is no universally accepted definition or 
agreed list) and also depending on which sections of 
a value added chain are considered.
All this complicates any attempts to predict future 
market development and often results in poor fore-
casts. Instead of trying to do this, the background study 
contains several detailed compilations of existing esti-
mations of future market volumes (of which there are 
many, not always pointing in the same direction). The 
results in terms of current and future market sizes as well 
as implied annual growth rates are set out in Table 4.3. 
(More detailed tables can be found in the background 
study.)
Bearing in mind the above caveats, as well as the fact 
that the six technologies in Table 4.3 have no intrinsic 
market value unless they can be commercialised in the 
form of marketable products for which there will be 
a demand, it is possible to get a rough idea of the size 
of the current and future market for applications of key 
enabling technologies by adding the volumes of the six 
technologies. (Some market volumes are likely to be 
to use robots more in the interest of productivity and 
competitiveness. The miniaturisation of robotic tech-
nologies and the development of sophisticated sensors 
are important trends in this context as they will enable 
robots to be used in small-batch production facilities. 
Similarly, new developments in robotic technologies 
mean that they can assist in operations under hazard-
ous conditions, for example in space, deep sea or mining 
and mineral extraction.
Another feature of applications of advanced manufac-
turing technologies is the emergence of multifunctional 
‘platform technologies’ with a range of manufacturing 
applications. These include technologies such as plas-
tic electronics, silicon design, renewable chemicals and 
carbon fibre composites capable of replacing various 
metals. Such platform technologies offer the potential 
for substantial economic opportunities.
Advanced manufacturing technologies are linked to 
most other key enabling technologies. In particular, 
progress made in advanced materials, microelectron-
ics, biotechnology and nanotechnology will profoundly 
affect manufacturing and help manufacturers master 
the challenges ahead (FutMan, 2003), while STPI (2010) 
refers specifically to photonics, nanomaterials and 
industrial biotechnology as having a crucial impact on 
advanced manufacturing technologies.
4.6.  Market potentials
Estimating market potentials is notoriously risky, even 
in the case of established products on stable markets. 
For key enabling technologies it is even more difficult 
as the technologies and products for which market 
potentials are estimated often do not yet exist on the 
market. Most of the potential applications are at a pre-
commercial or even conceptual stage, driven by tech-
nological opportunities rather than the likely prefer-
ences of users. Demand is largely unknown and it may 
well be that there will be no market at all for some of 
the concepts. Historical experience with new technolo-
Table 4.3: Estimated global market potentials of key enabling technologies
Current market size  
(around 2006–08; USD )
Expected size in 2015  
(around 2012–15; USD )
Expected compound  
annual growth rate
lower bound upper bound lower bound upper bound lower bound upper bound
Nanotechnology 12 bn 150 bn 27 bn 3 100 bn 16 % 46 %
Micro and nanoelectronics 250 bn 300 bn 350 bn 5 % 13 %
Industrial biotechnology 90 bn 125 bn 150 bn 6 % 9 %
Photonics 230 bn 480 bn 8 %
Advanced materials 100 bn 150 bn 6 %
Advanced manufacturing 
technologies
150 bn 200 bn 5 %
Source: Background study, Confindustria (2009).152
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technologies often requires close interaction between 
their producers and users, taking into account the spe-
cific needs of those users. Examples of indirect innov-
ation effects of key enabling technologies range from 
medicine to environmental technologies.
4.7.  European competitiveness by subsector
Analysing Europe’s international competitiveness in 
key enabling technologies is not a straightforward 
exercise as there are no data on sales, costs, prices or 
profitability for the type of pre-market products, or in 
some cases mere concepts or not even conceptual-
ised ideas, with which this chapter deals. One possible 
approach to take is to base the competitiveness ana-
lysis on patent data, using patent applications within 
a particular technology as a proxy for the competi-
tiveness of an applicant in that technology. However, 
using patent data for analysis is potentially more prob-
lematic than using such data for illustration purposes, 
as in Section 4.5. Potential pitfalls range from defin-
ition problems — assigning classification codes to the 
right technology, making sure that no relevant classifi-
cation code is left unassigned while keeping to a min-
imum the number of cases in which classification 
codes are assigned to more than one technology — 
via the skewed value distribution of patents (few 
patents are valuable and most are economically ir-
relevant) to the fundamental question of whether 
the number of patent applications is a good proxy for 
competitiveness or not. An illustration of the latter 
question is given in PCAST (2010), which notes that 
even though the USA is the world’s leading producer 
of nanotechnology patents, in terms of scientific pub-
lications in the field of nanotechnology it has been 
second to the EU since 1995 and has recently been 
surpassed by China as well.
The arguments for and against patent analysis are set 
out in the background study, which also contains an 
explanation of the methodology used to assign patent 
classification codes to technologies, as well as several 
examples of the effect on results of using data on pat-
ent applications made at the European Patent Office 
(EPO), the US Patent and Trademark Office or the Jap-
anese Patent Office or filed at all three patent offices 
jointly.
The analysis in this section will be based on applications 
made at the EPO or under the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(here referred to as EPO/PCT applications), bearing 
in mind that the data are probably biased in favour of 
European applicants and therefore likely to exaggerate 
Europe’s strengths. EPO/PCT applications are, however, 
preferred as they are likely to represent greater eco-
nomic value since they are more expensive than appli-
cations made at a single patent office.
counted twice, for instance the market for nanomater-
ial applications.) Such an exercise results in a current 
market volume of USD 830 billion to USD 970 billion 
which is projected to grow to between USD 1.3 trillion 
and USD 4.4 trillion around 2015. The spread of the 
latter interval reflects genuine uncertainty and is pre-
dominantly due to widely differing expectations about 
the future market for nanotechnology applications, 
which in a cautious scenario is expected to more than 
double from USD 12 billion to USD 27 billion and in 
the most optimistic scenario to grow by 2 000 %, from 
USD 150 billion to USD 3 100 billion. These differences 
reflect not only different levels of optimism and uncer-
tainty but also the lack of definitions of key enabling 
technologies. A case in point is the lower estimate of 
the current market volume for nanotechnology applica-
tions, which is clearly based on a much more restrictive 
definition of nanotechnology than the higher estimate 
of USD 150 billion.
It is interesting to note that only two markets, 
for nanotechnology and photonics applications, 
are  expected  to  outperform  the  overall  mar-
ket for goods. In the case of advanced materi-
als and advanced manu  facturing technologies, the 
market for applications is expected to grow by 5 % 
to 6 % per year, similar to the expected medium-term 
growth rate for the goods market as a whole, and in 
a conservative scen  ario this also applies to industrial 
biotechnology and micro and nanoelectronics includ-
ing semiconductors. At least as regards advanced 
materials and advanced manufacturing technologies, 
substitution effects may be part of the explanation for 
the seemingly low growth rates.
Market volumes and growing demand should not 
however be the main drivers for a policy on key enab-
ling technologies. Growth in market volumes for 
a particular technology says little about the effects on 
macroeconomic net growth. Although key enabling 
technologies make it possible to develop entirely 
new applications in many fields of manufacturing 
and help to establish new markets, many of the new 
applications will result in demand shifts between sec-
tors and markets and cause declining demand in sec-
tors less affected by such technologies. Policies should 
therefore focus on stimulating the productivity and 
innovation impacts of key enabling technologies, 
even though such impacts are difficult to quantify. 
Productivity impacts tend to be higher the faster the 
technologies diffuse across industries and the higher 
the number of different industries in which they are 
applied. Innovation impacts can be manifold and are 
not limited to technology producers. Key enabling 
technologies can stimulate product and process innov-
ation in several sectors, including innovative applica-
tions beyond the horizon of technology producers. 
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4.7.1.  Nanotechnology
European applicants accounted for one in four EPO/
PCT nanotechnology patent applications in 2005, com-
pared to 39 % for North America and 30 % for east Asia. 
These aggregate figures can be subdivided into nano-
structures, nanomagnetics, nanoanalytics, nano-optics, 
nanomaterials, nanoelectronics and nanobiotechnol-
ogy. The share of EPO/PCT applications for each of these 
fields is shown in Figure 4.21, for the three main regions 
and for the rest of the world. It is clear that in most of 
the fields North America accounts for more applications 
than Europe or east Asia. Europe’s strength is in nano-
biotechnology and its weakest fields are nanoanalytics 
and nano-optics. In all seven fields Europe is behind one 
or both of the other main regions in terms of EPO/PCT 
applications.
In Europe there are more than 240 nanotechnology 
research centres and around 800 companies specialis-
ing in nanotechnology research (Afsset, 2008; Conseil 
économique et social, 2008). Both figures are slightly 
higher than the corresponding US numbers. In terms 
of its research base Europe has a particularly strong 
pos  ition in nanomaterials, nano-optics and nanobio-
technology, whereas its position in nanoelectronics, 
nanoanalytics and nanomagnetics is less prominent. 
In 2008 public funding for European nanotechnol-
ogy research amounted to USD 2.6 billion, ahead of 
the US (USD 1.9 billion) and comparable to east Asia 
(USD 2.8 billion), but private investment in nanotech-
nology research fell short in Europe, at USD 1.7 billion 
compared to USD 2.7 billion to 2.8 billion in the US and 
east Asia (Confindustria, 2009; PCAST, 2010).
As illustrated in Figures 4.2, 4.5, 4.8, 4.11, 4.14 and 
4.17, patent applications from Europe have generally 
increased in tandem with applications from the rest of 
the world, enabling Europe to more or less hold on to its 
share of overall applications in each of the six technolo-
gies. As Figure 4.20 shows, the European share of all EPO/
PCT applications is particularly high in advanced manu-
facturing technologies and industrial biotechnology but 
lower in micro and nanoelectronics owing to a prepon-
derance of applications from east Asia in recent years.
Across all six technologies, German applicants make 
the single most important contribution to the European 
share, with more than 43 % of all European applications 
being made by German applicants, followed by France 
(15 %) and the UK (11 %).
Assuming that the shares indicated in Figure 4.20 
remain stable at their 2005 levels and that they can 
serve as proxies for market share, combining them 
with the global market volume estimations in Table 4.3 
gives a rough idea of the expected contribution of the 
technologies to the European economy around 2015. 
In the conservative scenario in Table 4.3, the market 
for European products applying key enabling tech-
nologies could be worth USD 400 billion, or 31 % of the 
USD 1.3 trillion world market. In the more optimistic 
scenario the market value for Europe would be consid-
erably higher, at USD 1.2 trillion, or 27 % of the world 
market of USD 4.4 trillion.
In the following subsections patent analysis and cluster 
analysis will be used to explore each of the six technolo-
gies in greater detail.
Figure 4.20:   European share (%) of total patent applications (EPO/PCT), 1991–2005
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semiconductors is far greater than the market volume of 
the other five segments combined.
As Figure 4.22 demonstrates, European applicants 
dominate the market for devices patents but are 
weaker in bonds/crystals and semiconductors. It is strik-
ing that east Asian applicants made almost half of all 
EPO/PCT applications in the important semiconductor 
field.
4.7.2.  Micro and nanoelectronics, including 
semiconductors
In 2005, European applicants accounted for 22 % of all 
EPO/PCT patent applications in micro and nanoelectron-
ics, compared to 30 % for North America and 46 % for 
east Asia. The applications can be divided into semicon-
ductors, computing, measurement, x-ray, bonds and 
crystals and electronic devices. The market volume for 
Figure 4.21:   Composition of nanotechnology patent applications (EPO/PCT) in 2005
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Figure 4.22:   Composition of patent applications (EPO/PCT) in micro and nanoelectronics including 
semiconductors in 2005 (in %)
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Figure 4.23 confirms Europe’s strong position in all four 
fields, notably in fermentation. In enzymes and other 
enzyme-using processes North American applicants are 
about as active as their European counterparts.
4.7.4.  Photonics
As in the case of micro and nanoelectronics, photonics 
is a key enabling technology in which east Asia has left 
Europe and North America behind in terms of patent 
applications. In 2005 European applicants accounted 
for 29 % of all EPO/PCT applications in photonics, North 
American applicants for 27 % and east Asian appli-
cants for 42 %. Even so, European producers maintain 
a strong position in many photonics applications such 
as data communication, healthcare, lighting (includ-
ing inorganic and organic LEDs), solar cells, safety and 
security and laser-assisted manufacturing. It is estimated 
that there are around 5 000 photonics companies in the 
EU, mostly SMEs, employing around 300 000 people 
directly (Photonics21). In addition, the jobs of more than 
2 million employees in the EU manufacturing sector 
depend directly on photonics products.
Photonics can be categorised as solar technology, light-
ing, laser and optical devices. Figure 4.24 shows the 
shares of EPO/PCT patent applications in each category, 
and it is clear that European applicants are strongest in 
solar technology. The largest field in photonics, how-
ever, is optical devices, where Europe is underrepre-
sented in terms of patent applications.
Returning to the aggregate level, Europe attracted only 
10 % of overall investment in micro and nanoelectronics 
in 2007, compared to 48 % in east Asia (Confindustria, 
2009).
4.7.3.  Industrial biotechnology
Industrial biotechnology is one of the key enabling tech-
nologies in which Europe is ahead of North America and 
east Asia in terms of patent applications. In 2005, Euro-
peans submitted the highest share of EPO/PCT patent 
applications in industrial biotechnnology (36 %), fol-
lowed by North American (34 %) and east Asian (23 %) 
applicants. Europeans are in fact world leaders in the 
production of enzymes and in fermentation: around 80 
of the most important enzyme producers are located in 
Europe, with only 20 in North America (Confindustria, 
2009).
The competitiveness of the entire European biotechnol-
ogy industry was the subject of a chapter in the Euro-
pean Competitiveness Report 2001 (European Commis-
sion, 2001). In the present chapter, however, the interest 
lies only in industrial biotechnology, which in turn can 
be divided into enzymes, fermentation processes, other 
enzyme-using processes and established biochemicals 
except enzymes (such as organic acids, vitamins and 
proteins).
Figure 4.23:   Composition of industrial biotechnology patent applications (EPO/PCT) in 2005
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Asian applications have continued to increase and had 
reached 37 % by 2005.
Advanced materials can be divided into layered mater-
ials, high-performance materials, tailored macroscaled 
materials, new alloys, energy-efficient materials, mag-
neto and piezo materials and nanomaterials. Though 
currently quite modest, the latter category is expected 
to grow faster than any other category of advanced 
materials in the medium term.
4.7.5.  Advanced materials
Despite a very strong research base in advanced 
materials, and public research spending to the tune 
of EUR 44 billion a year (around 75 % higher than USA 
or Japan), European patent applications in advanced 
materials have lost momentum in recent years and re-
presented 31 % of all EPO/PCT applications in this field 
in 2005. North American applications have also petered 
out and stood at 30 % of the total in 2005, whereas east 
Figure 4.24:   Composition of patent applications in photonics (EPO/PCT) in 2005
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Figure 4.25:   Composition of patent applications in advanced materials (EPO/PCT) in 2005
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also contains 10 case studies of clusters. For each key 
enabling technology except advanced manufacturing 
technologies, a cluster in the EU and a cluster outside 
Europe have been analysed and compared. The results 
are summarised in Table 4.4.
4.8.  Implications
Europe is an important source of technological progress 
in all six technologies considered in this chapter. It is the 
world leader in advanced manufacturing technologies, 
holds a top position in industrial biotechnology, has 
been able to maintain a strong position in advanced 
materials and is also building a strong position in pho-
tonics despite a rapid increase in technology output in 
east Asia. In nanotechnology and micro and nanoelec-
tronics, Europe contributes less than North America and 
east Asia.
4.8.1.  Existing priorities
The European Union and its Member States have rec-
ognised the importance of key enabling technologies 
and, in many cases, adopted strategies for them in the 
medium to long term. There is, however, a lack of coord-
ination between Member States.
France was the first Member State to publish a strategy 
for key technologies. Since 1995 it has published, every 
five years, strategy documents covering the next five 
years. The current strategy (‘Technologies clés 2010’) is 
Figure 4.25 demonstrates that Europe is relatively strong 
in tailored macroscaled materials and in energy-efficient 
materials, albeit in both cases with a smaller share than 
east Asia. In magneto and piezo materials, on the other 
hand, European applicants appear to be falling behind. 
In all seven fields Europe is behind one or both of the 
other main regions in terms of EPO/PCT applications.
4.7.6.  Advanced manufacturing technologies
Europe is the world leader in advanced manufacturing 
technologies and in 2005 accounted for almost half of 
all EPO/PCT applications, followed by North America 
with around 30 % of all applications and east Asia with 
around 20 %.
Advanced manufacturing technologies can be subdivided 
into robotics, measuring, controlling industrial processes, 
regulating industrial processes, machine tools and com-
puter-integrated manufacturing. Figure 4.26 illustrates 
how European applicants account for most EPO/PCT 
applications in all six categories, representing around half 
the applications in machine tools and in measuring indus-
trial processes. After Europe, east Asian applicants are par-
ticularly strong in robotics, and North American applicants 
in computer-integrated manufacturing.
4.7.7.  Cluster analysis
As a complement to the patent data analysis on which 
preceding subsections are based, the background study 
Figure 4.26:   Composition of patent applications in advanced manufacturing (EPO/PCT), 2005
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the European nanoelectronics initiative advisory coun-
cil (ENIAC) founded by the EU, its Member States and 
industry to take forward European research in nano-
electronics. As already pointed out, the framework pro-
gramme for research, technological development and 
demonstration activities also reflects the priorities of the 
EU in the area of key enabling technologies.
4.8.2.  Future directions
All in all, Europe is neither losing nor gaining ground in 
the six technologies, judging by its share of EPO/PCT 
patent applications and bearing in mind that patents are 
less relevant than future commercial applications based 
on the technologies. In all cases Europe is confronted 
with increasing competition from east Asia, which in the 
past decade has made considerable progress, whereas 
North America’s share in global technology output has 
gradually diminished.
Europe’s position tends to be stronger in chem-
icals-related fields than in technology areas linked 
to electronics. Another European peculiarity is the 
importance of the automotive sector as a source of 
technological progress in some key enabling technolo-
gies (micro and nanoelectronics, photonics, advanced 
manufacturing technologies) due to the high degree 
of technological competence in this particular industry 
in Europe.
in the process of being replaced by a new strategy run-
ning until 2015.
Germany launched its high-tech strategy in 2006 with 
nanotechnology, biotechnology, microsystems tech-
nology, ICT, optical technologies, material technologies, 
production technologies and innovative services identi-
fied as key technologies (BMBF, 2006).
In the United Kingdom, a strategy document published 
in 2008 listed advanced materials, biosciences, electron-
ics, photonics and electrical systems, nanotechnology, 
high-value manufacturing and ICT as key technologies 
(Technology Strategy Board, 2008).
At EU level, following last year’s communication (Euro-
pean Commission, 2009a), a high-level group has been 
set up with the task of developing a shared longer-term 
strategy and action plan on the key enabling technolo-
gies identified in the communication. Furthermore, 
a study has been launched comparing the policies in 
different countries. The present chapter should be seen 
in the same context.
The priorities of the EU regarding key enabling tech-
nologies have also manifested themselves in other 
ways: the action plan for Europe on nanosciences and 
nanotechnology 2005–09, which is being succeeded 
by a new action plan for the period 2010–15; the strat-
egy for Europe on life sciences and biotechnology; and 
Table 4.4: Main results of cluster analysis
Technologies EU cluster Non-EU cluster Main findings
Nanotechnology North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) Kyoto Both clusters are relatively young. Both 
focus on integrating nanotechnology 
with other sciences. Kyoto is better than 
NRW at private financing, 
commercialisation of results, lead or 
anchor firms and entrepreneurial spirit.
Micro and nano-electronics 
including semiconductors
Grenoble Ottawa Stronger cluster identity in Grenoble than 
Ottawa. Strong research base in both. 
Stronger government incentives  
(e.g. tax credits) in Ottawa than Grenoble.
Industrial biotechnology Cambridge San Francisco Bay area Both clusters developed spontaneously 
and are now mature. Bay area firms 
more commercially oriented than 
Cambridge, which is more closely linked 
to universities.
Photonics Berlin-Brandenburg (OpTecBB) Quebec OpTecBB geographically more 
concentrated, financially better equipped 
and with stronger cluster identity than 
Quebec. Stronger government incentives 
(e.g. tax credits), greater dynamism, more 
access to venture capital in Quebec.
Advanced materials Wallonia (Plastiwin) Changsha, China Both clusters are young and both 
have a number of large firms. Stronger 
government role in Changsha. Cluster 
leads or anchors in Plastiwin are the larger 
firms, in Changsha universities.159
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•  Key enabling technology actors should be encour-
aged to build up networks for joint technology 
development, particularly in areas requiring a high 
degree of cross-disciplinary and cross-technology 
fertilisation. Networking could take place at differ-
ent geographical levels: global networks of the lead-
ing organisations from research and industry where 
appropriate, regional networks (clusters) to spur 
technology development wherever close and fre-
quent cooperation among actors is needed. Clusters 
can be particularly helpful for linking R & D and com-
mercial applications.
•  Maintaining a competitive manufacturing base 
within each technology is critical in order to make 
full use of their productivity and innovation impact. 
While pure technology development could be spa-
tially separated from production, direct interaction 
between R & D, manufacture and application in user 
industries is needed for creating new fields of appli-
cation and developing efficient production facilities 
for new technologies.
•  Boosting education and training in these technolo-
gies is essential in order to ensure a supply of skilled 
personnel. Strengthening cross-disciplinary edu-
cation is a main challenge in that context. A likely 
shortage of skilled labour should be tackled through 
education and/or immigration policies.
•  An active venture capital market is important for 
commercialising research results in key enabling 
technologies through spin-offs and other types of 
start-ups. Above all, venture capital needs a sup-
portive regulatory environment. If private venture 
capital markets in Europe are not fully capable of 
providing sufficient funds for start-up and early-
stage financing, public programmes may have to fill 
the gaps.
•  Addressing barriers to the adoption of new tech-
nologies is another important task. Extensive experi-
ence has been gained in promoting the rapid and 
broad diffusion of, for example, advanced manufac-
turing technologies (Baptista, 1999; Link and Kapur, 
1994; Arvanitis and Hollenstein, 1997; Shapira and 
Youtie, 1998). These findings stress the need for 
consultancy, skills and training, access to external 
funding as well as cooperation and mutual learning 
among SMEs.
•  There is also a need to acknowledge the role of lead 
firms and lead markets in the commercialisation of 
key enabling technologies. Early incorporation of 
large, globally active companies can help match 
research with global market prospects and thereby 
link technological advances to market needs. Ven-
ture capitalists can also play a part in this process.
Public research plays a more prominent role in Europe 
than elsewhere, although in some technologies (indus-
trial biotechnology, nanotechnology) North America 
reports an even greater share of public research in total 
patent output. Dedicated technology start-ups are less 
significant in Europe compared to North America, but 
more prevalent than in east Asia.
The critical role of key enabling technologies for manu-
facturing calls for attention, regardless of the current 
technological competitiveness. A mix of generic meas-
ures and technology-specific interventions is most likely 
to accelerate the development, diffusion and use of key 
enabling technologies and increase their impact on the 
wider economy:
•  Since key enabling technologies are research-driven it 
is essential to maintain a strong research base. Fund-
ing basic research with a long-term view is a key policy 
task. Basic research funding in key enabling technolo-
gies needs to strike a balance between setting thematic 
priorities (in order to obtain a critical mass of know-
ledge and promote cooperation among researchers 
working on similar subjects) and providing free space 
for explorative research into entirely new areas.
•  Because these are technologies originating at the 
frontier between scientific research and industrial 
applications, the exchange between both groups of 
knowledge producers is essential as well. In particu-
lar, incentives need to be in place at public research 
institutions for actively engaging in technology 
transfer. This includes proper intellectual property 
management, promotion of spin-offs, acknowledg-
ing the importance of technology transfer in evalu-
ations and funding and offering linkage programmes 
such as researcher mobility programmes.
•  Industrial R & D on key enabling technologies is char-
acterised by high knowledge spillovers and high tech-
nological uncertainty. There is a case for public co-
funding of business enterprise R & D, as long as state 
aid rules are respected and case-by-case assessment 
criteria fulfilled. R & D programmes should follow 
a long-term perspective, align technology priorities 
with thematic priorities of basic research programmes 
and include incentives for cooperative R & D.
•  Although key enabling technologies are character-
ised by particularly high investment in R & D and 
high technological and market risks, a generally 
favourable framework for innovation and commer-
cialisation of new technologies can also be helpful. 
Policy measures that stimulate start-ups, including 
a culture of entrepreneurship and risk-taking, can be 
important, as can a favourable financial environment, 
including tax incentives for R & D and investment in 
new technologies.160
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5.1.  Introduction
Broadly speaking, the creative industries comprise activ-
ities ‘at the crossroads between arts, business and tech-
nology’ and produce ‘symbolic products with a heavy 
reliance on intellectual property’ (Unctad, 2004, p. 4). 
In European countries, the term ‘creative industries’ 
was first introduced by the UK’s Department of Cul-
ture, Media and Sport (DCMS) in 1998, to denote ‘those 
industries that have their origin in individual creativity, 
skill and talent and that have a potential for wealth and 
job creation through the generation and exploitation 
of intellectual property’ (DCMS, 1998, 2001). The sig-
nificant size of the creative industries and the fast rate 
at which it has grown over the last two decades has 
aroused considerable interest among policymakers at 
national, regional, and international levels, in particular 
among those concerned with urban planning, regional 
development, labour market and education policies 
and, more recently, innovation policy (Caves, 2000; 
Hesmondhalgh, 2007; Landry, 2000; Stoneman, 2010; 
Miles and Green, 2008).
While the term ‘creative industries’ has been commonly 
used in EU countries for more than a decade, in the US 
the focus has been more on creative knowledge workers 
or the ‘creative class’ as it is labelled by Florida (2002). 
Creative workers such as engineers, scientists, architects, 
artists and writers generate ideas and knowledge and 
are seen as the driving force behind regional growth. 
Creative industries do not have a monopoly on creative 
occupations: creative workers can also be found in other 
skill-intensive manufacturing or business services activ-
ities. In the related literature, the growth effects of cre-
ative industries and the creative workforce and their role 
in the wider economy are subjects of intensive debate.
The growth of the creative industries is driven by vari-
ous trends (Unctad, 2008): reduced working time (more 
leisure), improved education, and growing real income 
have all triggered changes in preferences, resulting in 
increased demand for goods and services with creative, 
cultural and artistic content. Areas like film, music, per-
forming arts and lifestyle products are the predictable 
beneficiaries of these trends, all of which have direct 
consequences for the overall contribution of the sec-
tor to national employment and GDP. In addition, new 
technologies — especially innovations in information 
and communication technologies (ICT) — have had a 
massive impact on many creative industry segments and 
contributed to the rapid growth of software and multi-
media services. ICT and the Internet are leading to new 
forms of distribution, more choices for consumers and a 
more efficient production process. However, they have 
also initiated the profound ongoing restructuring of the 
traditional publishing and media industry. Furthermore, 
firms in the creative industries are increasingly being 
regarded not merely as users of new technologies that 
trigger demand for innovative solutions, but also as 
a source of innovative ideas and services (e.g. images, 
design, symbols).
While there is a widespread perception that creative 
industries comprise a highly diverse set of economic 
activities, they are also often seen to have a number 
of common characteristics. Most of the firms are small 
(employing fewer than 10 people) and most of the 
workers are highly skilled self-employed professionals. 
In addition, many people within the creative industries 
work part time and/or have temporary contracts. Cre-
ative industries also often feature a high degree of net-
working, an intensive supply chain and other inter-firm 
linkages, and are concentrated in major cities, in many 
cases organised in regional clusters. Regional authorities 
can play an important role as facilitators and catalysts 
of such clusters in order to boost their competitiveness.
The main objective of this report is to provide a compre-
hensive picture of the innovation performance and com-
petitiveness of the creative industries, along with their 
relative size and economic performance in the EU-27 
countries. In doing so, it explores the growth drivers of 
the creative industries as well as their economic impact 
on the wider economy. This impact (Chartrand, 1984; 
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This four-part framework, where the three first elements 
are of an economic nature, provides a basis on which to 
answer a number of questions about competitiveness 
and innovation in the creative industries:
•  What is the relative size of the sector and its evolu-
tion over time in terms of employment, value added 
and exports?
•  How and to what extent is the current recession 
affecting the creative industries?
•  What do the different creative industries have in 
common? How do they differ?
•  To what extent are creative industries and the cre-
ative workforce spatially clustered and what are the 
underlying factors?
•  How innovative are firms in the selected creative 
industries in terms of technological innovations as 
compared to firms in other industries? Which sources 
of knowledge and innovation partners are most rele-
vant for the innovation process?
•  What characterises urban areas and regions with a 
high population share of creative individuals? Do 
these regions exhibit high levels of growth?
•  To what extent do creative industries contribute to 
innovation in the wider economy? What contribution 
do design innovations make to firms in non-creative 
industries?
Heng and Choo, 2003; Potts and Cunningham, 2008) is 
summarised in Figure 5.1 The study looks at four main 
types of impact: primary, secondary, tertiary and quater-
nary. 
The ‘primary’ economic impact of the creative industries 
refers to their direct contribution to the economy — usu-
ally in terms of employment and some output measure, 
such as value added or exports. ‘Secondary’ economic 
impact involves spillovers into the wider economy as a 
result of economic activity in the creative industries. For 
instance, those creative industry segments that produce 
intermediate inputs for other sectors rather than final 
products (such as graphics and design) are expected to 
profit from enterprises’ growing efforts to establish dedi-
cated brands and enhance brand recognition. Secondary 
impacts can be assessed by investigating how import-
ant the creative industries are in stimulating (i) regional 
growth through regional spillovers and (ii) demand in 
other sectors of the economy through sectoral spill-
overs. ‘Tertiary’ economic impact, meanwhile, embraces 
the direct, but less quantifiable, contributions of the cre-
ative industries to innovation. It addresses the question 
of how innovative the creative industries are and how 
they make other sectors innovative. This report touches 
only briefly on the ‘quaternary’ economic impact of the 
creative industries, examining such aspects as the cre-
ative industries’ role in improving quality of life, main-
taining and/or restoring a sense of cultural identity and 
realising a wide range of other societal objectives. These 
indirect and non-quantifiable contributions of the cre-
ative industries are referred to only in the policy con-
clusions. Finally, the last section explores the scope and 
opportunities for policy intervention.
Figure 5.1:   Economic impacts of the creative industries: structure of the report
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In practice, the sectors encompassed in these two 
concepts are quite similar. Creative industries include 
business market services that are not usually consid-
ered ‘cultural’ such as architecture, advertising, design, 
fashion and software services. Also, creative industries, 
as defined by DCMS, do not include non-profit activ-
ities. If one takes a statistical approach and sums up the 
various subsectors included in these different concepts, 
the aggregates are very similar. In practice, economic 
policy rationales tend to dominate in the case of cre-
ative industries while cultural policies tend to prevail for 
cultural industries. Indeed, the survey of policies in the 
27 Member States reveals that cultural objectives rank 
below economic policy rationales when they deal with 
creative industries.
The statistical definition of ‘the creative industries’ 
applied here is based on the definition developed by 
the UK Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). 
A number of reasons led to using this definition. The 
DCMS definition enjoys a first-mover advantage; it is 
well known and broadly acknowledged worldwide. 
Moreover, the statistical definition of an industry will 
always remain ill-defined if its conceptual foundations 
are too broad.
In future, the work of Eurostat will serve the purpose 
of sharing commonly agreed definitions. A network of 
several European statistical systems (ESSnet-culture) 
was set up in 2009 at Eurostat (59) to further coordinate 
the harmonisation of statistics on cultural and creative 
activities.
Once translated into industrial classifications NACE Rev. 
2 and NACE Rev. 1.1, the primary impact of creative 
industries (their share in the EU economy) can be esti-
mated. The exact choice of sectors is detailed in Table 
5.1 (NACE Rev. 2) below and in Table A.1 (NACE Rev. 1.1) 
in the appendix. As will be explained later, the defin-
itions are most sensitive to whether software is included 
or not, as this sector greatly influences the growth of 
creative industries.
(59)  http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-policy-development/doc1577_en.htm
•  What is the role of government in supporting and 
promoting the creative industries?
This study complements the work undertaken by Power 
and Nielsén (2010) and KEA (2006) in a number of ways. 
First, different concepts of creativity (i.e. both creative 
industries and the creative workforce) are considered, 
and different data sources are used (EU labour force sur-
vey at the individual level, structural business statistics 
and the firm-level Amadeus database). Second, new evi-
dence is provided on the growth effects of the creative 
industries at regional level, as well as on the drivers of 
the creative industries.
5.2.  Stylised facts on the creative industries 
in the EU
5.2.1.  Definition of the creative industries
Creative industries ‘have their origin in individual cre-
ativity, skill and talent and have a potential for wealth 
and job creation through the generation and exploit-
ation of intellectual property’ (UK Department of 
Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), 1998). As noted by 
Cunningham (2001), the ‘creative industries’ concept 
embraced activities from the new economy era that 
were not included in the ‘art’, ‘media’ or ‘culture’ con-
cepts. While creative industries link creative content 
to job and wealth creation, cultural industries are not 
first and foremost defined by their business value. Ac-
cording to Unesco, cultural activities correspond ‘to 
those activities, goods and services, which at the time 
they are considered as a specific attribute, use or pur-
pose, embody or convey cultural expressions, irrespect-
ive of the commercial value they may have’ (58). Dealing 
with creative industries is therefore not exactly the same 
as dealing with cultural industries. Cultural industries are 
considered by some as an ‘adjunct’ of the creative sec-
tors and vice versa. While the scope here is limited to 
creative industries, the broader perspective taken by the 
European Commission Green Paper (European Commis-
sion, 2010) includes both creative and cultural indus-
tries, therefore reconciling both economic and cultural 
objectives.
(58)  http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=33232&URL_DO=DO_
TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html166
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and EU-11 (EU-12 excluding Malta) are 3.2 % and 2.0 %, 
respectively (Figure 5.2). In terms of exports, creative 
goods account for 4.3 % of the EU-27’s external exports.
Figure 5.2 also shows that, in the EU-26, creative indus-
tries related to information services accounted for the 
bulk of total employment in the creative industries 
in 2008 (62 %, or 1.8 % of all EU-26 employment) (60). 
(60)  The EU-26 is defined as EU-27 excluding Malta.
5.2.2.  Size and evolution of the creative industries in 
the EU
The creative industries account for 3.0 % of total 
employment (2008) and 3.3 % of GDP (2006). The 
number of employees in the creative industries in the 
EU-27 was 6.7 million in 2008 (based on NACE Rev. 2). 
The corresponding employment shares for the EU-15 
Table 5.1: Definition of the creative industries (according to NACE Rev. 2)
NACE Rev. 2 Description Proportion of 
code taken
Information 
services
 J58 Publishing activities (publishing of books, periodicals and software publishing), 
motion pictures, video and television programme production
1.00
Sound recording and music publishing activities 1.00
J60 Programming and broadcasting activities 1.00
J62 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 1.00
Business 
services
M711 Architectural and engineering activities and related technical consultancy 0.25
M731 Advertising 1.00
M741 Specialised design activities 1.00
M742 Photographic activities 0.25
M743 Translation and interpretation activities 1.00
Art and 
entertainment
R90 Creative, arts and entertainment activities 1.00
Source: Söndermann (2009), Wilkinson (2007), p. 33.
Figure 5.2:   Employment share of the creative industries in the EU and USA in 2008 (in %)
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arts and entertainment) and architecture also grew 
faster than overall employment in the EU-27. In the US 
the fastest-growing creative industries are architectural 
and engineering services, computer services, radio and 
television, broadcasting and Internet publishing, inde-
pendent artists and performing arts (excluding specta-
tor sports).
The source of employment growth in the creative indus-
tries is concentrated in a handful of subsectors. A break-
down of the figures shows that software consulting and 
supply accounts for more than half the employment 
growth in creative industries in the EU-27 in the period 
2000–07 (Figure A.1 in the appendix). As can be seen, 
advertising is most sensitive to variations in the busi-
ness cycle. Recent research for the UK also suggests 
that the rapid growth of the creative industries varies 
greatly from one firm to another. In particular, NESTA 
analysis with the Economic Research Institute of North-
ern Ireland (ERINI) and Aston University suggests that 
just 7.5 % of ‘high-growth’ businesses accounted for the 
overall employment growth in the creative industries 
in 2005–08. Software, computer games and electronic 
publishing companies accounted for 45.3 % of all these 
high-growth creative businesses.
The short-term structural business statistics allow for 
a more detailed examination of the creative indus-
tries’ growth by subgroup at the NACE Rev. 2 level. The 
data for the EU-27 suggest that this strong growth is 
Creative industries in professional services represented 
29 % of total employment and the remaining group — 
creative, arts and entertainment activities — accounted 
for 10 %. In the US, the employment share of the creative 
industries was 4.0 % in 2008, based on BLS data and 
a very similar definition of the creative industries (Figure 
5.2). The employment share of the creative industries is 
sensitive to the definition applied. When both architec-
ture and photographic activities are fully incorporated 
into the classification of industries, it amounts to 3.9 % 
in the EU-26, 4.2 % in the EU-15 and 4.7 % in the US. The 
reason for the difference in the size of the employment 
share of the creative industries between the US and EU 
lies in their disparate structure: the US has a larger share 
of audiovisual and computer software sector activities as 
compared to both the EU-15 and the EU-27.
Between 2000 and 2007, employment in the creative 
industries grew by an average of 3.5 % per annum, 
compared to 1 % in the overall EU-27 economy. In the 
US and China the creative industries also grew quickly, 
averaging employment growth rates of 1.8 % and 1.9 % 
per annum respectively (Figure 5.3).
However, employment growth in the creative industries 
varied greatly from one subsector to another. While 
software consulting and supply showed the highest 
employment growth of all sub-industries (+ 5.4 % on 
average since 2000), publishing did not grow much at 
all (Figure 5.4). The audiovisual sector (including media, 
Figure 5.3:   Evolution of employment in the creative industries
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intangible assets such as ideas, knowledge and informa-
tion that increase firms’ value added. A large number 
of creative occupations are embedded outside the cre-
ative industries. In the EU-15 in 2008, 62 % of creative 
occupations were in sectors other than information 
and communication services, professional, scientific, 
and technical activities and the arts, entertainment and 
recreation.
Calculations based on the EU labour force survey for the 
EU-15 show that the core creative occupations grew by 
an average of 3.1 % per year between 2002 and 2008 
(see Table 5.2). The corresponding employment share of 
the core creative occupations increased from 6.6 % to 
7.7 % of persons employed in the EU-15 during the same 
period (Table 5.2). The highest employment growth can 
be observed for artistic and entertainment profession-
als — averaging 5.7 % per year — followed by social 
science and related professionals (5.0 %), mathematical 
and statistical professionals (4.0 %), computing profes-
sionals (3.2 %) and engineers and architects (3.2 %). 
Similar trends can be observed through an aggregate of 
new Member States.
5.2.3.  Drivers of the creative industries
A number of demand and supply factors have contribu-
ted to the rise of the creative industries. Key drivers of 
the creative economy include innovation, information 
and communication technologies, talent and skills. 
Other factors include wealth (i.e. GDP per capita), leis-
ure time and disposable household income, macroeco-
not limited to software consulting and supply; it also 
includes activities in motion pictures, video and tele-
vision programme production, sound recording and 
music publishing, which averaged an employment 
growth rate of 1.9 % per year between 2000 and 2008. 
However, employment in programming and broadcast-
ing activities increased by less than the average of the 
creative industries at large.
With respect to the structure of the creative industries 
classified in NACE Rev. 2, it can be seen that in the EU-27 
the largest subsector is computer programming and 
consulting, accounting for 37 % of total employment 
in the creative industries in 2008. Advertising services 
is also an important sector, with 15 % in the same year. 
The employment share of activities in motion pictures, 
video and television production, sound recording and 
music publishing activities was 6.2 %. Specialised design 
activities — introduced in NACE Rev. 2 for the first 
time — account for 2.5 % (Table A.2 in the appendix). 
Programming and broadcasting activities have a share 
of 3.3 %.
The increasing importance of the creative economy 
also becomes evident when its growth is measured 
in terms of creative occupations. ‘Creative occupa-
tions’ is a broader concept than ‘creative industries’. It 
embraces the professions that are ‘creative’ in essence, 
no matter whether they belong to the so-called ‘cre-
ative industries’. Table 5.2 details the occupations con-
sidered ‘creative’: engineers, architects, writers, creative 
and performing artists and artistic and entertainment 
professionals, etc. These ‘knowledge workers’ produce 
Figure 5.4:   Average annual employment growth of the creative industries in the EU by subsector,  
2000–07 (in %)
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arts, entertainment and recreation (of which the associ-
ated creative industries represent a significant part) had 
a tertiary education share of 57 % and 35 % respectively.
Other supply-side factors include the rapid advance of 
digital technologies, the globalisation of networks and 
the deregulation of media. The Internet has created new 
distribution channels and business models. For instance, 
the rise in online advertising has changed the entire 
advertising industry, leading to declining sales for trad-
itional advertising media. In four out of 15 EU countries, 
the share of online advertising is already about 20 % or 
more (IAB Europe, 2009). A recent study on the Euro-
pean software industry revealed that the rapid growth 
of online advertising is being driven by the growth of 
the worldwide online population, broadband access 
development and an increase in time spent online 
(Pierre Audoin Consultants SAS (PAC), 2009). A recent 
JRC-IPTS study on videogames yields similar results 
(De Prato et al., 2010). The shift to digitisation and the 
increase in broadband access have decreased the cost 
of media distribution, in particular for recorded music 
and films. In recent years, digital distribution of recorded 
music and other media via the Internet has created a 
whole new business model (Stoneman, 2010). Global 
nomic performance and the initial level of the creative 
industry in the economy.
Well-educated and skilled workers are the key resource 
in the creative economy. Indeed, evidence based on the 
EU labour force survey of 22 EU countries shows that 
the workforce in the creative industries has the highest 
proportion of persons with tertiary education (the Inter-
national Standard Classification of Education — ISCED 
levels 5 and 6). In the EU-22 in 2008, information services 
(NACE Rev. 2 J, of which the associated creative indus-
tries account for more than 70 % of industry employ-
ment) is the sector of the EU economy with the third-
largest share of workers with tertiary education (behind 
the education sector and professional, scientific and 
technical activities), boasting more than 50 % compared 
to 26 % for the total EU economy (61). Similarly, creative, 
arts and entertainment activities and the business-led 
creative industries (such as architecture, advertising and 
design) are characterised by significantly higher skill 
intensity than the rest of the economy. In the EU-22 in 
2008, professional, scientific and technical activities and 
(61)  Calculations are based on the EU labour force survey of 2008 where all num-
bers are weighted to reflect the total population of persons employed.
Table 5.2: Evolution of the core creative occupations between 2002 and 2008
EU-15 EU-7
Persons employed  
(in 1 000s)
Average 
annual 
growth rate
Persons employed  
(in 1 000s)
Average 
annual 
growth rate
2002 2008 % 2002 2008 %
211
Physicists, chemists and related 
professionals
260 287 1.6 23 31 4.7
212
Mathematicians, statisticians and 
related professionals
37 47 4.0 8 8 1.7
213 Computing professionals 1 528 1 845 3.2 84 124 6.8
214
Architects, engineers and related 
professionals
3 088 3 724 3.2 186 219 2.8
221 Life science professionals 332 298 - 1.8 25 33 4.8
222 Health professionals 1 769 1 978 1.9 129 150 2.6
243
Archivists, librarians and related infor-
mation professionals
198 193 - 0.5 24 29 3.3
244 Social science and related professionals 1 057 1 413 5.0 98 116 2.9
245
Writers and creative or performing 
artists
1 016 1 175 2.5 73 85 2.7
347+521
Artistic, entertainment and sports 
assoc.
897 1 250 5.7 46 60 4.5
total creative occupations
10 
183
12 
211
3.1 695 856 3.5
employment share of the creative 
occupations
6.6 7.7 5.2 6.0
Note:    The EU-7 includes CY, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV and SK. In the individual anonymised data of the EU labour force survey for SI, PL and 
BG there is no information on ISCO 88 at the 3-digit level. ISCO corresponds to International Standard Classification of Occupa-
tions. In addition, for RO there is no data on ISCO 88 at the 3-digit level before 2005. Creative occupations include physical, 
mathematical and engineering science professionals, life science professionals, health professionals (except nursing), archivists, 
librarians and related information professionals, social science and related professionals, writers and creative or performing 
artists, artistic, entertainment and sports associate professionals and fashion and other models. 
Source: EU labour force survey, WIFO calculations.170
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higher-than-average increase in their employment share 
in creative industries.
Besides, creative industries are very dependent on 
business cycles. There are various reasons why cre-
ative industries have been affected more severely by 
the recession than other sectors. First, falling consumer 
spending is expected to have a large impact on those 
industries that sell a large portion of their output to 
final demand (i.e. end-users), such as arts and entertain-
ment and the audiovisual sector. It is well known that 
decreases in consumer spending have a high impact 
on creative goods and services characterised by high 
income elasticity, such as opera tickets and other luxury 
items. Second, creative industries are affected indirectly 
as a result of intensive supply-chain linkages to other 
sectors. This particularly concerns creative industries 
that have a large number of business-to-business trans-
actions with industries that are badly affected by reces-
sion.
Available evidence for the EU-27 shows that, in each 
of the creative industries, turnover (in current prices) 
and labour decreased in 2009 for the first time in the 
last 10 years. (More information on the turnover evolu-
tion from 2000 to 2009 is available in the background 
report.) Advertising saw the strongest decrease between 
2008 and 2009 (approximately 12.4 %, see Table 5.3). 
It is obvious that the decline was caused by intensive 
supply-chain linkages to other sectors of the economy 
that have been hit hardest. Most firms cut their advertis-
ing budgets during the recessionary period. Publishing 
turnover decreased by 6.8 %, while computer program-
ming/consulting and architecture were less affected (a 
5.0 % decline).
The number of employees (measured by the labour 
index) also decreased, with the exception of computer 
programming and consulting, where employment 
was stable in 2009. The explanation for this procyclical 
behaviour lies in the labour hoarding of skilled workers. 
For the arts, entertainment and recreation sector there 
is no information on turnover on a regular basis. Avail-
able evidence for France suggests that the output (in 
current prices) of this sector decreased only moderately, 
showing declines of between 3.7 % for performing arts 
and 5.0 % for artistic creation. Turnover in the operation 
of arts facilities even increased between 2008 and 2009 
(Table A.3 in the appendix).
5.2.4.  Industry and labour market characteristics
Creative industries are dominated by a large number 
of micro firms (with nine or fewer employees, includ-
ing one-person firms). Based on the Eurostat structural 
business statistics data for the EU-22, 95 % of the 1.2 mil-
lion firms in the core creative industries employ fewer 
digital music sales are growing rapidly, whereas physical 
music sales have fallen in the last five years (IFPI, 2009). 
Recent unpublished data show that in the UK revenues 
from digital sales outstripped physical sales for the first 
time in 2009.
Correlations based on aggregate country data find a 
strong relationship between broadband penetration 
and the size of the creative industries (with a correlation 
of 0.80 for 27 EU countries in 2008). In addition, there is 
a significant correlation between the increase in broad-
band penetration and the increase in the employment 
share of creative industries across Member States. How-
ever, the EU-15 is lagging behind both the US and Japan 
in digital music distribution. In the EU-15 the share of 
digital music in retail sales is estimated at 12 % for 2009, 
compared to 33 % in the US and 19 % in Japan accord-
ing to the International Federation of Phonographic 
Industries (IFPI). Similarly, the EU is well behind the US 
in both online advertising and the deployment of ultra-
high broadband (IAB Europe, 2009).
The demand-side factors include the increase in avail-
able leisure time and disposable household income 
(Andari et al., 2007). Available empirical evidence for 
nine EU countries reveals that spending on cultural ser-
vices increased from 1.0 % to 1.3 % of GDP between 
1999 and 2005 (62). It is worth noting that cultural ser-
vices include licence fees for television equipment and 
subscriptions to television networks. Similarly, house-
hold spending on communication increased steadily 
due to rising expenditure on Internet connection ser-
vices. In 2005, spending on cultural services surpassed 
traditional media (i.e. books and newspapers) in the 
same eight countries. Between 1998 and 2005 there was 
even a decline in household consumption of these prod-
ucts, further indicating that Internet media are replac-
ing traditional media. Similar trends can be observed in 
the structure of US household consumption spending 
(Beyers, 2008).
Another explanation of the fast growth of the creative 
industries in the EU is that a number of less advanced EU 
countries are starting to catch up with the more devel-
oped Member States. In fact, empirical evidence shows 
that EU countries with a low initial employment share 
in creative industries exhibited a significantly stronger 
increase in the same employment share between 2000 
and 2007 (with a correlation of - 0.45). This relationship 
remains robust and highly significant when software 
consultancy and supply is excluded from the creative 
industries. Macroeconomic growth also explains the 
rapid increase in the overall share of the creative indus-
tries. EU countries with high growth rates experienced a 
(62)  The nine EU countries are Belgium, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom.171
Chapter 5 — Innovation and Competitiveness of the Creative Industries in the EU
aggregate self-employment rate (excluding agricultural 
employment).
In  creative  industries,  labour  costs  account  for 
a high percentage of value added, indicating that prod-
uction is both labour- and human capital-intensive. Cre-
ative industries also differ in their average labour prod-
uctivity and part-time ratio as compared to all business 
services. In particular, software consultancy and supply 
industries have the highest level of labour productivity 
of all the business services considered.
It is often argued that the different creative industries 
are so intertwined that they can be viewed as a single 
sector. Indeed, available evidence based on detailed 
input-output tables (at the 3-digit level) shows strong 
supply-chain linkages among the different creative 
industries. First and quite obviously, there are strong 
than 10 people (Table 5.4). This share is much higher 
than that of manufacturing industries (80 %). However, 
the share of micro firms is similar to that of all business 
services except advertising, which has a higher share of 
these small enterprises. Overall, a large share of small 
firms is a common characteristic of the creative indus-
try and shared by most sub-industries. Furthermore, 
the majority (58 %) of businesses in the creative indus-
try consist of self-employed people (Table 5.4). The 
share of self-employed people in all businesses is even 
higher in the culture and recreation sector (63 %) and 
advertising (67 %). When the employment distribution 
is considered, the findings again indicate the predom-
inance of micro firms. Such firms account for 35 % of 
all employment in the creative industries in the EU-22. 
This is similar to the corresponding share in all business 
services. Furthermore, the self-employment rate in cre-
ative industries is about 13 % — much higher than the 
Table 5.3: Annual change in turnover in current prices and labour input in 2008 and 2009 (in %)
EU-15 EU-27
Change in turnover in current prices in %
2008 2009 2008 2009
Total services (except retail trade and repair) 5.2 - 9.8 5.5 - 9.9
Publishing activities 0.6 - 6.7 0.9 - 6.8
Motion picture, video and television programme production, 
sound recording and music publishing activities
4.4 - 3.9 4.3 - 3.9
Programming and broadcasting activities 0.7 - 7.0 1.6 - 8.2
Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 4.4 - 5.5 4.9 - 5.0
Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing  7.1 - 5.5 7.7 - 5.0
Advertising and market research 0.6 - 12.6 2.6 - 12.4
Change in labour input in %
2008 2009 2008 2009
Total services (except retail trade and repair) 1.3 - 3.2 1.7 - 3.3
Publishing activities 0.0 - 4.0 0.2 - 3.2
Motion picture, video and television programme production, 
sound recording and music publishing activities
1.4 - 3.5 0.8 - 5.7
Programming and broadcasting activities 0.6 - 0.9 0.4 - 3.5
Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 4.3 0.1 4.5 0.3
Source: Eurostat structural business statistics, New Cronos.
Table 5.4: Size distribution of employment and firms in creative industries in the EU-22, 2007
Firm size  
(persons employed)
Size distribution of firms Size distribution of employment
Number of firms % Number of per-
sons employed
%
Zero 669 170 58 658 921 13
Between 1 and 4 376 537 32 752 344 15
Between 5 and 9 56 479 5 386 023 8
10 or more 58 961 5 3 267 222 65
Total 1 161 148 100 5 064 510 100
Note:    Creative industries are restricted to publishing, software consultancy and supply, architecture, advertising, motion picture 
and video activities, radio and television activities, arts and entertainment and news agencies. For architecture, all numbers 
are weighted by 0.25. The EU-22 refers to BG, CZ, DK, DE, EE, ES, FR, IT, CY, LV, LT, LU, HU, NL, AT, PT, RO, SI, SK, FI, SE and UK. 
The data refers to 2007 or the latest available year. For 221 and 223 the split into the three smallest size classes is based on 
additional data sources. 
Source: Eurostat structural business statistics, WIFO calculations.172
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audiovisual sector. However, there are surprisingly few 
linkages between software consultancy and supply on 
the one hand and the remaining creative industries on 
the other hand.
Table 5.5 shows the EU-15 labour-market characteris-
tics of creative workers, defined by creative occupa-
tions based on the European labour force survey for 
2008. Here the focus is on occupations that are most 
prevalent in the creative industries. These characteris-
tics include percentages of creative workers with ter-
tiary education (ISCED levels 5 and 6), self-employed 
individuals, creative workers with temporary contracts, 
part-time workers, creative workers at micro firms and 
multiple job holders (63).
The different creative occupations share a number of 
common characteristics. First, for creative occupations 
in the EU-15, the proportion of employees with tertiary 
education is 78 % against 24 % for workers in non-
creative occupations. The proportion of employees with 
tertiary education ranges from 42 % for artistic, enter-
tainment and sports associate professionals to 65 % for 
writers and creative/performing artists and over 80 % 
for physical, mathematical and engineering science pro-
fessionals. Another common characteristic of creative 
occupations is a higher self-employment rate. In the 
(63)  Based on the EU labour force survey, micro firms can only be defined as 
firms with 10 or fewer persons employed, instead of nine or fewer persons 
employed based on the Eurostat structural business statistics.
supply-chain linkages between publishing and adver-
tising. Second, it is well known that advertising is one 
of the two main sources of revenue of the traditional 
media industry and online advertising, besides con-
sumer and end-use spending. Picard (2009) suggests 
that book publishers rely on contract writers, editors, 
printers and binders and distribution services. Magazine 
publishers engage independent writers, photographers 
and printing and distribution firms. These interactions 
require ongoing contacts and coordination, and often 
lead service firms and individuals to establish them-
selves near those who require their services. Such inter-
actions and processes have historically produced self-
generating media clusters and a high degree of path 
dependency.
The supply-chain linkages among different creative 
industries can be described based on Danish supply-
and-use tables, which are available at the 3-digit level for 
2005. For advertising, the share of intermediate inputs 
supplied by publishing is 48 % (Figure A.2 in the appen-
dix). The second most important suppliers of advertis-
ing are recreational and cultural industries belonging to 
the market sector (i.e. excluding non-market firms such 
as museums and libraries). They contribute 17 % of all 
domestic inputs in advertising. This is clearly related 
to the close integration between advertising and the 
Table 5.5: Labour market characteristics of creative occupations in EU-15, 2008 (in %)
Creative occupations ISCO 88 Tertiary 
education
Self- 
employ- 
ment rate
Tempor-
ary con-
tracts
Part time Working in 
micro- 
firms
Multiple 
job holders
EU-15
Physicists, chemists and related 
professionals
211 87 7 13 7 11 3
Mathematicians, statisticians and 
related professionals
212 81 11 15 7 11 6
Computing professionals 213 70 10 8 7 9 3
Architects, engineers and related 
professionals
214 85 19 7 7 12 3
Life science professionals 221 91 10 14 10 15 4
Health professionals 222 95 40 14 14 26 8
Archivists, librarians and related 
information professionals
243 78 3 12 31 22 6
Social science and related 
professionals
244 86 16 15 30 14 8
Writers and creative or performing 
artists
245 65 44 13 26 14 10
Artistic, entertainment and sports 
associate professionals and fashion
347 42 38 14 30 24 9
Creative occupations 78 24 11 16 16 6
Non-creative occupations 24 15 12 21 26 4
Note:  All numbers are weighted in order to reflect total population.
Source: EU labour force survey, 2008.173
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butions of Disdier et al. (2010) on cultural goods and the 
Unctad report (2008) on the creative economy. Services 
play a large part in the creative industries, but services 
are by nature less tradable than goods. This may explain 
why creative industry trade issues are seldom analysed. 
They are nevertheless quite dynamic. Unfortunately, the 
coverage of services in trade statistics leaves a lot to be 
desired. For this reason, evidence is limited to a small 
number of EU countries as far as trade in services is con-
cerned while the geographical coverage of trade in cre-
ative industries’ goods is more exhaustive.
5.2.5.1. Trade in creative industry goods
Breakdown by region
The share of creative industries’ goods in total world 
exports was 3.6 % on average during the years 2000–05 
(based on the Unctad global databank) but its growth 
dynamics were lower than for total export goods. Its 
share fluctuated between 3.7 % and 3.8 % until 2003 
and declined to 3.3 % in 2005. This indicates that trade 
in creative industries’ goods did not grow as much as 
global trade at that time. World exports of creative 
industries’ goods grew at an average annual rate of 
only 1.7 % between 2000 and 2005, reaching a value of 
approximately EUR 270 billion in 2005.
In 2005, three economic regions accounted for two 
thirds of the world’s exports of creative goods (the 
exports within the regions not being taken into 
account): a third from China, almost a quarter from the 
EU-27 and 11 % from the US.
EU-15, the self-employment rate is 9 percentage points 
higher for workers in creative occupations than for those 
in non-creative occupations. Artists and writers tend to 
work fewer hours, as indicated by the part-time ratio. 
Furthermore, 6 % of creative professionals hold multiple 
jobs, compared to 4 % for those in non-creative occu-
pations. Among writers and performing artists, nearly 
one in 10 is a multiple job holder. Overall, non-standard 
forms of employment such as self-employment, part-
time employment and employment in multiple jobs 
are more prevalent among creative occupations than 
among non-creative occupations. However, the creative 
occupations are highly heterogeneous themselves, with 
wide variations between physical, mathematical and 
engineering science professionals on the one hand and 
writers and creative/performing artists on the other.
5.2.5.  Trade in creative industry goods and services
Sectoral competitiveness is invariably and closely 
related to trade performance. But it is important to high-
light that the EU, and its Member States, have chosen 
to preserve their capacity to define and implement 
policies for the purpose of preserving cultural diversity 
when joining the General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices (GATS). The question of trade is therefore not a 
straightforward one. While a number of studies, policy 
documents in particular, point at the growing import-
ance of trade in creative industry products, and the 
sound export performance of the creative industries, 
this issue has until now almost never been studied in a 
thorough way. This is mainly due to the limitations of 
trade statistical data. Notable exceptions are the contri-
Figure 5.5:   Exports breakdown of creative industries’ goods and exports of all goods, excluding intra-
regional trade (2005) (in %)
EU-27
Creative industries All goods
China
USA
Rest of world
18 %
13 %
11 %
58 %
32 %
24 %
11 %
33 %
Source: Unctad global databank on world trade in creative products (left panel), UN Comtrade (right panel), WIFO calculations.174
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China: With a share of 78 %, design goods dominate 
Chinese exports even more than they do globally, while 
publishing goods make up only 3 % of China’s extraterri-
torial export volume. With a relative export share of 9 %, 
arts and crafts products account for a non-negligible 
share of China’s total creative industries’ products. In 
fact China is the leading exporter of arts and crafts prod-
ucts worldwide (Unctad, 2008). These findings are quite 
intuitive and emphasise the role of common languages 
and cultural norms in creative industries’ trade. For 
instance, prevailing cultural and linguistic differences 
between China and the western hemisphere make it 
almost impossible for the Chinese publishing and music 
industries to compete in world trade. When it comes 
to the fastest-growing sectors, China significantly out-
paces other regions in terms of new media exports. The 
observed average annual growth of creative industries’ 
trade reached an impressive 42.6 % in 2000–05 (Table 
5.6).
The US: The US was specialised in publishing and the 
visual arts in 2005, which come in at 22 % and 18 % 
respectively; they hold a comparatively large share in 
new media (7 %), but a distinctly lower relative share in 
design (44 %). In the US, only the music sector saw an 
increase in the volume of creative industries’ goods in 
2000–05.
Breakdown by creative domains
When the focus is on the types of creative goods 
exported by region, more heterogeneity in the structure 
of exports can be observed (Figure 5.6 and Table 5.6).
World: In 2005, two thirds of world exports in creative 
industries’ goods were classified as design, followed by 
publishing with only 13 %. Strikingly, the sectors that 
account for the lowest share of world exports — music 
(4 %), audiovisuals (0.2 %) and new media (4 %) — are 
also the ones with the highest growth between 2000 
and 2005 (9.4 %, 5.7 % and 5.2 % respectively). This 
trend is in line with the change of consumer habits 
towards increased media/new media consumption 
highlighted in Section 5.2.3 on ‘Drivers of creative indus-
tries’. It is worth noticing that at this level of aggregation 
(world trade in creative industries’ domains) the struc-
ture of exports remains relatively stable over time.
EU: Apart from design, which dominates (65 % of 
exports), publishing and visual arts carry consider-
able weight in EU exports of creative industries’ goods 
(each with 13 %). The fastest-growing creative indus-
tries’ goods exports in 2000–05 were new media (8.7 % 
growth). When one looks at intraregional trade in 
the EU, the most dynamic sectors were music (16.2 % 
growth) and audiovisual (15.1 % growth).
Figure 5.6:   Share of creative industries’ domains in export of creative industries’ goods (2005) by region
China
World
USA
EU-27
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
65 13 7 7 4 3
65 13 13 4 4 2
44 22 18 4 6 7
78 3 5 9 5
Design Publishing Visual arts Art and craft Music (CDs, tapes) New media Audiovisual
Note:    Intraregional trade is not included. The share of audiovisuals in exports of creative industries’ goods accounts for 0.2 % of world 
exports, 0.1 % of both US and extra-EU-27 exports and 0.003 % of Chinese extraterritorial exports (i.e. only USD 3 out of every 
USD 1 000 worth of export earnings are derived from audiovisuals). The share of music exports from China is negligible.
Source: Unctad global databank on world trade in creative products, WIFO calculations.175
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industries’ services differs from the sluggish trend in 
trade of creative industries’ goods. As of 2005, the sam-
ple of 11 countries was still a net importer of creative 
industries’ services, but it certainly managed to improve 
its trade balance for creative industries’ services to a 
considerable degree.
The group of 11 EU countries advanced its international 
competitiveness in architectural, engineering and other 
technical services. This finding is relevant in economic 
terms since this creative industries’ service category 
also forms the top service category of the sample under 
review. As of 2005 its share came to 30 % of total cre-
ative industries services. With a share of 24 %, royalties 
and licence fees ranked second, which underlines the 
need to develop and enforce regulatory framework 
conditions that are responsive to the challenges of the 
digital age.
Since the internal market is an opportunity to boost 
intraregional trade in creative industries’ services, it is 
important to evaluate the current cross-border trade 
and the potential barriers. Another indicator of service 
trade is the percentage of firms carrying out cross-bor-
der trade. In the selected western EU countries, the per-
centage of firms ranges between 8.9 % in architecture 
and 23.1 % in software consultancy (Table 5.8). The cor-
responding share for advertising is 16.3 %. The sample 
of eastern EU countries shows similar shares except for 
software consultancy and supply.
Given the low share of exporters among service firms it 
is worth investigating the main barriers to export (such 
as taxation issues and language and cultural barriers). 
Table A.4 (in the appendix) provides an overview of a 
number of potential barriers to service exports charac-
terised by the degree of importance: somewhat, fairly, 
very and not important. All business service firms, 
exporting or non-exporting, were questioned. The 
greatest barriers are said to be ‘difficulties in identifying 
potential clients abroad’, ‘lack of international standards 
for services’ and ‘language and cultural barriers’, while 
‘insurance, guarantee systems, etc. issues’ and ‘taxation 
issues’ are less important.
Revealed comparative advantages
In 2005, the EU had a revealed comparative advan-
tage in creative industries’ exports for 13 out of 25 
products. This means that the share of EU creative 
industry exports in total exports is higher than the 
share of creative industry exports in total exports 
in the world (64). As can be seen in Figure A.3 (in the 
appendix), a number of products even increased their 
revealed comparative advantage in 2000–05. The 
individual products that most improved their pos-
ition were digital records (new media) and antiques. 
The publishing types of creative goods also enhanced 
their comparative advantage. In particular, the EU 
turned its former disadvantage in newspapers into 
an advantage. Interestingly, the EU still does not have 
a revealed comparative advantage in the fast-grow-
ing video games sector, but has nonetheless made 
considerable progress. Conversely, its competitive 
position in interior design deteriorated until the cor-
responding RCA index eventually became negative, 
indicating a revealed comparative disadvantage for 
this good. The ability of the EU to compete in arts and 
crafts goods was already low at the outset (2000), and 
had fallen further behind by 2005. A similar trend is 
observable for the visual arts, with the notable excep-
tion of antiques. Though the EU mostly retains its 
power to compete in design goods, its competitive-
ness there has definitely been eroded.
5.2.5.2.  Trade in creative industry services
Consistent evidence on trade in creative industries’ 
services is only available for 11 EU Member States. This 
group of countries increased its aggregate exports of 
creative industries’ services by nearly 60 % between 
2000 and 2005, while the increase in imports of creative 
industries’ services was less than 1 % a year. Evidence 
derived from this limited group of countries strongly 
suggests that the great dynamics in trade of creative 
(64)  The revealed comparative advantage formula is available in the statistical 
annex of this report.
Table 5.6: Average annual growth in exports of creative industries’ goods (2000–05) by domains
World EU-27 (extra) EU-27 (intra) USA China (gross)
All creative industries 1.7 % 1.0 % 3.4 % - 1.7 % 3.4 %
Arts and crafts - 0.5 % - 3.2 % 2.6 % - 3.4 % - 1.4 %
Audiovisuals 5.7 % - 1.2 % 15.1 % - 9.6 % - 17.0 %
Design 2.0 % 1.2 % 2.8 % - 1.3 % 3.1 %
Music (CDs, tapes) 9.4 % 0.7 % 16.2 % 2.2 % - 2.1 %
New media 5.2 % 8.7 % - 0.2 % - 0.1 % 41.6 %
Publishing - 0.3 % 0.9 % 2.1 % - 3.8 % 6.5 %
Visual arts - 0.1 % 0.7 % - 0.6 % - 1.4 % - 1.3 %
Source: Unctad global databank on world trade in creative products, WIFO calculations.176
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Figure A.4 in the appendix gives a first indication of 
the urban specialisation of the creative industries in 
the EU-27, based on the Amadeus database where 
specialisation is measured as the location quotient in 
2006 (65). The evidence shows that cities have far higher 
concentrations of creative industry activity than does 
the national economy. In particular, Ljubljana, Warsaw, 
Bratislava, Prague, Vienna, Sofia, Rome, Copenhagen 
and Lisbon all have a location quotient of 2.0 or higher. 
Unpublished results show that the location quotient 
does not vary much when the spatial unit is defined 
as the core city or the metropolitan unit, except in the 
cases of London and Paris, where the location quotients 
are much higher.
A similar picture emerges when the location quotient is 
based on the occupational measure. Figure 5.7 shows 
the location quotient based on creative occupations at 
NUTS 1 and 2 levels for the 17 EU countries for which 
data is available.
The findings show that 17 out of 20 NUTS regions with 
the highest share of creative occupations are capital 
regions or semi-capital regions. Again, Bucharest, Bra-
tislava and Prague have location quotients for creative 
occupations of 2.0 or more.
The finding that creative industries and creative workers 
are concentrated in urban areas is consistent with the 
related literature. A recent study conducted for the Euro-
pean Cluster Observatory also shows a high degree of 
urban clustering (Power and Nielsén, 2010). In particular, 
the authors find that large urban areas and capital city 
(65)  The location quotient indicates whether and to what extent the share of 
creative industries (creative occupations alternatively) exceeds the national 
average. A location quotient of 1 indicates that the employment share of 
the creative industries in the given area is identical to that of the national 
economy. A quotient greater than 1 means that the creative industries are 
more prevalent in a given area than in the national economy.
5.2.6.  Evidence on the urban specialisation of the 
creative industries
A major characteristic of creative industry firms is their 
geographical clustering. Firms that produce creative 
goods and services are located in close proximity. A 
large number of empirical studies show that the cre  ative 
industries and creative professionals (also referred to as 
the ‘creative class’) are highly concentrated in metro-
politan and urban areas. For a recent contribution see 
Power and Nielsén (2010) at the NUTS 2 level for the EU 
countries. (NUTS 2 correponds to the Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics, representing basic regions 
for the application of regional policies.) Calculations at 
NUTS 2 level for several EU countries reveal that the 
regional difference in the share of creative industries 
within countries is greater than the difference between 
EU countries, as indicated by the coefficient of variation. 
The same holds when the share of creative occupations 
is used to calculate the coefficient of variation between 
regions and industries.
Table 5.8: Share of enterprises carrying out  
cross-border trade, 2004
EU-West EU-East
Software consultancy and 
supply
23.1 17.4
Architectural and engineering 
activities 
8.9 8.7
Advertising 16.3 15.2
All NACE branches — Total 13.0 12.4
Note:    EU-West includes Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Portugal and Sweden. EU-East includes Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Malta, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia.
Source:   Eurostat structural business statistics, 
WIFO calculations.
Table 5.7: Trade in creative industries’ services in 11 EU countries, key figures
Export of creative industries’ services Import of creative industries’ services
Share in total 
creative industries’ 
services (2005)
Average annual 
change (2000–05)
Share in total 
creative industries' 
services (2005)
Average annual 
change
(2000–05)
Total creative industries services 100 % 9.5 100 % 0.6
Royalties and licence fees 24 % 9.8 24 % 1.1
Advertising, market research and public 
opinion polling services
16 % 10.3 17 % 1.8
Architectural, engineering and other 
technical services
30 % 12.2 21 % 1.2
Audiovisual and related services 3 % 5.8 9 % - 5.3
Research and development services 21 % 7.7 17 % 6.7
Personal, cultural and recreational 
services
6 % 4.0 11 % - 4.9
Note:  The 11 EU countries are the Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden.
Source: Unctad global databank on world trade in creative products, WIFO calculations.177
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also shows the highest urban concentration of adver-
tising, designer fashion and publishing as compared to 
the creative industries at large. The remaining creative 
industries are more evenly distributed across the British 
regions.
Using metropolitan data for the US for the year 2001, 
Schoales (2006) finds that independent artists, writers 
and performers and jobs in motion picture and video 
production, distribution and postproduction show the 
highest level of spatial concentration of all industrial 
activities and services except hotel casinos. The author 
suggests that these industries are very cluster-depend-
ent because of an inherently rapid pace of product 
innovation.
Table 5.9 presents evidence on the degree of spatial 
specialisation for selected creative occupations based 
on the EU labour force survey for 2008.
regions dominate the creative and cultural industries. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence for North America and 
the EU suggests that urban concentration is uneven 
across the different creative industries and among the 
different creative occupations. For Sweden, Hanson 
(2007) finds a higher degree of spatial concentration 
of ‘bohemians’ (artists, writers, etc.) as compared to all 
creative workers (Hanson, 2007). For the EU countries, 
Power and Nielsén (2010) find that sub-industries with 
the highest urban concentration include (i) reproduction 
of computer media, sound recording and video record-
ing, (ii) publishing of software and sound recordings, 
(iii) motion picture and video production and distribu-
tion and (iv) news agency activities. Similarly, evidence 
at regional level for the UK shows that the highest urban 
concentrations can be found for video, film and photo-
graphy, music, visual and performing arts and radio and 
TV, with London location quotients of about 2.7, 2.4 
and 3.1, respectively (De Propris et al., 2009). London 
Figure 5.7:   Location quotient of creative occupations, 2002 and 2008
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RO, SE, SK and UK. It is not possible to calculate the location quotient of creative occupations for SI, PL and BG because there is 
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tion for EE, LT, LU, LV and NL. See Table 1 for the definition of creative occupations. All numbers are weighted to reflect national 
population weights. 
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and tacit knowledge; (ii) spillovers from one spe-
cific creative industry to another; (iii) firms’ access to 
dedicated infrastructure and collective resources; (iv) 
project-based work; (v) synergistic benefits of collect-
ive learning; and (vi) development of associated ser-
vices, infrastructure and supportive government pol-
icies (Lorenzen and Frederiksen, 2008; Malmberg and 
Maskell, 2002). Local labour markets are particularly 
relevant for the creative industries. Creative industry 
firms locate near one another in order to take advan-
tage of a common pool of labour, knowledge and 
ideas. Lorenzen and Frederiksen (2008) mention the 
high degree of mobility and labour flows between 
different creative industry firms. In addition, there 
are a significant number of multiple job holders (e.g. 
a film director involved in advertisement production). 
Localisation helps to decrease transaction costs due 
to the temporary and flexible nature of projects. The 
second point concerns knowledge spillovers. Typically, 
agglomeration economies related to knowledge spill-
overs are usually more pronounced in skill-intensive 
industries, as is the case for creative industries. The 
size, density and compactness of urban centres foster 
interpersonal interaction, creating greater opportun-
In the EU-14 (EU-15 excluding Ireland) the difference 
in location quotient between rural and urban areas is 
greatest for mathematical and statistical professionals, 
writers, creative/performing artists and computing pro-
fessionals. For artistic, entertainment and sport occupa-
tions, the rural-urban gap is close to that of all creative 
occupations.
Based on Dutch urban areas and very long time series, 
Deinema and Kloosterman (2009) find that the arts 
show the highest degree of spatial concentration, fol-
lowed by publishing, as compared to advertising, archi-
tecture and broadcasting. The magnitude of spatial 
concentration not only lasts for a long time, but also 
seems to be reinforced over a long period of time. In 
other words, some creative industries display a very 
high degree of path dependence. Calculations based 
on EU data also show that the spatial pattern in the 
location of creative industries is highly persistent over 
time.
There are several reasons why creative industries 
are concentrated in urban areas. The main factors 
are: (i) importance of specific local labour markets 
Table 5.9: Location quotient of core creative occupations in urban, rural and intermediate populated 
areas, EU-14 and EU-7, 2008
EU-14 EU-7
Densely 
populated 
area
Inter- 
mediate 
area
Thinly popu-
lated area
Densely 
populated 
area
Inter- 
mediate 
area
Thinly popu-
lated area
Share of creative occupations 9.6 6.2 4.5 7.2 4.6 2.5
Total creative occupations 1.25 0.81 0.59 1.53 0.98 0.53
211
Physicists, chemists and related 
professionals
1.27 0.82 0.52 1.49 1.03 0.55
212
Mathematicians, statisticians and 
related professionals
1.57 0.46 0.23 2.09 0.63 0.20
213 Computing professionals 1.30 0.78 0.47 1.71 0.91 0.40
214
Architects, engineers and related 
professionals
1.20 0.91 0.57 1.51 1.01 0.55
221 Life science professionals 1.11 0.80 1.01 1.16 1.15 0.79
222 Health professionals 1.25 0.79 0.63 1.31 1.17 0.65
243
Archivists, librarians and related infor-
mation professionals
1.27 0.61 0.84 1.46 1.16 0.52
244
Social science and related profession-
als
1.23 0.82 0.64 1.52 1.00 0.54
245
Writers and creative or performing 
artists
1.36 0.65 0.53 1.86 0.72 0.36
347
Artistic, entertainment and sports 
associate professionals
1.28 0.73 0.63 1.53 0.75 0.64
521 Fashion and other models (1) 1.18 0.58 1.18 1.16 2.28 0.30
Note:    EU-14 refers to AT, BE, DE, DK, EL, ES, FI, FR, IT, LU, NL, PT, SE and UK. EU-7 refers CY, CZ, EE, HU LT, LV and SK. All numbers are 
weighted to reflect national population weights. Densely populated areas are defined as local areas with a density superior to 
500 inhabitants per km2, where the total population for the set is at least 50 000 inhabitants. Intermediate areas have a density 
of 100 inhabitants per km2 with a total population for the set of at least 50 000 inhabitants. Thinly populated areas contain 
areas that belong to neither types (see EU labour force survey user guide). 
(1)    In some cases, the number of observations is less than 50. The number of observations is sometimes fewer than 50 for ‘Fashion 
and other models’.
Source: EU labour force survey 2008.179
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cities. Within such music clusters, new project partners 
(e.g. art direction, media and event firms) can be easily 
found, which reduces transaction costs (Maskell and 
Lorenzen, 2004; STEP, 2003).
Given the degree of urban concentration in creative 
industries, it is natural to ask to what extent this is 
linked to factors such as population size, GDP per 
capita and availability of human capital. It is obvious 
that size matters. Large cities have a large number of 
consumers with a high disposable income for spend-
ing on luxury goods and a significant amount of leis-
ure time. The next step, therefore, is to explore the 
statistical relationship between the concentration of 
creative industries in cities and the size and wealth of 
the population of those cities. The data on metropol-
itan population, GDP per capita in PPS and the tertiary 
share are obtained from the urban audit statistics and 
refer to 2006 or the latest available year. The location 
quotient is calculated based on the Amadeus database 
and refers to 2006.
OLS (ordinary least squares) estimation results indicate 
that population size and human capital are the most 
important factors that affect the spatial concentration 
of creative industries in different urban areas in the EU. 
In particular, the larger the population of a European 
city or metropolitan area, the larger will be its share 
of creative industries relative to the national average. 
However, the elasticity of the 0.26 location quotient 
with respect to population size indicates that the 
degree of urban specialisation of the creative indus-
tries rises less than proportionally with an increase 
in population size. The significance of population is 
related to the fact that many cities have too few inhab-
itants to constitute sufficient consumer demand for 
the specialised services that creative industries offer. 
The elasticity for the tertiary graduate share indicates 
that the degree of urban specialisation of the creative 
industries rises proportionally with the tertiary educa-
tion share. However, in general, causality can go both 
ways. For instance, the employment share of creative 
industries does not only depend on a significant pro-
portion of highly skilled labour: cities that offer a sig-
nificant output of creative and cultural products as 
compared to the national average also tend to attract 
more highly skilled workers. GDP per capita is only 
significant at the 10 % level. The location quotient of 
capital cities is not significantly higher than that of 
non-capital cities. Other factors, such as past popula-
tion growth and the share of foreign-born people, are 
not significant. Belonging to a capital city is not sig-
nificantly related to the location quotient once cities’ 
GDP per capita and human capital population size are 
controlled for.
ities for enhanced information flows. As a result, cities 
have historically been the places where much innov-
ation has occurred (Bettencourt et al., 2007). Another 
reason is firms’ access to infrastructure — such as 
music schools and opera houses — and collective 
resources (e.g. universities). Furthermore, clustering in 
the creative industries is also related to the fact that 
the work is often project-based with many face-to-face 
contacts due to high levels of uncertainty, instability 
and project complexity, as well as short product cycles 
(Lorenzen and Frederiksen, 2008).
Evidence on interrelations between different creative 
industries can be obtained by investigating co-location 
patterns. Advertising businesses tend to favour highly 
centralised downtown locations in order to be close to 
national newspapers and television stations (Grabher, 
2002). The media industry often manifests itself as a spe-
cialised form of cluster designed to produce media con-
tent, such as motion pictures, television programmes/
videos, broadcasts, audio recordings, books, news-
papers, magazines, games, photography and designs, 
websites and mobile content (Picard, 2009). Wu (2005) 
suggests that multimedia firms (i.e. firms that provide 
Internet content) appear to settle in places where the 
traditional media sector (e.g. the film and music indus-
try, entertainment) and the software industry are already 
in place.
There are also significant relations between the media 
industry and music and theatrical performance and fes-
tivals, sport and entertainment activities, information 
and communication technologies (computers, software, 
telecommunications) and hardware manufacturers (tele-
vision and radio receivers, set-top boxes, game consoles, 
DVD players, etc.) (Picard, 2009).
Currid and Williams (2010) find that several cultural sub-
sectors show strong co-location patterns. Using highly 
disaggregated data for Los Angeles and New York, the 
authors find correlation coefficients across districts 
of 0.75 and higher for (i) performing arts and music, 
(ii) music and film, (iii) art and design, and (iv) art and 
film. The co-location patterns are explained by cultural 
infrastructure.
Not only are creative industries as a whole heavily con-
centrated in urban areas but the degree of urban con-
centration also depends on the type of creative indus-
try. A very high degree of spatial concentration can be 
found in film, music and other arts. The tendency of 
the music industry to agglomerate in urban areas can 
be explained by the fact that the music industry is very 
often a highly localised cultural product industry that 
draws on a local creative background and cultural forms 
(Power and Hallencreutz, 2002; Hesmondhalgh, 1996). 
Another reason is that the national subsidiaries of major 
international record companies are also located in major 180
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and the share of workers with tertiary education is 0.8. 
This indicates that the creative class is little different 
from the group that have received tertiary education 
(which often is the source of measurement of human 
capital) and raises serious doubts about how much the 
creative class concept introduced by Florida (2002) adds 
to the theory of human capital. From an empirical point 
of view, the high degree of multicollinearity makes it 
impossible to sort out the individual effects of the two 
explanatory variables.
Given the high degree of correlation between human 
capital and the creative class, it is not surprising that 
only a few studies come to the conclusion that the cre-
ative class measures explain growth better than human 
capital (Marlet and Van Workens (2007) for the Dutch 
regions; Möller and Tubadji (2009) for German regions). 
In a study of the 50 most important cities in the Neth-
erlands, Marlet and Van Woerkens (2007) find that 
both the creative class concept and education are sig-
nificant. More importantly, the professional categories 
which make up the creative class are better indicators 
for predicting economic growth than human capital. In 
contrast, the ‘bohemian index’ is not a useful indicator 
for explaining the differences in economic perform-
ance among Dutch cities. In an influential study, based 
on US metropolitan data, Glaeser (2005) finds that the 
creative class becomes an insignificant factor of urban 
growth when human capital is included. Similar find-
ings are obtained by Hoyman and Faricy (2009) based 
on US data. Rausch and Negrey (2006) also find that the 
concentration of creative class workers is insignificant in 
explaining metropolitan output growth after controlling 
for educational attainment.
Some studies do not even find that creative occupations 
have a direct effect on growth, even when human cap-
ital is not controlled for (Beckstead et al., 2008; Donegan 
et al., 2008; Rausch and Negrey, 2006; Beyers, 2010). Few 
studies investigate whether creative occupations are a 
significant driver of growth not only in urban but also 
in rural areas. An exception is the study by McGrana-
han and Wojan (2007), who find that both urban and 
rural areas with higher levels of creative occupations 
are associated with higher rates of total employment 
growth. Overall, the literature suggests that the cre-
ative class is important, but is not the dominant driver 
of metropolitan economic growth. Human capital and 
innovation are more important. An interesting result is 
obtained by Chantelot (2008) based on French urban 
data, namely that the growth effects of creative occupa-
tions are greater in metropolitan areas than in medium-
sized cities.
Table A.5 in the appendix provides ONS estimates of the 
relationship between the employment share of creative 
industries and the average annual change in GDP per 
capita in purchasing power parities between 2002 and 
5.3.  Growth effects and the wider role of the 
creative industries
5.3.1.  Relationship between the size of creative 
industries and regional growth
There is an ongoing debate about the effects of creative 
occupations and creative industries on regional growth 
in the EU and the US. Florida (2002, 2004) suggests that 
creative people are key drivers of urban and regional 
growth. This ‘creative class’ hypothesis has received 
much attention among scholars, policymakers, urban 
planners and civic leaders. In particular, the creative 
class hypothesis links urban growth with the knowledge 
economy. According to Mellander and Florida (2009) 
the creative workforce can have an indirect impact on 
regional growth through its positive impact on high-
tech employment, innovation and entrepreneurship.
In recent years there have been numerous studies test-
ing Florida’s hypothesis using more rigorous economet-
ric methods. So far, empirical evidence on the growth 
effects of the creative class hypothesis and/or the cre-
ative industries is mixed and controversial. However, 
the results based on regional data for EU countries tend 
to be more optimistic about the growth effects of the 
creative industries (Piergiovanni et al. (2009) for Italy; 
Stam et al., 2008; Marlet and Van Workens (2007) and 
Oort et al. (2009) for the Netherlands; Falck et al. (2009) 
and Möller and Tubadji (2009), both based on German 
regional data; Boschma and Fritsch (2009), for two EU 
countries; and Chantelot (2008), based on French data). 
Andersen (2010) validates Florida’s theories with regard 
to larger Nordic city regions. Although these studies 
show positive results, it is difficult to generalise from the 
findings since they differ widely in their scope: they are 
based on different sample periods and countries, differ-
ent definitions of the creative occupations and on dif-
ferent model specifications and estimation techniques.
Much of the controversy concerns how to define and 
measure the creative class. The major critical point is 
that there is no clear distinction between the creative 
class and people with high educational attainment, 
since no high-skill occupations have been excluded 
from the creative class (Markusen, 2006). In fact, a 
number of empirical studies find a high degree of cor-
relation between human capital (measured as the share 
of working-age population with tertiary education) and 
the creative class. Using Swedish regional data, Hansen 
(2007) shows that this correlation is 0.94. He captures 
the latter in terms of educational attainment levels. For 
the US, Glaeser (2005) finds a 0.75 correlation between 
the share of college graduates and the creative class. 
Based on regional data (at the NUTS 1 and 2 levels) 
drawn from the EU labour force survey from 2008, the 
correlation between the share of creative occupations 181
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is significantly negative, indicating that these regions 
exhibit, other things being equal, lower growth rates of 
GDP per capita.
When the growth rate is measured as real growth of 
GDP per capita in euro (rather than in current PPS), both 
human capital and the share of the creative industries 
are seen to have a positive and significant impact, as 
indicated by the Wald test statistic (lower panel of Table 
A.5 in the appendix). This means that the estimation 
results are not sensitive as to whether GDP is measured 
in euro or in PPS.
To sum up, the key result in this section is that the initial 
share of the creative industries has a positive and sig-
nificant effect on the growth rate of GDP per capita at 
regional level in 10 EU countries. The positive growth 
effect of the creative industries remains robust even 
when allowing for general human capital. This means 
that the real growth rate increases when other firms 
from the creative industries decide to locate nearby. 
The positive growth effects could be related to the fact 
that the resulting increased concentration of creative 
industry firms within a region facilitates knowledge 
spillovers. It appears that aggregate growth depends on 
the industrial structure and/or the concentration of spe-
cific industries, and this result is consistent with Peneder 
(2003), who finds that aggregate growth is significantly 
positively related to technology-led and skill-intensive 
industries based on a sample of OECD countries.
5.3.2.  Supply-chain linkages between creative 
industries and the rest of the economy
One way of investigating the wider effects of the cre-
ative industries is to look at the importance of creative 
goods and services as an intermediate input factor in 
other sectors. These supply-chain relationships may be 
an important factor for productivity gains and innov-
ation. Innovation effects might reflect the direct pro-
vision of innovative services in the case of advertising 
companies, say, that are developing new brands for 
their clients, or design consultancies that are offering 
customers product design services. Knowledge spill-
overs may also occur if creative working practices ‘rub 
off’ onto their business clients in an unremunerated 
way. A second mechanism under consideration is the 
possibility that the creative industries support local 
innovation systems through channels — including 
knowledge spillovers — that operate specifically at the 
local level. These mechanisms are not necessarily mutu-
ally exclusive.
Business-to-business (B2B) transactions account for the 
majority of creative industry sales. The official UK supply 
and use tables show that around 60 % of creative prod-
ucts supplied to the UK economy are used as intermedi-
2007. Alternatively, the real growth rate of regional GDP 
at market prices between 2002 and 2006 is used. The 
underlying data are at NUTS 2 regional level and drawn 
from the New Cronos regional database, combined with 
the employment share of the creative industries drawn 
from the Amadeus database, also at NUTS 2 level. All 
explanatory variables refer to 2002. Three specifications 
are provided. The first includes the initial log level of 
GDP per capita, the employment share of creative indus-
tries and the dummy variable for capital city regions. The 
second specification adds the investment ratio and the 
third includes the share of working age population with 
tertiary education as well.
The results show that the employment share of the 
creative industries in the initial year has a positive and 
highly significant impact on the average annual growth 
rate of regional GDP per capita in the next five years. This 
indicates that regions with a high employment share 
of creative industries grow faster than other regions 
(column i). The coefficient of 0.15 indicates that an in-
crease in the employment share of the creative indus-
tries by 1 percentage point raises the average annual 
growth rate by 0.15 percentage points (66).
The coefficient of the share of creative industries 
remains positive and significant when the investment 
ratio is included in the regression equation. However, 
the coefficient of the employment share of the creative 
industries drops considerably when human capital is 
included in the regional growth equation as indicated 
by column (iii). Furthermore, the standard error of the 
coefficient on the employment share of creative indus-
tries is enlarged due to multicollinearity between the 
share of creative industries and the share of workers 
with tertiary education (67). Wald test statistics of joint 
significance indicate that both the employment share of 
creative industries and human capital are jointly signifi-
cant at the 5 % level. Looking at the magnitude of the 
effects, one can see that human capital is more import-
ant than the share of the creative industries in explain-
ing regional growth (68). The finding that human capital 
is one of the main drivers of regional economic growth 
is consistent with the literature (e.g. Glaeser et al., 2000).
As expected, lagged GDP per capita is significantly nega-
tive. The coefficient indicates that the speed of conver-
gence is about 1 % per year, which is in line with earlier 
studies. The dummy variable for the capital city region 
(66)  However, the three variables (i.e. initial GDP per capita, employment share of 
the creative industries and the dummy variable for capital cities) in the basic 
equation explain only a small proportion of the variations in growth rates 
across European NUTS 2 regions, as indicated by the low R squared of 0.08.
(67)  The correlation between the two variables is 0.44.
(68)  In particular, an increase of one standard deviation in the tertiary graduates’ 
share leads to an increase in the growth rate of 0.5 percentage points (= 
0.057*0.084*100), whereas an increase in the employment share of creative 
industries by one standard deviation raise the average annual growth rate by 
0.2 percentage points (0.11*0.017*100).182
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up over 8 % of total gross output and accounted for 
19 % of intermediate purchases by the creative indus-
tries.
Calculations based on input-output tables for Denmark 
lead to similar findings (69). Figure A.7 in the appendix 
shows the 20 largest industry users of creative inputs 
among 121 Danish industries at the 3-digit level. Again, 
the creative industries themselves are the largest sup-
plier, with a creative intermediate input share of 37 %. 
The real estate sector acquires 22 % of its input from the 
creative industries (mainly inputs from publishing and 
software consultancy and supply). Among the manufac-
turing industries, manufacturers of tobacco and bever-
ages have the highest share of creative intermediate 
input due to their extensive use of advertising services. 
The education sector also has one of the highest usage 
rates of creative input (over 10 %), which is due to its 
close integration with the audiovisual sector. In add-
ition, wholesale and retail trade have a higher than aver-
age rate of usage of creative inputs. Unpublished results 
show that advertising and software consulting have 
supply-chain linkages with all of the 116 non-creative 
industries.
(69)  Statistics Denmark provides a detailed input-output table (121 x 121 product 
industry matrix). For most EU countries official input-output tables are only 
available at the 2-digit level.
ate inputs for other industries (including other creative 
industries (Experian, 2007). B2B demand is particularly 
important for advertising, architecture, software and 
fashion products (Figure A.5 in the appendix). For the 
latter two industries, notable growth can be observed 
over time. Architecture and software products also 
stimulate investment — adding to the future productive 
capacity of the UK economy (Figure A.6 in the appen-
dix). Other creative products — the arts, radio and TV 
and film — are primarily consumption goods.
Evidence based on structural business data for 12 EU 
countries in 2004 also shows that B2B transactions 
dominate in software architecture and advertising with 
a turnover share of 80 % or more in software and 93 % in 
advertising. Households account for 3 % to 6 % depend-
ing on the subsector. The public sector accounts for the 
remaining part.
Industry purchases of creative products accounted for 
around 6 % of overall intermediate purchases by UK 
industries in 2004 and were equivalent to around 3 % of 
total gross industry output (Figure 5.8). These ‘forward’ 
supply chain linkages from the UK’s creative industries 
appear to be stronger for certain services sectors than 
they are for manufacturing. Purchases of creative prod-
ucts were particularly important among the creative 
industries themselves: creative product purchases made 
Figure 5.8:   UK industry purchases of UK creative products, 1992–2004
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sectors (71). For example, 32 % of creative industry busi-
nesses introduced product innovations in the three 
years to 2007 (compared to 21 % in other industries) and 
16 % introduced new process innovations (compared to 
11 % outside the creative industries). The differences are 
greater when considering new-to-market, as opposed 
to new-to-firm, innovations: here, proportionately twice 
as many creative businesses were product innovative 
(14 %, compared to 7 % in the rest of the economy) and 
process innovative (6 %, compared to 3 % in other sec-
tors). As many as 40 % of creative industry firms intro-
duced wider innovations in the three years prior to 2007 
(that is, they made changes to their corporate strategies, 
management techniques, organisational structure or 
marketing methods), compared to 29 % in other sectors.
Furthermore, new evidence based on the Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS) 2006 for 19 EU countries also 
shows that creative industry firms are more innovative 
than firms belonging to non-creative industries (72). 
However, this innovativeness varies greatly from one 
industry to another. Most notably, it is very high in soft-
ware consulting and supply, a little lower in architecture 
and close to average in advertising and publishing. In 
particular, for the seven EU-15 countries for which data 
are available, half of the software firms introduced new 
or significantly improved services and/or goods, while 
for other services the share was 12.7 %. There are simi-
lar findings for the remaining EU countries. The differ-
ence in innovativeness is even more pronounced when 
market novelties are considered: 36 % of west Euro-
pean (EU west includes Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden) software firms 
were innovative in the three-year period 2004–06, 
compared to only 4.6 % of other service industries.
Compared to non-creative service industries, the archi-
tecture and advertising industries also have a higher per-
centage of firms introducing new or significantly 
improved services — although the difference is less 
pronounced than in the case of the software industry. 
Firms in the publishing sector are no more innov  ative 
than other manufacturing industries. Turning to process 
innovations, software firms again show a higher propor-
tion of innovation than firms in the non-creative services. 
For the remaining creative industries the evidence is not 
(71)  This survey covers the period 2005–07 with a sample size of 14 870 firms. 
Traditionally, not all of the 4-digit SIC codes that define the creative industries 
have been covered by the sample frame, but the statistical authorities have in 
recent years made particular efforts to address this. Advertising, architecture, 
arts and antiques, designer fashion, most of publishing (except news agency 
activities) and most parts of video, film and photography, software, computer 
games and electronic publishing are included. Radio and TV and all firms in 
artistic and literary creation and operation of arts facilities — which are part 
of the music, visual, and performing arts sector — are excluded.
(72)  However, in CIS data for the 19 EU countries, coverage of the creative indus-
tries is limited to publishing, software consultancy and supply, architecture 
and advertising, unlike the CIS data for the UK, which also includes arts and 
antiques, designer fashion and most parts of video, film and photography, 
software, computer games and electronic publishing.
5.4.  The role of innovation in the creative 
industries — The role of the creative 
industries in innovation
The links between the creative industries and innovation 
are manifold. First, the innovation performance of the 
creative industries is above average (70), although often 
underrated due to the mostly non-technological nature 
of these activities (Stam et al. (2008) for the Netherlands; 
Bakhshi et al. (2008) and Bakhshi and McVittie (2009), 
both for the UK; Müller et al. (2009) for Austria). Creative 
industries’ innovations rely on R & D inputs, and may 
not even promote the primary generation of new know-
ledge. Rather, innovations are driven by acts of creativity 
and cooperative efforts (Potts, 2009).
Second, this specific innovation behaviour of creative 
industries’ firms helps increase their dynamic capabil-
ities and thus helps disseminate new technologies. Cre-
ative industry firms tend to make use of a large network 
of weak, heterogeneous relationships that ensure easy 
access to and fast absorption of new knowledge — an 
observation which fits in well with the evolutionary/sys-
temic view of innovation. Knowledge and technology 
transfer is also driven by a strong functional or regional 
(business-to-business) network structure (Potts et, 
2008).
Third, the dynamic development of the creative indus-
tries is closely tied to technological progress and innov-
ations in some key technologies developed elsewhere. 
Current means of mass (re)production, mass consump-
tion and commercialisation of artistic/creative content 
have been made possible mostly by technological 
advances in the fields of information and communi-
cation technology (Cunningham et al., 2004). In fact, 
creative industries are intense users of ICT innovations 
in particular, as well as other new technologies. For 
instance, digital technologies and compression meth-
ods for audio and video signals that allow efficient 
storage and rapid transmission with little loss of qual-
ity have created new, low-cost means of sales distribu-
tion. Such a development accelerates the diffusion of 
technological innovations from the supply side (Müller 
et al., 2009). Lastly, consumer habits, particularly those 
of young buyers with considerable affinity for technol-
ogy, play a crucial role from the demand side (for the 
role of consumers see Hartley (2008)).
New data from the fifth UK innovation survey suggest 
that the creative industries have higher levels of prod-
uct, process and wider innovation activities than other 
(70)  A recent IPTS report supports this statement on the innovation performance 
of creative industries and in particular the quite outstanding one of the soft-
ware sector. The report indicates that, from 2002 to 2007, business expendi-
tures in R & D (BERD) increased by 40 % and employment of researchers by 
56 % in the computer services and software sector (NACE Rev. 1.1 sector 72). 
See Turlea 2010. 184
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and services, ranging from ideas for innovations to 
R & D support and product design (Müller et al., 2009). 
The design sector provides an especially good example 
of the supply-side effects. This sector has gained sig-
nificant importance over the past years and has earned 
itself a steady place in contemporary production. Fig-
ures 5.9 and A.7 (in the appendix) show the extent to 
which other industries make use of inputs from the 
design sector. The descriptive statistics are calculated 
using the CIS 2006 micro data for a sample of 15 EU 
Member States.
Figure 5.9 shows the proportion of firms that used 
industrial design registration as a protection method in 
a sample of 15 EU countries (largely from the new Mem-
ber States). A design registration offers the opportunity 
to protect intellectual property rights against others 
who subsequently produce articles with the same or 
similar appearance.
Clearly, most industrial design registrations are found 
in manufacturing industries such as chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, minerals, glass and ceramics, motor 
vehicles, tobacco and machinery. This shows that some 
forms of creativity, such as design, can be found in all 
industries; they are not restricted to a limited group of 
creative industry firms.
Another way to ascertain how and to what extent 
designers affect innovations in the greater economy is 
to look at the proportion of enterprises that introduce 
significant changes to the design of goods and services. 
Based on CIS 2006 data for four EU countries, Figure A.8 
in the appendix shows that product design innovations 
can be found in all industries. In the chemical and phar-
maceuticals sector, one fourth of the firms introduced 
product design innovations during the period 2004–06. 
A higher than average proportion of design innovators 
can be found in tobacco, banking, insurance, food and 
software. As expected, design innovations are less fre-
quently reported in non-manufacturing industries such 
as transport and energy and water supply.
Descriptive evidence based on 14 EU countries shows 
that different knowledge sources are more frequently 
used in both software and architecture firms than in the 
non-creative (services) industries. For instance, 73 % 
of software firms answered that clients and customers 
are an important source of innovation (to a medium or 
high extent), compared to 39 % in the non-creative ser-
vice industries. Another example refers to knowledge 
sourcing from universities: about a quarter of software 
and architecture firms regard university research as 
an important source of information for the innovation 
process, compared to 10 % in non-creative service 
industries. In addition, three of the remaining know-
ledge sources (i.e. government or public research insti-
tutes, scientific journals, trade/technical publications 
clear-cut. While publishing shows a higher share of firms 
with new production processes, architecture and adver-
tising exhibit a similar proportion of innovators.
There is a similar pattern when different innovation-
input activities (i.e. R & D and non-R & D innovation 
activities) are considered. Evidence based on the CIS 
2006 survey for the UK suggests that creative industry 
businesses tend to engage in more innovation-related 
activities, undertake more R & D, invest in more train-
ing and spend more on design than firms in other sec-
tors (Figure A.9 in the appendix). Descriptive evidence 
based on CIS 2006 data for 17 EU countries shows that 
software and architectural services have a significantly 
higher share of firms conducting R & D (47 % and 27 %, 
respectively) compared to 6 % for other services (based 
on seven EU-15 countries). More generally, innovation 
activities in the creative industries are much broader 
than just R & D investment. The evidence shows that 
creative industry firms tend to engage more in training 
activities related to innovation and the acquisition of 
external expertise and new machinery as compared to 
firms outside the creative industries. This also holds for 
advertising and publishing.
Creative industry firms are not only more innovative 
in general but are also early adopters of Internet and 
e-business practices. Evidence based on the e-business 
w@tch survey 2005 of seven EU countries shows that 
more than 30 % of creative industry firms had adopted 
e-business activities by 2000 or earlier, compared to 
17 % for the remaining industries. More importantly, 
the majority of technological innovations (90 % of 
innov  ations in the publishing industry, for instance) are 
enabled by ICT.
Following the system of innovation literature, the ability 
of firms and industries to generate innovations depends 
not only on the performance of individual firms but also 
on their interaction and organisation. There are many 
additional players, including other firms (suppliers, cus-
tomers, subcontractors and competing firms) and inter-
mediary organisations (consultants, technology centres, 
governmental offices and regulatory agencies), as well 
as public and private research centres and universities. 
It is within these networks that people are able to learn 
about, imitate and eventually create new products and 
ideas. Müller et al. (2009) note that, as a rich source of 
ideas and knowledge, the creative industries exhibit 
strong positive external effects on other innovating 
firms, such that a blind focus on their own innovative 
output is likely to underestimate the importance of the 
creative industries for the greater innovation system.
As prime producers of intellectual property, the cre-
ative industries are expected to be a particularly 
attractive source of external knowledge for innovating 
firms. They offer a diverse bundle of creative products 185
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only sixth. In the EU-East countries, universities are 
also much more relevant for software and architecture 
firms than for the rest of the economy. Overall this 
suggests that the importance of interaction between 
science and industry is most pronounced in software 
and architecture. It appears that these industries rely 
to a larger extent on new knowledge developed by 
universities.
As already mentioned, enterprises in the creative indus-
try tend to be heavily involved in business-to-business 
activities. They produce creative intermediate goods 
that are used as inputs in non-creative industry sectors, 
thereby contributing to innovations in the wider econ-
omy. Bakhshi et al. (2008) show that, for a wide range 
of innovation measures, firms with stronger links to the 
creative industries have a stronger innovation perform-
ance. The underlying data consist of input-output tables 
for the UK at the 3-digit level, combined with the fourth 
UK community innovation survey. For example, Figure 
A.10 in the appendix shows that firms in industries that 
exhibit above-median B2B spending on creative indus-
try products — expressed as a percentage of their gross 
output — have a stronger innovation performance than 
firms in industries with below-median B2B spending. 
Overall this indicates that the creative industries play a 
significant role in the transfer of knowledge, ideas and 
innovation in business-to-business transactions. This 
transfer becomes especially important in the flow of 
tacit knowledge in the sense of Polanyi (1977), who finds 
that the transfer hinges on personal communication in a 
creative environment.
and consultants, commercial labs and private R & D 
institutes) are regarded as much more important by 
both software and architecture firms than firms outside 
of the creative industries. However, in advertising and 
publishing, the degree of importance of these informa-
tion sources does not differ much from the non-creative 
service firms.
The CIS 2006 shows that in the western (73) and east-
ern (74) EU countries for which data are available, about 
one third of software and architecture firms are actu-
ally working together to innovate. In the western EU 
countries this proportion is twice as high as that of 
firms in the non-creative services sector; in the eastern 
EU countries it is 13 and 8 percentage points higher, 
respectively, than in the remaining service sectors. 
When it comes to choosing cooperation partners, soft-
ware firms most commonly choose to work with their 
customers. Customers are involved in the innovation 
activities of about 28 % of firms in EU-West and 40 % in 
EU-East. In architecture and advertising, suppliers are 
the most important cooperation partners. It is interest-
ing to note that in the EU-West countries, universities 
are the second most important cooperation partners 
for software firms (19 % of firms) and the third most 
important partners for architecture firms (also 19 %). 
For firms in non-creative industries, universities come 
(73)  EU-West includes Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and 
Sweden.
(74)  EU-East includes Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Hungary, Malta, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia.
Figure 5.9:   Proportion of firms with industrial design registration across EU industries, 2004–06
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first place for horizontal policies to set up proper frame-
work conditions and (re-)establish competitive markets 
and environments. In this spirit, a recent Green Paper 
launched by the European Commission (European 
Commission, 2010) emphasises the importance of fair 
market access and the role of competition policy in 
‘creating and maintaining the level playing field which 
ensures that there are no unjustified barriers to entry’ 
(European Commission, 2010, p. 7). Accordingly, a pol-
icy agenda in support of the creative industries would 
have to include issues such as ensuring fair access to 
market and to finance, in particular for innovative SMEs, 
the promotion of cultural exchanges and trade in cul-
tural/creative goods and services within the framework 
of international agreements (WTO, Unesco Convention 
on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cul-
tural Expressions), the reduction of regulatory burdens 
on creative entrepreneurs and the protection of intel-
lectual property rights.
Apart from establishing first-best framework conditions, 
the existence of market failure increases the acceptance 
of further policy intervention. The general support for 
policy intervention in the area of creative industries 
points to the overall consensus that the creative indus-
tries do indeed constitute a case of market failure in 
the sense that they give rise to externalities, informa-
tion failures (Frey, 2003), or structural, institutional and 
regulatory deficiencies which affect creative industries’ 
activities. These policy rationales apply more strongly to 
the cultural than to the more market-oriented segments 
of the creative industries; however, the role of policy 
would still be to correct these failures should the occa-
sion arise.
Market failures
Producers of creative industries’ goods and services face 
considerable uncertainties in demand. Since the returns 
are highly speculative, creative industry activities are 
hard to predict. Not having complete information on the 
pay-offs of their activities, creative industries’ firms are 
unable to make rational profit-maximising decisions — 
one of the core assumptions in the neoclassical bench-
mark model.
Information failures apply especially to the financing 
of creative industry activities. Even if creative entrepre-
neurs demonstrate perfect foresight with respect to 
their future pay-offs, they still face severe difficulties in 
credibly proving the value of their projects to potential 
investors, because this would involve revealing informa-
tion about the originality of the project. However, the 
creative industry business model is based on the notion 
of uniqueness and exploiting first-mover advantages; 
imitation at an early stage would thus be a substantial 
threat to setting up a new undertaking.
This finding is consistent with more formal cross-sec-
tional statistical analysis. In particular, econometric 
models explaining variations in innovative behaviour 
between firms suggest that firms in industries with 
stronger B2B linkages to creative industries are, all 
other things being equal, significantly more likely to 
introduce product innovations. The estimates suggest 
that firms that spend double the average amount on 
creative products — 6 % compared to 3 % of their gross 
output — are 25 % more likely to introduce product 
innovations new either to the firm or to the market. To 
put this result into perspective, according to the model 
these creative linkage impacts are similar in magnitude 
to the effect that access to government support has on 
innovation.
The direction of causality between spending on cre-
ative inputs and innovation cannot be established using 
these cross-sectional data alone. It is also difficult to be 
certain whether innovation is being driven directly by 
creative products (as inputs to the innovation process) 
or indirectly by knowledge transfer — possibly unre-
munerated — from the creative industries. Bakhshi et 
al. (2008), based on evidence drawn from the UK innov-
ation survey, find some evidence that knowledge trans-
fer from creative suppliers leads to improvements in 
product range and quality.
5.5.  The policy dimension: summary and 
conclusions
5.5.1.  Policy rationales
Irrespective of the general agreement as to the value 
of creative industries’ policy, there remains substantial 
disagreement about the best objectives and forms of 
intervention. Answers vary according to the views held 
regarding the intended roles of such policies.
The economic rationale for government interven-
tion in favour of the creative industries starts from the 
notion that this sector constitutes a significant locus of 
economic dynamism in the post-industrial world. This 
view evaluates cultural events, institutions and cre-
ative activities according to their significance for, or 
their positive contribution to, the aggregate economy. 
A survey among creative industries’ policymakers in EU 
Member States indicates their increased awareness of 
the creative industries, including diverse definitions of 
these industries and consciousness that they stimu-
late growth and innovation in various ways. There is 
a substantial amount of empirical evidence on the 
primary and secondary economic impacts of the cre-
ative industries that would support this view. However, 
taken by itself this evidence establishes no particular 
role for sector-specific policies, but rather calls in the 187
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Integrating creative industries in innovation systems
Section 5.4 strongly argues that the creative industries 
fit in well with the systemic and evolutionary concept 
of innovation. This perspective locates the bottlenecks 
of innovation not so much in the primary generation 
of knowledge but in a more fundamental problem. In 
the first place, firms are said to suffer from ‘bounded 
vision’ (Fransman, 1990). When faced with high-pressure 
deadlines, managers tend to disregard the value of new 
knowledge, unless it emerges from areas in which their 
firm is currently active. If they are aware of the import-
ance of new knowledge, their firm’s ability to transfer, 
assimilate and ultimately apply that knowledge to com-
mercial ends often requires a (much too) high level of 
absorptive capacity. Modern approaches to innovation 
policy therefore focus on the acquisition of learning 
capabilities and problem-solving skills. According to this 
view, the contribution of the creative industries to the 
economy should not be argued in terms of their impact 
on economic value but rather of their specific mindset. 
When the creative industries are seen as a ‘higher-order 
system that operates on the economic system’ (Potts 
and Cunningham, 2008, p. 10), then supporting them 
would promote a distinct way of thinking and social 
interaction that is conducive to the whole functioning 
of the innovation system. Hence, policy rationales based 
on tertiary economic impact would be eager to build 
on the original problem-solving skills of the creatives. 
They would try to establish the creative industries as a 
kind of ‘role model’ for the more traditional parts of the 
economy, since creative industries show how to success-
fully master (or at least experience) the unknown, how 
to deal with the complexities and unforeseen aspects of 
daily business life and how to escape from lock-ins — in 
short, how to be creative (Potts and Morrison, 2009).
Some related and encouraging best-practice examples 
can be found in the area of social innovation. Actors 
simulate mental disorders (borderline personality dis-
orders, depression, schizophrenia, etc.) to help med-
ical students develop their communication skills with 
future patients. Artists rehearse musical and theatrical 
performances with prisoners and at-risk youth, thereby 
teaching them things such as team spirit, discipline, reli-
ability and shared responsibility for the success of a joint 
project — indispensable social skills and prerequisites 
for later employability. Creative sector activities that are 
of practical value for society give rise to quaternary eco-
nomic effects.
Neoclassical thinking oscillates between the ideas of 
competitive markets and a well-functioning price mech-
anism. In principle, entrepreneurial and financial risks 
could be traded away in markets, especially in insur-
ance. However, the production of creative industries’ 
goods involves a whole range of unknowns and contin-
gencies, and there are few if any markets to underwrite 
all of these. Furthermore, since both the outcome value 
and probability distribution of a creative industries’ ven-
ture are ex ante uncertain, there is no reason to believe 
that competitive markets price such risks appropriately 
and allocate resources for creative industries’ activities 
efficiently.
In this perspective, demand uncertainties are not the 
prime problem — these could be met with smartly 
designed public procurement programmes — but 
rather the non-existence of proper markets and the lack 
of a properly functioning price mechanism. A prime 
policy task would therefore be to remove the barriers 
faced by creative industries’ firms, in particular small 
businesses (SMEs), in accessing finance, especially start-
up capital. Related policy measures involve improving 
access to (public) finance, taking initiatives to further 
develop venture funds and improving venture market 
regulation or reducing regulatory burdens.
The distinguishing feature of creative products is that 
their value arises mainly in the social sphere, and this 
introduces another source of market failure: strong 
externalities, both in the production and consumption of 
creative industries’ products. This means that prices — 
if they exist — lose their signalling function and fail in 
their coordinating role of matching production and con-
sumption plans. Where creative industries’ activities do 
link production and consumption — and manufacturing 
and services in the greater economy — the core policy 
objective would be to upgrade creative industries’ link-
ages so as to stimulate the emergence of vibrant clusters 
(Pratt, 2008). Besides addressing the specific market fail-
ures that hamper the activities of the creative industries, 
policies should therefore be particularly aware of (cross-)
sectoral linkages and promote clustering.
This view has considerable implications for, for exam-
ple, the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs). 
Clearly, if IPRs are handled too rigidly this raises the 
transaction costs of knowledge spillovers. For this rea-
son, open access policies and a stronger use of Creative 
Commons’ licences for intellectual copyrights may do 
more to foster the technological and legal basis of the 
creative industry business model. Yet the principles of 
openness and participation may sometimes be hard to 
put into practice. Apparently, the use of Creative Com-
mons challenges business models based on originality 
and uniqueness, and the unconditional enforcement of 
cooperation among competitors would be contested by 
the very group that such policies target.188
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are also essential and call for policy intervention at 
a national or even supranational level. From a benefi-
ciary point of view, a multiplicity of policies at different 
levels can be useful but also a source of complication. 
Coordination is crucial to help organisations reach out 
simultaneously to local, regional, national and supra-
national support programmes. The following section 
illustrates how creative industry policies are viewed at 
national and EU levels.
5.5.2.2.  Policies at national and EU level
As the research is concentrated on creative industries in 
EU Member States, it is essential to get an overview of 
the priorities at national level before taking an interest 
in EU policies. In the context of this study, a survey was 
carried out in which 32 ministries and 17 agencies and 
organisations took part. Some 90 % of ministries were 
found to have used the term ‘creative industries’; the 
survey also confirms that the governance structure is 
split between ministries of the economy and ministries 
of culture. Ministries of economy are typically in charge 
of design and software, games and the Internet (more 
than 70 % of those surveyed claim so), while the min-
istries of culture cover the ‘traditional’ areas of cultural 
policy.
It is worth noting that, in the context of creative indus-
tries, institutions concentrate their efforts on ‘art and 
entertainment’ and ‘information services’ activities (see 
Part 5.2.1 on classification), while activities of the pro-
fessional services tend to be neglected. The audiovisual 
sector, design and music are in the portfolio of about 
40 % of the responding institutions. Architecture, fash-
ion and advertising get only half as much attention, 
while the other industries and areas are somewhere 
in between. None of the included sectors — with the 
exception of advertising — could be excluded on this 
strictly empirical basis.
In practice, creative industries are expected to help 
achieve economic and non-economic goals, with a sub-
stantial bias towards economic objectives. The prime 
motivation is to support innovative activities (72 % of 
respondents claim that this motive is very important), 
followed by stimulating economic growth (63 %) and 
creating new jobs (53 %). These objectives are in line 
with the analytical findings of this study.
The first non-economic goal — securing cultural diver-
sity — is ‘very important’ for 51 % of respondents and 
thus about average in this ranking. The least important 
motive is the replacement of declining industries. Only 
14 % see this as a ‘very important’ objective while 36 % 
claim that this is ‘not important’. This goal may, in fact, 
be far more important at regional or city levels than at 
national level. Indeed, there are plenty of examples, 
5.5.2.  Policy approaches
5.5.2.1.  The superposition of policy levels
Creative industries’ policies needs are identified and 
dealt with at various levels. As a result, opportunities and 
challenges arise in the superposition and coordination 
of these policy levels. The main ones are the following:
Interdisciplinarity: Creative industries are the archetypal 
cross-cutting policy field. In addition to cultural and 
economic policies (including established subfields such 
as competition, industry, enterprise and SMEs), they 
span regional policy, technology and innovation policy, 
employment and social affairs, education and the infor-
mation society. While far from exhaustive, this list shows 
that creative industries’ policies significantly overlap 
with other policy areas. In designing and implementing 
a coherent creative industry policy agenda, it is of the 
utmost importance to recognise these interlinkages and 
to create interfaces among the various fields of action. 
Setting proper framework conditions, as outlined in the 
previous section, is a good place to start.
Horizontal versus sector-specific: Designing creative in-
dustry policy measures fluctuates between creating 
new sector-specific instruments and absorbing creative 
industries into existing support measures. Before re-
inventing the wheel once more, it seems wise to screen 
the usefulness and applicability of existing measures 
and to consider redesigning them if necessary. For 
instance, many of the challenges the creative industries 
face are the same as for service firms, simply because 
most of them fall into the service sector. Similarly, many 
creative industries face the same structural barriers to 
growth and innovation as SMEs, simply because most 
of them operate on a (very) small scale. Measures to 
help creative industries become more competitive and 
innovative should, as far as possible, be integrated into 
the overall support structures for service firms, SMEs and 
non-technical innovation.
Heterogeneity between the subsectors: At the same time, 
the subsectors of the creative industries are quite het-
erogeneous in terms of their business models, organi-
sational modes, cooperation structures and economic 
performance. There is no policy that fits them all. 
Acknowledging (sub-)sectoral specificities, differences in 
the targeted size of the firms and even differences in the 
characteristics and types of creative industry entrepre-
neurs leads one to quite different conclusions regarding 
policy support, support structures and policy initiatives.
From local to supranational levels: The diversity among 
the creative industries is a very good reason for align-
ing specific policies to local or regional circumstances. 
On the other hand, supportive horizontal pol  icies 189
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single intervention category relatively higher than the 
EU-15 members — except for insurance and access to 
external capital.
While intervention at national level is justified as a com-
plement to local and regional policies, the same can 
be said of EU policies with regard to national and sub-
national policies.
5.5.2.3.  The role of the EU
The EU’s place, as far as creative industries’ policies are 
concerned, is defined by its exclusive or shared powers 
and responsibilities.
The Lisbon Treaty which came into force in 2009 defines 
who is responsible for what in European governance, 
based on the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and 
proportionality. These principles ensure that action is 
taken as close as possible to the citizens. Powers and 
responsibilities are given to higher levels of governance 
only to the extent that lower levels cannot come up with 
sustainable solutions for the problem in hand.
The EU enjoys very few exclusive competencies. Its 
exclusive mandate is to legislate in the areas of inter-
national trade and customs and in setting the (com-
petition) rules that shape the internal market. This is 
being both stressed and challenged, for instance, by the 
emergence of China as a powerful exporter of creative 
industries’ products and the globalising market power 
of some strong players that provide ICT products.
such as the Ruhr district or Barcelona, where creative 
industries helped revive declining areas.
Moving on from motives to more concrete implementa-
tion, the survey revealed trends in the instruments that 
are most used. ‘Networking events’ are the preferred 
means of intervention in Europe’s creative economy. 
Some 70 % of the new Member States (EU-12) use 
networking events to support the players in this sec-
tor. In the EU-15 countries too, networking events 
are the most widely used form of intervention (57 %). 
‘Networking events’ is a particularly fuzzy notion for a 
policy measure: it may cover conferences, workshops, 
websites or attempts to create interaction between dis-
tinct groups or within a group, etc. Networking activ-
ities seem to be low-key activities in most countries, 
where no explicit networking measures were observed. 
The most likely explanation is that a number of policy 
measures in the surveyed institutions do have network-
ing components that stimulate interaction within the 
field, rather than a large number of initiatives which aim 
at networking as such. Grants as a means of interven-
tion rank second in this regard (48 % within the EU-27), 
followed by the provision of management training 
(44 % within the entire EU). In certain cases, there are 
significant differences between practices in the new 
Member States and the EU-15: marketing and public 
relations support is almost twice as important in the 
EU-12 states as in the EU-15. The same is true for intel-
lectual property rights (IPR) support: 35 % of the sup-
port institutions in the new Member States offer IPR 
support, whereas only 18 % in the EU-15 focus on this 
aspect. In general, the 12 new Member States rank each 
Table 5.10: What are the main motives for your interventions in these sectors and areas?
Very important 
( %)
Important  
(%)
Not important 
(%)
Rating Responses
Supporting innovative activities 71.8 28.2 0.0 1.7 39
Encouraging economic growth 62.5 35.0 2.5 1.6 40
Creating new jobs 52.5 45.0 2.5 1.5 40
Increased international visibility of 
national products and services
54.1 37.8 8.1 1.5 37
Improving networking within the 
industry
47.4 50.0 2.6 1.5 38
Attracting creative professionals 45.9 48.6 5.4 1.4 37
Securing cultural diversity 51.3 30.8 17.9 1.3 39
Increasing the attractiveness of the 
country for tourists
48.6 34.3 17.1 1.3 35
Stimulating innovation in downstream 
industries
35.1 54.1 10.8 1.2 37
Improving the quality of life 39.5 44.7 15.8 1.2 38
Internationalisation of firms 35.1 43.2 21.6 1.1 37
Promoting start-up activities 34.2 44.7 21.1 1.1 38
Improving the attractiveness of the 
business location
21.6 62.2 16.2 1.1 37
Replacing declining industries 13.9 50.0 36.1 0.8 36
Source: Leoon Consulting. 190
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4.  standardisation, which increases market size through 
complementarities and provides economies of scale 
on the producer side as well as network externalities 
on the consumer side; to achieve this single market 
effect they promote the dynamic aspects of compe-
tition and may generate momentum; at the same 
time, consumers have a vital interest in maintaining 
the ‘infinite variety of creative industries’ products’ 
and related infrastructures; this especially concerns 
cases where an old (technological) infrastructure is 
preserved, although a superior one exists.
The EU may support, coordinate or supplement action 
by the Member States in areas such as industry (includ-
ing innovation), culture, tourism and education relevant 
for creative industries. For the most part, policy inter-
vention that helps promote industries ‘at the crossroads 
of arts, culture, business and technology’ falls into this 
category.
It is very important to encourage, in particular, sup-
portive action that helps set the agenda. In the first 
place, the failure to come up with an unequivocal sec-
toral labelling system is one main reason why there is 
a lack of appropriate creative industry policy agendas 
at national or regional levels. The lack of a common 
(statistical) definition of creative industries makes for a 
poor database, and this severely affects evidence-based 
policymaking. Economic insight based on hard facts is 
of key importance, and one important role for creative 
industries’ policy is simply to gather these facts. The UK 
provides a good example of how the strong conceptual 
foundation for a policy field is accompanied by the avail-
ability of data which is then exploited for (re-)drafting 
policies. Since policymakers expect so many things of 
the creative industries, it is particularly regrettable that 
there is no systematic analysis and evaluation of the 
added value of intervention at different levels.
The EU is well placed to take on a coordinating role and 
to further develop and integrate expert knowledge on 
the common, as well as the distinct, patterns among 
the creative industries. For example, under the Euro-
pean Commission seventh framework programme for 
research, technological development and demonstra-
tion activities, it is anticipated that two pilot actions will 
be funded in 2011 to promote networking between the 
science and technology (S & T) base and the creative 
sector, in order to stimulate innovation. It is believed 
that this type of support — in essence, policy learn-
ing — would greatly help shape creative industries’ pol-
icy at national, regional and local levels. The Amsterdam 
declaration of February 2010, calling for the creation of 
a ‘European creative industry alliance’ (ECIA), aims to 
create ‘a favourable environment for the further devel-
opment of this sector’. The early 2010 Green Paper on 
‘Unlocking the potential of cultural and creative indus-
tries’ is another initiative designed to consult stake-
The EU also aims at reinforcing the pivotal role of SMEs 
in Europe through the small business act. The small 
business act concerns all companies that are independ-
ent and have fewer than 250 employees. It offers a set 
of principles that intends to create a level playing field 
of competition for SMEs. Considering the typical size of 
creative industries’ businesses, SME policies and more 
particularly the small business act are extremely relevant.
Single market policies constitute a powerful tool for the 
following purposes:
1.  supporting the mobility of the creative class across 
Europe;
2.  enforcing the implementation of the services direct-
ive (75) and thereby dismantling discrete barriers to 
creative entrepreneurship in Europe; professional 
services, which are the most neglected element 
in creative industries’ policies at national level, are 
directly concerned by the services directive;
3.  establishing ‘a true single market for online content 
and services (borderless and safe EU web services 
and digital content markets), with high levels of trust 
and confidence, a balanced regulatory framework 
governing the management of intellectual property 
rights, measures to facilitate cross-border online 
content services, the fostering of multiterritorial 
licences, adequate protection and remuneration for 
rights holders and active support for the digitisation 
of Europe’s rich cultural heritage’ (European Commis-
sion, 2010a, p. 8; European Commission, 2010b, p. 7 
and seq.);
(75)  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:376:0036:0
068:EN:PDF
Table 5.11: Instruments used to intervene in  
creative industries at national level  
(in % of respondents)
EU-15 EU-12 EU-27
Networking events 57 70 63
Grants 39 60 48
Management training 36 55 44
Cluster support 25 40 31
Marketing and PR support 21 40 29
Access to external capital 25 25 25
IPR support 18 35 25
Business consultancy 18 30 23
Access to public institutions 
as potential clients
18 30 23
Loans 14 20 17
Office resources 11 20 15
Voucher schemes 4 5 4
Insurance 4 0 2
Source:   Leoon Consulting.191
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in 2006. Their employment share is lower in the EU than 
in the US (3.0 % versus 3.9 %), but they have been one 
of the fastest-growing parts of the EU economy, with an 
average employment growth of 3.5 % per year between 
2000 and 2007, compared to 1 % for the total economy. 
In the current recession, employment decreased by 
2.5 % in 2009 after an increase of 2.4 % in 2008. The 
majority of the growth during this period came in soft-
ware consulting and supply, which represents the lar-
gest creative industry segment (37 % of total employ-
ment in the creative industries in EU-27). It is important 
to note that the strong growth in the creative industries 
is not limited to software consulting and supply, or to 
a specific creative occupation. In addition to software 
consulting and supply, there is strong growth in motion 
pictures, video and television programme production, 
sound recording and music publishing activities, which 
averaged an employment growth rate of 2 % per year 
between 2000 and 2008. Employment in advertising and 
architecture is also rising faster than average in the cre-
ative industries.
Similarly, an increasing percentage of people are being 
employed in creative occupations in the economy. In 
the EU-15, employment in creative occupations grew 
at around 3 % per year on average between 2002 and 
2008; the highest growth was recorded for artistic enter-
tainment occupations (5.7 %), followed by social science 
and related professionals (5.0 %) and architects, engin-
eers and computing professionals (each 3.3 %). Creative 
occupations are increasing both within and outside of 
the creative industries, indicating that creative profes-
sions spread to other industries.
A number of demand and supply factors are contribut-
ing to the rise of the creative industries. Key drivers of 
the creative economy include innovation, information 
and communication technologies (e.g. digital technolo-
gies), talent and skills. Other factors include wealth (i.e. 
GDP per capita), leisure time and disposable household 
income, macroeconomic performance and the initial 
level of the creative industries in the economy. In a 
group of eight EU Member States, spending on cultural 
services increased from 1.0 % to 1.3 % of GDP between 
1999 and 2005.
What the creative industries share is a particular kind of 
skilled labour force and a high share of very small busi-
nesses and sole entrepreneurs with no employees. In a 
group of 22 EU Member States, 95 % of creative industry 
firms have less than 10 employees, and 58 % of these 
businesses are sole entrepreneurs. Another important 
common characteristic of the creative industries is their 
strong inter-industry linkages, in particular between 
advertising and publishing but also among advertising, 
audiovisual, arts and entertainment businesses. In add-
ition, creative industry firms are more innovative, co-
operate more often with external partners and engage 
holders on how to better tailor policies to the needs of 
creative industries. The Green Paper draws on meetings 
of experts and on recent initiatives taken in the Nordic 
countries, the UK, the Netherlands and Estonia (76).
Finally, this report shows that creative industries 
develop mainly within the context of knowledge-driven 
economies. Knowledge as a driver gains in importance 
as countries approach the technological frontier and 
are forced to invest strongly in their own technology 
development to further improve their competitive posi-
tion. At the same time, knowledge dissemination is an 
important instrument in catching-up strategies.
Innovation and the emergence of creative industries 
have a strong local dimension and in many countries 
regions have gained more control over innovation pol-
icy with the objective of fully exploiting the local inter-
actions that affect the innovation process and tailor-
ing interventions to the local landscape. Knowledge, 
which is key in the development of creative industries, 
includes an important tacit component that cannot be 
easily codified and therefore requires direct interaction, 
on-the-job learning and workers’ mobility to circulate. 
As recent experiences by both national and regional 
authorities have shown, there is scope for developing 
regional innovation policies to capture positive local 
externalities. Improving the efficiency with which part-
ners interact and share knowledge and systematising 
their relationships are concrete possible actions.
Because it targets regions and is based on a policy 
approach which integrates sectoral interventions into 
a coherent framework tailored to the local context, 
the EU cohesion policy has been a key instrument for 
developing the economic and innovation potential of 
the creative industries. Its role is likely to grow in the 
future as in many countries, regions have gained more 
control over policy and innovation agendas have been 
developed at the sub-national level, focusing notably on 
regional clusters and capability building among know-
ledge producers. In particular, the cohesion policy will 
foster the design of innovation governance systems 
which reinforce horizontal (i.e. between local actors) 
and vertical (i.e. between local, regional, national and EU 
levels) coordination.
5.6.  Conclusions
The EU-27’s creative industries employ about 6.7 million 
people, which represented 3.0 % of total employment in 
2008. In the EU-27, they accounted for 3.3 % of total GDP 
(76)  ‘A creative economy Green Paper for the Nordic region’ (Nordic Council, 
2007), ‘Creative Britain — New talents for the new economy’ (UK, 2008), 
‘Creative value — Culture and economy policy paper’ (Netherlands, 2009) 
and ‘Potential of creative industries in Estonia’ (2009).192
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growth remains robust even when general human cap-
ital is accounted for. This positive effect could be related 
to the fact that the resulting increased concentration of 
creative industry firms within a region facilitates know-
ledge spillovers. This is consistent with studies compar-
ing one country to another that show technology-led 
and skill-intensive industries having a significant posi-
tive impact on the growth of GDP per capita.
Interdisciplinarity will play a key role in pushing for-
ward research and policymaking in the area of creative 
industries. Policies combining different fields (such as 
economics and culture) are set to become even more 
prominent. Indeed, creative industries can benefit from 
several policies already in place in the field of culture 
(such as promoting diversity and promoting cultural 
heritage) or in the area of economics (innovation pol-
icies, access to finance, etc.). At the same time, more 
tailored approaches that further bring together the 
various perspectives can complement the existing poli-
cies. As far as the EU is concerned, the ‘European cre-
ative industry alliance’ and the consultation to unlock 
‘the potential of cultural and creative industries’ are two 
cases in point. The former takes into account the artistic 
and creativity potential of these sectors and focuses on 
business-related policies research and innovation, clus-
ters and access to finance. The latter wants to tap the 
full potential of the EU’s cultural and creative industries. 
It has a broad scope and ranges from innovation and 
education to economic development. By casting their 
net wide, these recent initiatives exemplify a new way of 
reconciling economic and cultural objectives.
more frequently in innovation-related training activities. 
Furthermore, they use external sources of information 
and knowledge (e.g. consumers, universities) more often 
and more intensively than non-creative industry firms. 
An important aspect is that different creative industry 
segments are geographically concentrated in a few 
large city regions. 
Creative occupations also have similar spatial patterns, 
including strong urban concentration. This rural–urban 
gap in the share of creative industries and/or creative 
occupations is highly persistent over time. Among urban 
areas in the EU, human capital and population size are 
the main factors in the concentration of creative indus-
tries. In particular, the location quotient (i.e. the local 
concentration of employment in the creative industries 
relative to the nation as a whole) rises proportionally 
with local human capital, but less proportionally with 
population size and GDP per capita. Past population 
growth and foreign citizenship do not play a role. 
The creative industries share many common character-
istics, but there are also important differences. Forms of 
non-standard work such as part-time work, temporary 
contracts and holding multiple jobs are much more 
common among writers, creative/performing artists and 
artistic entertainment professionals than among other 
creative professionals. There are also wide differences in 
the level of productivity and employment performance. 
Finally, some creative industries are undergoing a pro-
cess of restructuring. Print and television advertising is 
being partly replaced by digital advertising, while phys-
ical media such as CDs and DVDs are being replaced by 
digital distribution (subscriptions, pay per view, adver-
tisement-based services, etc.).
Besides the direct effect on value added and employ-
ment, creative industries have a broader impact on the 
economy. Evidence based on input-output tables for 
two EU countries (Denmark and United Kingdom) shows 
that industry purchases of creative products account for 
a significant proportion of total intermediate purchases. 
In particular, firms in all industries rely on software sup-
ply and advertising to operate efficiently and success-
fully. Publishing and audiovisual activities are important 
input factors in the education sector. There is some evi-
dence that firms with stronger supply-chain linkages 
are more innovative. Another aspect of the wider role 
of creativity is that product design innovations, as well 
as design registrations, can be found in all industries. 
This clearly shows that some forms of creativity are not 
restricted to a limited group of creative industry firms.
Another key result is that the creative industries’ initial 
share of the economy had a positive and significant 
effect on the growth rate of GDP per capita at regional 
(NUTS 2) level in 10 EU countries during 2002–07. The 
positive effect of the creative industries on economic 193
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Annex
Table A.1: Definition of the creative industries
Based on NACE Rev. 1.1
Mapping  
Document 
Chapter
Sector NACE 
Rev. 1.1
Description Proportion  
of code  
taken
1 Advertising 74.4 Advertising 1.00
2 Architecture 74.2 Architecture and engineering activities and related 
technical consultancy
0.25
3 Art and 52.48 Other retail sale in specialised stores 0.05
antiques 52.5 Retail sale of second-hand goods in stores 0.05
4 Crafts Majority of businesses too small to be picked up in business surveys
5 Design No codes match this sector
17.7 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted articles 0.005
6 Designer 18 Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 0.005
Fashion 19.3 Manufacture of footwear 0.005
74.87 Other business activities n.e.c. 0.025
7 Video,  22.32 Reproduction of video recording 0.25
film and 74.81 Photographic activities 0.25
photography 92.1 Motion picture and video activities 1.00
9 & 10 Music  22.14 Publishing of sound recordings 1.00
and  22.31 Reproduction of sound recording 0.25
the 92.31 Artistic and literary creation and interpretation 1.00
visual and  92.32 Operation of arts facilities 1.00
performing 92.34 Other entertainment activities n.e.c. 0.50
arts 92.72 Other recreational activities n.e.c. 0.25
22.11 Publishing of books 1.00
22.12 Publishing of newspapers 1.00
11 Publishing 22.13 Publishing of journals and periodicals 1.00
22.15 Other publishing 0.50
92.4 News agency activities 1.00
8 & 12 Software, computer 
games
22.33 Reproduction of computer media 0.25
and electronic publishing 72.2 Software consultancy and supply 1.00
13 Radio and TV 92.2 Radio and television activities 1.00198
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Figure A.1:   Contribution of growth in employment in creative industries by subgroup in EU-27 (in %)
Source: Eurostat structural business statistics, Amadeus database and ZEW/AIT calculations.
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Table A.2: Employment in the creative industries in the EU by sub-industry (in %)
Persons employed (1 000s) %
EU-26 EU-15 EU-11 EU-26 EU-15 EU-11
Creative industries related to information 
services
61.6 62.2 58.2
Publishing activities  J58  999 557 845 396 154 161 14.8 14.6 16.5
Motion picture, video & television 
programme prod. sound recording & 
music publishing activities
J59  415 376 371 096 44 280 6.2 6.4 4.7
Programming and broadcasting 
activities
J60  222 737 166 272 56 466 3.3 2.9 6.0
Computer programming, consultancy & 
related activities
J62  2 510 230 2 221 344 288 886 37.3 38.3 30.9
Creative industries in professional 
services
28.7 28.2 31.8
Architectural & engineering act. & rel. 
techl consult.
M711  2 499 147 2 147 128 352 019
Architectural & eng. act. & rel. tech cons 
(weighted)
624 787 536 782 88 005 9.3 9.3 9.4
Advertising M731  1 004 955 854 277 150 678 14.9 14.7 16.1
Specialised design activities M741  165 704 150 002 15 702 2.5 2.6 1.7
Photographic activities M742  171 430 147 360 24 070
Photographic activities (weighted) 42 858 36 840 6 018 0.6 0.6 0.6
Translation and interpretation activities M743  9 5 081 58 539 36 542 1.4 1.0 3.9
Creative, arts and entertainment 
activities
R90 650 768 557 303 93 465 9.7 9.6 10.0
Total creative industries employment 
(weighted)
6 732 052 5 797 850 934 202 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total creative industries employment 
(unweighted)
8 734 985 7 518 716 1 216 268
Employment share of the creative 
industries (weighted)
3.0 3.2 2.1
Employment share of the creative 
industries (weighted)
3.9 4.2 2.7
Note:    EU-26 refers to the EU–27 excluding Malta. For the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands, employment data 
for J 59 and J 60 are calculated based on the Amadeus database. 
Source: Eurostat structural business statistics, national statistical offices, for R90: Amadeus database.
Table A.3: Annual change in turnover in France,  
2008 and 2009 (in %)
Performing 
arts
Support 
activities to 
performing 
arts
Artistic 
creation
Operation 
of arts 
facilities
Change in turnover in current prices (in %)
2008 0.1 1.5 - 0.9 0.8
2009 - 3.7 - 1.6 - 5.0 3.5
Change in turnover in constant prices (in %)
2008 1.9 3.3 0.8 1.7
2009 - 1.4 0.8 - 2.7 6.6
Source:   INSEE200
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Figure A.2:   Supply chain linkages between different creative industries
Publishing
Software
consultancy and supply
Consulting engineers
and architects 4 %
3 %
7 %
2 %
48 %
5 % 17 %
3 %
Advertising
Recreational, cultural
and sporting activities
(market -rms)
Note:    The numbers represent the share of intermediate production in total production. Only higher-than-average supplier chain link-
ages are shown.
Source: Danish input-output table by price unit, supply, use and supplying industries.
Figure A.3:   EU-27 revealed comparative advantage 2005 and change therein since 2000
- 0.8
1.2
0.2
- 0.4
1
- 0.2
Improvement
- 0.6
- 4 - 3 - 2 - 1 0 1 2
0.6
0.8
0.4
0
Revealed
 comparative
 advantage
Deterioration
Revealed
comparative
disadvantage
Extra EU-27
Colour — Domain
Red  Arts and crafts
Purple  Audiovisual (€lm) and new media
Blue  Design
Yellow  Music
Green  Publishing
Black  Visual arts
Wickerware Toys
Celebration Paintings
Sculpture
Yarn
Photography
Other arts & crafts
Interior design
Music (printed)
Jewellery
Paperware
Glassware
Architecture
Books Music (records)
Other publishing
Other visual arts
Newspapers
Fashion
Carpets
Video games
Antiques
Digital records
Film
Note:    Intra-regional trade is not accounted for.
Source: Unctad global databank on world trade in creative products — WIFO calculations, Balassa (1965).201
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Table A.4: Barriers to international trade (in %)
Very 
important
Fairly 
important
Some 
importance
Not important Unknown/not 
applicable
Cross-border trade not relevant (products not exportable)
Software consultancy and supply 15 8 7 30 39
Architectural & engineering activities  18 6 6 21 49
Advertising 18 12 10 19 41
All NACE branches — Total 19 7 6 21 46
Difficulties in identifying potential clients abroad
Software consultancy and supply 12 16 14 16 42
Architectural & engineering activities 17 9 7 10 56
Advertising 12 15 11 16 46
All NACE branches — Total 14 10 8 14 54
Establishing a commercial presence abroad
Software consultancy and supply 17 15 10 19 40
Architectural & engineering activities 18 10 5 12 55
Advertising 14 11 12 19 44
All NACE branches — Total 16 9 6 16 53
Insurance, guarantee systems, etc. issues
Software consultancy and supply 9 11 12 21 46
Architectural & engineering activities 11 8 8 11 62
Advertising 8 6 14 19 52
All NACE branches — Total 9 7 8 17 58
Lack of international standards for services
Software consultancy and supply 18 16 12 15 39
Architectural & engineering activities 14 10 8 9 58
Advertising 8 13 13 17 50
All NACE branches — Total 15 9 7 15 54
Language and cultural barriers
Software consultancy and supply 13 16 14 18 40
Architectural & engineering activities 10 13 10 12 55
Advertising 17 9 14 18 43
All NACE branches — Total 12 10 10 16 51
Movement of personnel on a temporary basis
Software consultancy and supply 14 9 10 23 43
Architectural & engineering activities 15 9 7 15 55
Advertising 14 8 9 24 45
All NACE branches — Total 13 7 7 19 54
Taxation issues
Software consultancy and supply 12 8 11 23 46
Architectural & engineering activities 9 7 10 12 62
Advertising 11 9 12 20 48
All NACE branches — Total 10 7 8 18 57
Other barriers
Software consultancy and supply 8 1 1 16 73
Architectural & engineering activities 8 1 1 14 75
Advertising 10 1 4 16 69
All NACE branches — Total 7 1 2 15 75
Source: Eurostat structural business statistics, WIFO calculations.202
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Figure A.4:   Location quotient of the creative industries in capital cities and semi-capitals, 2006
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Bucuresti
Madrid
Vilnius
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Note:    The data refer to the LQ based on (weighted) employment in the creative industries as percentage of total employment of the 
enterprise sector (excluding non agricultural and public sector) and finance and insurance. The definition of the creative indus-
tries is based on the DCMS. A location quotient higher than 1 indicates higher than average national concentration.
Source: Amadeus database, ZEW/AIT calculations.203
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Table A.5: Impact of the employment share of the creative industries on regional GDP growth 
Dep. Var.: average annual change in GDP per capita in PPS between 2002–07
(i) (ii) (iii)
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Log GDP per capita in PPS, 2002 - 0.012 (**) - 2.56 - 0.010 (*) - 1.71 - 0.010 (**) - 2.04
Investment ratio, 2002 0.076 (***) 3.14 0.078 (***) 3.71
Share of working age population with tertiary 
education, 2002
0.085 (***) 4.50
Employment share of the creative industries, 2002 0.154 (***) 2.80 0.201 (***) 3.12 0.111 (*) 1.68
Dummy variable for capital city region  - 0.006 - 1.59 - 0.011 (***) - 3.05 - 0.014 (***) - 3.76
# of obs 178 143 140
R-squared 0.080 0.165 0.282
Wald test of joint significance of tertiary education share 
and share of creative industry employment, p-value 
0.00
Dep. Var.: Real growth rate of regional GDP at market prices 2002–06
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Log GDP in million EUR current prices, 2002 - 0.002 (*) - 1.89 - 0.002 - 1.51 - 0.001 - 0.90
Investment ratio, 2002 0.047 (***) 2.72 0.085 (***) 4.56
Share of working age population with tertiary 
education, 2002
0.103 (***) 7.40
Employment share of the creative industries, 2002 0.142 (*) 1.91 0.203 (**) 2.30 0.064 0.79
Dummy variable for capital city region  0.000 - 0.07 - 0.002 - 0.37 - 0.006 - 1.07
Constant 0.036 3.14 0.020 (*) 1.68 - 0.010 - 0.81
# of obs 117 117 111
R-squared 0.065 0.120 0.421
Wald test of joint significance of tertiary education share 
and share of creative industry employment, p-value
0.00
Note:    (*) significant at 10 %; (**) significant at 5 %; (***) significant at 1 %. The regression is based on NUTS 2 data for 10 EU countries 
(Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden and United Kingdom).
Source: Eurostat structural business statistics, Amadeus database and WIFO calculations.204
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Figure A.5:   Intermediate inputs in total UK demand for UK creative products, 1992–2004
Figure A.6: Final demand for UK creative products, 2004
Source: ONS UK input-output supply and use tables, used in Experian (2007).
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Figure A.7:   Creative inputs used by other industries (in %)
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Note:    This figure shows the 20 industries which receive the largest share of intermediate inputs from the creative industries in relation 
to the total industries’ intermediate input.
Source: Danish input-output supply and use table, 2005.
Figure A.8:   Proportion of enterprises that made significant changes to the product design of goods and 
services, 2004–06
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weighted to reflect the population of firms.
Source: Community Innovation Survey 2006, WIFO calculations based on Eurostat data.206
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Figure A.9:   The percentage of firms engaged in various innovation-related activities, UK, 2005–07
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Source: De Propris et al. (forthcoming).
Figure A.10:   Innovation performance of industries with strongest and weakest creative sector linkages 
(purchases of creative products), UK, 2002–04
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6.1.  Sectoral competitiveness indicators
Explanatory notes
Geographical coverage: All indicators refer to the 
EU-27.
Production index (77): The production index is actually 
an index of final production in volume terms.
Labour productivity: This indicator is calculated by 
combining the indexes of production and number of 
persons employed or number of hours worked (78). 
Therefore, this indicator measures final production per 
person of final production per hour worked.
Unit labour cost: This is calculated from the production 
index and the index of wages and salaries and measures 
labour cost per unit of production. ‘Wages and salaries’ 
is defined (Eurostat) as ‘the total remuneration, in cash 
or in kind, payable to all persons counted on the payroll 
(including homeworkers), in return for work done during 
the accounting period, regardless of whether it is paid 
on the basis of working time, output or piecework and 
whether it is paid regularly wages and salaries do not 
include social contributions payable by the employer’.
Relative trade balance: This is calculated, for sector ‘i’, 
as (Xi-Mi)/(Xi+Mi), where Xi and Mi are EU-27 exports and 
imports of products of sector ‘i’ to and from the rest of 
the world.
(77)  The data are working-day adjusted for production.
(78)  The data are working-day adjusted for hours worked.
Revealed comparative advantage (RCA): The RCA 
indicator for product ‘i’ is defined as follows:
where:   = value of exports; the reference group (‘   ’) 
is the EU-25 plus 38 other countries (see list below); the 
source used is the UN Comtrade database. In the cal-
culation of  ,   stands for exports to the rest of 
the world (excluding intra-EU trade) and   measures 
exports to the rest of the world by the countries in the 
reference group. The latter consists of the EU-25 plus 
the following countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Alge-
ria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, 
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Benin, 
Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, 
Brazil, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cam-
eroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Repub-
lic, Chad, Chile, China, China, Hong Kong SAR, China, 
Macao SAR, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, East Timor, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myan-
mar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands Antilles, New Zea-
land, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Norway, 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, Oman, Pakistan, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian 
Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra 
Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Switzerland, Syria, 
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Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav   Repubic of Macedonia, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uru-
guay, USA, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Statistical nomenclatures: The indicators in Tables 
6.1 to 6.6 are presented at the level of divisions of the 
  statistical classification of economic activities in the 
European Community (NACE Rev. 2 (79), while those in 
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 are presented in terms of divisions of 
the statistic    al classification of products by activity (CPA).
Data sources: Tables 6.1 to 6.6 are based on Eurostat’s 
short-term indicators data. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 are based 
on United Nations’ Comtrade.
(79)  Compared to the statistical annexes of the previous publications, the new 
activity classification is used: NACE Rev. 2. The correspondance tables from 
NACE Rev. 2 — NACE Rev. 1.1 and from NACE Rev. 1.1 to NACE Rev. 2, are 
  available on Eurostat: 
  http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nace_rev2/introduction209
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Chapter 6 — Statistical Annex
Table 6.7: EU-27 Revealed comparative advantage index
NACE code Product 2007 2008
C10 Manufacture of food products 1.25 1.18
C11 Manufacture of beverages 1.67 1.67
C12 Manufacture of tobacco products 1.58 1.64
C13 Manufacture of textiles 0.85 0.80
C14 Manufacture of wearing apparel 0.79 0.81
C15 Manufacture of leather and related products 1.00 0.96
C16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles 
of straw and plaiting materials
1.20 1.24
C17 Manufacture of paper and paper products 1.33 1.37
C18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 1.24 1.70
C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 0.87 0.89
C20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 1.18 1.19
C21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 1.53 1.62
C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 1.23 1.27
C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 1.27 1.25
C24 Manufacture of basic metals 0.96 0.92
C25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 1.23 1.25
C26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 0.62 0.63
C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 1.02 1.04
C28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1.19 1.24
C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 1.27 1.29
C30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.89 0.92
C31 Manufacture of furniture 1.32 1.30
C32 Other manufacturing 0.83 0.82
Note:    There was a transition from NACE REV 1 to NACE REV 2, therefore the data are not completely comparable with the previous 
edition and are only available from 2007.
Source: Own calculations using Comtrade data.216
European Competitiveness Report 2010
Table 6.8: EU-27 Relative trade balance (X-M)/(X+M)
NACE code Product 2007 2008
C10 Manufacture of food products - 0.03 - 0.03
C11 Manufacture of beverages 0.21 0.20
C12 Manufacture of tobacco products 0.03 0.07
C13 Manufacture of textiles - 0.01 - 0.01
C14 Manufacture of wearing apparel - 0.19 - 0.19
C15 Manufacture of leather and related products - 0.07 - 0.08
C16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles 
of straw and plaiting materials
0.00 0.02
C17 Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.04 0.04
C18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.08 0.05
C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products - 0.03 - 0.02
C20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 0.03 0.03
C21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 0.07 0.08
C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 0.04 0.04
C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 0.08 0.08
C24 Manufacture of basic metals - 0.06 - 0.03
C25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 0.09 0.09
C26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products - 0.11 - 0.11
C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 0.07 0.08
C28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.16 0.17
C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.06 0.08
C30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.13 0.12
C31 Manufacture of furniture 0.04 0.04
C32 Other manufacturing - 0.04 - 0.04
Note:    There was a transition from NACE REV 1 to NACE REV 2, therefore the data are not completely comparable with the previous 
edition and are only available from 2007.
Source: Own calculations using Comtrade data.217
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